/*
This file is part of GNUnet.
- (C) 2009-2013 Christian Grothoff (and other contributing authors)
+ Copyright (C) 2009-2013, 2016 GNUnet e.V.
GNUnet is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with GNUnet; see the file COPYING. If not, write to the
- Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330,
- Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
+ Free Software Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
+ Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
*/
/**
#include "platform.h"
#include "gnunet-service-core_kx.h"
#include "gnunet-service-core.h"
-#include "gnunet-service-core_clients.h"
-#include "gnunet-service-core_neighbours.h"
#include "gnunet-service-core_sessions.h"
#include "gnunet_statistics_service.h"
+#include "gnunet_transport_core_service.h"
#include "gnunet_constants.h"
#include "gnunet_signatures.h"
#include "gnunet_protocols.h"
{
/**
- * Message type is CORE_EPHEMERAL_KEY.
+ * Message type is #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_EPHEMERAL_KEY.
*/
struct GNUNET_MessageHeader header;
/**
- * Status of the sender (should be in "enum PeerStateMachine"), nbo.
+ * Status of the sender (should be in `enum PeerStateMachine`), nbo.
*/
int32_t sender_status GNUNET_PACKED;
/**
- * An ECC signature of the 'origin' asserting the validity of
- * the given ephemeral key.
+ * An ECC signature of the @e origin_identity asserting the validity
+ * of the given ephemeral key.
*/
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccSignature signature;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaSignature signature;
/**
* Information about what is being signed.
* At what time was this key created (beginning of validity).
*/
struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO creation_time;
-
+
/**
* When does the given ephemeral key expire (end of validity).
*/
struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO expiration_time;
/**
- * Ephemeral public ECC key (always for NIST P-521) encoded in a format suitable
- * for network transmission as created using 'gcry_sexp_sprint'.
+ * Ephemeral public ECC key.
*/
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccPublicEncryptKey ephemeral_key;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePublicKey ephemeral_key;
/**
- * Public key of the signing peer (persistent version, not the ephemeral public key).
+ * Public key of the signing peer (persistent version, not the
+ * ephemeral public key).
*/
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccPublicSignKey origin_public_key;
+ struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity origin_identity;
};
struct PingMessage
{
/**
- * Message type is CORE_PING.
+ * Message type is #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PING.
*/
struct GNUNET_MessageHeader header;
struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity target;
/**
- * Random number chosen to make reply harder.
+ * Random number chosen to make replay harder.
*/
uint32_t challenge GNUNET_PACKED;
};
struct PongMessage
{
/**
- * Message type is CORE_PONG.
+ * Message type is #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PONG.
*/
struct GNUNET_MessageHeader header;
uint32_t iv_seed GNUNET_PACKED;
/**
- * Random number to make faking the reply harder. Must be
- * first field after header (this is where we start to encrypt!).
+ * Random number to make replay attacks harder.
*/
uint32_t challenge GNUNET_PACKED;
struct EncryptedMessage
{
/**
- * Message type is either CORE_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE.
+ * Message type is #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE.
*/
struct GNUNET_MessageHeader header;
uint32_t iv_seed GNUNET_PACKED;
/**
- * MAC of the encrypted message (starting at 'sequence_number'),
+ * MAC of the encrypted message (starting at @e sequence_number),
* used to verify message integrity. Everything after this value
- * (excluding this value itself) will be encrypted and authenticated.
- * ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE must be set to the offset of the *next* field.
+ * (excluding this value itself) will be encrypted and
+ * authenticated. #ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE must be set to the offset
+ * of the *next* field.
*/
struct GNUNET_HashCode hmac;
/**
* Reserved, always zero.
*/
- uint32_t reserved;
+ uint32_t reserved GNUNET_PACKED;
/**
- * Timestamp. Used to prevent reply of ancient messages
+ * Timestamp. Used to prevent replay of ancient messages
* (recent messages are caught with the sequence number).
*/
struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO timestamp;
/**
- * Number of bytes (at the beginning) of "struct EncryptedMessage"
+ * Number of bytes (at the beginning) of `struct EncryptedMessage`
* that are NOT encrypted.
*/
#define ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE (offsetof(struct EncryptedMessage, sequence_number))
-/**
- * State machine for our P2P encryption handshake. Everyone starts in
- * "DOWN", if we receive the other peer's key (other peer initiated)
- * we start in state RECEIVED (since we will immediately send our
- * own); otherwise we start in SENT. If we get back a PONG from
- * within either state, we move up to CONFIRMED (the PONG will always
- * be sent back encrypted with the key we sent to the other peer).
- */
-enum KxStateMachine
-{
- /**
- * No handshake yet.
- */
- KX_STATE_DOWN,
-
- /**
- * We've sent our session key.
- */
- KX_STATE_KEY_SENT,
-
- /**
- * We've received the other peers session key.
- */
- KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED,
-
- /**
- * The other peer has confirmed our session key + PING with a PONG
- * message encrypted with his session key (which we got). Key
- * exchange is done.
- */
- KX_STATE_UP,
-
- /**
- * We're rekeying (or had a timeout), so we have sent the other peer
- * our new ephemeral key, but we did not get a matching PONG yet.
- * This is equivalent to being 'KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED', except that
- * the session is marked as 'up' with sessions (as we don't want to
- * drop and re-establish P2P connections simply due to rekeying).
- */
- KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT
-
-};
-
-
/**
* Information about the status of a key exchange with another peer.
*/
/**
* Identity of the peer.
*/
- struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity peer;
+ const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *peer;
+ /**
+ * Message queue for sending messages to @a peer.
+ */
+ struct GNUNET_MQ_Handle *mq;
+
/**
* PING message we transmit to the other peer.
*/
struct PingMessage ping;
+ /**
+ * Ephemeral public ECC key of the other peer.
+ */
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePublicKey other_ephemeral_key;
+
/**
* Key we use to encrypt our messages for the other peer
* (initialized by us when we do the handshake).
*/
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey encrypt_key;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey encrypt_key;
/**
* Key we use to decrypt messages from the other peer
* (given to us by the other peer during the handshake).
*/
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey decrypt_key;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey decrypt_key;
/**
* At what time did the other peer generate the decryption key?
*/
struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute timeout;
+ /**
+ * What was the last timeout we informed our monitors about?
+ */
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute last_notify_timeout;
+
/**
* At what frequency are we currently re-trying SET_KEY messages?
*/
/**
* ID of task used for re-trying SET_KEY and PING message.
*/
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_TaskIdentifier retry_set_key_task;
+ struct GNUNET_SCHEDULER_Task *retry_set_key_task;
/**
* ID of task used for sending keep-alive pings.
*/
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_TaskIdentifier keep_alive_task;
+ struct GNUNET_SCHEDULER_Task *keep_alive_task;
/**
- * Bit map indicating which of the 32 sequence numbers before the last
- * were received (good for accepting out-of-order packets and
+ * Bit map indicating which of the 32 sequence numbers before the
+ * last were received (good for accepting out-of-order packets and
* estimating reliability of the connection)
*/
unsigned int last_packets_bitmap;
*/
uint32_t ping_challenge;
+ /**
+ * #GNUNET_YES if this peer currently has excess bandwidth.
+ */
+ int has_excess_bandwidth;
+
/**
* What is our connection status?
