/*
This file is part of GNUnet.
- (C) 2009, 2010, 2011 Christian Grothoff (and other contributing authors)
+ Copyright (C) 2009-2013 GNUnet e.V.
GNUnet is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with GNUnet; see the file COPYING. If not, write to the
- Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330,
- Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
+ Free Software Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
+ Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
*/
/**
#include "gnunet-service-core_neighbours.h"
#include "gnunet-service-core_sessions.h"
#include "gnunet_statistics_service.h"
-#include "gnunet_peerinfo_service.h"
-#include "gnunet_hello_lib.h"
#include "gnunet_constants.h"
#include "gnunet_signatures.h"
#include "gnunet_protocols.h"
#include "core.h"
+
/**
* How long do we wait for SET_KEY confirmation initially?
*/
-#define INITIAL_SET_KEY_RETRY_FREQUENCY GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (MAX_SET_KEY_DELAY, 1)
+#define INITIAL_SET_KEY_RETRY_FREQUENCY GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_SECONDS, 10)
/**
* What is the minimum frequency for a PING message?
*/
#define MIN_PING_FREQUENCY GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_SECONDS, 5)
+/**
+ * How often do we rekey?
+ */
+#define REKEY_FREQUENCY GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_HOURS, 12)
+
+/**
+ * What time difference do we tolerate?
+ */
+#define REKEY_TOLERANCE GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_MINUTES, 5)
+
/**
* What is the maximum age of a message for us to consider processing
* it? Note that this looks at the timestamp used by the other peer,
*/
#define MAX_MESSAGE_AGE GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_DAYS
-/**
- * What is the maximum delay for a SET_KEY message?
- */
-#define MAX_SET_KEY_DELAY GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_SECONDS, 10)
+GNUNET_NETWORK_STRUCT_BEGIN
+
/**
- * We're sending an (encrypted) PING to the other peer to check if he
- * can decrypt. The other peer should respond with a PONG with the
- * same content, except this time encrypted with the receiver's key.
+ * Message transmitted with the signed ephemeral key of a peer. The
+ * session key is then derived from the two ephemeral keys (ECDHE).
*/
-struct PingMessage
+struct EphemeralKeyMessage
{
+
/**
- * Message type is CORE_PING.
+ * Message type is #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_EPHEMERAL_KEY.
*/
struct GNUNET_MessageHeader header;
/**
- * Seed for the IV
+ * Status of the sender (should be in `enum PeerStateMachine`), nbo.
*/
- uint32_t iv_seed GNUNET_PACKED;
+ int32_t sender_status GNUNET_PACKED;
/**
- * Intended target of the PING, used primarily to check
- * that decryption actually worked.
+ * An ECC signature of the @e origin_identity asserting the validity of
+ * the given ephemeral key.
*/
- struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity target;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaSignature signature;
/**
- * Random number chosen to make reply harder.
+ * Information about what is being signed.
*/
- uint32_t challenge GNUNET_PACKED;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccSignaturePurpose purpose;
+
+ /**
+ * At what time was this key created (beginning of validity).
+ */
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO creation_time;
+
+ /**
+ * When does the given ephemeral key expire (end of validity).
+ */
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO expiration_time;
+
+ /**
+ * Ephemeral public ECC key.
+ */
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePublicKey ephemeral_key;
+
+ /**
+ * Public key of the signing peer (persistent version, not the ephemeral public key).
+ */
+ struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity origin_identity;
+
};
/**
- * Response to a PING. Includes data from the original PING
- * plus initial bandwidth quota information.
+ * We're sending an (encrypted) PING to the other peer to check if he
+ * can decrypt. The other peer should respond with a PONG with the
+ * same content, except this time encrypted with the receiver's key.
*/
-struct PongMessage
+struct PingMessage
{
/**
- * Message type is CORE_PONG.
+ * Message type is #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PING.
*/
struct GNUNET_MessageHeader header;
*/
uint32_t iv_seed GNUNET_PACKED;
- /**
- * Random number to make faking the reply harder. Must be
- * first field after header (this is where we start to encrypt!).
- */
- uint32_t challenge GNUNET_PACKED;
-
- /**
- * Desired bandwidth (how much we should send to this
- * peer / how much is the sender willing to receive).
- */
- struct GNUNET_BANDWIDTH_Value32NBO inbound_bw_limit;
-
/**
* Intended target of the PING, used primarily to check
* that decryption actually worked.
*/
struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity target;
+
+ /**
+ * Random number chosen to make replay harder.
+ */
+ uint32_t challenge GNUNET_PACKED;
};
/**
- * Message transmitted to set (or update) a session key.
+ * Response to a PING. Includes data from the original PING.
*/
-struct SetKeyMessage
+struct PongMessage
{
-
/**
- * Message type is either CORE_SET_KEY.
+ * Message type is #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PONG.
*/
struct GNUNET_MessageHeader header;
/**
- * Status of the sender (should be in "enum PeerStateMachine"), nbo.
- */
- int32_t sender_status GNUNET_PACKED;
-
- /**
- * Purpose of the signature, will be
- * GNUNET_SIGNATURE_PURPOSE_SET_KEY.
+ * Seed for the IV
*/
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaSignaturePurpose purpose;
+ uint32_t iv_seed GNUNET_PACKED;
/**
- * At what time was this key created?
+ * Random number to make replay attacks harder.
*/
- struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO creation_time;
+ uint32_t challenge GNUNET_PACKED;
/**
- * The encrypted session key.
+ * Reserved, always zero.
*/
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaEncryptedData encrypted_key;
+ uint32_t reserved;
/**
- * Who is the intended recipient?
+ * Intended target of the PING, used primarily to check
+ * that decryption actually worked.
*/
struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity target;
-
- /**
- * Signature of the stuff above (starting at purpose).
- */
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaSignature signature;
-
};
struct EncryptedMessage
{
/**
- * Message type is either CORE_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE.
+ * Message type is #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE.
*/
struct GNUNET_MessageHeader header;
uint32_t iv_seed GNUNET_PACKED;
/**
- * MAC of the encrypted message (starting at 'sequence_number'),
+ * MAC of the encrypted message (starting at @e sequence_number),
* used to verify message integrity. Everything after this value
* (excluding this value itself) will be encrypted and authenticated.
- * ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE must be set to the offset of the *next* field.
+ * #ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE must be set to the offset of the *next* field.
*/
- GNUNET_HashCode hmac;
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode hmac;
/**
* Sequence number, in network byte order. This field
uint32_t sequence_number GNUNET_PACKED;
/**
- * Desired bandwidth (how much we should send to this peer / how
- * much is the sender willing to receive)?
+ * Reserved, always zero.
*/
- struct GNUNET_BANDWIDTH_Value32NBO inbound_bw_limit;
+ uint32_t reserved;
/**
- * Timestamp. Used to prevent reply of ancient messages
+ * Timestamp. Used to prevent replay of ancient messages
* (recent messages are caught with the sequence number).
*/
struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO timestamp;
};
+GNUNET_NETWORK_STRUCT_END
+
/**
- * Number of bytes (at the beginning) of "struct EncryptedMessage"
+ * Number of bytes (at the beginning) of `struct EncryptedMessage`
* that are NOT encrypted.
*/
#define ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE (offsetof(struct EncryptedMessage, sequence_number))
/**
- * State machine for our P2P encryption handshake. Everyone starts in
- * "DOWN", if we receive the other peer's key (other peer initiated)
- * we start in state RECEIVED (since we will immediately send our
- * own); otherwise we start in SENT. If we get back a PONG from
- * within either state, we move up to CONFIRMED (the PONG will always
- * be sent back encrypted with the key we sent to the other peer).
+ * Information about the status of a key exchange with another peer.
*/
-enum KxStateMachine
+struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo
{
- /**
- * No handshake yet.
- */
- KX_STATE_DOWN,
/**
- * We've sent our session key.
+ * DLL.
*/
- KX_STATE_KEY_SENT,
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *next;
/**
- * We've received the other peers session key.
+ * DLL.
*/
- KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED,
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *prev;
- /**
- * The other peer has confirmed our session key with a message
- * encrypted with his session key (which we got). Key exchange
- * is done.
- */
- KX_STATE_UP
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Information about the status of a key exchange with another peer.
- */
-struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo
-{
/**
* Identity of the peer.
