struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey CKr;
/**
- * ECDH for key exchange (A0 / B0). Note that for the
- * 'unverified_ax', this member is an alias with the main
- * 't->ax.kx_0' value, so do not free it!
+ * ECDH for key exchange (A0 / B0).
*/
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePrivateKey *kx_0;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePrivateKey kx_0;
/**
- * ECDH Ratchet key (our private key in the current DH). Note that
- * for the 'unverified_ax', this member is an alias with the main
- * 't->ax.kx_0' value, so do not free it!
+ * ECDH Ratchet key (our private key in the current DH).
*/
- struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePrivateKey *DHRs;
+ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePrivateKey DHRs;
/**
* ECDH Ratchet key (other peer's public key in the current DH).
static struct CadetTConnection *
get_ready_connection (struct CadetTunnel *t)
{
- return t->connection_ready_head;
+ struct CadetTConnection *hd = t->connection_ready_head;
+
+ GNUNET_assert ( (NULL == hd) ||
+ (GNUNET_YES == hd->is_ready) );
+ return hd;
}
static void
new_ephemeral (struct CadetTunnelAxolotl *ax)
{
- GNUNET_free_non_null (ax->DHRs);
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Creating new ephemeral ratchet key (DHRs)\n");
- ax->DHRs = GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_create ();
+ GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_create2 (&ax->DHRs));
}
ax->HKs = ax->NHKs;
/* RK, NHKs, CKs = KDF( HMAC-HASH(RK, DH(DHRs, DHRr)) ) */
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_ecdh (ax->DHRs,
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_ecdh (&ax->DHRs,
&ax->DHRr,
&dh);
t_ax_hmac_hash (&ax->RK,
PNp);
/* RKp, NHKp, CKp = KDF (HMAC-HASH (RK, DH (DHRp, DHRs))) */
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_ecdh (ax->DHRs,
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_ecdh (&ax->DHRs,
DHRp,
&dh);
t_ax_hmac_hash (&ax->RK,
struct GNUNET_CADET_TunnelKeyExchangeMessage *msg;
enum GNUNET_CADET_KX_Flags flags;
- if (NULL == ct)
+ if ( (NULL == ct) ||
+ (GNUNET_NO == ct->is_ready) )
ct = get_ready_connection (t);
if (NULL == ct)
{
}
cc = ct->cc;
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Sending KX on %s via %s using %s in state %s\n",
+ "Sending KX on %s via %s in state %s\n",
GCT_2s (t),
GCC_2s (cc),
estate2s (t->estate));
flags = GNUNET_CADET_KX_FLAG_FORCE_REPLY; /* always for KX */
msg->flags = htonl (flags);
msg->cid = *GCC_get_id (cc);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (ax->kx_0,
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (&ax->kx_0,
&msg->ephemeral_key);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (ax->DHRs,
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (&ax->DHRs,
&msg->ratchet_key);
mark_connection_unready (ct);
t->kx_retry_delay = GNUNET_TIME_STD_BACKOFF (t->kx_retry_delay);
flags |= GNUNET_CADET_KX_FLAG_FORCE_REPLY;
msg->kx.flags = htonl (flags);
msg->kx.cid = *GCC_get_id (cc);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (ax->kx_0,
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (&ax->kx_0,
&msg->kx.ephemeral_key);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (ax->DHRs,
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (&ax->DHRs,
&msg->kx.ratchet_key);
/* Compute authenticator (this is the main difference to #send_kx()) */
GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&ax->RK,
delete_skipped_key (ax,
ax->skipped_head);
GNUNET_assert (0 == ax->skipped);
- GNUNET_free_non_null (ax->kx_0);
- GNUNET_free_non_null (ax->DHRs);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_clear (&ax->kx_0);
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_clear (&ax->DHRs);
}
}
else
{
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdh_eddsa (ax->kx_0, /* B0 */
