--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
+ * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "apps.h"
+#include "http_server.h"
+#include "s_apps.h"
+#include "progs.h"
+
+#include "cmp_mock_srv.h"
+
+/* tweaks needed due to missing unistd.h on Windows */
+#ifdef _WIN32
+# define access _access
+#endif
+#ifndef F_OK
+# define F_OK 0
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/cmp.h>
+#include <openssl/cmp_util.h>
+#include <openssl/crmf.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/store.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV)
+
+/* start TODO remove when PR #11755 is merged */
+static char *get_passwd(const char *pass, const char *desc)
+{
+ char *result = NULL;
+
+ app_passwd(pass, NULL, &result, NULL);
+ return result;
+}
+
+static void cleanse(char *str)
+{
+ if (str != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(str, strlen(str));
+}
+
+static void clear_free(char *str)
+{
+ if (str != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(str, strlen(str));
+}
+
+static int load_key_cert_crl(const char *uri, int maybe_stdin,
+ const char *pass, const char *desc,
+ EVP_PKEY **ppkey, X509 **pcert, X509_CRL **pcrl)
+{
+ PW_CB_DATA uidata;
+ OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (ppkey != NULL)
+ *ppkey = NULL;
+ if (pcert != NULL)
+ *pcert = NULL;
+ if (pcrl != NULL)
+ *pcrl = NULL;
+
+ uidata.password = pass;
+ uidata.prompt_info = uri;
+
+ ctx = OSSL_STORE_open(uri, get_ui_method(), &uidata, NULL, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not open file or uri %s for loading %s\n",
+ uri, desc);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ OSSL_STORE_INFO *info = OSSL_STORE_load(ctx);
+ int type = info == NULL ? 0 : OSSL_STORE_INFO_get_type(info);
+ const char *infostr =
+ info == NULL ? NULL : OSSL_STORE_INFO_type_string(type);
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ if (OSSL_STORE_eof(ctx))
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case OSSL_STORE_INFO_PKEY:
+ if (ppkey != NULL && *ppkey == NULL)
+ err = ((*ppkey = OSSL_STORE_INFO_get1_PKEY(info)) == NULL);
+ break;
+ case OSSL_STORE_INFO_CERT:
+ if (pcert != NULL && *pcert == NULL)
+ err = ((*pcert = OSSL_STORE_INFO_get1_CERT(info)) == NULL);
+ break;
+ case OSSL_STORE_INFO_CRL:
+ if (pcrl != NULL && *pcrl == NULL)
+ err = ((*pcrl = OSSL_STORE_INFO_get1_CRL(info)) == NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* skip any other type */
+ break;
+ }
+ OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(info);
+ if (err) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not read %s of %s from %s\n",
+ infostr, desc, uri);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ end:
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ OSSL_STORE_close(ctx);
+ if (!ret)
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static
+EVP_PKEY *load_key_preliminary(const char *uri, int format, int may_stdin,
+ const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+ if (desc == NULL)
+ desc = "private key";
+
+ if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) {
+ if (e == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "No engine specified for loading %s\n", desc);
+ } else {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ PW_CB_DATA cb_data;
+
+ cb_data.password = pass;
+ cb_data.prompt_info = uri;
+ if (ENGINE_init(e)) {
+ pkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, uri,
+ (UI_METHOD *)get_ui_method(),
+ &cb_data);
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+ }
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot load %s from engine\n", desc);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ }
+#else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Engines not supported for loading %s\n", desc);
+#endif
+ }
+ } else {
+ (void)load_key_cert_crl(uri, may_stdin, pass, desc, &pkey, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to load %s\n", desc);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ }
+ return pkey;
+}
+
+static X509 *load_cert_pass(const char *uri, int maybe_stdin,
+ const char *pass, const char *desc)
+{
+ X509 *cert = NULL;
+
+ if (desc == NULL)
+ desc = "certificate";
+ (void)load_key_cert_crl(uri, maybe_stdin, pass, desc, NULL, &cert, NULL);
+ if (cert == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to load %s\n", desc);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ }
+ return cert;
+}
+/* end TODO remove when PR #11755 is merged */
+
+static char *opt_config = NULL;
+#define CMP_SECTION "cmp"
+#define SECTION_NAME_MAX 40 /* max length of section name */
+#define DEFAULT_SECTION "default"
+static char *opt_section = CMP_SECTION;
+
+#undef PROG
+#define PROG cmp_main
+static char *prog = "cmp";
+
+static int read_config(void);
+
+static CONF *conf = NULL; /* OpenSSL config file context structure */
+static OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx = NULL; /* the client-side CMP context */
+
+/* TODO remove when new setup_engine_flags() is in apps/lib/apps.c (PR #4277) */
+static
+ENGINE *setup_engine_flags(const char *engine, unsigned int flags, int debug)
+{
+ return setup_engine(engine, debug);
+}
+
+/* the type of cmp command we want to send */
+typedef enum {
+ CMP_IR,
+ CMP_KUR,
+ CMP_CR,
+ CMP_P10CR,
+ CMP_RR,
+ CMP_GENM
+} cmp_cmd_t;
+
+/* message transfer */
+static char *opt_server = NULL;
+static char server_port_s[32] = { '\0' };
+static int server_port = 0;
+static char *opt_proxy = NULL;
+static char *opt_no_proxy = NULL;
+static char *opt_path = "/";
+static int opt_msg_timeout = -1;
+static int opt_total_timeout = -1;
+
+/* server authentication */
+static char *opt_trusted = NULL;
+static char *opt_untrusted = NULL;
+static char *opt_srvcert = NULL;
+static char *opt_recipient = NULL;
+static char *opt_expect_sender = NULL;
+static int opt_ignore_keyusage = 0;
+static int opt_unprotected_errors = 0;
+static char *opt_extracertsout = NULL;
+static char *opt_cacertsout = NULL;
+
+/* client authentication */
+static char *opt_ref = NULL;
+static char *opt_secret = NULL;
+static char *opt_cert = NULL;
+static char *opt_key = NULL;
+static char *opt_keypass = NULL;
+static char *opt_digest = NULL;
+static char *opt_mac = NULL;
+static char *opt_extracerts = NULL;
+static int opt_unprotected_requests = 0;
+
+/* generic message */
+static char *opt_cmd_s = NULL;
+static int opt_cmd = -1;
+static char *opt_geninfo = NULL;
+static char *opt_infotype_s = NULL;
+static int opt_infotype = NID_undef;
+
+/* certificate enrollment */
+static char *opt_newkey = NULL;
+static char *opt_newkeypass = NULL;
+static char *opt_subject = NULL;
+static char *opt_issuer = NULL;
+static int opt_days = 0;
+static char *opt_reqexts = NULL;
+static char *opt_sans = NULL;
+static int opt_san_nodefault = 0;
+static char *opt_policies = NULL;
+static char *opt_policy_oids = NULL;
+static int opt_policy_oids_critical = 0;
+static int opt_popo = OSSL_CRMF_POPO_NONE - 1;
+static char *opt_csr = NULL;
+static char *opt_out_trusted = NULL;
+static int opt_implicit_confirm = 0;
+static int opt_disable_confirm = 0;
+static char *opt_certout = NULL;
+
+/* certificate enrollment and revocation */
+static char *opt_oldcert = NULL;
+static int opt_revreason = CRL_REASON_NONE;
+
+/* credentials format */
+static char *opt_certform_s = "PEM";
+static int opt_certform = FORMAT_PEM;
+static char *opt_keyform_s = "PEM";
+static int opt_keyform = FORMAT_PEM;
+static char *opt_certsform_s = "PEM";
+static int opt_certsform = FORMAT_PEM;
+static char *opt_otherpass = NULL;
+static char *opt_engine = NULL;
+
+/* TLS connection */
+static int opt_tls_used = 0;
+static char *opt_tls_cert = NULL;
+static char *opt_tls_key = NULL;
+static char *opt_tls_keypass = NULL;
+static char *opt_tls_extra = NULL;
+static char *opt_tls_trusted = NULL;
+static char *opt_tls_host = NULL;
+
+/* client-side debugging */
+static int opt_batch = 0;
+static int opt_repeat = 1;
+static char *opt_reqin = NULL;
+static char *opt_reqout = NULL;
+static char *opt_rspin = NULL;
+static char *opt_rspout = NULL;
+static int opt_use_mock_srv = 0;
+
+/* server-side debugging */
+static char *opt_port = NULL;
+static int opt_max_msgs = 0;
+
+static char *opt_srv_ref = NULL;
+static char *opt_srv_secret = NULL;
+static char *opt_srv_cert = NULL;
+static char *opt_srv_key = NULL;
+static char *opt_srv_keypass = NULL;
+
+static char *opt_srv_trusted = NULL;
+static char *opt_srv_untrusted = NULL;
+static char *opt_rsp_cert = NULL;
+static char *opt_rsp_extracerts = NULL;
+static char *opt_rsp_capubs = NULL;
+static int opt_poll_count = 0;
+static int opt_check_after = 1;
+static int opt_grant_implicitconf = 0;
+
+static int opt_pkistatus = OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_accepted;
+static int opt_failure = INT_MIN;
+static int opt_failurebits = 0;
+static char *opt_statusstring = NULL;
+static int opt_send_error = 0;
+static int opt_send_unprotected = 0;
+static int opt_send_unprot_err = 0;
+static int opt_accept_unprotected = 0;
+static int opt_accept_unprot_err = 0;
+static int opt_accept_raverified = 0;
+
+static X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
+
+typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+ OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
+ OPT_CONFIG, OPT_SECTION,
+
+ OPT_CMD, OPT_INFOTYPE, OPT_GENINFO,
+