*/
struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity peer;
- /**
- * SetKeyMessage to transmit (initialized the first
- * time our status goes past 'KX_STATE_KEY_SENT').
- */
- struct SetKeyMessage skm;
-
/**
* PING message we transmit to the other peer.
*/
struct PingMessage ping;
/**
- * SetKeyMessage we received and did not process yet.
- */
- struct SetKeyMessage *skm_received;
-
- /**
- * PING message we received from the other peer and
- * did not process yet (or NULL).
- */
- struct PingMessage *ping_received;
-
- /**
- * PONG message we received from the other peer and
- * did not process yet (or NULL).
- */
- struct PongMessage *pong_received;
-
- /**
- * Non-NULL if we are currently looking up HELLOs for this peer.
- * for this peer.
- */
- struct GNUNET_PEERINFO_IteratorContext *pitr;
-
- /**
- * Public key of the neighbour, NULL if we don't have it yet.
+ * Ephemeral public ECC key of the other peer.
*/
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaPublicKeyBinaryEncoded *public_key;
-
- /**
- * We received a PONG message before we got the "public_key"
- * (or the SET_KEY). We keep it here until we have a key
- * to decrypt it. NULL if no PONG is pending.
- */
- struct PongMessage *pending_pong;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePublicKey other_ephemeral_key;
/**
* Key we use to encrypt our messages for the other peer
* (initialized by us when we do the handshake).
*/
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey encrypt_key;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey encrypt_key;
/**
* Key we use to decrypt messages from the other peer
* (given to us by the other peer during the handshake).
*/
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey decrypt_key;
-
- /**
- * At what time did we generate our encryption key?
- */
- struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute encrypt_key_created;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey decrypt_key;
/**
* At what time did the other peer generate the decryption key?
*/
- struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute decrypt_key_created;
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute foreign_key_expires;
/**
* When should the session time out (if there are no PONGs)?
*/
struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute timeout;
+ /**
+ * What was the last timeout we informed our monitors about?
+ */
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute last_notify_timeout;
+
/**
* At what frequency are we currently re-trying SET_KEY messages?
*/
/**
* ID of task used for re-trying SET_KEY and PING message.
*/
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_TaskIdentifier retry_set_key_task;
+ struct GNUNET_SCHEDULER_Task *retry_set_key_task;
/**
* ID of task used for sending keep-alive pings.
*/
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_TaskIdentifier keep_alive_task;
+ struct GNUNET_SCHEDULER_Task *keep_alive_task;
/**
* Bit map indicating which of the 32 sequence numbers before the last
/**
* What is our connection status?
*/
- enum KxStateMachine status;
+ enum GNUNET_CORE_KxState status;
};
-
/**
- * Handle to peerinfo service.
+ * Our private key.
*/
-static struct GNUNET_PEERINFO_Handle *peerinfo;
+static struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPrivateKey *my_private_key;
/**
- * Our private key.
+ * Our ephemeral private key.
*/
-static struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaPrivateKey *my_private_key;
+static struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePrivateKey *my_ephemeral_key;
/**
- * Our public key.
+ * Current message we send for a key exchange.
*/
-static struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaPublicKeyBinaryEncoded my_public_key;
+static struct EphemeralKeyMessage current_ekm;
/**
* Our message stream tokenizer (for encrypted payload).
*/
static struct GNUNET_SERVER_MessageStreamTokenizer *mst;
+/**
+ * DLL head.
+ */
+static struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx_head;
+
+/**
+ * DLL tail.
+ */
+static struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx_tail;
+
+/**
+ * Task scheduled for periodic re-generation (and thus rekeying) of our
+ * ephemeral key.
+ */
+static struct GNUNET_SCHEDULER_Task *rekey_task;
+
+/**
+ * Notification context for all monitors.
+ */
+static struct GNUNET_SERVER_NotificationContext *nc;
+
+
+/**
+ * Inform the given monitor about the KX state of
+ * the given peer.
+ *
+ * @param client client to inform
+ * @param kx key exchange state to inform about
+ */
+static void
+monitor_notify (struct GNUNET_SERVER_Client *client,
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
+{
+ struct MonitorNotifyMessage msg;
+
+ msg.header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_NOTIFY);
+ msg.header.size = htons (sizeof (msg));
+ msg.state = htonl ((uint32_t) kx->status);
+ msg.peer = kx->peer;
+ msg.timeout = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (kx->timeout);
+ GNUNET_SERVER_notification_context_unicast (nc,
+ client,
+ &msg.header,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Calculate seed value we should use for a message.
+ *
+ * @param kx key exchange context
+ */
+static uint32_t
+calculate_seed (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
+{
+ /* Note: may want to make this non-random and instead
+ derive from key material to avoid having an undetectable
+ side-channel */
+ return htonl (GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32
+ (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_NONCE, UINT32_MAX));
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Inform all monitors about the KX state of the given peer.
+ *
+ * @param kx key exchange state to inform about
+ */
+static void
+monitor_notify_all (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
+{
+ struct MonitorNotifyMessage msg;
+
+ msg.header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_NOTIFY);
+ msg.header.size = htons (sizeof (msg));
+ msg.state = htonl ((uint32_t) kx->status);
+ msg.peer = kx->peer;
+ msg.timeout = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (kx->timeout);
+ GNUNET_SERVER_notification_context_broadcast (nc,
+ &msg.header,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ kx->last_notify_timeout = kx->timeout;
+}
/**
* Derive an authentication key from "set key" information
+ *
+ * @param akey authentication key to derive
+ * @param skey session key to use
+ * @param seed seed to use
*/
static void
derive_auth_key (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AuthKey *akey,
- const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey *skey, uint32_t seed,
- struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute creation_time)
+ const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey *skey,
+ uint32_t seed)
{
static const char ctx[] = "authentication key";
- struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO ctbe;
-
- ctbe = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (creation_time);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac_derive_key (akey, skey, &seed, sizeof (seed), &skey->key,
- sizeof (skey->key), &ctbe, sizeof (ctbe), ctx,
- sizeof (ctx), NULL);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac_derive_key (akey, skey,
+ &seed, sizeof (seed),
+ skey, sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey),
+ ctx, sizeof (ctx),
+ NULL);
}
/**
* Derive an IV from packet information
+ *
+ * @param iv initialization vector to initialize
+ * @param skey session key to use
+ * @param seed seed to use
+ * @param identity identity of the other peer to use
*/
static void
-derive_iv (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector *iv,
- const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey *skey, uint32_t seed,
+derive_iv (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector *iv,
+ const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey *skey,
+ uint32_t seed,
const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *identity)
{
static const char ctx[] = "initialization vector";
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_aes_derive_iv (iv, skey, &seed, sizeof (seed),
- &identity->hashPubKey.bits,
- sizeof (identity->hashPubKey.bits), ctx,
- sizeof (ctx), NULL);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_derive_iv (iv, skey,
+ &seed, sizeof (seed),
+ identity,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity), ctx,
+ sizeof (ctx), NULL);
}
+
/**
* Derive an IV from pong packet information
+ *
+ * @param iv initialization vector to initialize
+ * @param skey session key to use
+ * @param seed seed to use
+ * @param challenge nonce to use
+ * @param identity identity of the other peer to use
*/
static void
-derive_pong_iv (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector *iv,
- const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey *skey, uint32_t seed,
- uint32_t challenge, const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *identity)
+derive_pong_iv (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector *iv,
+ const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey *skey,
+ uint32_t seed,
+ uint32_t challenge,
+ const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *identity)
{
static const char ctx[] = "pong initialization vector";
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_aes_derive_iv (iv, skey, &seed, sizeof (seed),
- &identity->hashPubKey.bits,
- sizeof (identity->hashPubKey.bits), &challenge,
- sizeof (challenge), ctx, sizeof (ctx), NULL);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_derive_iv (iv, skey,
+ &seed, sizeof (seed),
+ identity,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ &challenge, sizeof (challenge),
+ ctx, sizeof (ctx),
+ NULL);
}
/**
- * Encrypt size bytes from in and write the result to out. Use the
- * key for outbound traffic of the given neighbour.
