This file is part of GNUnet.
Copyright (C) 2009-2013, 2016 GNUnet e.V.
- GNUnet is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
- by the Free Software Foundation; either version 3, or (at your
- option) any later version.
+ GNUnet is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License,
+ or (at your option) any later version.
GNUnet is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
- General Public License for more details.
+ Affero General Public License for more details.
- You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with GNUnet; see the file COPYING. If not, write to the
- Free Software Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
- Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
-*/
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL3.0-or-later
+ */
/**
* @file core/gnunet-service-core_kx.c
- * @brief code for managing the key exchange (SET_KEY, PING, PONG) with other peers
+ * @brief code for managing the key exchange (SET_KEY, PING, PONG) with other
+ * peers
* @author Christian Grothoff
*/
#include "platform.h"
#include "gnunet-service-core.h"
#include "gnunet-service-core_sessions.h"
#include "gnunet_statistics_service.h"
-#include "gnunet_transport_core_service.h"
+#include "gnunet_transport_service.h"
#include "gnunet_constants.h"
#include "gnunet_signatures.h"
#include "gnunet_protocols.h"
#include "core.h"
+/**
+ * Enable expensive (and possibly problematic for privacy!) logging of KX.
+ */
+#define DEBUG_KX 0
/**
* How long do we wait for SET_KEY confirmation initially?
*/
-#define INITIAL_SET_KEY_RETRY_FREQUENCY GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_SECONDS, 10)
+#define INITIAL_SET_KEY_RETRY_FREQUENCY \
+ GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_SECONDS, 10)
/**
* What is the minimum frequency for a PING message?
*/
-#define MIN_PING_FREQUENCY GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_SECONDS, 5)
+#define MIN_PING_FREQUENCY \
+ GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_SECONDS, 5)
/**
* How often do we rekey?
*/
-#define REKEY_FREQUENCY GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_HOURS, 12)
+#define REKEY_FREQUENCY \
+ GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_HOURS, 12)
/**
* What time difference do we tolerate?
*/
-#define REKEY_TOLERANCE GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_MINUTES, 5)
+#define REKEY_TOLERANCE \
+ GNUNET_TIME_relative_multiply (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_MINUTES, 5)
/**
* What is the maximum age of a message for us to consider processing
#define MAX_MESSAGE_AGE GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_DAYS
-
GNUNET_NETWORK_STRUCT_BEGIN
/**
*/
struct EphemeralKeyMessage
{
-
/**
* Message type is #GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_EPHEMERAL_KEY.
*/
* ephemeral public key).
*/
struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity origin_identity;
-
};
/**
- * We're sending an (encrypted) PING to the other peer to check if he
+ * We're sending an (encrypted) PING to the other peer to check if it
* can decrypt. The other peer should respond with a PONG with the
* same content, except this time encrypted with the receiver's key.
*/
* (recent messages are caught with the sequence number).
*/
struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO timestamp;
-
};
GNUNET_NETWORK_STRUCT_END
* Number of bytes (at the beginning) of `struct EncryptedMessage`
* that are NOT encrypted.
*/
-#define ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE (offsetof(struct EncryptedMessage, sequence_number))
+#define ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE \
+ (offsetof (struct EncryptedMessage, sequence_number))
/**
*/
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo
{
-
/**
* DLL.
*/
* What is our connection status?
*/
enum GNUNET_CORE_KxState status;
-
};
/* Note: may want to make this non-random and instead
derive from key material to avoid having an undetectable
side-channel */
- return htonl (GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32
- (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_NONCE, UINT32_MAX));
+ return htonl (
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32 (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_NONCE, UINT32_MAX));
}
struct MonitorNotifyMessage msg;
msg.header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_NOTIFY);
- msg.header.size = htons (sizeof (msg));
+ msg.header.size = htons (sizeof(msg));
msg.state = htonl ((uint32_t) kx->status);
msg.peer = *kx->peer;
msg.timeout = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (kx->timeout);
- GNUNET_notification_context_broadcast (nc,
- &msg.header,
- GNUNET_NO);
+ GNUNET_notification_context_broadcast (nc, &msg.header, GNUNET_NO);
kx->last_notify_timeout = kx->timeout;
}
{
static const char ctx[] = "authentication key";
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac_derive_key (akey, skey,
- &seed, sizeof (seed),
- skey, sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey),
- ctx, sizeof (ctx),
+#if DEBUG_KX
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode sh;
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (skey, sizeof(*skey), &sh);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Deriving Auth key from SKEY %s and seed %u\n",
+ GNUNET_h2s (&sh),
+ (unsigned int) seed);
+#endif
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac_derive_key (akey,
+ skey,
+ &seed,
+ sizeof(seed),
+ skey,
+ sizeof(
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey),
+ ctx,
+ sizeof(ctx),
NULL);
}
{
static const char ctx[] = "initialization vector";
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_derive_iv (iv, skey,
- &seed, sizeof (seed),
- identity,
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity), ctx,
- sizeof (ctx), NULL);
+#if DEBUG_KX
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode sh;
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (skey, sizeof(*skey), &sh);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Deriving IV from SKEY %s and seed %u for peer %s\n",
+ GNUNET_h2s (&sh),
+ (unsigned int) seed,
+ GNUNET_i2s (identity));
+#endif
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_derive_iv (iv,
+ skey,
+ &seed,
+ sizeof(seed),
+ identity,
+ sizeof(struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ ctx,
+ sizeof(ctx),
+ NULL);