*/
- enum KxStateMachine status;
+ enum GNUNET_CORE_KxState status;
};
+/**
+ * Transport service.
+ */
+static struct GNUNET_TRANSPORT_CoreHandle *transport;
+
/**
* Our private key.
*/
-static struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccPrivateKey *my_private_key;
+static struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPrivateKey *my_private_key;
/**
* Our ephemeral private key.
*/
-static struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccPrivateKey *my_ephemeral_key;
+static struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePrivateKey *my_ephemeral_key;
/**
* Current message we send for a key exchange.
*/
static struct EphemeralKeyMessage current_ekm;
-/**
- * Our public key.
- */
-static struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccPublicSignKey my_public_key;
-
/**
* Our message stream tokenizer (for encrypted payload).
*/
/**
* Task scheduled for periodic re-generation (and thus rekeying) of our
* ephemeral key.
- */
-static GNUNET_SCHEDULER_TaskIdentifier rekey_task;
+ */
+static struct GNUNET_SCHEDULER_Task *rekey_task;
+
+/**
+ * Notification context for broadcasting to monitors.
+ */
+static struct GNUNET_NotificationContext *nc;
+
+
+/**
+ * Calculate seed value we should use for a message.
+ *
+ * @param kx key exchange context
+ */
+static uint32_t
+calculate_seed (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
+{
+ /* Note: may want to make this non-random and instead
+ derive from key material to avoid having an undetectable
+ side-channel */
+ return htonl (GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32
+ (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_NONCE, UINT32_MAX));
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Inform all monitors about the KX state of the given peer.
+ *
+ * @param kx key exchange state to inform about
+ */
+static void
+monitor_notify_all (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
+{
+ struct MonitorNotifyMessage msg;
+
+ msg.header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_NOTIFY);
+ msg.header.size = htons (sizeof (msg));
+ msg.state = htonl ((uint32_t) kx->status);
+ msg.peer = *kx->peer;
+ msg.timeout = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (kx->timeout);
+ GNUNET_notification_context_broadcast (nc,
+ &msg.header,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ kx->last_notify_timeout = kx->timeout;
+}
/**
*/
static void
derive_auth_key (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AuthKey *akey,
- const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey *skey, uint32_t seed)
+ const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey *skey,
+ uint32_t seed)
{
static const char ctx[] = "authentication key";
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac_derive_key (akey, skey, &seed, sizeof (seed), &skey->key,
- sizeof (skey->key), ctx,
- sizeof (ctx), NULL);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac_derive_key (akey, skey,
+ &seed, sizeof (seed),
+ skey, sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey),
+ ctx, sizeof (ctx),
+ NULL);
}
* @param identity identity of the other peer to use
*/
static void
-derive_iv (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector *iv,
- const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey *skey, uint32_t seed,
+derive_iv (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector *iv,
+ const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey *skey,
+ uint32_t seed,
const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *identity)
{
static const char ctx[] = "initialization vector";
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_aes_derive_iv (iv, skey, &seed, sizeof (seed),
- &identity->hashPubKey.bits,
- sizeof (identity->hashPubKey.bits), ctx,
- sizeof (ctx), NULL);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_derive_iv (iv, skey,
+ &seed, sizeof (seed),
+ identity,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity), ctx,
+ sizeof (ctx), NULL);
}
* @param identity identity of the other peer to use
*/
static void
-derive_pong_iv (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector *iv,
- const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey *skey, uint32_t seed,
- uint32_t challenge, const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *identity)
+derive_pong_iv (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector *iv,
+ const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey *skey,
+ uint32_t seed,
+ uint32_t challenge,
+ const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *identity)
{
static const char ctx[] = "pong initialization vector";
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_aes_derive_iv (iv, skey, &seed, sizeof (seed),
- &identity->hashPubKey.bits,
- sizeof (identity->hashPubKey.bits), &challenge,
- sizeof (challenge), ctx, sizeof (ctx), NULL);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_derive_iv (iv, skey,
+ &seed, sizeof (seed),
+ identity,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ &challenge, sizeof (challenge),
+ ctx, sizeof (ctx),
+ NULL);
}
* @param sender peer identity of the sender
* @param receiver peer identity of the sender
* @param key_material high entropy key material to use
- * @param skey set to derived session key
+ * @param skey set to derived session key
*/
static void
derive_aes_key (const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *sender,
const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *receiver,
const struct GNUNET_HashCode *key_material,
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey *skey)
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey *skey)
{
static const char ctx[] = "aes key generation vector";
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_kdf (skey, sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesSessionKey),
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_kdf (skey, sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey),
ctx, sizeof (ctx),
key_material, sizeof (struct GNUNET_HashCode),
sender, sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
/**
- * Encrypt size bytes from in and write the result to out. Use the
- * key for outbound traffic of the given neighbour.
+ * Encrypt size bytes from @a in and write the result to @a out. Use the
+ * @a kx key for outbound traffic of the given neighbour.
*
* @param kx key information context
* @param iv initialization vector to use
* @param in ciphertext
* @param out plaintext
- * @param size size of in/out
- * @return GNUNET_OK on success
+ * @param size size of @a in/@a out
+ * @return #GNUNET_OK on success
*/
static int
do_encrypt (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector *iv,
- const void *in, void *out, size_t size)
+ const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector *iv,
+ const void *in,
+ void *out,
+ size_t size)
{
if (size != (uint16_t) size)
{
return GNUNET_NO;
}
GNUNET_assert (size ==
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_aes_encrypt (in, (uint16_t) size,
- &kx->encrypt_key, iv, out));
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats, gettext_noop ("# bytes encrypted"), size,
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_encrypt (in,
+ (uint16_t) size,
+ &kx->encrypt_key,
+ iv,
+ out));
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# bytes encrypted"),
+ size,
GNUNET_NO);
/* the following is too sensitive to write to log files by accident,
so we require manual intervention to get this one... */
#if 0
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Encrypted %u bytes for `%4s' using key %u, IV %u\n",
- (unsigned int) size, GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
- (unsigned int) kx->encrypt_key.crc32, GNUNET_CRYPTO_crc32_n (iv,
- sizeof
- (iv)));
+ "Encrypted %u bytes for `%s' using key %u, IV %u\n",
+ (unsigned int) size,
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
+ (unsigned int) kx->encrypt_key.crc32,
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_crc32_n (iv,
+ sizeof (iv)));
#endif
return GNUNET_OK;
}
/**
- * Decrypt size bytes from in and write the result to out. Use the
- * key for inbound traffic of the given neighbour. This function does
- * NOT do any integrity-checks on the result.
+ * Decrypt size bytes from @a in and write the result to @a out. Use
+ * the @a kx key for inbound traffic of the given neighbour. This
+ * function does NOT do any integrity-checks on the result.