+ OPT_NEWKEY, OPT_NEWKEYPASS, OPT_SUBJECT, OPT_ISSUER,
+ OPT_DAYS, OPT_REQEXTS,
+ OPT_SANS, OPT_SAN_NODEFAULT,
+ OPT_POLICIES, OPT_POLICY_OIDS, OPT_POLICY_OIDS_CRITICAL,
+ OPT_POPO, OPT_CSR,
+ OPT_OUT_TRUSTED, OPT_IMPLICIT_CONFIRM, OPT_DISABLE_CONFIRM,
+ OPT_CERTOUT,
+
+ OPT_OLDCERT, OPT_REVREASON,
+
+ OPT_SERVER, OPT_PROXY, OPT_NO_PROXY, OPT_PATH,
+ OPT_MSG_TIMEOUT, OPT_TOTAL_TIMEOUT,
+
+ OPT_TRUSTED, OPT_UNTRUSTED, OPT_SRVCERT,
+ OPT_RECIPIENT, OPT_EXPECT_SENDER,
+ OPT_IGNORE_KEYUSAGE, OPT_UNPROTECTED_ERRORS,
+ OPT_EXTRACERTSOUT, OPT_CACERTSOUT,
+
+ OPT_REF, OPT_SECRET, OPT_CERT, OPT_KEY, OPT_KEYPASS,
+ OPT_DIGEST, OPT_MAC, OPT_EXTRACERTS,
+ OPT_UNPROTECTED_REQUESTS,
+
+ OPT_CERTFORM, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_CERTSFORM,
+ OPT_OTHERPASS,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ OPT_ENGINE,
+#endif
+ OPT_PROV_ENUM,
+
+ OPT_TLS_USED, OPT_TLS_CERT, OPT_TLS_KEY,
+ OPT_TLS_KEYPASS,
+ OPT_TLS_EXTRA, OPT_TLS_TRUSTED, OPT_TLS_HOST,
+
+ OPT_BATCH, OPT_REPEAT,
+ OPT_REQIN, OPT_REQOUT, OPT_RSPIN, OPT_RSPOUT,
+
+ OPT_USE_MOCK_SRV, OPT_PORT, OPT_MAX_MSGS,
+ OPT_SRV_REF, OPT_SRV_SECRET,
+ OPT_SRV_CERT, OPT_SRV_KEY, OPT_SRV_KEYPASS,
+ OPT_SRV_TRUSTED, OPT_SRV_UNTRUSTED,
+ OPT_RSP_CERT, OPT_RSP_EXTRACERTS, OPT_RSP_CAPUBS,
+ OPT_POLL_COUNT, OPT_CHECK_AFTER,
+ OPT_GRANT_IMPLICITCONF,
+ OPT_PKISTATUS, OPT_FAILURE,
+ OPT_FAILUREBITS, OPT_STATUSSTRING,
+ OPT_SEND_ERROR, OPT_SEND_UNPROTECTED,
+ OPT_SEND_UNPROT_ERR, OPT_ACCEPT_UNPROTECTED,
+ OPT_ACCEPT_UNPROT_ERR, OPT_ACCEPT_RAVERIFIED,
+
+ OPT_V_ENUM
+} OPTION_CHOICE;
+
+const OPTIONS cmp_options[] = {
+ /* entries must be in the same order as enumerated above!! */
+ {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+ {"config", OPT_CONFIG, 's',
+ "Configuration file to use. \"\" = none. Default from env variable OPENSSL_CONF"},
+ {"section", OPT_SECTION, 's',
+ "Section(s) in config file to get options from. \"\" = 'default'. Default 'cmp'"},
+
+ OPT_SECTION("Generic message"),
+ {"cmd", OPT_CMD, 's', "CMP request to send: ir/cr/kur/p10cr/rr/genm"},
+ {"infotype", OPT_INFOTYPE, 's',
+ "InfoType name for requesting specific info in genm, e.g. 'signKeyPairTypes'"},
+ {"geninfo", OPT_GENINFO, 's',
+ "generalInfo integer values to place in request PKIHeader with given OID"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "specified in the form <OID>:int:<n>, e.g. \"1.2.3:int:987\""},
+
+ OPT_SECTION("Certificate enrollment"),
+ {"newkey", OPT_NEWKEY, 's',
+ "Private or public key for the requested cert. Default: CSR key or client key"},
+ {"newkeypass", OPT_NEWKEYPASS, 's', "New private key pass phrase source"},
+ {"subject", OPT_SUBJECT, 's',
+ "Distinguished Name (DN) of subject to use in the requested cert template"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "For kur, default is the subject DN of the reference cert (see -oldcert);"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "this default is used for ir and cr only if no Subject Alt Names are set"},
+ {"issuer", OPT_ISSUER, 's',
+ "DN of the issuer to place in the requested certificate template"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "also used as recipient if neither -recipient nor -srvcert are given"},
+ {"days", OPT_DAYS, 'n',
+ "Requested validity time of the new certificate in number of days"},
+ {"reqexts", OPT_REQEXTS, 's',
+ "Name of config file section defining certificate request extensions"},
+ {"sans", OPT_SANS, 's',
+ "Subject Alt Names (IPADDR/DNS/URI) to add as (critical) cert req extension"},
+ {"san_nodefault", OPT_SAN_NODEFAULT, '-',
+ "Do not take default SANs from reference certificate (see -oldcert)"},
+ {"policies", OPT_POLICIES, 's',
+ "Name of config file section defining policies certificate request extension"},
+ {"policy_oids", OPT_POLICY_OIDS, 's',
+ "Policy OID(s) to add as policies certificate request extension"},
+ {"policy_oids_critical", OPT_POLICY_OIDS_CRITICAL, '-',
+ "Flag the policy OID(s) given with -policy_oids as critical"},
+ {"popo", OPT_POPO, 'n',
+ "Proof-of-Possession (POPO) method to use for ir/cr/kur where"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "-1 = NONE, 0 = RAVERIFIED, 1 = SIGNATURE (default), 2 = KEYENC"},
+ {"csr", OPT_CSR, 's',
+ "CSR file in PKCS#10 format to use in p10cr for legacy support"},
+ {"out_trusted", OPT_OUT_TRUSTED, 's',
+ "Certificates to trust when verifying newly enrolled certificates"},
+ {"implicit_confirm", OPT_IMPLICIT_CONFIRM, '-',
+ "Request implicit confirmation of newly enrolled certificates"},
+ {"disable_confirm", OPT_DISABLE_CONFIRM, '-',
+ "Do not confirm newly enrolled certificate w/o requesting implicit"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "confirmation. WARNING: This leads to behavior violating RFC 4210"},
+ {"certout", OPT_CERTOUT, 's',
+ "File to save newly enrolled certificate"},
+
+ OPT_SECTION("Certificate enrollment and revocation"),
+
+ {"oldcert", OPT_OLDCERT, 's',
+ "Certificate to be updated (defaulting to -cert) or to be revoked in rr;"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "also used as reference (defaulting to -cert) for subject DN and SANs."},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "Its issuer is used as recipient unless -srvcert, -recipient or -issuer given"},
+ {"revreason", OPT_REVREASON, 'n',
+ "Reason code to include in revocation request (rr); possible values:"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "0..6, 8..10 (see RFC5280, 5.3.1) or -1. Default -1 = none included"},
+
+ OPT_SECTION("Message transfer"),
+ {"server", OPT_SERVER, 's',
+ "[http[s]://]address[:port] of CMP server. Default port 80 or 443."},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "The address may be a DNS name or an IP address"},
+ {"proxy", OPT_PROXY, 's',
+ "[http[s]://]address[:port][/path] of HTTP(S) proxy to use; path is ignored"},
+ {"no_proxy", OPT_NO_PROXY, 's',
+ "List of addresses of servers not to use HTTP(S) proxy for"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "Default from environment variable 'no_proxy', else 'NO_PROXY', else none"},
+ {"path", OPT_PATH, 's',
+ "HTTP path (aka CMP alias) at the CMP server. Default \"/\""},
+ {"msg_timeout", OPT_MSG_TIMEOUT, 'n',
+ "Timeout per CMP message round trip (or 0 for none). Default 120 seconds"},
+ {"total_timeout", OPT_TOTAL_TIMEOUT, 'n',
+ "Overall time an enrollment incl. polling may take. Default 0 = infinite"},
+
+ OPT_SECTION("Server authentication"),
+ {"trusted", OPT_TRUSTED, 's',
+ "Trusted certs used for CMP server authentication when verifying responses"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0, "unless -srvcert is given"},
+ {"untrusted", OPT_UNTRUSTED, 's',
+ "Intermediate certs for chain construction verifying CMP/TLS/enrolled certs"},
+ {"srvcert", OPT_SRVCERT, 's',
+ "Specific CMP server cert to use and trust directly when verifying responses"},
+ {"recipient", OPT_RECIPIENT, 's',
+ "Distinguished Name (DN) of the recipient to use unless -srvcert is given"},
+ {"expect_sender", OPT_EXPECT_SENDER, 's',
+ "DN of expected response sender. Defaults to DN of -srvcert, if provided"},
+ {"ignore_keyusage", OPT_IGNORE_KEYUSAGE, '-',
+ "Ignore CMP signer cert key usage, else 'digitalSignature' must be allowed"},
+ {"unprotected_errors", OPT_UNPROTECTED_ERRORS, '-',
+ "Accept missing or invalid protection of regular error messages and negative"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "certificate responses (ip/cp/kup), revocation responses (rp), and PKIConf"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "WARNING: This setting leads to behavior allowing violation of RFC 4210"},
+ {"extracertsout", OPT_EXTRACERTSOUT, 's',
+ "File to save extra certificates received in the extraCerts field"},
+ {"cacertsout", OPT_CACERTSOUT, 's',
+ "File to save CA certificates received in the caPubs field of 'ip' messages"},
+
+ OPT_SECTION("Client authentication"),
+ {"ref", OPT_REF, 's',
+ "Reference value to use as senderKID in case no -cert is given"},
+ {"secret", OPT_SECRET, 's',
+ "Password source for client authentication with a pre-shared key (secret)"},
+ {"cert", OPT_CERT, 's',
+ "Client's current certificate (needed unless using -secret for PBM);"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "any further certs included are appended in extraCerts field"},
+ {"key", OPT_KEY, 's', "Private key for the client's current certificate"},
+ {"keypass", OPT_KEYPASS, 's',
+ "Client private key (and cert and old cert file) pass phrase source"},
+ {"digest", OPT_DIGEST, 's',
+ "Digest to use in message protection and POPO signatures. Default \"sha256\""},
+ {"mac", OPT_MAC, 's',
+ "MAC algorithm to use in PBM-based message protection. Default \"hmac-sha1\""},
+ {"extracerts", OPT_EXTRACERTS, 's',
+ "Certificates to append in extraCerts field of outgoing messages"},
+ {"unprotected_requests", OPT_UNPROTECTED_REQUESTS, '-',
+ "Send messages without CMP-level protection"},
+
+ OPT_SECTION("Credentials format"),
+ {"certform", OPT_CERTFORM, 's',
+ "Format (PEM or DER) to use when saving a certificate to a file. Default PEM"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "This also determines format to use for writing (not supported for P12)"},
+ {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 's',
+ "Format to assume when reading key files. Default PEM"},
+ {"certsform", OPT_CERTSFORM, 's',