}
{
static const char ctx[] = "pong initialization vector";
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_derive_iv (iv, skey,
- &seed, sizeof (seed),
- identity,
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
- &challenge, sizeof (challenge),
- ctx, sizeof (ctx),
- NULL);
+#if DEBUG_KX
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode sh;
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (skey, sizeof(*skey), &sh);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Deriving PONG IV from SKEY %s and seed %u/%u for %s\n",
+ GNUNET_h2s (&sh),
+ (unsigned int) seed,
+ (unsigned int) challenge,
+ GNUNET_i2s (identity));
+#endif
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_derive_iv (iv,
+ skey,
+ &seed,
+ sizeof(seed),
+ identity,
+ sizeof(struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ &challenge,
+ sizeof(challenge),
+ ctx,
+ sizeof(ctx),
+ NULL);
}
*/
static void
derive_aes_key (const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *sender,
- const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *receiver,
- const struct GNUNET_HashCode *key_material,
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey *skey)
+ const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *receiver,
+ const struct GNUNET_HashCode *key_material,
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey *skey)
{
static const char ctx[] = "aes key generation vector";
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_kdf (skey, sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey),
- ctx, sizeof (ctx),
- key_material, sizeof (struct GNUNET_HashCode),
- sender, sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
- receiver, sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
- NULL);
+#if DEBUG_KX
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode sh;
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (skey, sizeof(*skey), &sh);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Deriving AES Keys for %s to %s from %s\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (sender),
+ GNUNET_i2s2 (receiver),
+ GNUNET_h2s (key_material));
+#endif
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_kdf (skey,
+ sizeof(struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey),
+ ctx,
+ sizeof(ctx),
+ key_material,
+ sizeof(struct GNUNET_HashCode),
+ sender,
+ sizeof(struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ receiver,
+ sizeof(struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ NULL);
}
GNUNET_break (0);
return GNUNET_NO;
}
- GNUNET_assert (size ==
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_encrypt (in,
- (uint16_t) size,
- &kx->encrypt_key,
- iv,
- out));
+ GNUNET_assert (size == GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_encrypt (in,
+ (uint16_t) size,
+ &kx->encrypt_key,
+ iv,
+ out));
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# bytes encrypted"),
- size,
+ gettext_noop ("# bytes encrypted"),
+ size,
GNUNET_NO);
/* the following is too sensitive to write to log files by accident,
so we require manual intervention to get this one... */
-#if 0
+#if DEBUG_KX
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Encrypted %u bytes for `%s' using key %u, IV %u\n",
(unsigned int) size,
GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
(unsigned int) kx->encrypt_key.crc32,
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_crc32_n (iv,
- sizeof (iv)));
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_crc32_n (iv, sizeof(iv)));
#endif
return GNUNET_OK;
}
GNUNET_break (0);
return GNUNET_NO;
}
- if ( (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
- (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP) &&
- (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT) )
+ if ((kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
+ (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP) &&
+ (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT))
{
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
- if (size !=
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_decrypt (in,
- (uint16_t) size,
- &kx->decrypt_key,
- iv,
- out))
+ if (size != GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_decrypt (in,
+ (uint16_t) size,
+ &kx->decrypt_key,
+ iv,
+ out))
{
GNUNET_break (0);
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
GNUNET_NO);
/* the following is too sensitive to write to log files by accident,
so we require manual intervention to get this one... */
-#if 0
+#if DEBUG_KX
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Decrypted %u bytes from `%s' using key %u, IV %u\n",
(unsigned int) size,
GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
(unsigned int) kx->decrypt_key.crc32,
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_crc32_n (iv,
- sizeof
- (*iv)));
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_crc32_n (iv, sizeof(*iv)));
#endif
return GNUNET_OK;
}
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
kx->retry_set_key_task = NULL;
- kx->set_key_retry_frequency = GNUNET_TIME_STD_BACKOFF (kx->set_key_retry_frequency);
+ kx->set_key_retry_frequency =
+ GNUNET_TIME_STD_BACKOFF (kx->set_key_retry_frequency);
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN != kx->status);
send_key (kx);
}
struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector iv;
pm = &kx->ping;
- kx->ping_challenge = GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32 (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_WEAK,
- UINT32_MAX);
- pm->header.size = htons (sizeof (struct PingMessage));
+ kx->ping_challenge =
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32 (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_WEAK, UINT32_MAX);
+ pm->header.size = htons (sizeof(struct PingMessage));
pm->header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PING);
pm->iv_seed = calculate_seed (kx);
- derive_iv (&iv,
- &kx->encrypt_key,
- pm->iv_seed,
- kx->peer);
+ derive_iv (&iv, &kx->encrypt_key, pm->iv_seed, kx->peer);
pp.challenge = kx->ping_challenge;
pp.target = *kx->peer;
do_encrypt (kx,
- &iv,
- &pp.target,
- &pm->target,
- sizeof (struct PingMessage) - ((void *) &pm->target -
- (void *) pm));
+ &iv,
+ &pp.target,
+ &pm->target,
+ sizeof(struct PingMessage)
+ - ((void *) &pm->target - (void *) pm));
}
*
* @param cls the `struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo`
* @param m the message