+ * Derive an AES key from key material
+ *
+ * @param sender peer identity of the sender
+ * @param receiver peer identity of the sender
+ * @param key_material high entropy key material to use
+ * @param skey set to derived session key
+ */
+static void
+derive_aes_key (const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *sender,
+ const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *receiver,
+ const struct GNUNET_HashCode *key_material,
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey *skey)
+{
+ static const char ctx[] = "aes key generation vector";
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_kdf (skey, sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey),
+ ctx, sizeof (ctx),
+ key_material, sizeof (struct GNUNET_HashCode),
+ sender, sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ receiver, sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ NULL);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Encrypt size bytes from @a in and write the result to @a out. Use the
+ * @a kx key for outbound traffic of the given neighbour.
*
* @param kx key information context
* @param iv initialization vector to use
* @param in ciphertext
* @param out plaintext
- * @param size size of in/out
- * @return GNUNET_OK on success
+ * @param size size of @a in/@a out
+ * @return #GNUNET_OK on success
*/
static int
do_encrypt (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector *iv,
- const void *in, void *out, size_t size)
+ const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector *iv,
+ const void *in,
+ void *out,
+ size_t size)
{
if (size != (uint16_t) size)
{
return GNUNET_NO;
}
GNUNET_assert (size ==
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_aes_encrypt (in, (uint16_t) size,
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_encrypt (in, (uint16_t) size,
&kx->encrypt_key, iv, out));
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats, gettext_noop ("# bytes encrypted"), size,
GNUNET_NO);
-#if DEBUG_CORE > 2
+ /* the following is too sensitive to write to log files by accident,
+ so we require manual intervention to get this one... */
+#if 0
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Encrypted %u bytes for `%4s' using key %u, IV %u\n",
- (unsigned int) size, GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
+ "Encrypted %u bytes for `%s' using key %u, IV %u\n",
+ (unsigned int) size,
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
(unsigned int) kx->encrypt_key.crc32, GNUNET_CRYPTO_crc32_n (iv,
- sizeof
- (iv)));
+ sizeof
+ (iv)));
#endif
return GNUNET_OK;
}
-
-
/**
- * Decrypt size bytes from in and write the result to out. Use the
- * key for inbound traffic of the given neighbour. This function does
+ * Decrypt size bytes from @a in and write the result to @a out. Use the
+ * @a kx key for inbound traffic of the given neighbour. This function does
* NOT do any integrity-checks on the result.
*
* @param kx key information context
* @param iv initialization vector to use
* @param in ciphertext
* @param out plaintext
- * @param size size of in/out
- * @return GNUNET_OK on success
+ * @param size size of @a in / @a out
+ * @return #GNUNET_OK on success
*/
static int
do_decrypt (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector *iv,
- const void *in, void *out, size_t size)
+ const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector *iv,
+ const void *in,
+ void *out,
+ size_t size)
{
if (size != (uint16_t) size)
{
GNUNET_break (0);
return GNUNET_NO;
}
- if ((kx->status != KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
- (kx->status != KX_STATE_UP))
+ if ( (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
+ (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP) &&
+ (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT) )
{
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
if (size !=
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_aes_decrypt (in, (uint16_t) size, &kx->decrypt_key, iv, out))
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_decrypt (in,
+ (uint16_t) size,
+ &kx->decrypt_key,
+ iv,
+ out))
{
GNUNET_break (0);
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats, gettext_noop ("# bytes decrypted"), size,
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# bytes decrypted"),
+ size,
GNUNET_NO);
-#if DEBUG_CORE > 1
+ /* the following is too sensitive to write to log files by accident,
+ so we require manual intervention to get this one... */
+#if 0
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Decrypted %u bytes from `%4s' using key %u, IV %u\n",
- (unsigned int) size, GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
- (unsigned int) kx->decrypt_key.crc32, GNUNET_CRYPTO_crc32_n (iv,
- sizeof
- (*iv)));
+ "Decrypted %u bytes from `%s' using key %u, IV %u\n",
+ (unsigned int) size,
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
+ (unsigned int) kx->decrypt_key.crc32,
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_crc32_n (iv,
+ sizeof
+ (*iv)));
#endif
return GNUNET_OK;
}
/**
- * Task that will retry "send_key" if our previous attempt failed.
+ * Task that will retry #send_key() if our previous attempt failed.
*
- * @param cls our 'struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo'
- * @param tc scheduler context
+ * @param cls our `struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo`
*/
static void
-set_key_retry_task (void *cls, const struct GNUNET_SCHEDULER_TaskContext *tc)
+set_key_retry_task (void *cls)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
- kx->retry_set_key_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
- kx->set_key_retry_frequency = GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (kx->set_key_retry_frequency, 2);
+ kx->retry_set_key_task = NULL;
+ kx->set_key_retry_frequency = GNUNET_TIME_STD_BACKOFF (kx->set_key_retry_frequency);
+ GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN != kx->status);
send_key (kx);
}
/**
- * PEERINFO is giving us a HELLO for a peer. Add the public key to
- * the neighbour's struct and continue with the key exchange. Or, if
- * we did not get a HELLO, just do nothing.
+ * Create a fresh PING message for transmission to the other peer.
*
- * @param cls the 'struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo' to retry sending the key for
- * @param peer the peer for which this is the HELLO
- * @param hello HELLO message of that peer
- * @param err_msg NULL if successful, otherwise contains error message
+ * @param kx key exchange context to create PING for
*/
static void
-process_hello (void *cls, const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *peer,
- const struct GNUNET_HELLO_Message *hello,
- const char *err_msg)
+setup_fresh_ping (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
{
- struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
- struct SetKeyMessage *skm;
+ struct PingMessage pp;
+ struct PingMessage *pm;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector iv;
- GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK == kx->retry_set_key_task);
- if (err_msg != NULL)
- {
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- _("Error in communication with PEERINFO service\n"));
- kx->pitr = NULL;
- return;
- }
- if (peer == NULL)
- {
- kx->pitr = NULL;
- if (kx->public_key != NULL)
- return; /* done here */
-#if DEBUG_CORE
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Failed to obtain public key for peer `%4s', delaying processing of SET_KEY\n",
- GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
-#endif
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop
- ("# Delayed connecting due to lack of public key"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
- kx->retry_set_key_task =
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (kx->set_key_retry_frequency,
- &set_key_retry_task, kx);
- return;
- }
- if (kx->public_key != NULL)
- {
- /* already have public key, why are we here? */
- GNUNET_break (0);
- return;
- }
- kx->public_key =
- GNUNET_malloc (sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaPublicKeyBinaryEncoded));
- if (GNUNET_OK != GNUNET_HELLO_get_key (hello, kx->public_key))
- {
- GNUNET_break (0);
- GNUNET_free (kx->public_key);
- kx->public_key = NULL;
- return;
- }
- send_key (kx);
- if (NULL != kx->skm_received)
- {
- skm = kx->skm_received;
- kx->skm_received = NULL;
- GSC_KX_handle_set_key (kx, &skm->header);
- GNUNET_free (skm);
- }
+ pm = &kx->ping;
+ kx->ping_challenge = GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32 (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_WEAK,
+ UINT32_MAX);
+ pm->header.size = htons (sizeof (struct PingMessage));
+ pm->header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PING);
+ pm->iv_seed = calculate_seed (kx);
+ derive_iv (&iv, &kx->encrypt_key, pm->iv_seed, &kx->peer);
+ pp.challenge = kx->ping_challenge;
+ pp.target = kx->peer;
+ do_encrypt (kx, &iv, &pp.target, &pm->target,
+ sizeof (struct PingMessage) - ((void *) &pm->target -
+ (void *) pm));
}
GSC_KX_start (const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *pid)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx;
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode h1;
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode h2;
- kx = GNUNET_malloc (sizeof (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo));
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Initiating key exchange with `%s'\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (pid));
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# key exchanges initiated"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ kx = GNUNET_new (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo);
kx->peer = *pid;
kx->set_key_retry_frequency = INITIAL_SET_KEY_RETRY_FREQUENCY;
- kx->pitr = GNUNET_PEERINFO_iterate (peerinfo,
- pid,
- GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_REL /* timeout? */,
- &process_hello,
- kx);
+ GNUNET_CONTAINER_DLL_insert (kx_head,
+ kx_tail,
+ kx);
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (pid,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ &h1);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&GSC_my_identity,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ &h2);
+ if (0 < GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash_cmp (&h1,
+ &h2))
+ {
+ /* peer with "lower" identity starts KX, otherwise we typically end up
+ with both peers starting the exchange and transmit the 'set key'
+ message twice */
+ send_key (kx);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* peer with "higher" identity starts a delayed KX, if the "lower" peer
+ * does not start a KX since he sees no reasons to do so */
+ kx->retry_set_key_task
+ = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_SECONDS,
+ &set_key_retry_task,
+ kx);
+ }
return kx;
}
void
GSC_KX_stop (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
{
- if (kx->pitr != NULL)
- {
- GNUNET_PEERINFO_iterate_cancel (kx->pitr);
- kx->pitr = NULL;
- }
- if (kx->retry_set_key_task != GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK)
+ GSC_SESSIONS_end (&kx->peer);
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats, gettext_noop ("# key exchanges stopped"),
+ 1, GNUNET_NO);
+ if (NULL != kx->retry_set_key_task)
{
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->retry_set_key_task);
- kx->retry_set_key_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
+ kx->retry_set_key_task = NULL;
}
- if (kx->keep_alive_task != GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK)
+ if (NULL != kx->keep_alive_task)
{
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->keep_alive_task);
- kx->keep_alive_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
+ kx->keep_alive_task = NULL;
}
- GNUNET_free_non_null (kx->skm_received);
- GNUNET_free_non_null (kx->ping_received);
- GNUNET_free_non_null (kx->pong_received);
- GNUNET_free_non_null (kx->public_key);
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_PEER_DISCONNECT;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ GNUNET_CONTAINER_DLL_remove (kx_head,
+ kx_tail,
+ kx);
GNUNET_free (kx);
}
/**
- * We received a SET_KEY message. Validate and update
- * our key material and status.