+ "Format (PEM/DER/P12) to try first reading multiple certs. Default PEM"},
+ {"otherpass", OPT_OTHERPASS, 's',
+ "Pass phrase source potentially needed for loading certificates of others"},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's',
+ "Use crypto engine with given identifier, possibly a hardware device."},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "Engines may be defined in OpenSSL config file engine section."},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "Options like -key specifying keys held in the engine can give key IDs"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "prefixed by 'engine:', e.g. '-key engine:pkcs11:object=mykey;pin-value=1234'"},
+#endif
+ OPT_PROV_OPTIONS,
+
+ OPT_SECTION("TLS connection"),
+ {"tls_used", OPT_TLS_USED, '-',
+ "Enable using TLS (also when other TLS options are not set)"},
+ {"tls_cert", OPT_TLS_CERT, 's',
+ "Client's TLS certificate. May include chain to be provided to TLS server"},
+ {"tls_key", OPT_TLS_KEY, 's',
+ "Private key for the client's TLS certificate"},
+ {"tls_keypass", OPT_TLS_KEYPASS, 's',
+ "Pass phrase source for the client's private TLS key (and TLS cert file)"},
+ {"tls_extra", OPT_TLS_EXTRA, 's',
+ "Extra certificates to provide to TLS server during TLS handshake"},
+ {"tls_trusted", OPT_TLS_TRUSTED, 's',
+ "Trusted certificates to use for verifying the TLS server certificate;"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0, "this implies host name validation"},
+ {"tls_host", OPT_TLS_HOST, 's',
+ "Address to be checked (rather than -server) during TLS host name validation"},
+
+ OPT_SECTION("Client-side debugging"),
+ {"batch", OPT_BATCH, '-',
+ "Do not interactively prompt for input when a password is required etc."},
+ {"repeat", OPT_REPEAT, 'n',
+ "Invoke the transaction the given number of times. Default 1"},
+ {"reqin", OPT_REQIN, 's', "Take sequence of CMP requests from file(s)"},
+ {"reqout", OPT_REQOUT, 's', "Save sequence of CMP requests to file(s)"},
+ {"rspin", OPT_RSPIN, 's',
+ "Process sequence of CMP responses provided in file(s), skipping server"},
+ {"rspout", OPT_RSPOUT, 's', "Save sequence of CMP responses to file(s)"},
+
+ {"use_mock_srv", OPT_USE_MOCK_SRV, '-', "Use mock server at API level, bypassing HTTP"},
+
+ OPT_SECTION("Mock server"),
+ {"port", OPT_PORT, 's', "Act as HTTP mock server listening on given port"},
+ {"max_msgs", OPT_MAX_MSGS, 'n',
+ "max number of messages handled by HTTP mock server. Default: 0 = unlimited"},
+
+ {"srv_ref", OPT_SRV_REF, 's',
+ "Reference value to use as senderKID of server in case no -srv_cert is given"},
+ {"srv_secret", OPT_SRV_SECRET, 's',
+ "Password source for server authentication with a pre-shared key (secret)"},
+ {"srv_cert", OPT_SRV_CERT, 's', "Certificate of the server"},
+ {"srv_key", OPT_SRV_KEY, 's',
+ "Private key used by the server for signing messages"},
+ {"srv_keypass", OPT_SRV_KEYPASS, 's',
+ "Server private key (and cert) file pass phrase source"},
+
+ {"srv_trusted", OPT_SRV_TRUSTED, 's',
+ "Trusted certificates for client authentication"},
+ {"srv_untrusted", OPT_SRV_UNTRUSTED, 's',
+ "Intermediate certs for constructing chains for CMP protection by client"},
+ {"rsp_cert", OPT_RSP_CERT, 's',
+ "Certificate to be returned as mock enrollment result"},
+ {"rsp_extracerts", OPT_RSP_EXTRACERTS, 's',
+ "Extra certificates to be included in mock certification responses"},
+ {"rsp_capubs", OPT_RSP_CAPUBS, 's',
+ "CA certificates to be included in mock ip response"},
+ {"poll_count", OPT_POLL_COUNT, 'n',
+ "Number of times the client must poll before receiving a certificate"},
+ {"check_after", OPT_CHECK_AFTER, 'n',
+ "The check_after value (time to wait) to include in poll response"},
+ {"grant_implicitconf", OPT_GRANT_IMPLICITCONF, '-',
+ "Grant implicit confirmation of newly enrolled certificate"},
+
+ {"pkistatus", OPT_PKISTATUS, 'n',
+ "PKIStatus to be included in server response. Possible values: 0..6"},
+ {"failure", OPT_FAILURE, 'n',
+ "A single failure info bit number to include in server response, 0..26"},
+ {"failurebits", OPT_FAILUREBITS, 'n',
+ "Number representing failure bits to include in server response, 0..2^27 - 1"},
+ {"statusstring", OPT_STATUSSTRING, 's',
+ "Status string to be included in server response"},
+ {"send_error", OPT_SEND_ERROR, '-',
+ "Force server to reply with error message"},
+ {"send_unprotected", OPT_SEND_UNPROTECTED, '-',
+ "Send response messages without CMP-level protection"},
+ {"send_unprot_err", OPT_SEND_UNPROT_ERR, '-',
+ "In case of negative responses, server shall send unprotected error messages,"},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "certificate responses (ip/cp/kup), and revocation responses (rp)."},
+ {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
+ "WARNING: This setting leads to behavior violating RFC 4210"},
+ {"accept_unprotected", OPT_ACCEPT_UNPROTECTED, '-',
+ "Accept missing or invalid protection of requests"},
+ {"accept_unprot_err", OPT_ACCEPT_UNPROT_ERR, '-',
+ "Accept unprotected error messages from client"},
+ {"accept_raverified", OPT_ACCEPT_RAVERIFIED, '-',
+ "Accept RAVERIFIED as proof-of-possession (POPO)"},
+
+ OPT_V_OPTIONS,
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+typedef union {
+ char **txt;
+ int *num;
+ long *num_long;
+} varref;
+static varref cmp_vars[] = { /* must be in same order as enumerated above! */
+ {&opt_config}, {&opt_section},
+
+ {&opt_cmd_s}, {&opt_infotype_s}, {&opt_geninfo},
+
+ {&opt_newkey}, {&opt_newkeypass}, {&opt_subject}, {&opt_issuer},
+ {(char **)&opt_days}, {&opt_reqexts},
+ {&opt_sans}, {(char **)&opt_san_nodefault},
+ {&opt_policies}, {&opt_policy_oids}, {(char **)&opt_policy_oids_critical},
+ {(char **)&opt_popo}, {&opt_csr},
+ {&opt_out_trusted},
+ {(char **)&opt_implicit_confirm}, {(char **)&opt_disable_confirm},
+ {&opt_certout},
+
+ {&opt_oldcert}, {(char **)&opt_revreason},
+
+ {&opt_server}, {&opt_proxy}, {&opt_no_proxy}, {&opt_path},
+ {(char **)&opt_msg_timeout}, {(char **)&opt_total_timeout},
+
+ {&opt_trusted}, {&opt_untrusted}, {&opt_srvcert},
+ {&opt_recipient}, {&opt_expect_sender},
+ {(char **)&opt_ignore_keyusage}, {(char **)&opt_unprotected_errors},
+ {&opt_extracertsout}, {&opt_cacertsout},
+
+ {&opt_ref}, {&opt_secret}, {&opt_cert}, {&opt_key}, {&opt_keypass},
+ {&opt_digest}, {&opt_mac}, {&opt_extracerts},
+ {(char **)&opt_unprotected_requests},
+
+ {&opt_certform_s}, {&opt_keyform_s}, {&opt_certsform_s},
+ {&opt_otherpass},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ {&opt_engine},
+#endif
+
+ {(char **)&opt_tls_used}, {&opt_tls_cert}, {&opt_tls_key},
+ {&opt_tls_keypass},
+ {&opt_tls_extra}, {&opt_tls_trusted}, {&opt_tls_host},
+
+ {(char **)&opt_batch}, {(char **)&opt_repeat},
+ {&opt_reqin}, {&opt_reqout}, {&opt_rspin}, {&opt_rspout},
+
+ {(char **)&opt_use_mock_srv}, {&opt_port}, {(char **)&opt_max_msgs},
+ {&opt_srv_ref}, {&opt_srv_secret},
+ {&opt_srv_cert}, {&opt_srv_key}, {&opt_srv_keypass},
+ {&opt_srv_trusted}, {&opt_srv_untrusted},
+ {&opt_rsp_cert}, {&opt_rsp_extracerts}, {&opt_rsp_capubs},
+ {(char **)&opt_poll_count}, {(char **)&opt_check_after},
+ {(char **)&opt_grant_implicitconf},
+ {(char **)&opt_pkistatus}, {(char **)&opt_failure},
+ {(char **)&opt_failurebits}, {&opt_statusstring},
+ {(char **)&opt_send_error}, {(char **)&opt_send_unprotected},
+ {(char **)&opt_send_unprot_err}, {(char **)&opt_accept_unprotected},
+ {(char **)&opt_accept_unprot_err}, {(char **)&opt_accept_raverified},
+
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+# define FUNC (strcmp(OPENSSL_FUNC, "(unknown function)") == 0 \
+ ? "CMP" : "OPENSSL_FUNC")
+# define PRINT_LOCATION(bio) BIO_printf(bio, "%s:%s:%d:", \
+ FUNC, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE)
+#else
+# define PRINT_LOCATION(bio) ((void)0)
+#endif
+#define CMP_print(bio, prefix, msg, a1, a2, a3) \
+ (PRINT_LOCATION(bio), \
+ BIO_printf(bio, "CMP %s: " msg "\n", prefix, a1, a2, a3))
+#define CMP_INFO(msg, a1, a2, a3) CMP_print(bio_out, "info", msg, a1, a2, a3)
+#define CMP_info(msg) CMP_INFO(msg"%s%s%s", "", "", "")
+#define CMP_info1(msg, a1) CMP_INFO(msg"%s%s", a1, "", "")
+#define CMP_info2(msg, a1, a2) CMP_INFO(msg"%s", a1, a2, "")
+#define CMP_info3(msg, a1, a2, a3) CMP_INFO(msg, a1, a2, a3)
+#define CMP_WARN(m, a1, a2, a3) CMP_print(bio_out, "warning", m, a1, a2, a3)
+#define CMP_warn(msg) CMP_WARN(msg"%s%s%s", "", "", "")
+#define CMP_warn1(msg, a1) CMP_WARN(msg"%s%s", a1, "", "")
+#define CMP_warn2(msg, a1, a2) CMP_WARN(msg"%s", a1, a2, "")
+#define CMP_warn3(msg, a1, a2, a3) CMP_WARN(msg, a1, a2, a3)
+#define CMP_ERR(msg, a1, a2, a3) CMP_print(bio_err, "error", msg, a1, a2, a3)
+#define CMP_err(msg) CMP_ERR(msg"%s%s%s", "", "", "")
+#define CMP_err1(msg, a1) CMP_ERR(msg"%s%s", a1, "", "")
+#define CMP_err2(msg, a1, a2) CMP_ERR(msg"%s", a1, a2, "")
+#define CMP_err3(msg, a1, a2, a3) CMP_ERR(msg, a1, a2, a3)
+
+static int print_to_bio_out(const char *func, const char *file, int line,
+ OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg)
+{
+ return OSSL_CMP_print_to_bio(bio_out, func, file, line, level, msg);
+}
+
+/* code duplicated from crypto/cmp/cmp_util.c */
+static int sk_X509_add1_cert(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert,
+ int no_dup, int prepend)
+{
+ if (no_dup) {
+ /*
+ * not using sk_X509_set_cmp_func() and sk_X509_find()
+ * because this re-orders the certs on the stack