+ * @return #GNUNET_OK on success,
+ * #GNUNET_NO to stop further processing (no error)
+ * #GNUNET_SYSERR to stop further processing with error
*/
static int
-deliver_message (void *cls,
- const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *m)
+deliver_message (void *cls, const struct GNUNET_MessageHeader *m)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
case GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_COMPRESSED_TYPE_MAP:
GSC_SESSIONS_set_typemap (kx->peer, m);
return GNUNET_OK;
+
case GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_CONFIRM_TYPE_MAP:
GSC_SESSIONS_confirm_typemap (kx->peer, m);
return GNUNET_OK;
+
default:
GSC_CLIENTS_deliver_message (kx->peer,
m,
GNUNET_CORE_OPTION_SEND_FULL_INBOUND);
GSC_CLIENTS_deliver_message (kx->peer,
m,
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_MessageHeader),
+ sizeof(struct GNUNET_MessageHeader),
GNUNET_CORE_OPTION_SEND_HDR_INBOUND);
}
return GNUNET_OK;
static void *
handle_transport_notify_connect (void *cls,
const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *pid,
- struct GNUNET_MQ_Handle *mq)
+ struct GNUNET_MQ_Handle *mq)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx;
struct GNUNET_HashCode h1;
struct GNUNET_HashCode h2;
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Initiating key exchange with `%s'\n",
+ "Initiating key exchange with `%s'\n",
GNUNET_i2s (pid));
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# key exchanges initiated"),
1,
GNUNET_NO);
kx = GNUNET_new (struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo);
- kx->mst = GNUNET_MST_create (&deliver_message,
- kx);
+ kx->mst = GNUNET_MST_create (&deliver_message, kx);
kx->mq = mq;
kx->peer = pid;
kx->set_key_retry_frequency = INITIAL_SET_KEY_RETRY_FREQUENCY;
- GNUNET_CONTAINER_DLL_insert (kx_head,
- kx_tail,
- kx);
+ GNUNET_CONTAINER_DLL_insert (kx_head, kx_tail, kx);
kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT;
monitor_notify_all (kx);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (pid,
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
- &h1);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (pid, sizeof(struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity), &h1);
GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&GSC_my_identity,
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
+ sizeof(struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity),
&h2);
- if (0 < GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash_cmp (&h1,
- &h2))
+ if (0 < GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash_cmp (&h1, &h2))
{
/* peer with "lower" identity starts KX, otherwise we typically end up
with both peers starting the exchange and transmit the 'set key'
}
else
{
- /* peer with "higher" identity starts a delayed KX, if the "lower" peer
- * does not start a KX since he sees no reasons to do so */
- kx->retry_set_key_task
- = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_SECONDS,
- &set_key_retry_task,
- kx);
+ /* peer with "higher" identity starts a delayed KX, if the "lower" peer
+ * does not start a KX since it sees no reasons to do so */
+ kx->retry_set_key_task =
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_SECONDS,
+ &set_key_retry_task,
+ kx);
}
return kx;
}
static void
handle_transport_notify_disconnect (void *cls,
const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *peer,
- void *handler_cls)
+ void *handler_cls)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = handler_cls;
GNUNET_i2s (peer));
GSC_SESSIONS_end (kx->peer);
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# key exchanges stopped"),
+ gettext_noop ("# key exchanges stopped"),
1,
- GNUNET_NO);
+ GNUNET_NO);
if (NULL != kx->retry_set_key_task)
{
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->retry_set_key_task);
}
kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_PEER_DISCONNECT;
monitor_notify_all (kx);
- GNUNET_CONTAINER_DLL_remove (kx_head,
- kx_tail,
- kx);
+ GNUNET_CONTAINER_DLL_remove (kx_head, kx_tail, kx);
GNUNET_MST_destroy (kx->mst);
GNUNET_free (kx);
}
1,
GNUNET_NO);
env = GNUNET_MQ_msg_copy (&kx->ping.header);
- GNUNET_MQ_send (kx->mq,
- env);
+ GNUNET_MQ_send (kx->mq, env);
}
{
struct GNUNET_HashCode key_material;
- if (GNUNET_OK !=
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_ecdh (my_ephemeral_key,
- &kx->other_ephemeral_key,
- &key_material))
+ if (GNUNET_OK != GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_ecdh (my_ephemeral_key,
+ &kx->other_ephemeral_key,
+ &key_material))
{
GNUNET_break (0);
return;
}
- derive_aes_key (&GSC_my_identity,
- kx->peer,
- &key_material,
- &kx->encrypt_key);
- derive_aes_key (kx->peer,
- &GSC_my_identity,
- &key_material,
- &kx->decrypt_key);
- memset (&key_material, 0, sizeof (key_material));
+ derive_aes_key (&GSC_my_identity, kx->peer, &key_material, &kx->encrypt_key);
+ derive_aes_key (kx->peer, &GSC_my_identity, &key_material, &kx->decrypt_key);
+ memset (&key_material, 0, sizeof(key_material));
/* fresh key, reset sequence numbers */
kx->last_sequence_number_received = 0;
kx->last_packets_bitmap = 0;
* @param m the set key message we received
*/
static void
-handle_ephemeral_key (void *cls,
- const struct EphemeralKeyMessage *m)
+handle_ephemeral_key (void *cls, const struct EphemeralKeyMessage *m)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute start_t;
enum GNUNET_CORE_KxState sender_status;
end_t = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_ntoh (m->expiration_time);
- if ( ( (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED == kx->status) ||
- (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP == kx->status) ||
- (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT == kx->status) ) &&
- (end_t.abs_value_us < kx->foreign_key_expires.abs_value_us) )
+ if (((GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED == kx->status) ||
+ (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP == kx->status) ||
+ (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT == kx->status)) &&
+ (end_t.abs_value_us < kx->foreign_key_expires.abs_value_us))
{
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# old ephemeral keys ignored"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
+ "Received expired EPHEMERAL_KEY from %s\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&m->origin_identity));
return;
}