+ * Send our PING to the other peer.
+ *
+ * @param kx key exchange context
+ */
+static void
+send_ping (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
+{
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# PING messages transmitted"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ GSC_NEIGHBOURS_transmit (&kx->peer,
+ &kx->ping.header,
+ kx->set_key_retry_frequency);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Derive fresh session keys from the current ephemeral keys.
+ *
+ * @param kx session to derive keys for
+ */
+static void
+derive_session_keys (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
+{
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode key_material;
+
+ if (GNUNET_OK !=
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_ecdh (my_ephemeral_key,
+ &kx->other_ephemeral_key,
+ &key_material))
+ {
+ GNUNET_break (0);
+ return;
+ }
+ derive_aes_key (&GSC_my_identity,
+ &kx->peer,
+ &key_material,
+ &kx->encrypt_key);
+ derive_aes_key (&kx->peer,
+ &GSC_my_identity,
+ &key_material,
+ &kx->decrypt_key);
+ memset (&key_material, 0, sizeof (key_material));
+ /* fresh key, reset sequence numbers */
+ kx->last_sequence_number_received = 0;
+ kx->last_packets_bitmap = 0;
+ setup_fresh_ping (kx);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * We received a #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_EPHEMERAL_KEY message.
+ * Validate and update our key material and status.
*
* @param kx key exchange status for the corresponding peer
* @param msg the set key message we received
*/
void
-GSC_KX_handle_set_key (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *msg)
+GSC_KX_handle_ephemeral_key (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
+ const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *msg)
{
- const struct SetKeyMessage *m;
- struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute t;
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey k;
- struct PingMessage *ping;
- struct PongMessage *pong;
- enum KxStateMachine sender_status;
+ const struct EphemeralKeyMessage *m;
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute start_t;
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute end_t;
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute now;
+ enum GNUNET_CORE_KxState sender_status;
uint16_t size;
-
- size = ntohs (msg->size);
- if (size != sizeof (struct SetKeyMessage))
- {
- GNUNET_break_op (0);
- return;
- }
- m = (const struct SetKeyMessage*) msg;
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats, gettext_noop ("# session keys received"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
-#if DEBUG_CORE
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Core service receives `%s' request from `%4s'.\n", "SET_KEY",
- GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
-#endif
- if (kx->public_key == NULL)
+ size = ntohs (msg->size);
+ if (sizeof (struct EphemeralKeyMessage) != size)
{
- GNUNET_free_non_null (kx->skm_received);
- kx->skm_received = GNUNET_copy_message (msg);
+ GNUNET_break_op (0);
+ return;
+ }
+ m = (const struct EphemeralKeyMessage *) msg;
+ end_t = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_ntoh (m->expiration_time);
+ if ( ( (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED == kx->status) ||
+ (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP == kx->status) ||
+ (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT == kx->status) ) &&
+ (end_t.abs_value_us < kx->foreign_key_expires.abs_value_us) )
+ {
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# old ephemeral keys ignored"),
+ 1, GNUNET_NO);
return;
}
+ start_t = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_ntoh (m->creation_time);
+
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# ephemeral keys received"),
+ 1, GNUNET_NO);
+
if (0 !=
- memcmp (&m->target, &GSC_my_identity, sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
+ memcmp (&m->origin_identity,
+ &kx->peer,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
{
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- _("`%s' is for `%s', not for me. Ignoring.\n"),
- "SET_KEY", GNUNET_i2s (&m->target));
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
+ "Received EPHEMERAL_KEY from %s, but expected %s\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&m->origin_identity),
+ GNUNET_i2s_full (&kx->peer));
+ GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
}
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Core service receives EPHEMERAL_KEY request from `%s'.\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
if ((ntohl (m->purpose.size) !=
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaSignaturePurpose) +
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccSignaturePurpose) +
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaEncryptedData) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)) ||
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPublicKey) +
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPublicKey)) ||
(GNUNET_OK !=
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_verify (GNUNET_SIGNATURE_PURPOSE_SET_KEY, &m->purpose,
- &m->signature, kx->public_key)))
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_eddsa_verify (GNUNET_SIGNATURE_PURPOSE_SET_ECC_KEY,
+ &m->purpose,
+ &m->signature,
+ &m->origin_identity.public_key)))
{
/* invalid signature */
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
}
- t = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_ntoh (m->creation_time);
- if (((kx->status == KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) ||
- (kx->status == KX_STATE_UP)) &&
- (t.abs_value < kx->decrypt_key_created.abs_value))
- {
- /* this could rarely happen due to massive re-ordering of
- * messages on the network level, but is most likely either
- * a bug or some adversary messing with us. Report. */
- GNUNET_break_op (0);
- return;
- }
- if ((GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_decrypt
- (my_private_key, &m->encrypted_key, &k,
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey)) !=
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey)) ||
- (GNUNET_OK != GNUNET_CRYPTO_aes_check_session_key (&k)))
+ now = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get ();
+ if ( (end_t.abs_value_us < GNUNET_TIME_absolute_subtract (now, REKEY_TOLERANCE).abs_value_us) ||
+ (start_t.abs_value_us > GNUNET_TIME_absolute_add (now, REKEY_TOLERANCE).abs_value_us) )
{
- /* failed to decrypt !? */
- GNUNET_break_op (0);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
+ _("Ephemeral key message from peer `%s' rejected as its validity range does not match our system time (%llu not in [%llu,%llu]).\n"),
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
+ (unsigned long long) now.abs_value_us,
+ (unsigned long long) start_t.abs_value_us,
+ (unsigned long long) end_t.abs_value_us);
return;
}
+ kx->other_ephemeral_key = m->ephemeral_key;
+ kx->foreign_key_expires = end_t;
+ derive_session_keys (kx);
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# SET_KEY messages decrypted"), 1,
+ gettext_noop ("# EPHEMERAL_KEY messages received"), 1,
GNUNET_NO);
- kx->decrypt_key = k;
- if (kx->decrypt_key_created.abs_value != t.abs_value)
- {
- /* fresh key, reset sequence numbers */
- kx->last_sequence_number_received = 0;
- kx->last_packets_bitmap = 0;
- kx->decrypt_key_created = t;
- }
- sender_status = (enum KxStateMachine) ntohl (m->sender_status);
- switch (kx->status)
+ /* check if we still need to send the sender our key */
+ sender_status = (enum GNUNET_CORE_KxState) ntohl (m->sender_status);
+ switch (sender_status)
{
- case KX_STATE_DOWN:
- kx->status = KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED;
- /* we're not up, so we are already doing 'send_key' */
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN:
+ GNUNET_break_op (0);
+ break;
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
+ /* fine, need to send our key after updating our status, see below */
+ GSC_SESSIONS_reinit (&kx->peer);
break;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
- kx->status = KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED;
- /* we're not up, so we are already doing 'send_key' */
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
+ /* other peer already got our key, but typemap did go down */