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdh_eddsa (&ax->kx_0, /* B0 */
&pid->public_key, /* A */
&key_material[0]);
}
/* ECDH A0 B */
if (GNUNET_YES == am_I_alice)
{
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdh_eddsa (ax->kx_0, /* A0 */
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdh_eddsa (&ax->kx_0, /* A0 */
&pid->public_key, /* B */
&key_material[1]);
}
/* ECDH A0 B0 */
/* (This is the triple-DH, we could probably safely skip this,
as A0/B0 are already in the key material.) */
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_ecdh (ax->kx_0, /* A0 or B0 */
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecc_ecdh (&ax->kx_0, /* A0 or B0 */
ephemeral_key, /* B0 or A0 */
&key_material[2]);
GCP_get_id (t->destination),
&msg->kx.ephemeral_key,
&msg->kx.ratchet_key);
- GNUNET_break (GNUNET_OK == ret);
+ if (GNUNET_OK != ret)
+ {
+ if (GNUNET_NO == ret)
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (stats,
+ "# redundant KX_AUTH received",
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ else
+ GNUNET_break (0); /* connect to self!? */
+ return;
+ }
GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash (&ax_tmp.RK,
sizeof (ax_tmp.RK),
&kx_auth);
{
/* This KX_AUTH is not using the latest KX/KX_AUTH data
we transmitted to the sender, refuse it, try KX again. */
- GNUNET_break_op (0);
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (stats,
+ "# KX_AUTH not using our last KX received (auth failure)",
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
send_kx (t,
- NULL,
+ ct,
&t->ax);
return;
}
if (NULL != t->unverified_ax)
{
/* We got some "stale" KX before, drop that. */
- t->unverified_ax->DHRs = NULL; /* aliased with ax.DHRs */
- t->unverified_ax->kx_0 = NULL; /* aliased with ax.DHRs */
cleanup_ax (t->unverified_ax);
GNUNET_free (t->unverified_ax);
t->unverified_ax = NULL;
ctn = ntohl (t->next_ctn.cn);
while (NULL !=
GNUNET_CONTAINER_multihashmap32_get (t->channels,
- ctn))
+ ctn | highbit))
{
- ctn = ((ctn + 1) & (~ HIGH_BIT)) | highbit;
+ ctn = ((ctn + 1) & (~ HIGH_BIT));
}
- t->next_ctn.cn = htonl (((ctn + 1) & (~ HIGH_BIT)) | highbit);
- ret.cn = ntohl (ctn);
+ t->next_ctn.cn = htonl ((ctn + 1) & (~ HIGH_BIT));
+ ret.cn = htonl (ctn | highbit);
return ret;
}
struct CadetTunnel *t = ct->t;
if (GNUNET_YES == ct->is_ready)
+ {
GNUNET_CONTAINER_DLL_remove (t->connection_ready_head,
t->connection_ready_tail,
ct);
+ t->num_ready_connections--;
+ }
else
+ {
GNUNET_CONTAINER_DLL_remove (t->connection_busy_head,
t->connection_busy_tail,
ct);
+ t->num_busy_connections--;
+ }
GNUNET_free (ct);
}
GNUNET_MQ_destroy (t->mq);
if (NULL != t->unverified_ax)
{
- t->unverified_ax->DHRs = NULL; /* aliased with ax.DHRs */
- t->unverified_ax->kx_0 = NULL; /* aliased with ax.DHRs */
cleanup_ax (t->unverified_ax);
GNUNET_free (t->unverified_ax);
}
struct CadetPeerPath *p,
unsigned int off)
{
+ LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
+ "Considering %s for %s\n",
+ GCPP_2s (p),
+ GCT_2s (t));
(void) consider_path_cb (t,
p,
off);
/* We don't know about such a channel, might have been destroyed on our
end in the meantime, or never existed. Send back a DESTROY. */
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Receicved %u bytes of application data for unknown channel %u, sending DESTROY\n",
+ "Received %u bytes of application data for unknown channel %u, sending DESTROY\n",
(unsigned int) (ntohs (msg->header.size) - sizeof (*msg)),
ntohl (msg->ctn.cn));
GCT_send_channel_destroy (t,
/* We don't know about such a channel, might have been destroyed on our
end in the meantime, or never existed. Send back a DESTROY. */
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Receicved DATA_ACK for unknown channel %u, sending DESTROY\n",
+ "Received DATA_ACK for unknown channel %u, sending DESTROY\n",