- start_t = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_ntoh (m->creation_time);
-
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# ephemeral keys received"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
-
- if (0 !=
- memcmp (&m->origin_identity,
- kx->peer,
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
+ if (0 == memcmp (&m->ephemeral_key,
+ &kx->other_ephemeral_key,
+ sizeof(m->ephemeral_key)))
{
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop (
+ "# duplicate ephemeral keys ignored"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
+ "Ignoring duplicate EPHEMERAL_KEY from %s\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&m->origin_identity));
+ return;
+ }
+ if (0 != memcmp (&m->origin_identity,
+ kx->peer,
+ sizeof(struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
+ {
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
"Received EPHEMERAL_KEY from %s, but expected %s\n",
GNUNET_i2s (&m->origin_identity),
GNUNET_i2s_full (kx->peer));
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
}
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Core service receives EPHEMERAL_KEY request from `%s'.\n",
- GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
if ((ntohl (m->purpose.size) !=
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccSignaturePurpose) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPublicKey) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPublicKey)) ||
+ sizeof(struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccSignaturePurpose)
+ + sizeof(struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO)
+ + sizeof(struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO)
+ + sizeof(struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPublicKey)
+ + sizeof(struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPublicKey)) ||
(GNUNET_OK !=
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_eddsa_verify (GNUNET_SIGNATURE_PURPOSE_SET_ECC_KEY,
- &m->purpose,
- &m->signature,
- &m->origin_identity.public_key)))
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_eddsa_verify_ (GNUNET_SIGNATURE_PURPOSE_SET_ECC_KEY,
+ &m->purpose,
+ &m->signature,
+ &m->origin_identity.public_key)))
{
/* invalid signature */
GNUNET_break_op (0);
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop (
+ "# EPHEMERAL_KEYs rejected (bad signature)"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
+ "Received EPHEMERAL_KEY from %s with bad signature\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (&m->origin_identity));
return;
}
now = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get ();
- if ( (end_t.abs_value_us < GNUNET_TIME_absolute_subtract (now, REKEY_TOLERANCE).abs_value_us) ||
- (start_t.abs_value_us > GNUNET_TIME_absolute_add (now, REKEY_TOLERANCE).abs_value_us) )
+ start_t = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_ntoh (m->creation_time);
+ if ((end_t.abs_value_us <
+ GNUNET_TIME_absolute_subtract (now, REKEY_TOLERANCE).abs_value_us) ||
+ (start_t.abs_value_us >
+ GNUNET_TIME_absolute_add (now, REKEY_TOLERANCE).abs_value_us))
{
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
- _("Ephemeral key message from peer `%s' rejected as its validity range does not match our system time (%llu not in [%llu,%llu]).\n"),
- GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
- (unsigned long long) now.abs_value_us,
- (unsigned long long) start_t.abs_value_us,
- (unsigned long long) end_t.abs_value_us);
+ GNUNET_log (
+ GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
+ _ (
+ "EPHEMERAL_KEY from peer `%s' rejected as its validity range does not match our system time (%llu not in [%llu,%llu]).\n"),
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
+ (unsigned long long) now.abs_value_us,
+ (unsigned long long) start_t.abs_value_us,
+ (unsigned long long) end_t.abs_value_us);
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop (
+ "# EPHEMERAL_KEY messages rejected due to time"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
return;
}
+#if DEBUG_KX
+ {
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode eh;
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&m->ephemeral_key, sizeof(m->ephemeral_key), &eh);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Received valid EPHEMERAL_KEY `%s' from `%s' in state %d.\n",
+ GNUNET_h2s (&eh),
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
+ kx->status);
+ }
+#endif
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
+ gettext_noop ("# valid ephemeral keys received"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
kx->other_ephemeral_key = m->ephemeral_key;
kx->foreign_key_expires = end_t;
derive_session_keys (kx);
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# EPHEMERAL_KEY messages received"), 1,
- GNUNET_NO);
/* check if we still need to send the sender our key */
sender_status = (enum GNUNET_CORE_KxState) ntohl (m->sender_status);
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN:
GNUNET_break_op (0);
break;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
/* fine, need to send our key after updating our status, see below */
GSC_SESSIONS_reinit (kx->peer);
break;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
/* other peer already got our key, but typemap did go down */
GSC_SESSIONS_reinit (kx->peer);
break;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP:
/* other peer already got our key, typemap NOT down */
break;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
/* other peer already got our key, typemap NOT down */
break;
+
default:
GNUNET_break (0);
break;
else
send_ping (kx);
break;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
GNUNET_assert (NULL == kx->keep_alive_task);
kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED;
else
send_ping (kx);
break;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
GNUNET_assert (NULL == kx->keep_alive_task);
if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
else
send_ping (kx);
break;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP:
kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT;
monitor_notify_all (kx);
else
send_ping (kx);
break;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT == sender_status)
send_key (kx);
else
send_ping (kx);
break;
+
default:
GNUNET_break (0);
break;
* @param m the encrypted PING message itself
*/
static void
-handle_ping (void *cls,
- const struct PingMessage *m)