*
* @param kx key information context
* @param iv initialization vector to use
* @param in ciphertext
* @param out plaintext
- * @param size size of in/out
- * @return GNUNET_OK on success
+ * @param size size of @a in / @a out
+ * @return #GNUNET_OK on success
*/
static int
do_decrypt (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector *iv,
- const void *in, void *out, size_t size)
+ const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector *iv,
+ const void *in,
+ void *out,
+ size_t size)
{
if (size != (uint16_t) size)
{
GNUNET_break (0);
return GNUNET_NO;
}
- if ( (kx->status != KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) && (kx->status != KX_STATE_UP) &&
- (kx->status != KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT) )
+ if ( (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
+ (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP) &&
+ (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT) )
{
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
if (size !=
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_aes_decrypt (in, (uint16_t) size, &kx->decrypt_key, iv,
- out))
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_decrypt (in,
+ (uint16_t) size,
+ &kx->decrypt_key,
+ iv,
+ out))
{
GNUNET_break (0);
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats, gettext_noop ("# bytes decrypted"), size,
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# bytes decrypted"),
+ size,
GNUNET_NO);
/* the following is too sensitive to write to log files by accident,
so we require manual intervention to get this one... */
#if 0
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Decrypted %u bytes from `%4s' using key %u, IV %u\n",
- (unsigned int) size, GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
- (unsigned int) kx->decrypt_key.crc32, GNUNET_CRYPTO_crc32_n (iv,
- sizeof
- (*iv)));
+ "Decrypted %u bytes from `%s' using key %u, IV %u\n",
+ (unsigned int) size,
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
+ (unsigned int) kx->decrypt_key.crc32,
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_crc32_n (iv,
+ sizeof
+ (*iv)));
#endif
return GNUNET_OK;
}
/**
- * Task that will retry "send_key" if our previous attempt failed.
+ * Task that will retry #send_key() if our previous attempt failed.
*
- * @param cls our 'struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo'
- * @param tc scheduler context
+ * @param cls our `struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo`
*/
static void
-set_key_retry_task (void *cls, const struct GNUNET_SCHEDULER_TaskContext *tc)
+set_key_retry_task (void *cls)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
- kx->retry_set_key_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
+ kx->retry_set_key_task = NULL;
kx->set_key_retry_frequency = GNUNET_TIME_STD_BACKOFF (kx->set_key_retry_frequency);
- GNUNET_assert (KX_STATE_DOWN != kx->status);
+ GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN != kx->status);
send_key (kx);
}
{
struct PingMessage pp;
struct PingMessage *pm;
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector iv;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector iv;
pm = &kx->ping;
+ kx->ping_challenge = GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32 (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_WEAK,
+ UINT32_MAX);
pm->header.size = htons (sizeof (struct PingMessage));
pm->header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PING);
- pm->iv_seed =
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32 (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_NONCE, UINT32_MAX);
- derive_iv (&iv, &kx->encrypt_key, pm->iv_seed, &kx->peer);
+ pm->iv_seed = calculate_seed (kx);
+ derive_iv (&iv,
+ &kx->encrypt_key,
+ pm->iv_seed,
+ kx->peer);
pp.challenge = kx->ping_challenge;
- pp.target = kx->peer;
- do_encrypt (kx, &iv, &pp.target, &pm->target,
+ pp.target = *kx->peer;
+ do_encrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &pp.target,
+ &pm->target,
sizeof (struct PingMessage) - ((void *) &pm->target -
(void *) pm));
}
/**
- * Start the key exchange with the given peer.
+ * Function called by transport to notify us that
+ * a peer connected to us (on the network level).
+ * Starts the key exchange with the given peer.
*
+ * @param cls closure (NULL)
* @param pid identity of the peer to do a key exchange with
* @return key exchange information context
*/
-struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *
-GSC_KX_start (const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *pid)
+static void *
+handle_transport_notify_connect (void *cls,
+ const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *pid,
+ struct GNUNET_MQ_Handle *mq)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx;
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode h1;
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode h2;
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Initiating key exchange with `%s'\n",
GNUNET_i2s (pid));
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# key exchanges initiated"), 1,
+ gettext_noop ("# key exchanges initiated"),
+ 1,
GNUNET_NO);
- kx = GNUNET_malloc (sizeof (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo));
- kx->peer = *pid;
+ kx = GNUNET_new (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo);
+ kx->mq = mq;
+ kx->peer = pid;
kx->set_key_retry_frequency = INITIAL_SET_KEY_RETRY_FREQUENCY;
GNUNET_CONTAINER_DLL_insert (kx_head,
kx_tail,
kx);
- if (0 < GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash_cmp (&pid->hashPubKey,
- &GSC_my_identity.hashPubKey))
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (pid,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ &h1);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&GSC_my_identity,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ &h2);
+ if (0 < GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash_cmp (&h1,
+ &h2))
{
/* peer with "lower" identity starts KX, otherwise we typically end up
- with both peers starting the exchange and transmit the 'set key'
+ with both peers starting the exchange and transmit the 'set key'
message twice */
- kx->status = KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
send_key (kx);
}
+ else
+ {
+ /* peer with "higher" identity starts a delayed KX, if the "lower" peer
+ * does not start a KX since he sees no reasons to do so */
+ kx->retry_set_key_task
+ = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_SECONDS,
+ &set_key_retry_task,
+ kx);
+ }
return kx;
}
/**
+ * Function called by transport telling us that a peer
+ * disconnected.
* Stop key exchange with the given peer. Clean up key material.
*
- * @param kx key exchange to stop
+ * @param cls closure
+ * @param peer the peer that disconnected
+ * @param handler_cls the `struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo` of the peer
*/
-void
-GSC_KX_stop (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
+static void
+handle_transport_notify_disconnect (void *cls,
+ const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *peer,
+ void *handler_cls)
{
- GSC_SESSIONS_end (&kx->peer);
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats, gettext_noop ("# key exchanges stopped"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
- if (kx->retry_set_key_task != GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK)
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = handler_cls;
+
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Peer `%s' disconnected from us.\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (peer));
+ GSC_SESSIONS_end (kx->peer);
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# key exchanges stopped"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ if (NULL != kx->retry_set_key_task)
{
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->retry_set_key_task);
- kx->retry_set_key_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
+ kx->retry_set_key_task = NULL;
}
- if (kx->keep_alive_task != GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK)
+ if (NULL != kx->keep_alive_task)
{
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->keep_alive_task);
- kx->keep_alive_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
+ kx->keep_alive_task = NULL;
}
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_PEER_DISCONNECT;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
GNUNET_CONTAINER_DLL_remove (kx_head,
kx_tail,
kx);
static void
send_ping (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
{
- GSC_NEIGHBOURS_transmit (&kx->peer, &kx->ping.header,
- MIN_PING_FREQUENCY);
+ struct GNUNET_MQ_Envelope *env;
+
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# PING messages transmitted"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ env = GNUNET_MQ_msg_copy (&kx->ping.header);
+ GNUNET_MQ_send (kx->mq,
+ env);
}
+
/**
- * We received a SET_KEY message. Validate and update
- * our key material and status.
+ * Derive fresh session keys from the current ephemeral keys.