+ */
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!X509_up_ref(cert))
+ return 0;
+ if (!sk_X509_insert(sk, cert, prepend ? 0 : -1)) {
+ X509_free(cert);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* code duplicated from crypto/cmp/cmp_util.c */
+static int sk_X509_add1_certs(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ int no_self_signed, int no_dups, int prepend)
+/* compiler would allow 'const' for the list of certs, yet they are up-ref'ed */
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (certs == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+
+ if (!no_self_signed || X509_check_issued(cert, cert) != X509_V_OK) {
+ if (!sk_X509_add1_cert(sk, cert, no_dups, prepend))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* TODO potentially move to apps/lib/apps.c */
+static char *next_item(char *opt) /* in list separated by comma and/or space */
+{
+ /* advance to separator (comma or whitespace), if any */
+ while (*opt != ',' && !isspace(*opt) && *opt != '\0') {
+ if (*opt == '\\' && opt[1] != '\0')
+ /* skip and unescape '\' escaped char */
+ memmove(opt, opt + 1, strlen(opt));
+ opt++;
+ }
+ if (*opt != '\0') {
+ /* terminate current item */
+ *opt++ = '\0';
+ /* skip over any whitespace after separator */
+ while (isspace(*opt))
+ opt++;
+ }
+ return *opt == '\0' ? NULL : opt; /* NULL indicates end of input */
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *load_key_pwd(const char *uri, int format,
+ const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc)
+{
+ char *pass_string = get_passwd(pass, desc);
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = load_key_preliminary(uri, format, 0, pass_string, e, desc);
+
+ clear_free(pass_string);
+ return pkey;
+}
+
+static X509 *load_cert_pwd(const char *uri, const char *pass, const char *desc)
+{
+ X509 *cert;
+ char *pass_string = get_passwd(pass, desc);
+
+ cert = load_cert_pass(uri, 0, pass_string, desc);
+ clear_free(pass_string);
+ return cert;
+}
+
+/* TODO remove when PR #4930 is merged */
+static int load_pkcs12(BIO *in, const char *desc,
+ pem_password_cb *pem_cb, void *cb_data,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
+{
+ const char *pass;
+ char tpass[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+ int len;
+ int ret = 0;
+ PKCS12 *p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(in, NULL);
+
+ if (desc == NULL)
+ desc = "PKCS12 input";
+ if (p12 == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error loading PKCS12 file for %s\n", desc);
+ goto die;
+ }
+
+ /* See if an empty password will do */
+ if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0) || PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) {
+ pass = "";
+ } else {
+ if (pem_cb == NULL)
+ pem_cb = wrap_password_callback;
+ len = pem_cb(tpass, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, cb_data);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "passphrase callback error for %s\n", desc);
+ goto die;
+ }
+ if (len < PEM_BUFSIZE)
+ tpass[len] = 0;
+ if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, tpass, len)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "mac verify error (wrong password?) in PKCS12 file for %s\n",
+ desc);
+ goto die;
+ }
+ pass = tpass;
+ }
+ ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, pkey, cert, ca);
+ die:
+ PKCS12_free(p12);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* TODO potentially move this and related functions to apps/lib/apps.c */
+static int adjust_format(const char **infile, int format, int engine_ok)
+{
+ if (!strncasecmp(*infile, "http://", 7)
+ || !strncasecmp(*infile, "https://", 8)) {
+ format = FORMAT_HTTP;
+ } else if (engine_ok && strncasecmp(*infile, "engine:", 7) == 0) {
+ *infile += 7;
+ format = FORMAT_ENGINE;
+ } else {
+ if (strncasecmp(*infile, "file:", 5) == 0)
+ *infile += 5;
+ /*
+ * the following is a heuristic whether first to try PEM or DER
+ * or PKCS12 as the input format for files
+ */
+ if (strlen(*infile) >= 4) {
+ const char *extension = *infile + strlen(*infile) - 4;
+
+ if (strncasecmp(extension, ".crt", 4) == 0
+ || strncasecmp(extension, ".pem", 4) == 0)
+ /* weak recognition of PEM format */
+ format = FORMAT_PEM;
+ else if (strncasecmp(extension, ".cer", 4) == 0
+ || strncasecmp(extension, ".der", 4) == 0)
+ /* weak recognition of DER format */
+ format = FORMAT_ASN1;
+ else if (strncasecmp(extension, ".p12", 4) == 0)
+ /* weak recognition of PKCS#12 format */
+ format = FORMAT_PKCS12;
+ /* else retain given format */
+ }
+ }
+ return format;
+}
+
+/*
+ * TODO potentially move this and related functions to apps/lib/
+ * or even better extend OSSL_STORE with type OSSL_STORE_INFO_CRL
+ */
+static X509_REQ *load_csr_autofmt(const char *infile, const char *desc)
+{
+ X509_REQ *csr;
+ BIO *bio_bak = bio_err;
+ int can_retry;
+ int format = adjust_format(&infile, FORMAT_PEM, 0);
+
+ can_retry = format == FORMAT_PEM || format == FORMAT_ASN1;
+ if (can_retry)
+ bio_err = NULL; /* do not show errors on more than one try */
+ csr = load_csr(infile, format, desc);
+ bio_err = bio_bak;
+ if (csr == NULL && can_retry) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ format = (format == FORMAT_PEM ? FORMAT_ASN1 : FORMAT_PEM);
+ csr = load_csr(infile, format, desc);
+ }
+ if (csr == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error: unable to load %s from file '%s'\n", desc,
+ infile);
+ }
+ return csr;
+}
+
+/* TODO replace by calling generalized load_certs() when PR #4930 is merged */
+static int load_certs_preliminary(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509) **certs,
+ int format, const char *pass,
+ const char *desc)
+{
+ X509 *cert = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) {
+ BIO *bio = bio_open_default(file, 'r', format);
+
+ if (bio != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; /* pkey is needed until PR #4930 is merged */
+ PW_CB_DATA cb_data;
+
+ cb_data.password = pass;
+ cb_data.prompt_info = file;
+ ret = load_pkcs12(bio, desc, wrap_password_callback,
+ &cb_data, &pkey, &cert, certs);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ }
+ } else if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) { /* load only one cert in this case */
+ CMP_warn1("can load only one certificate in DER format from %s", file);
+ cert = load_cert_pass(file, 0, pass, desc);
+ }
+ if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12 || format == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+ if (cert) {
+ if (*certs == NULL)
+ *certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (*certs != NULL)
+ ret = sk_X509_insert(*certs, cert, 0);
+ else
+ X509_free(cert);
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = load_certs(file, certs, format, pass, desc);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void warn_certs_expired(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509) **certs)
+{
+ int i, res;
+ X509 *cert;
+ char *subj;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(*certs); i++) {
+ cert = sk_X509_value(*certs, i);
+ res = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert),
+ X509_get0_notAfter(cert));
+ if (res != 0) {
+ subj = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0);
+ CMP_warn3("certificate from '%s' with subject '%s' %s", file, subj,
+ res > 0 ? "has expired" : "not yet valid");
+ OPENSSL_free(subj);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * TODO potentially move this and related functions to apps/lib/
+ * or even better extend OSSL_STORE with type OSSL_STORE_INFO_CERTS
+ */
+static int load_certs_autofmt(const char *infile, STACK_OF(X509) **certs,
+ int exclude_http, const char *pass,
+ const char *desc)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ char *pass_string;
+ BIO *bio_bak = bio_err;
+ int format = adjust_format(&infile, opt_certsform, 0);
+
+ if (exclude_http && format == FORMAT_HTTP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error: HTTP retrieval not allowed for %s\n", desc);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ pass_string = get_passwd(pass, desc);
+ if (format != FORMAT_HTTP)
+ bio_err = NULL; /* do not show errors on more than one try */
+ ret = load_certs_preliminary(infile, certs, format, pass_string, desc);
+ bio_err = bio_bak;
+ if (!ret && format != FORMAT_HTTP) {
+ int format2 = format == FORMAT_PEM ? FORMAT_ASN1 : FORMAT_PEM;
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ret = load_certs_preliminary(infile, certs, format2, pass_string, desc);
+ }
+ clear_free(pass_string);
+
+ if (ret)
+ warn_certs_expired(infile, certs);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* set expected host name/IP addr and clears the email addr in the given ts */
+static int truststore_set_host_etc(X509_STORE *ts, char *host)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *ts_vpm = X509_STORE_get0_param(ts);
+
+ /* first clear any host names, IP, and email addresses */
+ if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(ts_vpm, NULL, 0)
+ || !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(ts_vpm, NULL, 0)
+ || !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(ts_vpm, NULL, 0))
+ return 0;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(ts_vpm,
+ X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT |
+ X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS);