+ GSC_SESSIONS_reinit (&kx->peer);
break;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
- /* we're not up, so we are already doing 'send_key' */
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP:
+ /* other peer already got our key, typemap NOT down */
break;
- case KX_STATE_UP:
- if ( (sender_status == KX_STATE_DOWN) ||
- (sender_status == KX_STATE_KEY_SENT) )
- send_key (kx); /* we are up, but other peer is not! */
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
+ /* other peer already got our key, typemap NOT down */
break;
default:
GNUNET_break (0);
break;
}
- if (kx->ping_received != NULL)
- {
- ping = kx->ping_received;
- kx->ping_received = NULL;
- GSC_KX_handle_ping (kx, &ping->header);
- GNUNET_free (ping);
- }
- if (kx->pong_received != NULL)
+ /* check if we need to confirm everything is fine via PING + PONG */
+ switch (kx->status)
{
- pong = kx->pong_received;
- kx->pong_received = NULL;
- GSC_KX_handle_pong (kx, &pong->header);
- GNUNET_free (pong);
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN:
+ GNUNET_assert (NULL == kx->keep_alive_task);
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
+ send_key (kx);
+ else
+ send_ping (kx);
+ break;
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
+ GNUNET_assert (NULL == kx->keep_alive_task);
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
+ send_key (kx);
+ else
+ send_ping (kx);
+ break;
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
+ GNUNET_assert (NULL == kx->keep_alive_task);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
+ send_key (kx);
+ else
+ send_ping (kx);
+ break;
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP:
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
+ send_key (kx);
+ else
+ send_ping (kx);
+ break;
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
+ send_key (kx);
+ else
+ send_ping (kx);
+ break;
+ default:
+ GNUNET_break (0);
+ break;
}
}
*/
void
GSC_KX_handle_ping (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *msg)
+ const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *msg)
{
const struct PingMessage *m;
struct PingMessage t;
struct PongMessage tx;
struct PongMessage tp;
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector iv;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector iv;
uint16_t msize;
msize = ntohs (msg->size);
if (msize != sizeof (struct PingMessage))
- {
- GNUNET_break_op (0);
- return;
- }
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# PING messages received"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
- if ( (kx->status != KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
- (kx->status != KX_STATE_UP) )
- {
- /* defer */
- GNUNET_free_non_null (kx->ping_received);
- kx->ping_received = GNUNET_copy_message (msg);
- return;
- }
- m = (const struct PingMessage*) msg;
-#if DEBUG_CORE
+ {
+ GNUNET_break_op (0);
+ return;
+ }
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# PING messages received"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ if ( (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
+ (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP) &&
+ (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT))
+ {
+ /* ignore */
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# PING messages dropped (out of order)"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ return;
+ }
+ m = (const struct PingMessage *) msg;
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Core service receives `%s' request from `%4s'.\n", "PING",
+ "Core service receives PING request from `%s'.\n",
GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
-#endif
derive_iv (&iv, &kx->decrypt_key, m->iv_seed, &GSC_my_identity);
if (GNUNET_OK !=
do_decrypt (kx, &iv, &m->target, &t.target,
return;
}
if (0 !=
- memcmp (&t.target, &GSC_my_identity, sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
+ memcmp (&t.target,
+ &GSC_my_identity,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
{
- char sender[9];
- char peer[9];
-
- GNUNET_snprintf (sender, sizeof (sender), "%8s", GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
- GNUNET_snprintf (peer, sizeof (peer), "%8s", GNUNET_i2s (&t.target));
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
- _("Received PING from `%s' for different identity: I am `%s', PONG identity: `%s'\n"),
- sender, GNUNET_i2s (&GSC_my_identity), peer);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT != kx->status)
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
+ "Decryption of PING from peer `%s' failed\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
+ else
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Decryption of PING from peer `%s' failed after rekey (harmless)\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
}
/* construct PONG */
- tx.inbound_bw_limit = kx->bw_in; // FIXME!
+ tx.reserved = 0;
tx.challenge = t.challenge;
tx.target = t.target;
tp.header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PONG);
tp.header.size = htons (sizeof (struct PongMessage));
- tp.iv_seed =
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32 (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_NONCE, UINT32_MAX);
- derive_pong_iv (&iv, &kx->encrypt_key, tp.iv_seed, t.challenge, &kx->peer);
- do_encrypt (kx, &iv, &tx.challenge, &tp.challenge,
+ tp.iv_seed = calculate_seed (kx);
+ derive_pong_iv (&iv,
+ &kx->encrypt_key,
+ tp.iv_seed,
+ t.challenge,
+ &kx->peer);
+ do_encrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &tx.challenge,
+ &tp.challenge,
sizeof (struct PongMessage) - ((void *) &tp.challenge -
- (void *) tp));
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# PONG messages created"), 1,
+ (void *) &tp));
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# PONG messages created"),
+ 1,
GNUNET_NO);
GSC_NEIGHBOURS_transmit (&kx->peer,
- &tp.header,
- GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_REL /* FIXME: timeout */);
-}
-
-
-/**
- * Create a fresh SET KEY message for transmission to the other peer.
- * Also creates a new key.
- *
- * @param kx key exchange context to create SET KEY message for
- */
-static void
-setup_fresh_setkey (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
-{
- struct SetKeyMessage *skm;
-
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_aes_create_session_key (&kx->encrypt_key);
- kx->encrypt_key_created = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get ();
- skm = &kx->skm;
- skm->header.size = htons (sizeof (struct SetKeyMessage));
- skm->header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_SET_KEY);
- skm->purpose.size =
- htonl (sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaSignaturePurpose) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaEncryptedData) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity));
- skm->purpose.purpose = htonl (GNUNET_SIGNATURE_PURPOSE_SET_KEY);
- skm->creation_time = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (kx->encrypt_key_created);
- skm->target = kx->peer;
- GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_encrypt (&kx->encrypt_key,
- sizeof (struct
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey),
- kx->public_key, &skm->encrypted_key));
- GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_sign (my_private_key, &skm->purpose,
- &skm->signature));
-}
-
-
-/**
- * Create a fresh PING message for transmission to the other peer.
- *
- * @param kx key exchange context to create PING for
- */
-static void
-setup_fresh_ping (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
-{
- struct PingMessage pp;
- struct PingMessage *pm;
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector iv;
-
- pm = &kx->ping;
- pm->header.size = htons (sizeof (struct PingMessage));
- pm->header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PING);
- pm->iv_seed =
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32 (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_NONCE, UINT32_MAX);
- derive_iv (&iv, &kx->encrypt_key, pm->iv_seed, &kx->peer);
- pp.challenge = kx->ping_challenge;
- pp.target = kx->peer;
- do_encrypt (kx, &iv, &pp.target, &pm->target,
- sizeof (struct PingMessage) - ((void *) &pm->target -
- (void *) pm));
+ &tp.header,
+ kx->set_key_retry_frequency);
}
* Task triggered when a neighbour entry is about to time out
* (and we should prevent this by sending a PING).