*
- * @param kx key exchange status for the corresponding peer
- * @param msg the set key message we received
+ * @param kx session to derive keys for
*/
-void
-GSC_KX_handle_ephemeral_key (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *msg)
+static void
+derive_session_keys (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
{
- const struct EphemeralKeyMessage *m;
- struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute start_t;
- struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute end_t;
- struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute now;
- struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity signer_id;
- enum KxStateMachine sender_status;
- uint16_t size;
struct GNUNET_HashCode key_material;
-
- size = ntohs (msg->size);
- if (sizeof (struct EphemeralKeyMessage) != size)
+
+ if (GNUNET_OK !=
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_ecdh (my_ephemeral_key,
+ &kx->other_ephemeral_key,
+ &key_material))
{
- GNUNET_break_op (0);
+ GNUNET_break (0);
return;
}
- m = (const struct EphemeralKeyMessage *) msg;
+ derive_aes_key (&GSC_my_identity,
+ kx->peer,
+ &key_material,
+ &kx->encrypt_key);
+ derive_aes_key (kx->peer,
+ &GSC_my_identity,
+ &key_material,
+ &kx->decrypt_key);
+ memset (&key_material, 0, sizeof (key_material));
+ /* fresh key, reset sequence numbers */
+ kx->last_sequence_number_received = 0;
+ kx->last_packets_bitmap = 0;
+ setup_fresh_ping (kx);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * We received a #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_EPHEMERAL_KEY message.
+ * Validate and update our key material and status.
+ *
+ * @param cls key exchange status for the corresponding peer
+ * @param m the set key message we received
+ */
+static void
+handle_ephemeral_key (void *cls,
+ const struct EphemeralKeyMessage *m)
+{
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute start_t;
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute end_t;
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute now;
+ enum GNUNET_CORE_KxState sender_status;
+
end_t = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_ntoh (m->expiration_time);
- if ( ( (KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED == kx->status) ||
- (KX_STATE_UP == kx->status) ||
- (KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT == kx->status) ) &&
- (end_t.abs_value_us <= kx->foreign_key_expires.abs_value_us) )
+ if ( ( (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED == kx->status) ||
+ (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP == kx->status) ||
+ (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT == kx->status) ) &&
+ (end_t.abs_value_us < kx->foreign_key_expires.abs_value_us) )
{
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats, gettext_noop ("# old ephemeral keys ignored"),
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# old ephemeral keys ignored"),
1, GNUNET_NO);
return;
}
start_t = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_ntoh (m->creation_time);
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats, gettext_noop ("# ephemeral keys received"),
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# ephemeral keys received"),
1, GNUNET_NO);
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Core service receives `%s' request from `%4s'.\n", "EPHEMERAL_KEY",
- GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&m->origin_public_key,
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccPublicSignKey),
- &signer_id.hashPubKey);
if (0 !=
- memcmp (&signer_id, &kx->peer,
+ memcmp (&m->origin_identity,
+ kx->peer,
sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
- {
+ {
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
+ "Received EPHEMERAL_KEY from %s, but expected %s\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&m->origin_identity),
+ GNUNET_i2s_full (kx->peer));
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
}
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Core service receives EPHEMERAL_KEY request from `%s'.\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
if ((ntohl (m->purpose.size) !=
sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccSignaturePurpose) +
sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccPublicSignKey) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccPublicSignKey)) ||
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPublicKey) +
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPublicKey)) ||
(GNUNET_OK !=
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_verify (GNUNET_SIGNATURE_PURPOSE_SET_ECC_KEY,
- &m->purpose,
- &m->signature, &m->origin_public_key)))
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_eddsa_verify (GNUNET_SIGNATURE_PURPOSE_SET_ECC_KEY,
+ &m->purpose,
+ &m->signature,
+ &m->origin_identity.public_key)))
{
/* invalid signature */
GNUNET_break_op (0);
{
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
_("Ephemeral key message from peer `%s' rejected as its validity range does not match our system time (%llu not in [%llu,%llu]).\n"),
- GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
- now.abs_value_us,
- start_t.abs_value_us,
- end_t.abs_value_us);
- return;
- }
- if (GNUNET_OK !=
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_ecdh (my_ephemeral_key,
- &m->ephemeral_key,
- &key_material))
- {
- GNUNET_break (0);
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
+ (unsigned long long) now.abs_value_us,
+ (unsigned long long) start_t.abs_value_us,
+ (unsigned long long) end_t.abs_value_us);
return;
}
+ kx->other_ephemeral_key = m->ephemeral_key;
+ kx->foreign_key_expires = end_t;
+ derive_session_keys (kx);
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# EPHEMERAL_KEY messages decrypted"), 1,
+ gettext_noop ("# EPHEMERAL_KEY messages received"), 1,
GNUNET_NO);
- derive_aes_key (&GSC_my_identity,
- &kx->peer,
- &key_material,
- &kx->encrypt_key);
- derive_aes_key (&kx->peer,
- &GSC_my_identity,
- &key_material,
- &kx->decrypt_key);
- /* fresh key, reset sequence numbers */
- kx->last_sequence_number_received = 0;
- kx->last_packets_bitmap = 0;
- kx->foreign_key_expires = end_t;
- setup_fresh_ping (kx);
/* check if we still need to send the sender our key */
- sender_status = (enum KxStateMachine) ntohl (m->sender_status);
+ sender_status = (enum GNUNET_CORE_KxState) ntohl (m->sender_status);
switch (sender_status)
{
- case KX_STATE_DOWN:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN:
GNUNET_break_op (0);
break;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
/* fine, need to send our key after updating our status, see below */
+ GSC_SESSIONS_reinit (kx->peer);
+ break;
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
+ /* other peer already got our key, but typemap did go down */
+ GSC_SESSIONS_reinit (kx->peer);
break;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
- case KX_STATE_UP:
- case KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
- /* other peer already got our key */
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP:
+ /* other peer already got our key, typemap NOT down */
+ break;
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
+ /* other peer already got our key, typemap NOT down */
break;
default:
GNUNET_break (0);
/* check if we need to confirm everything is fine via PING + PONG */
switch (kx->status)
{
- case KX_STATE_DOWN:
- GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK == kx->keep_alive_task);
- kx->status = KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED;
- if (KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN:
+ GNUNET_assert (NULL == kx->keep_alive_task);
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
send_key (kx);
- send_ping (kx);
+ else
+ send_ping (kx);
break;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
- GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK == kx->keep_alive_task);
- kx->status = KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED;
- if (KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
+ GNUNET_assert (NULL == kx->keep_alive_task);
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
send_key (kx);
- send_ping (kx);
+ else
+ send_ping (kx);
break;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
- GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK == kx->keep_alive_task);
- if (KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
+ GNUNET_assert (NULL == kx->keep_alive_task);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
send_key (kx);
- send_ping (kx);
+ else
+ send_ping (kx);
break;
- case KX_STATE_UP:
- kx->status = KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT;
- if (KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP:
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
send_key (kx);
- /* we got a new key, need to reconfirm! */
- send_ping (kx);
+ else
+ send_ping (kx);
break;
- case KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
- if (KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
send_key (kx);
- /* we got a new key, need to reconfirm! */
- send_ping (kx);
+ else
+ send_ping (kx);
break;
default:
GNUNET_break (0);
* We received a PING message. Validate and transmit
* a PONG message.