+ return (host != NULL && X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(ts_vpm, host))
+ || X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(ts_vpm, host, 0);
+}
+
+static X509_STORE *sk_X509_to_store(X509_STORE *store /* may be NULL */,
+ const STACK_OF(X509) *certs /* may NULL */)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (store == NULL)
+ store = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (store == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(store, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) {
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ return store;
+}
+
+/* write OSSL_CMP_MSG DER-encoded to the specified file name item */
+static int write_PKIMESSAGE(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, char **filenames)
+{
+ char *file;
+ BIO *bio;
+
+ if (msg == NULL || filenames == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("NULL arg to write_PKIMESSAGE");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (*filenames == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("Not enough file names provided for writing PKIMessage");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ file = *filenames;
+ *filenames = next_item(file);
+ bio = BIO_new_file(file, "wb");
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ CMP_err1("Cannot open file '%s' for writing", file);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (i2d_OSSL_CMP_MSG_bio(bio, msg) < 0) {
+ CMP_err1("Cannot write PKIMessage to file '%s'", file);
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* read DER-encoded OSSL_CMP_MSG from the specified file name item */
+static OSSL_CMP_MSG *read_PKIMESSAGE(char **filenames)
+{
+ char *file;
+ BIO *bio;
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG *ret;
+
+ if (filenames == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("NULL arg to read_PKIMESSAGE");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (*filenames == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("Not enough file names provided for reading PKIMessage");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ file = *filenames;
+ *filenames = next_item(file);
+ bio = BIO_new_file(file, "rb");
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ CMP_err1("Cannot open file '%s' for reading", file);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = d2i_OSSL_CMP_MSG_bio(bio, NULL);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ CMP_err1("Cannot read PKIMessage from file '%s'", file);
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Sends the PKIMessage req and on success place the response in *res
+ * basically like OSSL_CMP_MSG_http_perform(), but in addition allows
+ * to dump the sequence of requests and responses to files and/or
+ * to take the sequence of requests and responses from files.
+ */
+static OSSL_CMP_MSG *read_write_req_resp(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
+ const OSSL_CMP_MSG *req)
+{
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG *req_new = NULL;
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG *res = NULL;
+ OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr;
+
+ if (req != NULL && opt_reqout != NULL
+ && !write_PKIMESSAGE(req, &opt_reqout))
+ goto err;
+ if (opt_reqin != NULL) {
+ if (opt_rspin != NULL) {
+ CMP_warn("-reqin is ignored since -rspin is present");
+ } else {
+ if ((req_new = read_PKIMESSAGE(&opt_reqin)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /*-
+ * The transaction ID in req_new may not be fresh.
+ * In this case the Insta Demo CA correctly complains:
+ * "Transaction id already in use."
+ * The following workaround unfortunately requires re-protection.
+ * See also https://github.com/mpeylo/cmpossl/issues/8
+ */
+#if defined(USE_TRANSACTIONID_WORKAROUND)
+ hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(req_new);
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(hdr, NULL)
+ || !ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, req_new))
+ goto err;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (opt_rspin != NULL) {
+ res = read_PKIMESSAGE(&opt_rspin);
+ } else {
+ const OSSL_CMP_MSG *actual_req = opt_reqin != NULL ? req_new : req;
+
+ res = opt_use_mock_srv
+ ? OSSL_CMP_CTX_server_perform(ctx, actual_req)
+ : OSSL_CMP_MSG_http_perform(ctx, actual_req);
+ }
+ if (res == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (opt_reqin != NULL || opt_rspin != NULL) {
+ /* need to satisfy nonce and transactionID checks */
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *nonce;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *tid;
+
+ hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(res);
+ nonce = OSSL_CMP_HDR_get0_recipNonce(hdr);
+ tid = OSSL_CMP_HDR_get0_transactionID(hdr);
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_senderNonce(ctx, nonce)
+ || !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, tid)) {
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(res);
+ res = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (opt_rspout != NULL && !write_PKIMESSAGE(res, &opt_rspout)) {
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(res);
+ res = NULL;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(req_new);
+ return res;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse string as integer value, not allowing trailing garbage, see also
+ * https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Parsing-of-Integers.html
+ *
+ * returns integer value, or INT_MIN on error
+ */
+static int atoint(const char *str)
+{
+ char *tailptr;
+ long res = strtol(str, &tailptr, 10);
+
+ if ((*tailptr != '\0') || (res < INT_MIN) || (res > INT_MAX))
+ return INT_MIN;
+ else
+ return (int)res;
+}
+
+static int parse_addr(char **opt_string, int port, const char *name)
+{
+ char *port_string;
+
+ if (strncasecmp(*opt_string, OSSL_HTTP_PREFIX,
+ strlen(OSSL_HTTP_PREFIX)) == 0) {
+ *opt_string += strlen(OSSL_HTTP_PREFIX);
+ } else if (strncasecmp(*opt_string, OSSL_HTTPS_PREFIX,
+ strlen(OSSL_HTTPS_PREFIX)) == 0) {
+ *opt_string += strlen(OSSL_HTTPS_PREFIX);
+ if (port == 0)
+ port = 443; /* == integer value of OSSL_HTTPS_PORT */
+ }
+
+ if ((port_string = strrchr(*opt_string, ':')) == NULL)
+ return port; /* using default */
+ *(port_string++) = '\0';
+ port = atoint(port_string);
+ if ((port <= 0) || (port > 65535)) {
+ CMP_err2("invalid %s port '%s' given, sane range 1-65535",
+ name, port_string);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return port;
+}
+
+static int set1_store_parameters(X509_STORE *ts)
+{
+ if (ts == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* copy vpm to store */
+ if (!X509_STORE_set1_param(ts, vpm /* may be NULL */)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting verification parameters\n");
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(cmp_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(ts, X509_STORE_CTX_print_verify_cb);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int set_name(const char *str,
+ int (*set_fn) (OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const X509_NAME *name),
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const char *desc)
+{
+ if (str != NULL) {
+ X509_NAME *n = parse_name(str, MBSTRING_ASC, 0);
+
+ if (n == NULL) {
+ CMP_err2("cannot parse %s DN '%s'", desc, str);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(*set_fn) (ctx, n)) {
+ X509_NAME_free(n);
+ CMP_err("out of memory");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ X509_NAME_free(n);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int set_gennames(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, char *names, const char *desc)
+{
+ char *next;
+
+ for (; names != NULL; names = next) {
+ GENERAL_NAME *n;
+
+ next = next_item(names);
+ if (strcmp(names, "critical") == 0) {
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx,
+ OSSL_CMP_OPT_SUBJECTALTNAME_CRITICAL,
+ 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* try IP address first, then URI or domain name */
+ (void)ERR_set_mark();
+ n = a2i_GENERAL_NAME(NULL, NULL, NULL, GEN_IPADD, names, 0);
+ if (n == NULL)
+ n = a2i_GENERAL_NAME(NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ strchr(names, ':') != NULL ? GEN_URI : GEN_DNS,
+ names, 0);
+ (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
+
+ if (n == NULL) {
+ CMP_err2("bad syntax of %s '%s'", desc, names);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_push1_subjectAltName(ctx, n)) {
+ GENERAL_NAME_free(n);
+ CMP_err("out of memory");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ GENERAL_NAME_free(n);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* TODO potentially move to apps/lib/apps.c */
+/*
+ * create cert store structure with certificates read from given file(s)
+ * returns pointer to created X509_STORE on success, NULL on error
+ */
+static X509_STORE *load_certstore(char *input, const char *desc)
+{
+ X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
+
+ if (input == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ while (input != NULL) {
+ char *next = next_item(input); \
+
+ if (!load_certs_autofmt(input, &certs, 1, opt_otherpass, desc)
+ || !(store = sk_X509_to_store(store, certs))) {
+ /* CMP_err("out of memory"); */
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ store = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ certs = NULL;