*
- * @param cls the 'struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo'
- * @param tc scheduler context (not used)
+ * @param cls the `struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo`
*/
static void
-send_keep_alive (void *cls, const struct GNUNET_SCHEDULER_TaskContext *tc)
+send_keep_alive (void *cls)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative retry;
struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative left;
- kx->keep_alive_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
+ kx->keep_alive_task = NULL;
left = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_remaining (kx->timeout);
- if (left.rel_value == 0)
- {
+ if (0 == left.rel_value_us)
+ {
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# sessions terminated by timeout"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
GSC_SESSIONS_end (&kx->peer);
- kx->status = KX_STATE_DOWN;
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ send_key (kx);
return;
}
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Sending KEEPALIVE to `%s'\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# keepalive messages sent"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
setup_fresh_ping (kx);
- GSC_NEIGHBOURS_transmit (&kx->peer,
- &kx->ping.header,
- kx->set_key_retry_frequency);
+ send_ping (kx);
retry =
GNUNET_TIME_relative_max (GNUNET_TIME_relative_divide (left, 2),
MIN_PING_FREQUENCY);
kx->keep_alive_task =
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (retry, &send_keep_alive, kx);
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (retry,
+ &send_keep_alive,
+ kx);
}
static void
update_timeout (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
{
- kx->timeout = GNUNET_TIME_relative_to_absolute (GNUNET_CONSTANTS_IDLE_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT);
- if (kx->keep_alive_task != GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK)
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative delta;
+
+ kx->timeout =
+ GNUNET_TIME_relative_to_absolute
+ (GNUNET_CONSTANTS_IDLE_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT);
+ delta = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_difference (kx->last_notify_timeout,
+ kx->timeout);
+ if (delta.rel_value_us > 5LL * 1000LL * 1000LL)
+ {
+ /* we only notify monitors about timeout changes if those
+ are bigger than the threshold (5s) */
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ }
+ if (NULL != kx->keep_alive_task)
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->keep_alive_task);
kx->keep_alive_task =
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (GNUNET_TIME_relative_divide
- (GNUNET_CONSTANTS_IDLE_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT,
- 2), &send_keep_alive, kx);
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (GNUNET_TIME_relative_divide
+ (GNUNET_CONSTANTS_IDLE_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT,
+ 2),
+ &send_keep_alive,
+ kx);
}
* We received a PONG message. Validate and update our status.
*
* @param kx key exchange context for the the PONG
- * @param m the encrypted PONG message itself
+ * @param msg the encrypted PONG message itself
*/
void
-GSC_KX_handle_pong (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx, const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *msg)
+GSC_KX_handle_pong (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
+ const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *msg)
{
const struct PongMessage *m;
struct PongMessage t;
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector iv;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector iv;
uint16_t msize;
msize = ntohs (msg->size);
- if (msize != sizeof (struct PongMessage))
+ if (sizeof (struct PongMessage) != msize)
{
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
}
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats, gettext_noop ("# PONG messages received"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
-
- if ( (kx->status != KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
- (kx->status != KX_STATE_UP) )
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# PONG messages received"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ switch (kx->status)
{
- if (kx->status == KX_STATE_KEY_SENT)
- {
- GNUNET_free_non_null (kx->pong_received);
- kx->pong_received = GNUNET_copy_message (msg);
- }
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN:
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# PONG messages dropped (connection down)"), 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ return;
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# PONG messages dropped (out of order)"), 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ return;
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
+ break;
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP:
+ break;
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
+ break;
+ default:
+ GNUNET_break (0);
return;
}
- m = (const struct PongMessage*) msg;
-#if DEBUG_HANDSHAKE
+ m = (const struct PongMessage *) msg;
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Core service receives `%s' response from `%4s'.\n", "PONG",
+ "Core service receives PONG response from `%s'.\n",
GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
-#endif
/* mark as garbage, just to be sure */
memset (&t, 255, sizeof (t));
- derive_pong_iv (&iv, &kx->decrypt_key, m->iv_seed, kx->ping_challenge,
+ derive_pong_iv (&iv,
+ &kx->decrypt_key,
+ m->iv_seed,
+ kx->ping_challenge,
&GSC_my_identity);
if (GNUNET_OK !=
- do_decrypt (kx, &iv, &m->challenge, &t.challenge,
+ do_decrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &m->challenge,
+ &t.challenge,
sizeof (struct PongMessage) - ((void *) &m->challenge -
(void *) m)))
{
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
}
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats, gettext_noop ("# PONG messages decrypted"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
- if ((0 != memcmp (&t.target, &kx->peer, sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
- || (kx->ping_challenge != t.challenge))
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# PONG messages decrypted"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ if ((0 != memcmp (&t.target,
+ &kx->peer,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity))) ||
+ (kx->ping_challenge != t.challenge))
{
/* PONG malformed */
-#if DEBUG_CORE
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Received malformed `%s' wanted sender `%4s' with challenge %u\n",
- "PONG", GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
+ "Received malformed PONG wanted sender `%s' with challenge %u\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
(unsigned int) kx->ping_challenge);
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Received malformed `%s' received from `%4s' with challenge %u\n",
- "PONG", GNUNET_i2s (&t.target), (unsigned int) t.challenge);
-#endif
+ "Received malformed PONG received from `%s' with challenge %u\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&t.target),
+ (unsigned int) t.challenge);
return;
}
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Received PONG from `%s'\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
+ /* no need to resend key any longer */
+ if (NULL != kx->retry_set_key_task)
+ {
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->retry_set_key_task);
+ kx->retry_set_key_task = NULL;
+ }
switch (kx->status)
{
- case KX_STATE_DOWN:
- GNUNET_break (0); /* should be impossible */
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN:
+ GNUNET_assert (0); /* should be impossible */
return;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
- GNUNET_break (0); /* should be impossible */
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
+ GNUNET_assert (0); /* should be impossible */
return;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop
- ("# Session keys confirmed via PONG"), 1,
+ gettext_noop ("# session keys confirmed via PONG"),
+ 1,
GNUNET_NO);
- kx->status = KX_STATE_UP;
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
GSC_SESSIONS_create (&kx->peer, kx);
- GNUNET_assert (kx->retry_set_key_task != GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK);
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->retry_set_key_task);
- kx->retry_set_key_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
- GNUNET_assert (kx->keep_alive_task == GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK);
+ GNUNET_assert (NULL == kx->keep_alive_task);
+ update_timeout (kx);
+ break;
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP:
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# timeouts prevented via PONG"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
update_timeout (kx);
break;
- case KX_STATE_UP:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# rekey operations confirmed via PONG"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
update_timeout (kx);
break;
default:
/**
- * Send our key (and encrypted PING) to the other peer.
+ * Send our key to the other peer.
*
* @param kx key exchange context
*/
static void
send_key (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
{
- GNUNET_assert (kx->retry_set_key_task == GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK);
- if (KX_STATE_UP == kx->status)
- return; /* nothing to do */
- if (kx->public_key == NULL)
- {
- /* lookup public key, then try again */
- kx->pitr =
- GNUNET_PEERINFO_iterate (peerinfo, &kx->peer,
- GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_REL /* timeout? */,
- &process_hello, kx);
- return;
- }
-
- /* update status */
- switch (kx->status)
+ GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN != kx->status);
+ if (NULL != kx->retry_set_key_task)
{
- case KX_STATE_DOWN:
- kx->status = KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
- /* setup SET KEY message */
- setup_fresh_setkey (kx);
- setup_fresh_ping (kx);
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop
- ("# SET_KEY and PING messages created"), 1,
- GNUNET_NO);
- break;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
- break;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
- break;
- case KX_STATE_UP:
- GNUNET_break (0);
- return;
- default:
- GNUNET_break (0);
- return;
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->retry_set_key_task);
+ kx->retry_set_key_task = NULL;
}
-
/* always update sender status in SET KEY message */
- kx->skm.sender_status = htonl ((int32_t) kx->status);
-
- GSC_NEIGHBOURS_transmit (&kx->peer,
- &kx->skm.header,
- kx->set_key_retry_frequency);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Sending key to `%s' (my status: %d)\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
+ kx->status);
+ current_ekm.sender_status = htonl ((int32_t) (kx->status));
GSC_NEIGHBOURS_transmit (&kx->peer,
- &kx->ping.header,
- kx->set_key_retry_frequency);
+ ¤t_ekm.header,
+ kx->set_key_retry_frequency);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT != kx->status)
+ send_ping (kx);
kx->retry_set_key_task =
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (kx->set_key_retry_frequency,
- &set_key_retry_task, kx);
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (kx->set_key_retry_frequency,
+ &set_key_retry_task,
+ kx);
}
* Encrypt and transmit a message with the given payload.