*
- * @param kx key exchange status for the corresponding peer
- * @param msg the encrypted PING message itself
+ * @param cls key exchange status for the corresponding peer
+ * @param m the encrypted PING message itself
*/
-void
-GSC_KX_handle_ping (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *msg)
+static void
+handle_ping (void *cls,
+ const struct PingMessage *m)
{
- const struct PingMessage *m;
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
struct PingMessage t;
struct PongMessage tx;
- struct PongMessage tp;
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector iv;
- uint16_t msize;
+ struct PongMessage *tp;
+ struct GNUNET_MQ_Envelope *env;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector iv;
- msize = ntohs (msg->size);
- if (msize != sizeof (struct PingMessage))
- {
- GNUNET_break_op (0);
- return;
- }
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# PING messages received"), 1,
+ gettext_noop ("# PING messages received"),
+ 1,
GNUNET_NO);
- if ( (kx->status != KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
- (kx->status != KX_STATE_UP) &&
- (kx->status != KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT))
+ if ( (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
+ (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP) &&
+ (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT))
{
/* ignore */
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# PING messages dropped (out of order)"), 1,
+ gettext_noop ("# PING messages dropped (out of order)"),
+ 1,
GNUNET_NO);
return;
}
- m = (const struct PingMessage *) msg;
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Core service receives `%s' request from `%4s'.\n", "PING",
- GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
- derive_iv (&iv, &kx->decrypt_key, m->iv_seed, &GSC_my_identity);
+ "Core service receives PING request from `%s'.\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
+ derive_iv (&iv,
+ &kx->decrypt_key,
+ m->iv_seed,
+ &GSC_my_identity);
if (GNUNET_OK !=
- do_decrypt (kx, &iv, &m->target, &t.target,
+ do_decrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &m->target,
+ &t.target,
sizeof (struct PingMessage) - ((void *) &m->target -
(void *) m)))
{
return;
}
if (0 !=
- memcmp (&t.target, &GSC_my_identity, sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
+ memcmp (&t.target,
+ &GSC_my_identity,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
{
- char sender[9];
- char peer[9];
-
- GNUNET_snprintf (sender, sizeof (sender), "%8s", GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
- GNUNET_snprintf (peer, sizeof (peer), "%8s", GNUNET_i2s (&t.target));
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
- _
- ("Received PING from `%s' for different identity: I am `%s', PONG identity: `%s'\n"),
- sender, GNUNET_i2s (&GSC_my_identity), peer);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT != kx->status)
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
+ "Decryption of PING from peer `%s' failed\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
+ else
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Decryption of PING from peer `%s' failed after rekey (harmless)\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
}
tx.reserved = 0;
tx.challenge = t.challenge;
tx.target = t.target;
- tp.header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PONG);
- tp.header.size = htons (sizeof (struct PongMessage));
- tp.iv_seed =
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32 (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_NONCE, UINT32_MAX);
- derive_pong_iv (&iv, &kx->encrypt_key, tp.iv_seed, t.challenge, &kx->peer);
- do_encrypt (kx, &iv, &tx.challenge, &tp.challenge,
- sizeof (struct PongMessage) - ((void *) &tp.challenge -
- (void *) &tp));
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats, gettext_noop ("# PONG messages created"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
- GSC_NEIGHBOURS_transmit (&kx->peer, &tp.header,
- GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_REL /* FIXME: timeout */ );
+ env = GNUNET_MQ_msg (tp,
+ GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PONG);
+ tp->iv_seed = calculate_seed (kx);
+ derive_pong_iv (&iv,
+ &kx->encrypt_key,
+ tp->iv_seed,
+ t.challenge,
+ kx->peer);
+ do_encrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &tx.challenge,
+ &tp->challenge,
+ sizeof (struct PongMessage) - ((void *) &tp->challenge -
+ (void *) tp));
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# PONG messages created"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ GNUNET_MQ_send (kx->mq,
+ env);
}
* Task triggered when a neighbour entry is about to time out
* (and we should prevent this by sending a PING).
*
- * @param cls the 'struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo'
- * @param tc scheduler context (not used)
+ * @param cls the `struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo`
*/
static void
-send_keep_alive (void *cls, const struct GNUNET_SCHEDULER_TaskContext *tc)
+send_keep_alive (void *cls)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative retry;
struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative left;
- kx->keep_alive_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
+ kx->keep_alive_task = NULL;
left = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_remaining (kx->timeout);
if (0 == left.rel_value_us)
{
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# sessions terminated by timeout"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
- GSC_SESSIONS_end (&kx->peer);
- kx->status = KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ GSC_SESSIONS_end (kx->peer);
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
send_key (kx);
return;
}
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, "Sending KEEPALIVE to `%s'\n",
- GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Sending KEEPALIVE to `%s'\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# keepalive messages sent"), 1,
+ gettext_noop ("# keepalive messages sent"),
+ 1,
GNUNET_NO);
setup_fresh_ping (kx);
- GSC_NEIGHBOURS_transmit (&kx->peer, &kx->ping.header,
- kx->set_key_retry_frequency);
+ send_ping (kx);
retry =
GNUNET_TIME_relative_max (GNUNET_TIME_relative_divide (left, 2),
MIN_PING_FREQUENCY);
kx->keep_alive_task =
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (retry, &send_keep_alive, kx);
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (retry,
+ &send_keep_alive,
+ kx);
}
static void
update_timeout (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
{
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative delta;
+
kx->timeout =
GNUNET_TIME_relative_to_absolute
(GNUNET_CONSTANTS_IDLE_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT);
- if (kx->keep_alive_task != GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK)
+ delta = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_difference (kx->last_notify_timeout,
+ kx->timeout);
+ if (delta.rel_value_us > 5LL * 1000LL * 1000LL)
+ {
+ /* we only notify monitors about timeout changes if those
+ are bigger than the threshold (5s) */
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ }
+ if (NULL != kx->keep_alive_task)
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->keep_alive_task);
kx->keep_alive_task =
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (GNUNET_TIME_relative_divide
(GNUNET_CONSTANTS_IDLE_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT,
- 2), &send_keep_alive, kx);
+ 2),
+ &send_keep_alive,
+ kx);
}
* We received a PONG message. Validate and update our status.