+handle_ping (void *cls, const struct PingMessage *m)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
struct PingMessage t;
gettext_noop ("# PING messages received"),
1,
GNUNET_NO);
- if ( (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
- (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP) &&
- (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT))
+ if ((kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED) &&
+ (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP) &&
+ (kx->status != GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT))
{
/* ignore */
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# PING messages dropped (out of order)"),
+ gettext_noop (
+ "# PING messages dropped (out of order)"),
1,
- GNUNET_NO);
+ GNUNET_NO);
return;
}
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Core service receives PING request from `%s'.\n",
GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
- derive_iv (&iv,
- &kx->decrypt_key,
- m->iv_seed,
- &GSC_my_identity);
- if (GNUNET_OK !=
- do_decrypt (kx,
- &iv,
- &m->target,
- &t.target,
- sizeof (struct PingMessage) - ((void *) &m->target -
- (void *) m)))
+ derive_iv (&iv, &kx->decrypt_key, m->iv_seed, &GSC_my_identity);
+ if (GNUNET_OK != do_decrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &m->target,
+ &t.target,
+ sizeof(struct PingMessage)
+ - ((void *) &m->target - (void *) m)))
{
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
}
if (0 !=
- memcmp (&t.target,
- &GSC_my_identity,
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
+ memcmp (&t.target, &GSC_my_identity, sizeof(struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity)))
{
if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT != kx->status)
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
- "Decryption of PING from peer `%s' failed\n",
- GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
+ "Decryption of PING from peer `%s' failed, PING for `%s'?\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
+ GNUNET_i2s2 (&t.target));
else
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Decryption of PING from peer `%s' failed after rekey (harmless)\n",
- GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
+ GNUNET_log (
+ GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Decryption of PING from peer `%s' failed after rekey (harmless)\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
}
tx.reserved = 0;
tx.challenge = t.challenge;
tx.target = t.target;
- env = GNUNET_MQ_msg (tp,
- GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PONG);
+ env = GNUNET_MQ_msg (tp, GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_PONG);
tp->iv_seed = calculate_seed (kx);
- derive_pong_iv (&iv,
- &kx->encrypt_key,
- tp->iv_seed,
- t.challenge,
- kx->peer);
+ derive_pong_iv (&iv, &kx->encrypt_key, tp->iv_seed, t.challenge, kx->peer);
do_encrypt (kx,
&iv,
&tx.challenge,
&tp->challenge,
- sizeof (struct PongMessage) - ((void *) &tp->challenge -
- (void *) tp));
+ sizeof(struct PongMessage)
+ - ((void *) &tp->challenge - (void *) tp));
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# PONG messages created"),
1,
GNUNET_NO);
- GNUNET_MQ_send (kx->mq,
- env);
+ GNUNET_MQ_send (kx->mq, env);
}
GNUNET_NO);
setup_fresh_ping (kx);
send_ping (kx);
- retry =
- GNUNET_TIME_relative_max (GNUNET_TIME_relative_divide (left, 2),
- MIN_PING_FREQUENCY);
+ retry = GNUNET_TIME_relative_max (GNUNET_TIME_relative_divide (left, 2),
+ MIN_PING_FREQUENCY);
kx->keep_alive_task =
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (retry,
- &send_keep_alive,
- kx);
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (retry, &send_keep_alive, kx);
}
struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative delta;
kx->timeout =
- GNUNET_TIME_relative_to_absolute
- (GNUNET_CONSTANTS_IDLE_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT);
- delta = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_difference (kx->last_notify_timeout,
- kx->timeout);
+ GNUNET_TIME_relative_to_absolute (GNUNET_CONSTANTS_IDLE_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT);
+ delta =
+ GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_difference (kx->last_notify_timeout, kx->timeout);
if (delta.rel_value_us > 5LL * 1000LL * 1000LL)
{
/* we only notify monitors about timeout changes if those
}
if (NULL != kx->keep_alive_task)
GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->keep_alive_task);
- kx->keep_alive_task =
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (GNUNET_TIME_relative_divide
- (GNUNET_CONSTANTS_IDLE_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT,
- 2),
- &send_keep_alive,
- kx);
+ kx->keep_alive_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (
+ GNUNET_TIME_relative_divide (GNUNET_CONSTANTS_IDLE_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT, 2),
+ &send_keep_alive,
+ kx);
}
* @param m the encrypted PONG message itself
*/
static void
-handle_pong (void *cls,
- const struct PongMessage *m)
+handle_pong (void *cls, const struct PongMessage *m)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
struct PongMessage t;
{
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN:
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# PONG messages dropped (connection down)"), 1,
- GNUNET_NO);
+ gettext_noop (
+ "# PONG messages dropped (connection down)"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
return;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# PONG messages dropped (out of order)"), 1,
- GNUNET_NO);
+ gettext_noop (
+ "# PONG messages dropped (out of order)"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
return;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
break;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP:
break;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
break;
+
default:
GNUNET_break (0);
return;
"Core service receives PONG response from `%s'.\n",
GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
/* mark as garbage, just to be sure */
- memset (&t, 255, sizeof (t));
+ memset (&t, 255, sizeof(t));
derive_pong_iv (&iv,
&kx->decrypt_key,
m->iv_seed,
kx->ping_challenge,
&GSC_my_identity);
- if (GNUNET_OK !=
- do_decrypt (kx,
- &iv,
- &m->challenge,
- &t.challenge,
- sizeof (struct PongMessage) - ((void *) &m->challenge -
- (void *) m)))
+ if (GNUNET_OK != do_decrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &m->challenge,