*
* @param kx key exchange context
- * @param bw_in bandwidth limit to transmit to the other peer;
- * the other peer shall not send us more than the
- * given rate
* @param payload payload of the message
- * @param payload_size number of bytes in 'payload'
+ * @param payload_size number of bytes in @a payload
*/
void
GSC_KX_encrypt_and_transmit (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- struct GNUNET_BANDWIDTH_Value32NBO bw_in,
- const void *payload,
- size_t payload_size)
+ const void *payload,
+ size_t payload_size)
{
size_t used = payload_size + sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage);
- char pbuf[used]; /* plaintext */
- char cbuf[used]; /* ciphertext */
+ char pbuf[used]; /* plaintext */
+ char cbuf[used]; /* ciphertext */
struct EncryptedMessage *em; /* encrypted message */
struct EncryptedMessage *ph; /* plaintext header */
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector iv;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector iv;
struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AuthKey auth_key;
-#if DEBUG_CORE_QUOTA
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Sending %u b/s as new limit to peer `%4s'\n",
- (unsigned int) ntohl (bw_in.value__),
- GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
-#endif
- ph = (struct EncryptedMessage*) pbuf;
- ph->iv_seed =
- htonl (GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32
- (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_NONCE, UINT32_MAX));
+ ph = (struct EncryptedMessage *) pbuf;
ph->sequence_number = htonl (++kx->last_sequence_number_sent);
- ph->inbound_bw_limit = bw_in;
+ ph->iv_seed = calculate_seed (kx);
+ ph->reserved = 0;
ph->timestamp = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get ());
- memcpy (&ph[1], payload, payload_size);
+ memcpy (&ph[1],
+ payload,
+ payload_size);
em = (struct EncryptedMessage *) cbuf;
em->header.size = htons (used);
em->header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE);
em->iv_seed = ph->iv_seed;
- derive_iv (&iv, &kx->encrypt_key, ph->iv_seed, &kx->peer);
+ derive_iv (&iv,
+ &kx->encrypt_key,
+ ph->iv_seed,
+ &kx->peer);
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
- do_encrypt (kx, &iv, &ph->sequence_number, &em->sequence_number,
+ do_encrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &ph->sequence_number,
+ &em->sequence_number,
used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE));
- derive_auth_key (&auth_key, &kx->encrypt_key, ph->iv_seed,
- kx->encrypt_key_created);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac (&auth_key, &em->sequence_number,
- used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE, &em->hmac);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Encrypted %u bytes for %s\n",
+ (unsigned int) (used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE),
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
+ derive_auth_key (&auth_key,
+ &kx->encrypt_key,
+ ph->iv_seed);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac (&auth_key,
+ &em->sequence_number,
+ used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE,
+ &em->hmac);
GSC_NEIGHBOURS_transmit (&kx->peer,
- &em->header,
- GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_REL);
-}
+ &em->header,
+ GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_REL);
+}
/**
- * Closure for 'deliver_message'
+ * Closure for #deliver_message()
*/
struct DeliverMessageContext
{
-
+
/**
- * Performance information for the connection.
+ * Key exchange context.
*/
- const struct GNUNET_TRANSPORT_ATS_Information *atsi;
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx;
/**
* Sender of the message.
*/
const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *peer;
-
- /**
- * Number of entries in 'atsi' array.
- */
- uint32_t atsi_count;
};
-
+
/**
* We received an encrypted message. Decrypt, validate and
* pass on to the appropriate clients.
*
* @param kx key exchange context for encrypting the message
- * @param m encrypted message
- * @param atsi performance data
- * @param atsi_count number of entries in ats (excluding 0-termination)
+ * @param msg encrypted message
*/
void
-GSC_KX_handle_encrypted_message (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *msg,
- const struct GNUNET_TRANSPORT_ATS_Information *atsi,
- uint32_t atsi_count)
+GSC_KX_handle_encrypted_message (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
+ const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *msg)
{
const struct EncryptedMessage *m;
struct EncryptedMessage *pt; /* plaintext */
- GNUNET_HashCode ph;
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode ph;
uint32_t snum;
struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute t;
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector iv;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector iv;
struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AuthKey auth_key;
struct DeliverMessageContext dmc;
uint16_t size = ntohs (msg->size);
- char buf[size];
+ char buf[size] GNUNET_ALIGN;
if (size <
sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage) + sizeof (struct GNUNET_MessageHeader))
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
}
- m = (const struct EncryptedMessage*) msg;
- if ( (kx->status != KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
- (kx->status != KX_STATE_UP) )
+ m = (const struct EncryptedMessage *) msg;
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP != kx->status)
{
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop
- ("# failed to decrypt message (no session key)"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
+ gettext_noop ("# DATA message dropped (out of order)"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
return;
}
+ if (0 == GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_remaining (kx->foreign_key_expires).rel_value_us)
+ {
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
+ _("Session to peer `%s' went down due to key expiration (should not happen)\n"),
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# sessions terminated by key expiration"),
+ 1, GNUNET_NO);
+ GSC_SESSIONS_end (&kx->peer);
+ if (NULL != kx->keep_alive_task)
+ {
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->keep_alive_task);
+ kx->keep_alive_task = NULL;
+ }
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ send_key (kx);
+ return;
+ }
+
/* validate hash */
- derive_auth_key (&auth_key, &kx->decrypt_key, m->iv_seed,
- kx->decrypt_key_created);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac (&auth_key, &m->sequence_number,
- size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE, &ph);
- if (0 != memcmp (&ph, &m->hmac, sizeof (GNUNET_HashCode)))
+ derive_auth_key (&auth_key,
+ &kx->decrypt_key,
+ m->iv_seed);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac (&auth_key,
+ &m->sequence_number,
+ size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE,
+ &ph);
+ if (0 != memcmp (&ph,
+ &m->hmac,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_HashCode)))
{
/* checksum failed */
- GNUNET_break_op (0);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Failed checksum validation for a message from `%s'\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
return;
}
- derive_iv (&iv, &kx->decrypt_key, m->iv_seed, &GSC_my_identity);
+ derive_iv (&iv,
+ &kx->decrypt_key,
+ m->iv_seed,
+ &GSC_my_identity);
/* decrypt */
if (GNUNET_OK !=
- do_decrypt (kx, &iv, &m->sequence_number, &buf[ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE],
+ do_decrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &m->sequence_number,
+ &buf[ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE],
size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE))
return;
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Decrypted %u bytes from %s\n",
+ (unsigned int) (size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE),
+ GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
pt = (struct EncryptedMessage *) buf;
/* validate sequence number */
snum = ntohl (pt->sequence_number);
if (kx->last_sequence_number_received == snum)
{
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO,
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Received duplicate message, ignoring.\n");
/* duplicate, ignore */
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# bytes dropped (duplicates)"),
- size, GNUNET_NO);
+ size,
+ GNUNET_NO);
return;
}
if ((kx->last_sequence_number_received > snum) &&
(kx->last_sequence_number_received - snum > 32))
{
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO,
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Received ancient out of sequence message, ignoring.\n");
/* ancient out of sequence, ignore */
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
if ((kx->last_packets_bitmap & rotbit) != 0)
{
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO,
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Received duplicate message, ignoring.\n");
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# bytes dropped (duplicates)"),
/* check timestamp */
t = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_ntoh (pt->timestamp);
- if (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_duration (t).rel_value >
- MAX_MESSAGE_AGE.rel_value)
+ if (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_duration (t).rel_value_us >
+ MAX_MESSAGE_AGE.rel_value_us)
{
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO,
- _("Message received far too old (%llu ms). Content ignored.\n"),
- GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_duration (t).rel_value);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Message received far too old (%s). Content ignored.\n",
+ GNUNET_STRINGS_relative_time_to_string (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_duration (t),
+ GNUNET_YES));
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop
("# bytes dropped (ancient message)"), size,
/* process decrypted message(s) */
update_timeout (kx);
- GSC_SESSIONS_update (&kx->peer,
- pt->inbound_bw_limit);
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# bytes of payload decrypted"),
- size - sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage), GNUNET_NO);
- dmc.atsi = atsi;
- dmc.atsi_count = atsi_count;
+ size - sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage),
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ dmc.kx = kx;
dmc.peer = &kx->peer;
if (GNUNET_OK !=
- GNUNET_SERVER_mst_receive (mst, &dmc, &buf[sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage)],
+ GNUNET_SERVER_mst_receive (mst, &dmc,
+ &buf[sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage)],
size - sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage),
- GNUNET_YES, GNUNET_NO))
+ GNUNET_YES,
+ GNUNET_NO))
GNUNET_break_op (0);
}
/**
* Deliver P2P message to interested clients.