+ input = next;
+ }
+ err:
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ return store;
+}
+
+/* TODO potentially move to apps/lib/apps.c */
+static STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs_multifile(char *files,
+ const char *pass, const char *desc)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *result = sk_X509_new_null();
+
+ if (files == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (result == NULL)
+ goto oom;
+
+ while (files != NULL) {
+ char *next = next_item(files);
+
+ if (!load_certs_autofmt(files, &certs, 0, pass, desc))
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_X509_add1_certs(result, certs, 0, 1 /* no dups */, 0))
+ goto oom;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ certs = NULL;
+ files = next;
+ }
+ return result;
+
+ oom:
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "out of memory\n");
+ err:
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(result, X509_free);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+typedef int (*add_X509_stack_fn_t)(void *ctx, const STACK_OF(X509) *certs);
+typedef int (*add_X509_fn_t)(void *ctx, const X509 *cert);
+
+static int setup_certs(char *files, const char *desc, void *ctx,
+ add_X509_stack_fn_t addn_fn, add_X509_fn_t add1_fn)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (files != NULL) {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs = load_certs_multifile(files, opt_otherpass,
+ desc);
+ if (certs == NULL) {
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (addn_fn != NULL) {
+ ret = (*addn_fn)(ctx, certs);
+ } else {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs /* may be NULL */); i++)
+ ret &= (*add1_fn)(ctx, sk_X509_value(certs, i));
+ }
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * parse and transform some options, checking their syntax.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
+ */
+static int transform_opts(void)
+{
+ if (opt_cmd_s != NULL) {
+ if (!strcmp(opt_cmd_s, "ir")) {
+ opt_cmd = CMP_IR;
+ } else if (!strcmp(opt_cmd_s, "kur")) {
+ opt_cmd = CMP_KUR;
+ } else if (!strcmp(opt_cmd_s, "cr")) {
+ opt_cmd = CMP_CR;
+ } else if (!strcmp(opt_cmd_s, "p10cr")) {
+ opt_cmd = CMP_P10CR;
+ } else if (!strcmp(opt_cmd_s, "rr")) {
+ opt_cmd = CMP_RR;
+ } else if (!strcmp(opt_cmd_s, "genm")) {
+ opt_cmd = CMP_GENM;
+ } else {
+ CMP_err1("unknown cmp command '%s'", opt_cmd_s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ CMP_err("no cmp command to execute");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# define FORMAT_OPTIONS (OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_PKCS12 | OPT_FMT_ENGINE)
+#else
+# define FORMAT_OPTIONS (OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_PKCS12)
+#endif
+
+ if (opt_keyform_s != NULL
+ && !opt_format(opt_keyform_s, FORMAT_OPTIONS, &opt_keyform)) {
+ CMP_err("unknown option given for key loading format");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#undef FORMAT_OPTIONS
+
+ if (opt_certform_s != NULL
+ && !opt_format(opt_certform_s, OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &opt_certform)) {
+ CMP_err("unknown option given for certificate storing format");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (opt_certsform_s != NULL
+ && !opt_format(opt_certsform_s, OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_PKCS12,
+ &opt_certsform)) {
+ CMP_err("unknown option given for certificate list loading format");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX *setup_srv_ctx(ENGINE *e)
+{
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx; /* extra CMP (client) ctx partly used by server */
+ OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX *srv_ctx = ossl_cmp_mock_srv_new();
+
+ if (srv_ctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ ctx = OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX_get0_cmp_ctx(srv_ctx);
+
+ if (opt_srv_ref == NULL) {
+ if (opt_srv_cert == NULL) {
+ /* opt_srv_cert should determine the sender */
+ CMP_err("must give -srv_ref for server if no -srv_cert given");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_referenceValue(ctx, (unsigned char *)opt_srv_ref,
+ strlen(opt_srv_ref)))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (opt_srv_secret != NULL) {
+ int res;
+ char *pass_str = get_passwd(opt_srv_secret, "PBMAC secret of server");
+
+ if (pass_str != NULL) {
+ cleanse(opt_srv_secret);
+ res = OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_secretValue(ctx, (unsigned char *)pass_str,
+ strlen(pass_str));
+ clear_free(pass_str);
+ if (res == 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (opt_srv_cert == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("server credentials must be given if -use_mock_srv or -port is used");
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ CMP_warn("server will not be able to handle PBM-protected requests since -srv_secret is not given");
+ }
+
+ if (opt_srv_secret == NULL
+ && ((opt_srv_cert == NULL) != (opt_srv_key == NULL))) {
+ CMP_err("must give both -srv_cert and -srv_key options or neither");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (opt_srv_cert != NULL) {
+ X509 *srv_cert = load_cert_pwd(opt_srv_cert, opt_srv_keypass,
+ "certificate of the server");
+ if (srv_cert == NULL || !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_clCert(ctx, srv_cert)) {
+ X509_free(srv_cert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_free(srv_cert);
+ }
+ if (opt_srv_key != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = load_key_pwd(opt_srv_key, opt_keyform,
+ opt_srv_keypass,
+ e, "private key for server cert");
+
+ if (pkey == NULL || !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_pkey(ctx, pkey)) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+ cleanse(opt_srv_keypass);
+
+ if (opt_srv_trusted != NULL) {
+ X509_STORE *ts =
+ load_certstore(opt_srv_trusted, "certificates trusted by server");
+
+ if (ts == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!set1_store_parameters(ts)
+ || !truststore_set_host_etc(ts, NULL)
+ || !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set0_trustedStore(ctx, ts)) {
+ X509_STORE_free(ts);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ CMP_warn("server will not be able to handle signature-protected requests since -srv_trusted is not given");
+ }
+ if (!setup_certs(opt_srv_untrusted, "untrusted certificates", ctx,
+ (add_X509_stack_fn_t)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_untrusted_certs,
+ NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (opt_rsp_cert == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("must give -rsp_cert for mock server");
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ X509 *cert = load_cert_pwd(opt_rsp_cert, opt_keypass,
+ "cert to be returned by the mock server");
+
+ if (cert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* from server perspective the server is the client */
+ if (!ossl_cmp_mock_srv_set1_certOut(srv_ctx, cert)) {
+ X509_free(cert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_free(cert);
+ }
+ /* TODO find a cleaner solution not requiring type casts */
+ if (!setup_certs(opt_rsp_extracerts,
+ "CMP extra certificates for mock server", srv_ctx,
+ (add_X509_stack_fn_t)ossl_cmp_mock_srv_set1_chainOut,
+ NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!setup_certs(opt_rsp_capubs, "caPubs for mock server", srv_ctx,
+ (add_X509_stack_fn_t)ossl_cmp_mock_srv_set1_caPubsOut,
+ NULL))
+ goto err;
+ (void)ossl_cmp_mock_srv_set_pollCount(srv_ctx, opt_poll_count);
+ (void)ossl_cmp_mock_srv_set_checkAfterTime(srv_ctx, opt_check_after);
+ if (opt_grant_implicitconf)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX_set_grant_implicit_confirm(srv_ctx, 1);
+
+ if (opt_failure != INT_MIN) { /* option has been set explicity */
+ if (opt_failure < 0 || OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_MAX < opt_failure) {
+ CMP_err1("-failure out of range, should be >= 0 and <= %d",
+ OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_MAX);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (opt_failurebits != 0)
+ CMP_warn("-failurebits overrides -failure");
+ else
+ opt_failurebits = 1 << opt_failure;
+ }
+ if ((unsigned)opt_failurebits > OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_MAX_BIT_PATTERN) {
+ CMP_err("-failurebits out of range");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ossl_cmp_mock_srv_set_statusInfo(srv_ctx, opt_pkistatus,
+ opt_failurebits, opt_statusstring))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (opt_send_error)
+ (void)ossl_cmp_mock_srv_set_send_error(srv_ctx, 1);
+
+ if (opt_send_unprotected)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_UNPROTECTED_SEND, 1);
+ if (opt_send_unprot_err)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX_set_send_unprotected_errors(srv_ctx, 1);
+ if (opt_accept_unprotected)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX_set_accept_unprotected(srv_ctx, 1);
+ if (opt_accept_unprot_err)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_UNPROTECTED_ERRORS, 1);
+ if (opt_accept_raverified)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX_set_accept_raverified(srv_ctx, 1);
+
+ return srv_ctx;
+
+ err:
+ ossl_cmp_mock_srv_free(srv_ctx);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set up verification aspects of OSSL_CMP_CTX w.r.t. opts from config file/CLI.