+ &t.challenge,
+ sizeof(struct PongMessage)
+ - ((void *) &m->challenge - (void *) m)))
{
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
gettext_noop ("# PONG messages decrypted"),
1,
GNUNET_NO);
- if ((0 != memcmp (&t.target,
- kx->peer,
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity))) ||
+ if ((0 !=
+ memcmp (&t.target, kx->peer, sizeof(struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity))) ||
(kx->ping_challenge != t.challenge))
{
/* PONG malformed */
return;
}
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Received PONG from `%s'\n",
+ "Received valid PONG from `%s'\n",
GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
/* no need to resend key any longer */
if (NULL != kx->retry_set_key_task)
switch (kx->status)
{
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN:
- GNUNET_assert (0); /* should be impossible */
+ GNUNET_assert (0); /* should be impossible */
return;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT:
- GNUNET_assert (0); /* should be impossible */
+ GNUNET_assert (0); /* should be impossible */
return;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_RECEIVED:
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# session keys confirmed via PONG"),
+ gettext_noop (
+ "# session keys confirmed via PONG"),
1,
GNUNET_NO);
kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP;
GNUNET_assert (NULL == kx->keep_alive_task);
update_timeout (kx);
break;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP:
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# timeouts prevented via PONG"),
GNUNET_NO);
update_timeout (kx);
break;
+
case GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_REKEY_SENT:
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# rekey operations confirmed via PONG"),
+ gettext_noop (
+ "# rekey operations confirmed via PONG"),
1,
GNUNET_NO);
kx->status = GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP;
monitor_notify_all (kx);
update_timeout (kx);
break;
+
default:
GNUNET_break (0);
break;
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_DOWN != kx->status);
if (NULL != kx->retry_set_key_task)
{
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->retry_set_key_task);
- kx->retry_set_key_task = NULL;
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (kx->retry_set_key_task);
+ kx->retry_set_key_task = NULL;
}
/* always update sender status in SET KEY message */
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Sending key to `%s' (my status: %d)\n",
- GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
- kx->status);
+#if DEBUG_KX
+ {
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode hc;
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (¤t_ekm.ephemeral_key,
+ sizeof(current_ekm.ephemeral_key),
+ &hc);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Sending EPHEMERAL_KEY %s to `%s' (my status: %d)\n",
+ GNUNET_h2s (&hc),
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
+ kx->status);
+ }
+#endif
current_ekm.sender_status = htonl ((int32_t) (kx->status));
env = GNUNET_MQ_msg_copy (¤t_ekm.header);
- GNUNET_MQ_send (kx->mq,
- env);
+ GNUNET_MQ_send (kx->mq, env);
if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_KEY_SENT != kx->status)
send_ping (kx);
kx->retry_set_key_task =
- GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (kx->set_key_retry_frequency,
- &set_key_retry_task,
- kx);
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (kx->set_key_retry_frequency,
+ &set_key_retry_task,
+ kx);
}
const void *payload,
size_t payload_size)
{
- size_t used = payload_size + sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage);
- char pbuf[used]; /* plaintext */
- struct EncryptedMessage *em; /* encrypted message */
- struct EncryptedMessage *ph; /* plaintext header */
+ size_t used = payload_size + sizeof(struct EncryptedMessage);
+ char pbuf[used]; /* plaintext */
+ struct EncryptedMessage *em; /* encrypted message */
+ struct EncryptedMessage *ph; /* plaintext header */
struct GNUNET_MQ_Envelope *env;
struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector iv;
struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_AuthKey auth_key;
ph->iv_seed = calculate_seed (kx);
ph->reserved = 0;
ph->timestamp = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get ());
- GNUNET_memcpy (&ph[1],
- payload,
- payload_size);
+ GNUNET_memcpy (&ph[1], payload, payload_size);
env = GNUNET_MQ_msg_extra (em,
- payload_size,
- GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE);
+ payload_size,
+ GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE);
em->iv_seed = ph->iv_seed;
- derive_iv (&iv,
- &kx->encrypt_key,
- ph->iv_seed,
- kx->peer);
- GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
- do_encrypt (kx,
- &iv,
- &ph->sequence_number,
- &em->sequence_number,
- used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE));
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Encrypted %u bytes for %s\n",
- (unsigned int) (used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE),
- GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
- derive_auth_key (&auth_key,
- &kx->encrypt_key,
- ph->iv_seed);
+ derive_iv (&iv, &kx->encrypt_key, ph->iv_seed, kx->peer);
+ GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK == do_encrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &ph->sequence_number,
+ &em->sequence_number,
+ used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE));
+#if DEBUG_KX
+ {
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode hc;
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&ph->sequence_number,
+ used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE,
+ &hc);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Encrypted payload `%s' of %u bytes for %s\n",
+ GNUNET_h2s (&hc),
+ (unsigned int) (used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE),
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
+ }
+#endif
+ derive_auth_key (&auth_key, &kx->encrypt_key, ph->iv_seed);
GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac (&auth_key,
&em->sequence_number,
used - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE,
&em->hmac);
+#if DEBUG_KX
+ {
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode hc;