* Invokes send twice, once for clients that want the full message, and once
- * for clients that only want the header
+ * for clients that only want the header
*
* @param cls always NULL
* @param client who sent us the message (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo)
* @param m the message
*/
-static void
-deliver_message (void *cls, void *client, const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *m)
+static int
+deliver_message (void *cls,
+ void *client,
+ const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *m)
{
struct DeliverMessageContext *dmc = client;
- GSC_CLIENTS_deliver_message (dmc->peer,
- dmc->atsi, dmc->atsi_count,
- m,
- ntohs (m->size),
- GNUNET_CORE_OPTION_SEND_FULL_INBOUND);
- GSC_CLIENTS_deliver_message (dmc->peer,
- dmc->atsi, dmc->atsi_count,
- m,
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_MessageHeader),
- GNUNET_CORE_OPTION_SEND_HDR_INBOUND);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP != dmc->kx->status)
+ {
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# PAYLOAD dropped (out of order)"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ return GNUNET_OK;
+ }
+ switch (ntohs (m->type))
+ {
+ case GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_BINARY_TYPE_MAP:
+ case GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_COMPRESSED_TYPE_MAP:
+ GSC_SESSIONS_set_typemap (dmc->peer, m);
+ return GNUNET_OK;
+ case GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_CONFIRM_TYPE_MAP:
+ GSC_SESSIONS_confirm_typemap (dmc->peer, m);
+ return GNUNET_OK;
+ default:
+ GSC_CLIENTS_deliver_message (dmc->peer, m,
+ ntohs (m->size),
+ GNUNET_CORE_OPTION_SEND_FULL_INBOUND);
+ GSC_CLIENTS_deliver_message (dmc->peer, m,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_MessageHeader),
+ GNUNET_CORE_OPTION_SEND_HDR_INBOUND);
+ }
+ return GNUNET_OK;
}
/**
- * Initialize KX subsystem.
- *
- * @return GNUNET_OK on success, GNUNET_SYSERR on failure
+ * Setup the message that links the ephemeral key to our persistent
+ * public key and generate the appropriate signature.
*/
-int
-GSC_KX_init ()
+static void
+sign_ephemeral_key ()
{
- char *keyfile;
-
- if (GNUNET_OK !=
- GNUNET_CONFIGURATION_get_value_filename (GSC_cfg, "GNUNETD", "HOSTKEY",
- &keyfile))
+ current_ekm.header.size = htons (sizeof (struct EphemeralKeyMessage));
+ current_ekm.header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_EPHEMERAL_KEY);
+ current_ekm.sender_status = 0; /* to be set later */
+ current_ekm.purpose.purpose = htonl (GNUNET_SIGNATURE_PURPOSE_SET_ECC_KEY);
+ current_ekm.purpose.size = htonl (sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccSignaturePurpose) +
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePublicKey) +
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity));
+ current_ekm.creation_time = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get ());
+ if (GNUNET_YES ==
+ GNUNET_CONFIGURATION_get_value_yesno (GSC_cfg,
+ "core",
+ "USE_EPHEMERAL_KEYS"))
{
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
- _("Core service is lacking HOSTKEY configuration setting. Exiting.\n"));
- return GNUNET_SYSERR;
+ current_ekm.expiration_time = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_relative_to_absolute (GNUNET_TIME_relative_add (REKEY_FREQUENCY,
+ REKEY_TOLERANCE)));
}
- my_private_key = GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_key_create_from_file (keyfile);
- GNUNET_free (keyfile);
- if (my_private_key == NULL)
+ else
{
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
- _("Core service could not access hostkey. Exiting.\n"));
- return GNUNET_SYSERR;
+ current_ekm.expiration_time = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_ABS);
}
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_key_get_public (my_private_key, &my_public_key);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&my_public_key, sizeof (my_public_key),
- &GSC_my_identity.hashPubKey);
- peerinfo = GNUNET_PEERINFO_connect (GSC_cfg);
- if (NULL == peerinfo)
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (my_ephemeral_key,
+ ¤t_ekm.ephemeral_key);
+ current_ekm.origin_identity = GSC_my_identity;
+ GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_eddsa_sign (my_private_key,
+ ¤t_ekm.purpose,
+ ¤t_ekm.signature));
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Task run to trigger rekeying.
+ *
+ * @param cls closure, NULL
+ */
+static void
+do_rekey (void *cls)
+{
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *pos;
+
+ rekey_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (REKEY_FREQUENCY,
+ &do_rekey,
+ NULL);
+ if (NULL != my_ephemeral_key)
+ GNUNET_free (my_ephemeral_key);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO,
+ "Rekeying\n");
+ my_ephemeral_key = GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_create ();
+ GNUNET_assert (NULL != my_ephemeral_key);
+ sign_ephemeral_key ();
+ for (pos = kx_head; NULL != pos; pos = pos->next)
{
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
- _("Could not access PEERINFO service. Exiting.\n"));
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_key_free (my_private_key);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP == pos->status)
+ {
+ pos->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT;
+ monitor_notify_all (pos);
+ derive_session_keys (pos);
+ }
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN == pos->status)
+ {
+ pos->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
+ monitor_notify_all (pos);
+ }
+ monitor_notify_all (pos);
+ send_key (pos);
+ }
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Initialize KX subsystem.
+ *
+ * @param pk private key to use for the peer
+ * @param server the server of the CORE service
+ * @return #GNUNET_OK on success, #GNUNET_SYSERR on failure
+ */
+int
+GSC_KX_init (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPrivateKey *pk,
+ struct GNUNET_SERVER_Handle *server)
+{
+ nc = GNUNET_SERVER_notification_context_create (server,
+ 1);
+ my_private_key = pk;
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_eddsa_key_get_public (my_private_key,
+ &GSC_my_identity.public_key);
+ my_ephemeral_key = GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_create ();
+ if (NULL == my_ephemeral_key)
+ {
+ GNUNET_break (0);
+ GNUNET_free (my_private_key);
my_private_key = NULL;
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
+ sign_ephemeral_key ();
+ rekey_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (REKEY_FREQUENCY,
+ &do_rekey,
+ NULL);
mst = GNUNET_SERVER_mst_create (&deliver_message, NULL);
return GNUNET_OK;
}
/**
* Shutdown KX subsystem.
*/
-void
+void
GSC_KX_done ()
{
- if (my_private_key != NULL)
+ if (NULL != rekey_task)
{
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_key_free (my_private_key);
- my_private_key = NULL;
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (rekey_task);
+ rekey_task = NULL;
}
- if (peerinfo != NULL)
+ if (NULL != my_ephemeral_key)
{
- GNUNET_PEERINFO_disconnect (peerinfo);
- peerinfo = NULL;
+ GNUNET_free (my_ephemeral_key);
+ my_ephemeral_key = NULL;
}
- if (mst != NULL)
+ if (NULL != my_private_key)
+ {
+ GNUNET_free (my_private_key);
+ my_private_key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (NULL != mst)
{
GNUNET_SERVER_mst_destroy (mst);
mst = NULL;
}
+ if (NULL != nc)
+ {
+ GNUNET_SERVER_notification_context_destroy (nc);
+ nc = NULL;
+ }
}
+
+/**
+ * Handle #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_PEERS request. For this
+ * request type, the client does not have to have transmitted an INIT
+ * request. All current peers are returned, regardless of which
+ * message types they accept.
+ *
+ * @param cls unused
+ * @param client client sending the iteration request
+ * @param message iteration request message
+ */
+void
+GSC_KX_handle_client_monitor_peers (void *cls,
+ struct GNUNET_SERVER_Client *client,
+ const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *message)
+{
+ struct MonitorNotifyMessage done_msg;
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx;
+
+ GNUNET_SERVER_receive_done (client, GNUNET_OK);
+ GNUNET_SERVER_notification_context_add (nc,
+ client);
+ for (kx = kx_head; NULL != kx; kx = kx->next)
+ monitor_notify (client, kx);
+ done_msg.header.size = htons (sizeof (struct MonitorNotifyMessage));
+ done_msg.header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_NOTIFY);
+ done_msg.state = htonl ((uint32_t) GNUNET_CORE_KX_ITERATION_FINISHED);
+ memset (&done_msg.peer, 0, sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity));
+ done_msg.timeout = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_ABS);
+ GNUNET_SERVER_notification_context_unicast (nc,
+ client,
+ &done_msg.header,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+}
+
+
/* end of gnunet-service-core_kx.c */