* @param src Source of the plaintext. Can overlap with @c dst.
* @param size Size of the plaintext.
* @param iv Initialization Vector to use.
+ * @param force_newest_key Force the use of the newest key, otherwise
+ * CADET will use the old key when allowed.
+ * This can happen in the case when a KX is going on
+ * and the old one hasn't expired.
*/
static int
-t_encrypt (struct CadetTunnel *t,
- void *dst, const void *src,
- size_t size, uint32_t iv)
+t_encrypt (struct CadetTunnel *t, void *dst, const void *src,
+ size_t size, uint32_t iv, int force_newest_key)
{
struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricInitializationVector siv;
struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey *e_key;
size_t out_size;
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, " t_encrypt start\n");
- if (NULL != t->kx_ctx && GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK == t->kx_ctx->finish_task)
+ if (GNUNET_NO == force_newest_key
+ && NULL != t->kx_ctx
+ && GNUNET_SCHEDULER_NO_TASK == t->kx_ctx->finish_task)
{
struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative age;
msg = (struct GNUNET_CADET_Encrypted *) cbuf;
msg->header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CADET_ENCRYPTED);
msg->iv = iv;
- GNUNET_assert (t_encrypt (t, &msg[1], message, size, iv) == size);
+ GNUNET_assert (t_encrypt (t, &msg[1], message, size, iv, GNUNET_NO) == size);
t_hmac (t, &msg[1], size, iv, GNUNET_YES, &msg->hmac);
msg->header.size = htons (sizeof (struct GNUNET_CADET_Encrypted) + size);
static void
send_ephemeral (struct CadetTunnel *t)
{
- LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO, "=> EPHM for %s\n", GCT_2s (t));
+ LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO, "===> EPHM for %s\n", GCT_2s (t));
kx_msg.sender_status = htonl (t->estate);
send_kx (t, &kx_msg.header);
{
struct GNUNET_CADET_KX_Ping msg;
- LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO, "=> PING for %s\n", GCT_2s (t));
+ LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO, "===> PING for %s\n", GCT_2s (t));
msg.header.size = htons (sizeof (msg));
msg.header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CADET_KX_PING);
msg.iv = GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32 (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_NONCE, UINT32_MAX);
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, " sending %u\n", msg.nonce);
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, " towards %s\n", GNUNET_i2s (&msg.target));
- t_encrypt (t, &msg.target, &msg.target, ping_encryption_size(), msg.iv);
+ t_encrypt (t, &msg.target, &msg.target,
+ ping_encryption_size(), msg.iv, GNUNET_YES);
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, " e sending %u\n", msg.nonce);
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, " e towards %s\n", GNUNET_i2s (&msg.target));
{
struct GNUNET_CADET_KX_Pong msg;
- LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO, "=> PONG for %s\n", GCT_2s (t));
+ LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO, "===> PONG for %s\n", GCT_2s (t));
msg.header.size = htons (sizeof (msg));
msg.header.type = htons (GNUNET_MESSAGE_TYPE_CADET_KX_PONG);
msg.iv = GNUNET_CRYPTO_random_u32 (GNUNET_CRYPTO_QUALITY_NONCE, UINT32_MAX);
msg.nonce = challenge;
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, " sending %u\n", msg.nonce);
- t_encrypt (t, &msg.nonce, &msg.nonce, sizeof (msg.nonce), msg.iv);
+ t_encrypt (t, &msg.nonce, &msg.nonce,
+ sizeof (msg.nonce), msg.iv, GNUNET_YES);
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, " e sending %u\n", msg.nonce);
send_kx (t, &msg.header);