+ * Returns pointer on success, NULL on error
+ */
+static int setup_verification_ctx(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (!setup_certs(opt_untrusted, "untrusted certificates", ctx,
+ (add_X509_stack_fn_t)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_untrusted_certs,
+ NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (opt_srvcert != NULL || opt_trusted != NULL) {
+ X509_STORE *ts = NULL;
+
+ if (opt_srvcert != NULL) {
+ X509 *srvcert;
+
+ if (opt_trusted != NULL) {
+ CMP_warn("-trusted option is ignored since -srvcert option is present");
+ opt_trusted = NULL;
+ }
+ if (opt_recipient != NULL) {
+ CMP_warn("-recipient option is ignored since -srvcert option is present");
+ opt_recipient = NULL;
+ }
+ srvcert = load_cert_pwd(opt_srvcert, opt_otherpass,
+ "directly trusted CMP server certificate");
+ if (srvcert == NULL)
+ /*
+ * opt_otherpass is needed in case
+ * opt_srvcert is an encrypted PKCS#12 file
+ */
+ goto err;
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_srvCert(ctx, srvcert)) {
+ X509_free(srvcert);
+ goto oom;
+ }
+ X509_free(srvcert);
+ if ((ts = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL)
+ goto oom;
+ }
+ if (opt_trusted != NULL
+ && (ts = load_certstore(opt_trusted, "trusted certificates"))
+ == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!set1_store_parameters(ts) /* also copies vpm */
+ /*
+ * clear any expected host/ip/email address;
+ * opt_expect_sender is used instead
+ */
+ || !truststore_set_host_etc(ts, NULL)
+ || !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set0_trustedStore(ctx, ts)) {
+ X509_STORE_free(ts);
+ goto oom;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (opt_ignore_keyusage)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_IGNORE_KEYUSAGE, 1);
+
+ if (opt_unprotected_errors)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_UNPROTECTED_ERRORS, 1);
+
+ if (opt_out_trusted != NULL) { /* for use in OSSL_CMP_certConf_cb() */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *out_vpm = NULL;
+ X509_STORE *out_trusted =
+ load_certstore(opt_out_trusted,
+ "trusted certs for verifying newly enrolled cert");
+
+ if (out_trusted == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* any -verify_hostname, -verify_ip, and -verify_email apply here */
+ if (!set1_store_parameters(out_trusted))
+ goto oom;
+ /* ignore any -attime here, new certs are current anyway */
+ out_vpm = X509_STORE_get0_param(out_trusted);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(out_vpm, X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME);
+
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_certConf_cb_arg(ctx, out_trusted);
+ }
+
+ if (opt_disable_confirm)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_DISABLE_CONFIRM, 1);
+
+ if (opt_implicit_confirm)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_IMPLICIT_CONFIRM, 1);
+
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_certConf_cb(ctx, OSSL_CMP_certConf_cb);
+
+ return 1;
+
+ oom:
+ CMP_err("out of memory");
+ err:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+/*
+ * set up ssl_ctx for the OSSL_CMP_CTX based on options from config file/CLI.
+ * Returns pointer on success, NULL on error
+ */
+static SSL_CTX *setup_ssl_ctx(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted_certs = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_untrusted_certs(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ X509_STORE *trust_store = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx;
+ int i;
+
+ ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
+ if (ssl_ctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(ssl_ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+
+ if (opt_tls_trusted != NULL) {
+ if ((trust_store = load_certstore(opt_tls_trusted,
+ "trusted TLS certificates")) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ssl_ctx, trust_store);
+ /* for improved diagnostics on SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain() errors: */
+ X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(trust_store, X509_STORE_CTX_print_verify_cb);
+ }
+
+ if (opt_tls_cert != NULL && opt_tls_key != NULL) {
+ X509 *cert;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
+
+ if (!load_certs_autofmt(opt_tls_cert, &certs, 0, opt_tls_keypass,
+ "TLS client certificate (optionally with chain)"))
+ /*
+ * opt_tls_keypass is needed in case opt_tls_cert is an encrypted
+ * PKCS#12 file
+ */
+ goto err;
+
+ cert = sk_X509_delete(certs, 0);
+ if (cert == NULL || SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ssl_ctx, cert) <= 0) {
+ CMP_err1("unable to use client TLS certificate file '%s'",
+ opt_tls_cert);
+ X509_free(cert);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_free(cert); /* we do not need the handle any more */
+
+ /*
+ * Any further certs and any untrusted certs are used for constructing
+ * the client cert chain to be provided along with the TLS client cert
+ * to the TLS server.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ssl_ctx, certs)) {
+ CMP_err("could not set TLS client cert chain");
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(untrusted_certs); i++) {
+ cert = sk_X509_value(untrusted_certs, i);
+ if (!SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(ssl_ctx, cert)) {
+ CMP_err("could not add untrusted cert to TLS client cert chain");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(ssl_ctx,
+ SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED |
+ SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT)) {
+ CMP_warn("could not build cert chain for own TLS cert");
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
+ }
+
+ /* If present we append to the list also the certs from opt_tls_extra */
+ if (opt_tls_extra != NULL) {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *tls_extra = load_certs_multifile(opt_tls_extra,
+ opt_otherpass,
+ "extra certificates for TLS");
+ int res = 1;
+
+ if (tls_extra == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(tls_extra); i++) {
+ cert = sk_X509_value(tls_extra, i);
+ if (res != 0)
+ res = SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ssl_ctx, cert);
+ if (res == 0)
+ X509_free(cert);
+ }
+ sk_X509_free(tls_extra);
+ if (res == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error: unable to add TLS extra certs\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pkey = load_key_pwd(opt_tls_key, opt_keyform, opt_tls_keypass,
+ e, "TLS client private key");
+ cleanse(opt_tls_keypass);
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * verify the key matches the cert,
+ * not using SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ssl_ctx)
+ * because it gives poor and sometimes misleading diagnostics
+ */
+ if (!X509_check_private_key(SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(ssl_ctx),
+ pkey)) {
+ CMP_err2("TLS private key '%s' does not match the TLS certificate '%s'\n",
+ opt_tls_key, opt_tls_cert);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ pkey = NULL; /* otherwise, for some reason double free! */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey) <= 0) {
+ CMP_err1("unable to use TLS client private key '%s'", opt_tls_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ pkey = NULL; /* otherwise, for some reason double free! */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); /* we do not need the handle any more */
+ }
+ if (opt_tls_trusted != NULL) {
+ /* enable and parameterize server hostname/IP address check */
+ if (!truststore_set_host_etc(trust_store,
+ opt_tls_host != NULL ?
+ opt_tls_host : opt_server))
+ /* TODO: is the server host name correct for TLS via proxy? */
+ goto err;
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
+ }
+ return ssl_ctx;
+ err:
+ SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx);
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * set up protection aspects of OSSL_CMP_CTX based on options from config
+ * file/CLI while parsing options and checking their consistency.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
+ */
+static int setup_protection_ctx(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
+{
+ if (!opt_unprotected_requests && opt_secret == NULL && opt_cert == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("must give client credentials unless -unprotected_requests is set");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (opt_ref == NULL && opt_cert == NULL && opt_subject == NULL) {
+ /* cert or subject should determine the sender */
+ CMP_err("must give -ref if no -cert and no -subject given");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!opt_secret && ((opt_cert == NULL) != (opt_key == NULL))) {
+ CMP_err("must give both -cert and -key options or neither");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (opt_secret != NULL) {
+ char *pass_string = get_passwd(opt_secret, "PBMAC");
+ int res;
+
+ if (pass_string != NULL) {
+ cleanse(opt_secret);
+ res = OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_secretValue(ctx,
+ (unsigned char *)pass_string,
+ strlen(pass_string));
+ clear_free(pass_string);
+ if (res == 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (opt_cert != NULL || opt_key != NULL)
+ CMP_warn("no signature-based protection used since -secret is given");
+ }
+ if (opt_ref != NULL
+ && !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_referenceValue(ctx, (unsigned char *)opt_ref,
+ strlen(opt_ref)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (opt_key != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = load_key_pwd(opt_key, opt_keyform, opt_keypass, e,
+ "private key for CMP client certificate");
+
+ if (pkey == NULL || !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_pkey(ctx, pkey)) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+ if (opt_secret == NULL && opt_srvcert == NULL && opt_trusted == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("missing -secret or -srvcert or -trusted");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (opt_cert != NULL) {
+ X509 *clcert;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
+ int ok;
+
+ if (!load_certs_autofmt(opt_cert, &certs, 0, opt_keypass,
+ "CMP client certificate (and optionally extra certs)"))
+ /* opt_keypass is needed if opt_cert is an encrypted PKCS#12 file */
+ goto err;
+
+ clcert = sk_X509_delete(certs, 0);
+ if (clcert == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("no client certificate found");
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ok = OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_clCert(ctx, clcert);
+ X509_free(clcert);
+
+ if (ok) {
+ /* add any remaining certs to the list of untrusted certs */
+ STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_untrusted_certs(ctx);
+ ok = untrusted != NULL ?