*
* @param kx key exchange context for the the PONG
- * @param msg the encrypted PONG message itself
+ * @param m the encrypted PONG message itself
*/
-void
-GSC_KX_handle_pong (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *msg)
+static void
+handle_pong (void *cls,
+ const struct PongMessage *m)
{
- const struct PongMessage *m;
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
struct PongMessage t;
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector iv;
- uint16_t msize;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector iv;
- msize = ntohs (msg->size);
- if (sizeof (struct PongMessage) != msize)
- {
- GNUNET_break_op (0);
- return;
- }
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# PONG messages received"), 1,
+ gettext_noop ("# PONG messages received"),
+ 1,
GNUNET_NO);
switch (kx->status)
{
- case KX_STATE_DOWN:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN:
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# PONG messages dropped (connection down)"), 1,
GNUNET_NO);
return;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# PONG messages dropped (out of order)"), 1,
GNUNET_NO);
return;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
break;
- case KX_STATE_UP:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP:
break;
- case KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
break;
default:
GNUNET_break (0);
return;
}
- m = (const struct PongMessage *) msg;
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Core service receives `%s' response from `%4s'.\n", "PONG",
- GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
+ "Core service receives PONG response from `%s'.\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
/* mark as garbage, just to be sure */
memset (&t, 255, sizeof (t));
- derive_pong_iv (&iv, &kx->decrypt_key, m->iv_seed, kx->ping_challenge,
+ derive_pong_iv (&iv,
+ &kx->decrypt_key,
+ m->iv_seed,
+ kx->ping_challenge,
&GSC_my_identity);
if (GNUNET_OK !=
- do_decrypt (kx, &iv, &m->challenge, &t.challenge,
+ do_decrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &m->challenge,
+ &t.challenge,
sizeof (struct PongMessage) - ((void *) &m->challenge -
(void *) m)))
{
return;
}
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# PONG messages decrypted"), 1,
+ gettext_noop ("# PONG messages decrypted"),
+ 1,
GNUNET_NO);
- if ((0 != memcmp (&t.target, &kx->peer, sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
- || (kx->ping_challenge != t.challenge))
+ if ((0 != memcmp (&t.target,
+ kx->peer,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity))) ||
+ (kx->ping_challenge != t.challenge))
{
/* PONG malformed */
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Received malformed `%s' wanted sender `%4s' with challenge %u\n",
- "PONG", GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
+ "Received malformed PONG wanted sender `%s' with challenge %u\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
(unsigned int) kx->ping_challenge);
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Received malformed `%s' received from `%4s' with challenge %u\n",
- "PONG", GNUNET_i2s (&t.target), (unsigned int) t.challenge);
+ "Received malformed PONG received from `%s' with challenge %u\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&t.target),
+ (unsigned int) t.challenge);
return;
}
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, "Received PONG from `%s'\n",
- GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Received PONG from `%s'\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
/* no need to resend key any longer */
- if (GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK != kx->retry_set_key_task)
+ if (NULL != kx->retry_set_key_task)
{
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->retry_set_key_task);
- kx->retry_set_key_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
- }
+ kx->retry_set_key_task = NULL;
+ }
switch (kx->status)
{
- case KX_STATE_DOWN:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN:
GNUNET_assert (0); /* should be impossible */
return;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
GNUNET_assert (0); /* should be impossible */
return;
- case KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop
- ("# session keys confirmed via PONG"), 1,
+ gettext_noop ("# session keys confirmed via PONG"),
+ 1,
GNUNET_NO);
- kx->status = KX_STATE_UP;
- GSC_SESSIONS_create (&kx->peer, kx);
- GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK == kx->keep_alive_task);
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
+ GSC_SESSIONS_create (kx->peer, kx);
+ GNUNET_assert (NULL == kx->keep_alive_task);
update_timeout (kx);
break;
- case KX_STATE_UP:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP:
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop
- ("# timeouts prevented via PONG"), 1,
+ gettext_noop ("# timeouts prevented via PONG"),
+ 1,
GNUNET_NO);
update_timeout (kx);
break;
- case KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
+ case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop
- ("# rekey operations confirmed via PONG"), 1,
+ gettext_noop ("# rekey operations confirmed via PONG"),
+ 1,
GNUNET_NO);
- kx->status = KX_STATE_UP;
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
update_timeout (kx);
break;
default:
static void
send_key (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx)
{
- GNUNET_assert (KX_STATE_DOWN != kx->status);
- if (GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK != kx->retry_set_key_task)
+ struct GNUNET_MQ_Envelope *env;
+
+ GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN != kx->status);
+ if (NULL != kx->retry_set_key_task)
{
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->retry_set_key_task);
- kx->retry_set_key_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
+ kx->retry_set_key_task = NULL;
}
/* always update sender status in SET KEY message */
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Sending key to `%s' (my status: %d)\n",
- GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer),
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
kx->status);
- current_ekm.sender_status = htonl ((int32_t) (kx->status));
- GSC_NEIGHBOURS_transmit (&kx->peer, ¤t_ekm.header,
- kx->set_key_retry_frequency);
+ current_ekm.sender_status = htonl ((int32_t) (kx->status));
+ env = GNUNET_MQ_msg_copy (¤t_ekm.header);
+ GNUNET_MQ_send (kx->mq,
+ env);
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT != kx->status)
+ send_ping (kx);
kx->retry_set_key_task =
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (kx->set_key_retry_frequency,
- &set_key_retry_task, kx);
+ &set_key_retry_task,
+ kx);
}
*
* @param kx key exchange context
* @param payload payload of the message
- * @param payload_size number of bytes in 'payload'
+ * @param payload_size number of bytes in @a payload
*/
void
GSC_KX_encrypt_and_transmit (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- const void *payload, size_t payload_size)
+ const void *payload,
+ size_t payload_size)
{
size_t used = payload_size + sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage);
char pbuf[used]; /* plaintext */
- char cbuf[used]; /* ciphertext */
struct EncryptedMessage *em; /* encrypted message */
struct EncryptedMessage *ph; /* plaintext header */
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector iv;
+ struct GNUNET_MQ_Envelope *env;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector iv;
struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AuthKey auth_key;
ph = (struct EncryptedMessage *) pbuf;
- ph->iv_seed =
- htonl (GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32
- (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_NONCE, UINT32_MAX));
ph->sequence_number = htonl (++kx->last_sequence_number_sent);
+ ph->iv_seed = calculate_seed (kx);
ph->reserved = 0;
ph->timestamp = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get ());
- memcpy (&ph[1], payload, payload_size);
-
- em = (struct EncryptedMessage *) cbuf;
- em->header.size = htons (used);
- em->header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE);
+ GNUNET_memcpy (&ph[1],
+ payload,
+ payload_size);
+ env = GNUNET_MQ_msg_extra (em,
+ payload_size,
+ GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE);
em->iv_seed = ph->iv_seed;
- derive_iv (&iv, &kx->encrypt_key, ph->iv_seed, &kx->peer);
+ derive_iv (&iv,
+ &kx->encrypt_key,
+ ph->iv_seed,
+ kx->peer);
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
- do_encrypt (kx, &iv, &ph->sequence_number,
+ do_encrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &ph->sequence_number,
&em->sequence_number,
used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE));
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, "Encrypted %u bytes for %s\n",
- used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE, GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
- derive_auth_key (&auth_key,
- &kx->encrypt_key,
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Encrypted %u bytes for %s\n",
+ (unsigned int) (used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE),
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
+ derive_auth_key (&auth_key,
+ &kx->encrypt_key,
ph->iv_seed);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac (&auth_key, &em->sequence_number,
- used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE, &em->hmac);
- GSC_NEIGHBOURS_transmit (&kx->peer, &em->header,
- GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_REL);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac (&auth_key,
+ &em->sequence_number,
+ used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE,
+ &em->hmac);
+ kx->has_excess_bandwidth = GNUNET_NO;
+ GNUNET_MQ_send (kx->mq,
+ env);
}
/**
- * Closure for 'deliver_message'
+ * Closure for #deliver_message()
*/
struct DeliverMessageContext
{
};
+/**
+ * We received an encrypted message. Check that it is
+ * well-formed (size-wise).
+ *
+ * @param cls key exchange context for encrypting the message
+ * @param m encrypted message
+ * @return #GNUNET_OK if @a msg is well-formed (size-wise)
+ */
+static int
+check_encrypted (void *cls,
+ const struct EncryptedMessage *m)
+{
+ uint16_t size = ntohs (m->header.size) - sizeof (*m);
+
+ if (size < sizeof (struct GNUNET_MessageHeader))
+ {
+ GNUNET_break_op (0);
+ return GNUNET_SYSERR;
+ }
+ return GNUNET_OK;
+}
+
+
/**
* We received an encrypted message. Decrypt, validate and
* pass on to the appropriate clients.