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&auth_key, sizeof(auth_key), &hc);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "For peer %s, used AC %s to create hmac %s\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
+ GNUNET_h2s (&hc),
+ GNUNET_h2s2 (&em->hmac));
+ }
+#endif
kx->has_excess_bandwidth = GNUNET_NO;
- GNUNET_MQ_send (kx->mq,
- env);
+ GNUNET_MQ_send (kx->mq, env);
}
* @return #GNUNET_OK if @a msg is well-formed (size-wise)
*/
static int
-check_encrypted (void *cls,
- const struct EncryptedMessage *m)
+check_encrypted (void *cls, const struct EncryptedMessage *m)
{
- uint16_t size = ntohs (m->header.size) - sizeof (*m);
+ uint16_t size = ntohs (m->header.size) - sizeof(*m);
- if (size < sizeof (struct GNUNET_MessageHeader))
+ if (size < sizeof(struct GNUNET_MessageHeader))
{
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
* @param m encrypted message
*/
static void
-handle_encrypted (void *cls,
- const struct EncryptedMessage *m)
+handle_encrypted (void *cls, const struct EncryptedMessage *m)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = cls;
- struct EncryptedMessage *pt; /* plaintext */
+ struct EncryptedMessage *pt; /* plaintext */
struct GNUNET_HashCode ph;
uint32_t snum;
struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute t;
if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP != kx->status)
{
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# DATA message dropped (out of order)"),
+ gettext_noop (
+ "# DATA message dropped (out of order)"),
1,
GNUNET_NO);
return;
}
- if (0 == GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_remaining (kx->foreign_key_expires).rel_value_us)
+ if (0 ==
+ GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_remaining (kx->foreign_key_expires).rel_value_us)
{
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
- _("Session to peer `%s' went down due to key expiration (should not happen)\n"),
- GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
+ GNUNET_log (
+ GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
+ _ (
+ "Session to peer `%s' went down due to key expiration (should not happen)\n"),
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop ("# sessions terminated by key expiration"),
- 1, GNUNET_NO);
+ gettext_noop (
+ "# sessions terminated by key expiration"),
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
GSC_SESSIONS_end (kx->peer);
if (NULL != kx->keep_alive_task)
{
}
/* validate hash */
- derive_auth_key (&auth_key,
- &kx->decrypt_key,
- m->iv_seed);
+#if DEBUG_KX
+ {
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode hc;
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&m->sequence_number, size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE, &hc);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Received encrypted payload `%s' of %u bytes from %s\n",
+ GNUNET_h2s (&hc),
+ (unsigned int) (size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE),
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
+ }
+#endif
+ derive_auth_key (&auth_key, &kx->decrypt_key, m->iv_seed);
GNUNET_CRYPTO_hmac (&auth_key,
&m->sequence_number,
size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE,
&ph);
- if (0 != memcmp (&ph,
- &m->hmac,
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_HashCode)))
+#if DEBUG_KX
+ {
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode hc;
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&auth_key, sizeof(auth_key), &hc);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "For peer %s, used AC %s to verify hmac %s\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer),
+ GNUNET_h2s (&hc),
+ GNUNET_h2s2 (&m->hmac));
+ }
+#endif
+ if (0 != memcmp (&ph, &m->hmac, sizeof(struct GNUNET_HashCode)))
{
/* checksum failed */
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
- "Failed checksum validation for a message from `%s'\n",
- GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
+ "Failed checksum validation for a message from `%s'\n",
+ GNUNET_i2s (kx->peer));
return;
}
- derive_iv (&iv,
- &kx->decrypt_key,
- m->iv_seed,
- &GSC_my_identity);
+ derive_iv (&iv, &kx->decrypt_key, m->iv_seed, &GSC_my_identity);
/* decrypt */
- if (GNUNET_OK !=
- do_decrypt (kx,
- &iv,
- &m->sequence_number,
- &buf[ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE],
- size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE))
+ if (GNUNET_OK != do_decrypt (kx,
+ &iv,
+ &m->sequence_number,
+ &buf[ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE],
+ size - ENCRYPTED_HEADER_SIZE))
{
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return;
"Received ancient out of sequence message, ignoring.\n");
/* ancient out of sequence, ignore */
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop
- ("# bytes dropped (out of sequence)"), size,
+ gettext_noop (
+ "# bytes dropped (out of sequence)"),
+ size,
GNUNET_NO);
return;
}
"Received duplicate message, ignoring.\n");
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# bytes dropped (duplicates)"),
- size, GNUNET_NO);
+ size,
+ GNUNET_NO);
/* duplicate, ignore */
return;
}
{
unsigned int shift = (snum - kx->last_sequence_number_received);
- if (shift >= 8 * sizeof (kx->last_packets_bitmap))
+ if (shift >= 8 * sizeof(kx->last_packets_bitmap))
kx->last_packets_bitmap = 0;
else
kx->last_packets_bitmap <<= shift;
{
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Message received far too old (%s). Content ignored.\n",
- GNUNET_STRINGS_relative_time_to_string (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_duration (t),
- GNUNET_YES));
+ GNUNET_STRINGS_relative_time_to_string (
+ GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get_duration (t),
+ GNUNET_YES));
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
- gettext_noop
- ("# bytes dropped (ancient message)"), size,
+ gettext_noop (
+ "# bytes dropped (ancient message)"),
+ size,
GNUNET_NO);
return;
}
update_timeout (kx);
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (GSC_stats,
gettext_noop ("# bytes of payload decrypted"),
- size - sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage),
+ size - sizeof(struct EncryptedMessage),
GNUNET_NO);
if (GNUNET_OK !=
GNUNET_MST_from_buffer (kx->mst,
- &buf[sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage)],
- size - sizeof (struct EncryptedMessage),
+ &buf[sizeof(struct EncryptedMessage)],
+ size - sizeof(struct EncryptedMessage),
GNUNET_YES,
GNUNET_NO))
GNUNET_break_op (0);
static void
handle_transport_notify_excess_bw (void *cls,
const struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity *pid,
- void *connect_cls)
+ void *connect_cls)
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx = connect_cls;
static void
sign_ephemeral_key ()
{
- current_ekm.header.size = htons (sizeof (struct EphemeralKeyMessage));
+ current_ekm.header.size = htons (sizeof(struct EphemeralKeyMessage));
current_ekm.header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_EPHEMERAL_KEY);
current_ekm.sender_status = 0; /* to be set later */
current_ekm.purpose.purpose = htonl (GNUNET_SIGNATURE_PURPOSE_SET_ECC_KEY);
- current_ekm.purpose.size = htonl (sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccSignaturePurpose) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePublicKey) +
- sizeof (struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity));
- current_ekm.creation_time = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get ());
- if (GNUNET_YES ==
- GNUNET_CONFIGURATION_get_value_yesno (GSC_cfg,
- "core",
- "USE_EPHEMERAL_KEYS"))
+ current_ekm.purpose.size =
+ htonl (sizeof(struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccSignaturePurpose)
+ + sizeof(struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO)
+ + sizeof(struct GNUNET_TIME_AbsoluteNBO)
+ + sizeof(struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePublicKey)
+ + sizeof(struct GNUNET_PeerIdentity));
+ current_ekm.creation_time =
+ GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get ());
+ if (GNUNET_YES == GNUNET_CONFIGURATION_get_value_yesno (GSC_cfg,
+ "core",
+ "USE_EPHEMERAL_KEYS"))
{
- current_ekm.expiration_time = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_relative_to_absolute (GNUNET_TIME_relative_add (REKEY_FREQUENCY,
- REKEY_TOLERANCE)));
+ current_ekm.expiration_time =
+ GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_relative_to_absolute (
+ GNUNET_TIME_relative_add (REKEY_FREQUENCY,
+ REKEY_TOLERANCE)));
}
else
{
- current_ekm.expiration_time = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_ABS);
+ current_ekm.expiration_time =
+ GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_ABS);
}
GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (my_ephemeral_key,
¤t_ekm.ephemeral_key);
current_ekm.origin_identity = GSC_my_identity;
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_eddsa_sign (my_private_key,
- ¤t_ekm.purpose,
- ¤t_ekm.signature));
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_eddsa_sign_ (my_private_key,
+ ¤t_ekm.purpose,
+ ¤t_ekm.signature));
}
{
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *pos;
- rekey_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (REKEY_FREQUENCY,
- &do_rekey,
- NULL);
+ rekey_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (REKEY_FREQUENCY, &do_rekey, NULL);
if (NULL != my_ephemeral_key)
GNUNET_free (my_ephemeral_key);
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO,
- "Rekeying\n");
my_ephemeral_key = GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_create ();
GNUNET_assert (NULL != my_ephemeral_key);
sign_ephemeral_key ();
+ {
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode eh;
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (¤t_ekm.ephemeral_key,
+ sizeof(current_ekm.ephemeral_key),
+ &eh);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO, "Rekeying to %s\n", GNUNET_h2s (&eh));
+ }
for (pos = kx_head; NULL != pos; pos = pos->next)
{
if (GNUNET_CORE_KX_STATE_UP == pos->status)
int
GSC_KX_init (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EddsaPrivateKey *pk)
{
- struct GNUNET_MQ_MessageHandler handlers[] = {
- GNUNET_MQ_hd_fixed_size (ephemeral_key,
+ struct GNUNET_MQ_MessageHandler handlers[] =
+ { GNUNET_MQ_hd_fixed_size (ephemeral_key,
GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_EPHEMERAL_KEY,
struct EphemeralKeyMessage,
NULL),
GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE,
struct EncryptedMessage,
NULL),
- GNUNET_MQ_handler_end()
- };
+ GNUNET_MQ_handler_end () };
my_private_key = pk;
GNUNET_CRYPTO_eddsa_key_get_public (my_private_key,
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
sign_ephemeral_key ();
+ {
+ struct GNUNET_HashCode eh;
+
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (¤t_ekm.ephemeral_key,
+ sizeof(current_ekm.ephemeral_key),
+ &eh);
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO,
+ "Starting with ephemeral key %s\n",
+ GNUNET_h2s (&eh));
+ }
+
nc = GNUNET_notification_context_create (1);
- rekey_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (REKEY_FREQUENCY,
- &do_rekey,
- NULL);
- transport
- = GNUNET_TRANSPORT_core_connect (GSC_cfg,
- &GSC_my_identity,
- handlers,
- NULL,
- &handle_transport_notify_connect,
- &handle_transport_notify_disconnect,
- &handle_transport_notify_excess_bw);
+ rekey_task = GNUNET_SCHEDULER_add_delayed (REKEY_FREQUENCY, &do_rekey, NULL);
+ transport =
+ GNUNET_TRANSPORT_core_connect (GSC_cfg,
+ &GSC_my_identity,
+ handlers,
+ NULL,
+ &handle_transport_notify_connect,
+ &handle_transport_notify_disconnect,
+ &handle_transport_notify_excess_bw);
if (NULL == transport)
{
GSC_KX_done ();
}
- /**
+/**
* Check how many messages are queued for the given neighbour.
*
* @param kxinfo data about neighbour to check
struct MonitorNotifyMessage *done_msg;
struct GSC_KeyExchangeInfo *kx;
- GNUNET_notification_context_add (nc,
- mq);
+ GNUNET_notification_context_add (nc, mq);
for (kx = kx_head; NULL != kx; kx = kx->next)
{
struct GNUNET_MQ_Envelope *env;
struct MonitorNotifyMessage *msg;
- env = GNUNET_MQ_msg (msg,
- GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_NOTIFY);
+ env = GNUNET_MQ_msg (msg, GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_NOTIFY);
msg->state = htonl ((uint32_t) kx->status);
msg->peer = *kx->peer;
msg->timeout = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (kx->timeout);
- GNUNET_MQ_send (mq,
- env);
+ GNUNET_MQ_send (mq, env);
}
- env = GNUNET_MQ_msg (done_msg,
- GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_NOTIFY);
+ env = GNUNET_MQ_msg (done_msg, GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CORE_MONITOR_NOTIFY);
done_msg->state = htonl ((uint32_t) GNUNET_CORE_KX_ITERATION_FINISHED);
done_msg->timeout = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_hton (GNUNET_TIME_UNIT_FOREVER_ABS);
- GNUNET_MQ_send (mq,
- env);
+ GNUNET_MQ_send (mq, env);
}
projects / oweals / gnunet.git / blobdiff