ntohl (ack->ctn.cn));
GCT_send_channel_destroy (t,
ack->ctn);
if (NULL != ch)
{
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Receicved duplicate channel OPEN on port %s from %s (%s), resending ACK\n",
+ "Received duplicate channel CHANNEL_OPEN on port %s from %s (%s), resending ACK\n",
GNUNET_h2s (&copen->port),
GCT_2s (t),
GCCH_2s (ch));
return;
}
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Receicved channel OPEN on port %s from %s\n",
+ "Received CHANNEL_OPEN on port %s from %s\n",
GNUNET_h2s (&copen->port),
GCT_2s (t));
ch = GCCH_channel_incoming_new (t,
return;
}
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
- "Receicved channel DESTROY on %s from %s\n",
+ "Received channel DESTROY on %s from %s\n",
GCCH_2s (ch),
GCT_2s (t));
GCCH_handle_remote_destroy (ch,
t->kx_retry_delay = INITIAL_KX_RETRY_DELAY;
new_ephemeral (&t->ax);
- t->ax.kx_0 = GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_create ();
+ GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_create2 (&t->ax.kx_0));
t->destination = destination;
t->channels = GNUNET_CONTAINER_multihashmap32_create (8);
t->maintain_connections_task
case CADET_TUNNEL_KEY_UNINITIALIZED:
case CADET_TUNNEL_KEY_AX_RECV:
/* We did not even SEND our KX, how can the other peer
- send us encrypted data? */
- GNUNET_break_op (0);
+ send us encrypted data? Must have been that we went
+ down and the other peer still things we are up.
+ Let's send it KX back. */
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (stats,
+ "# received encrypted without any KX",
+ 1,
+ GNUNET_NO);
+ if (NULL != t->kx_task)
+ {
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (t->kx_task);
+ t->kx_task = NULL;
+ }
+ send_kx (t,
+ ct,
+ &t->ax);
return;
case CADET_TUNNEL_KEY_AX_SENT_AND_RECV:
/* We send KX, and other peer send KX to us at the same time.
break;
}
- GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (stats,
- "# received encrypted",
- 1,
- GNUNET_NO);
decrypted_size = -1;
if (CADET_TUNNEL_KEY_OK == t->estate)
{
if (-1 != decrypted_size)
{
/* It worked! Treat this as authentication of the AX data! */
- t->ax.DHRs = NULL; /* aliased with ax.DHRs */
- t->ax.kx_0 = NULL; /* aliased with ax.DHRs */
cleanup_ax (&t->ax);
t->ax = *t->unverified_ax;
GNUNET_free (t->unverified_ax);
t->unverified_attempts);
if (t->unverified_attempts > MAX_UNVERIFIED_ATTEMPTS)
{
- t->unverified_ax->DHRs = NULL; /* aliased with ax.DHRs */
- t->unverified_ax->kx_0 = NULL; /* aliased with ax.DHRs */
cleanup_ax (t->unverified_ax);
GNUNET_free (t->unverified_ax);
t->unverified_ax = NULL;
if (-1 == decrypted_size)
{
/* Decryption failed for good, complain. */
- GNUNET_break_op (0);
LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
- "%s failed to decrypt and validate encrypted data\n",
+ "%s failed to decrypt and validate encrypted data, retrying KX\n",
GCT_2s (t));
GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (stats,
"# unable to decrypt",
1,
GNUNET_NO);
+ if (NULL != t->kx_task)
+ {
+ GNUNET_SCHEDULER_cancel (t->kx_task);
+ t->kx_task = NULL;
+ }
+ send_kx (t,
+ ct,
+ &t->ax);
return;
}
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (stats,
+ "# decrypted bytes",
+ decrypted_size,
+ GNUNET_NO);
/* The MST will ultimately call #handle_decrypted() on each message. */
t->current_ct = ct;
&ax_msg[1],
message,
payload_size);
+ GNUNET_STATISTICS_update (stats,
+ "# encrypted bytes",
+ payload_size,
+ GNUNET_NO);
ax_msg->ax_header.Ns = htonl (t->ax.Ns++);
ax_msg->ax_header.PNs = htonl (t->ax.PNs);
/* FIXME: we should do this once, not once per message;
this is a point multiplication, and DHRs does not
change all the time. */
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (t->ax.DHRs,
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (&t->ax.DHRs,
&ax_msg->ax_header.DHRs);
t_h_encrypt (&t->ax,
ax_msg);