*
- * @param kx key exchange context for encrypting the message
- * @param msg encrypted message
+ * @param cls key exchange context for encrypting the message
+ * @param m encrypted message
*/
-void
-GSC_KX_handle_encrypted_message (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx,
- const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *msg)
+static void
+handle_encrypted (void *cls,
+ const struct EncryptedMessage *m)
{
- const struct EncryptedMessage *m;
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
struct EncryptedMessage *pt; /* plaintext */
struct GNUNET_HashCode ph;
uint32_t snum;
struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute t;
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AesInitializationVector iv;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector iv;
struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AuthKey auth_key;
struct DeliverMessageContext dmc;
- uint16_t size = ntohs (msg->size);
+ uint16_t size = ntohs (m->header.size);
char buf[size] GNUNET_ALIGN;
- if (size <
- sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage) + sizeof (struct GNUNET_MessageHeader))
- {
- GNUNET_break_op (0);
- return;
- }
- m = (const struct EncryptedMessage *) msg;
- if (kx->status != KX_STATE_UP)
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP != kx->status)
{
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop
- ("# DATA message dropped (out of order)"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
+ gettext_noop ("# DATA message dropped (out of order)"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
return;
}
if (0 == GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_remaining (kx->foreign_key_expires).rel_value_us)
{
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
_("Session to peer `%s' went down due to key expiration (should not happen)\n"),
- GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# sessions terminated by key expiration"),
1, GNUNET_NO);
- GSC_SESSIONS_end (&kx->peer);
- if (GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK != kx->keep_alive_task)
+ GSC_SESSIONS_end (kx->peer);
+ if (NULL != kx->keep_alive_task)
{
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->keep_alive_task);
- kx->keep_alive_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
+ kx->keep_alive_task = NULL;
}
- kx->status = KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
+ kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
+ monitor_notify_all (kx);
send_key (kx);
return;
}
/* validate hash */
- derive_auth_key (&auth_key, &kx->decrypt_key, m->iv_seed);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac (&auth_key, &m->sequence_number,
- size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE, &ph);
- if (0 != memcmp (&ph, &m->hmac, sizeof (struct GNUNET_HashCode)))
+ derive_auth_key (&auth_key,
+ &kx->decrypt_key,
+ m->iv_seed);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac (&auth_key,
+ &m->sequence_number,
+ size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE,
+ &ph);
+ if (0 != memcmp (&ph,
+ &m->hmac,
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_HashCode)))
{
/* checksum failed */
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Failed checksum validation for a message from `%s'\n",
- GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Failed checksum validation for a message from `%s'\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
return;
}
- derive_iv (&iv, &kx->decrypt_key, m->iv_seed, &GSC_my_identity);
+ derive_iv (&iv,
+ &kx->decrypt_key,
+ m->iv_seed,
+ &GSC_my_identity);
/* decrypt */
if (GNUNET_OK !=
- do_decrypt (kx, &iv, &m->sequence_number, &buf[ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE],
+ do_decrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &m->sequence_number,
+ &buf[ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE],
size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE))
return;
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, "Decrypted %u bytes from %s\n",
- size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE, GNUNET_i2s (&kx->peer));
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Decrypted %u bytes from %s\n",
+ (unsigned int) (size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE),
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
pt = (struct EncryptedMessage *) buf;
/* validate sequence number */
/* duplicate, ignore */
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# bytes dropped (duplicates)"),
- size, GNUNET_NO);
+ size,
+ GNUNET_NO);
return;
}
if ((kx->last_sequence_number_received > snum) &&
{
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Message received far too old (%s). Content ignored.\n",
- GNUNET_STRINGS_relative_time_to_string (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_duration (t), GNUNET_YES));
+ GNUNET_STRINGS_relative_time_to_string (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_duration (t),
+ GNUNET_YES));
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop
("# bytes dropped (ancient message)"), size,
update_timeout (kx);
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# bytes of payload decrypted"),
- size - sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage), GNUNET_NO);
+ size - sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage),
+ GNUNET_NO);
dmc.kx = kx;
- dmc.peer = &kx->peer;
+ dmc.peer = kx->peer;
if (GNUNET_OK !=
- GNUNET_SERVER_mst_receive (mst, &dmc,
+ GNUNET_SERVER_mst_receive (mst,
+ &dmc,
&buf[sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage)],
size - sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage),
- GNUNET_YES, GNUNET_NO))
+ GNUNET_YES,
+ GNUNET_NO))
GNUNET_break_op (0);
}
/**
- * Deliver P2P message to interested clients.
- * Invokes send twice, once for clients that want the full message, and once
- * for clients that only want the header
+ * One of our neighbours has excess bandwidth, remember this.
+ *
+ * @param cls NULL
+ * @param pid identity of the peer with excess bandwidth
+ * @param connect_cls the `struct Neighbour`
+ */
+static void
+handle_transport_notify_excess_bw (void *cls,
+ const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *pid,
+ void *connect_cls)
+{
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = connect_cls;
+
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Peer %s has excess bandwidth available\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (pid));
+ kx->has_excess_bandwidth = GNUNET_YES;
+ GSC_SESSIONS_solicit (pid);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Deliver P2P message to interested clients. Invokes send twice,
+ * once for clients that want the full message, and once for clients
+ * that only want the header
*
* @param cls always NULL
* @param client who sent us the message (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo)
* @param m the message
*/
static int
-deliver_message (void *cls, void *client, const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *m)
+deliver_message (void *cls,
+ void *client,
+ const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *m)
{
struct DeliverMessageContext *dmc = client;
- if (KX_STATE_UP != dmc->kx->status)
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP != dmc->kx->status)
{
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop
- ("# PAYLOAD dropped (out of order)"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
+ gettext_noop ("# PAYLOAD dropped (out of order)"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
return GNUNET_OK;
}
switch (ntohs (m->type))
case GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_COMPRESSED_TYPE_MAP:
GSC_SESSIONS_set_typemap (dmc->peer, m);
return GNUNET_OK;
+ case GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_CONFIRM_TYPE_MAP:
+ GSC_SESSIONS_confirm_typemap (dmc->peer, m);
+ return GNUNET_OK;
default:
- GSC_CLIENTS_deliver_message (dmc->peer, m,
+ GSC_CLIENTS_deliver_message (dmc->peer,
+ m,
ntohs (m->size),
GNUNET_CORE_OPTION_SEND_FULL_INBOUND);
- GSC_CLIENTS_deliver_message (dmc->peer, m,
+ GSC_CLIENTS_deliver_message (dmc->peer,
+ m,
sizeof (struct GNUNET_MessageHeader),
GNUNET_CORE_OPTION_SEND_HDR_INBOUND);
}
current_ekm.purpose.size = htonl (sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccSignaturePurpose) +
sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccPublicSignKey) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccPublicSignKey));
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePublicKey) +
+ sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity));
current_ekm.creation_time = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get ());
if (GNUNET_YES ==
GNUNET_CONFIGURATION_get_value_yesno (GSC_cfg,
{
current_ekm.expiration_time = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_ABS);
}
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_key_get_public_for_encryption (my_ephemeral_key,
- ¤t_ekm.ephemeral_key);
- current_ekm.origin_public_key = my_public_key;
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (my_ephemeral_key,
+ ¤t_ekm.ephemeral_key);
+ current_ekm.origin_identity = GSC_my_identity;
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_sign (my_private_key,
- ¤t_ekm.purpose,
- ¤t_ekm.signature));
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_eddsa_sign (my_private_key,
+ ¤t_ekm.purpose,
+ ¤t_ekm.signature));
}
* Task run to trigger rekeying.
*
* @param cls closure, NULL
- * @param tc scheduler context
*/
static void
-do_rekey (void *cls,
- const struct GNUNET_SCHEDULER_TaskContext *tc)
+do_rekey (void *cls)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *pos;
NULL);
if (NULL != my_ephemeral_key)
GNUNET_free (my_ephemeral_key);
- my_ephemeral_key = GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_key_create ();
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO,
+ "Rekeying\n");
+ my_ephemeral_key = GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_create ();
GNUNET_assert (NULL != my_ephemeral_key);
sign_ephemeral_key ();
for (pos = kx_head; NULL != pos; pos = pos->next)
{
- pos->status = KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT;
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP == pos->status)
+ {
+ pos->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT;
+ monitor_notify_all (pos);
+ derive_session_keys (pos);
+ }
+ if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN == pos->status)
+ {
+ pos->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
+ monitor_notify_all (pos);
+ }
+ monitor_notify_all (pos);
send_key (pos);
}
}
* Initialize KX subsystem.
*
* @param pk private key to use for the peer
- * @return GNUNET_OK on success, GNUNET_SYSERR on failure
+ * @return #GNUNET_OK on success, #GNUNET_SYSERR on failure
*/
int
-GSC_KX_init (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccPrivateKey *pk)
+GSC_KX_init (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPrivateKey *pk)
{
- GNUNET_assert (NULL != pk);
+ struct GNUNET_MQ_MessageHandler handlers[] = {
+ GNUNET_MQ_hd_fixed_size (ephemeral_key,
+ GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_EPHEMERAL_KEY,
+ struct EphemeralKeyMessage,
+ NULL),
+ GNUNET_MQ_hd_fixed_size (ping,
+ GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PING,
+ struct PingMessage,
+ NULL),
+ GNUNET_MQ_hd_fixed_size (pong,
+ GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PONG,
+ struct PongMessage,
+ NULL),
+ GNUNET_MQ_hd_var_size (encrypted,
+ GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE,
+ struct EncryptedMessage,
+ NULL),
+ GNUNET_MQ_handler_end()
+ };
+
my_private_key = pk;
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_key_get_public_for_signature (my_private_key, &my_public_key);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&my_public_key, sizeof (my_public_key),
- &GSC_my_identity.hashPubKey);
- if (GNUNET_YES ==
- GNUNET_CONFIGURATION_get_value_yesno (GSC_cfg,
- "core",
- "USE_EPHEMERAL_KEYS"))
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_eddsa_key_get_public (my_private_key,
+ &GSC_my_identity.public_key);
+ my_ephemeral_key = GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_create ();
+ if (NULL == my_ephemeral_key)
{
- my_ephemeral_key = GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_key_create ();
- if (NULL == my_ephemeral_key)
- {
- GNUNET_break (0);
- GNUNET_free (my_private_key);
- my_private_key = NULL;
- return GNUNET_SYSERR;
- }
- sign_ephemeral_key ();
- rekey_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (REKEY_FREQUENCY,
- &do_rekey,
- NULL);
+ GNUNET_break (0);
+ GNUNET_free (my_private_key);
+ my_private_key = NULL;
+ return GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
- else
+ sign_ephemeral_key ();
+ nc = GNUNET_notification_context_create (1);
+ rekey_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (REKEY_FREQUENCY,
+ &do_rekey,
+ NULL);
+ mst = GNUNET_SERVER_mst_create (&deliver_message,
+ NULL);
+ transport
+ = GNUNET_TRANSPORT_core_connect (GSC_cfg,
+ &GSC_my_identity,
+ handlers,
+ NULL,
+ &handle_transport_notify_connect,
+ &handle_transport_notify_disconnect,
+ &handle_transport_notify_excess_bw);
+ if (NULL == transport)
{
- my_ephemeral_key = my_private_key;
- sign_ephemeral_key ();
+ GSC_KX_done ();
+ return GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
- mst = GNUNET_SERVER_mst_create (&deliver_message, NULL);
return GNUNET_OK;
}
void
GSC_KX_done ()
{
- if (GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK != rekey_task)
+ if (NULL != transport)
+ {
+ GNUNET_TRANSPORT_core_disconnect (transport);
+ transport = NULL;
+ }
+ if (NULL != rekey_task)
{
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (rekey_task);
- rekey_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK;
+ rekey_task = NULL;
}
- if ( (NULL != my_ephemeral_key) &&
- (my_ephemeral_key != my_private_key) )
+ if (NULL != my_ephemeral_key)
{
GNUNET_free (my_ephemeral_key);
my_ephemeral_key = NULL;
GNUNET_SERVER_mst_destroy (mst);
mst = NULL;
}
+ if (NULL != nc)
+ {
+ GNUNET_notification_context_destroy (nc);
+ nc = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+
+ /**
+ * Check how many messages are queued for the given neighbour.
+ *
+ * @param kxinfo data about neighbour to check
+ * @return number of items in the message queue
+ */
+unsigned int
+GSC_NEIGHBOURS_get_queue_length (const struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kxinfo)
+{
+ return GNUNET_MQ_get_length (kxinfo->mq);
}
+
+/**
+ * Check if the given neighbour has excess bandwidth available.
+ *
+ * @param target neighbour to check
+ * @return #GNUNET_YES if excess bandwidth is available, #GNUNET_NO if not
+ */
+int
+GSC_NEIGHBOURS_check_excess_bandwidth (const struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kxinfo)
+{
+ return kxinfo->has_excess_bandwidth;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Handle #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_PEERS request. For this
+ * request type, the client does not have to have transmitted an INIT
+ * request. All current peers are returned, regardless of which
+ * message types they accept.
+ *
+ * @param mq message queue to add for monitoring
+ */
+void
+GSC_KX_handle_client_monitor_peers (struct GNUNET_MQ_Handle *mq)
+{
+ struct GNUNET_MQ_Envelope *env;
+ struct MonitorNotifyMessage *done_msg;
+ struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx;
+
+ GNUNET_notification_context_add (nc,
+ mq);
+ for (kx = kx_head; NULL != kx; kx = kx->next)
+ {
+ struct GNUNET_MQ_Envelope *env;
+ struct MonitorNotifyMessage *msg;
+
+ env = GNUNET_MQ_msg (msg,
+ GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_NOTIFY);
+ msg->state = htonl ((uint32_t) kx->status);
+ msg->peer = *kx->peer;
+ msg->timeout = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (kx->timeout);
+ GNUNET_MQ_send (mq,
+ env);
+ }
+ env = GNUNET_MQ_msg (done_msg,
+ GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_NOTIFY);
+ done_msg->state = htonl ((uint32_t) GNUNET_CORE_KX_ITERATION_FINISHED);
+ done_msg->timeout = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_ABS);
+ GNUNET_MQ_send (mq,
+ env);
+}
+
+
/* end of gnunet-service-core_kx.c */