+ sk_X509_add1_certs(untrusted, certs, 0, 1 /* no dups */, 0) :
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_untrusted_certs(ctx, certs);
+ }
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto oom;
+ }
+
+ if (!setup_certs(opt_extracerts, "extra certificates for CMP", ctx,
+ (add_X509_stack_fn_t)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_extraCertsOut,
+ NULL))
+ goto err;
+ cleanse(opt_otherpass);
+
+ if (opt_unprotected_requests)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_UNPROTECTED_SEND, 1);
+
+ if (opt_digest != NULL) {
+ int digest = OBJ_ln2nid(opt_digest);
+
+ if (digest == NID_undef) {
+ CMP_err1("digest algorithm name not recognized: '%s'", opt_digest);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_DIGEST_ALGNID, digest);
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_OWF_ALGNID, digest);
+ }
+
+ if (opt_mac != NULL) {
+ int mac = OBJ_ln2nid(opt_mac);
+ if (mac == NID_undef) {
+ CMP_err1("MAC algorithm name not recognized: '%s'", opt_mac);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_MAC_ALGNID, mac);
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ oom:
+ CMP_err("out of memory");
+ err:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set up IR/CR/KUR/CertConf/RR specific parts of the OSSL_CMP_CTX
+ * based on options from config file/CLI.
+ * Returns pointer on success, NULL on error
+ */
+static int setup_request_ctx(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
+{
+ if (opt_subject == NULL && opt_oldcert == NULL && opt_cert == NULL)
+ CMP_warn("no -subject given, neither -oldcert nor -cert available as default");
+ if (!set_name(opt_subject, OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_subjectName, ctx, "subject")
+ || !set_name(opt_issuer, OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_issuer, ctx, "issuer"))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (opt_newkey != NULL) {
+ const char *file = opt_newkey;
+ const int format = opt_keyform;
+ const char *pass = opt_newkeypass;
+ const char *desc = "new private or public key for cert to be enrolled";
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = load_key_pwd(file, format, pass, e, NULL);
+ int priv = 1;
+
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ pkey = load_pubkey(file, format, 0, pass, e, desc);
+ priv = 0;
+ }
+ cleanse(opt_newkeypass);
+ if (pkey == NULL || !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set0_newPkey(ctx, priv, pkey)) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (opt_days > 0)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_VALIDITY_DAYS,
+ opt_days);
+
+ if (opt_policies != NULL && opt_policy_oids != NULL) {
+ CMP_err("cannot have policies both via -policies and via -policy_oids");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (opt_reqexts != NULL || opt_policies != NULL) {
+ X509V3_CTX ext_ctx;
+ X509_EXTENSIONS *exts = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null();
+
+ if (exts == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ X509V3_set_ctx(&ext_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ X509V3_set_nconf(&ext_ctx, conf);
+ if (opt_reqexts != NULL
+ && !X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk(conf, &ext_ctx, opt_reqexts, &exts)) {
+ CMP_err1("cannot load certificate request extension section '%s'",
+ opt_reqexts);
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (opt_policies != NULL
+ && !X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk(conf, &ext_ctx, opt_policies, &exts)) {
+ CMP_err1("cannot load policy cert request extension section '%s'",
+ opt_policies);
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_set0_reqExtensions(ctx, exts);
+ }
+ if (OSSL_CMP_CTX_reqExtensions_have_SAN(ctx) && opt_sans != NULL) {
+ CMP_err("cannot have Subject Alternative Names both via -reqexts and via -sans");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!set_gennames(ctx, opt_sans, "Subject Alternative Name"))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (opt_san_nodefault) {
+ if (opt_sans != NULL)
+ CMP_warn("-opt_san_nodefault has no effect when -sans is used");
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx,
+ OSSL_CMP_OPT_SUBJECTALTNAME_NODEFAULT, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (opt_policy_oids_critical) {
+ if (opt_policy_oids == NULL)
+ CMP_warn("-opt_policy_oids_critical has no effect unless -policy_oids is given");
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_POLICIES_CRITICAL, 1);
+ }
+
+ while (opt_policy_oids != NULL) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *policy;
+ POLICYINFO *pinfo;
+ char *next = next_item(opt_policy_oids);
+
+ if ((policy = OBJ_txt2obj(opt_policy_oids, 1)) == 0) {
+ CMP_err1("unknown policy OID '%s'", opt_policy_oids);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((pinfo = POLICYINFO_new()) == NULL) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(policy);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pinfo->policyid = policy;
+
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_push0_policy(ctx, pinfo)) {
+ CMP_err1("cannot add policy with OID '%s'", opt_policy_oids);
+ POLICYINFO_free(pinfo);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ opt_policy_oids = next;
+ }
+
+ if (opt_popo >= OSSL_CRMF_POPO_NONE)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_POPO_METHOD, opt_popo);
+
+ if (opt_csr != NULL) {
+ if (opt_cmd != CMP_P10CR) {
+ CMP_warn("-csr option is ignored for command other than p10cr");
+ } else {
+ X509_REQ *csr =
+ load_csr_autofmt(opt_csr, "PKCS#10 CSR for p10cr");
+
+ if (csr == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_p10CSR(ctx, csr)) {
+ X509_REQ_free(csr);
+ goto oom;
+ }
+ X509_REQ_free(csr);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (opt_oldcert != NULL) {
+ X509 *oldcert = load_cert_pwd(opt_oldcert, opt_keypass,
+ "certificate to be updated/revoked");
+ /* opt_keypass is needed if opt_oldcert is an encrypted PKCS#12 file */
+
+ if (oldcert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_oldCert(ctx, oldcert)) {
+ X509_free(oldcert);
+ goto oom;
+ }
+ X509_free(oldcert);
+ }
+ cleanse(opt_keypass);
+ if (opt_revreason > CRL_REASON_NONE)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_REVOCATION_REASON,
+ opt_revreason);
+
+ return 1;
+
+ oom:
+ CMP_err("out of memory");
+ err:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_opt_geninfo(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ long value;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *type;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *aint;
+ ASN1_TYPE *val;
+ OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav;
+ char *endstr;
+ char *valptr = strchr(opt_geninfo, ':');
+
+ if (valptr == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("missing ':' in -geninfo option");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ valptr[0] = '\0';
+ valptr++;
+
+ if (strncasecmp(valptr, "int:", 4) != 0) {
+ CMP_err("missing 'int:' in -geninfo option");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ valptr += 4;
+
+ value = strtol(valptr, &endstr, 10);
+ if (endstr == valptr || *endstr != '\0') {
+ CMP_err("cannot parse int in -geninfo option");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ type = OBJ_txt2obj(opt_geninfo, 1);
+ if (type == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("cannot parse OID in -geninfo option");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ aint = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+ if (aint == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(aint, value))
+ goto oom;
+
+ val = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+ if (val == NULL) {
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(aint);
+ goto oom;
+ }
+ ASN1_TYPE_set(val, V_ASN1_INTEGER, aint);
+ itav = OSSL_CMP_ITAV_create(type, val);
+ if (itav == NULL) {
+ ASN1_TYPE_free(val);
+ goto oom;
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_push0_geninfo_ITAV(ctx, itav)) {
+ OSSL_CMP_ITAV_free(itav);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ oom:
+ CMP_err("out of memory");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * set up the client-side OSSL_CMP_CTX based on options from config file/CLI
+ * while parsing options and checking their consistency.
+ * Prints reason for error to bio_err.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
+ */
+static int setup_client_ctx(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ char server_buf[200] = { '\0' };
+ char proxy_buf[200] = { '\0' };
+ char *proxy_host = NULL;
+ char *proxy_port_str = NULL;
+
+ if (opt_server == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("missing server address[:port]");
+ goto err;
+ } else if ((server_port =
+ parse_addr(&opt_server, server_port, "server")) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (server_port != 0)
+ BIO_snprintf(server_port_s, sizeof(server_port_s), "%d", server_port);
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_server(ctx, opt_server)
+ || !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_serverPort(ctx, server_port)
+ || !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_serverPath(ctx, opt_path))
+ goto oom;
+ if (opt_proxy != NULL && !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_proxy(ctx, opt_proxy))
+ goto oom;
+ (void)BIO_snprintf(server_buf, sizeof(server_buf), "http%s://%s%s%s/%s",
+ opt_tls_used ? "s" : "", opt_server,
+ server_port == 0 ? "" : ":", server_port_s,
+ opt_path[0] == '/' ? opt_path + 1 : opt_path);
+
+ if (opt_proxy != NULL)
+ (void)BIO_snprintf(proxy_buf, sizeof(proxy_buf), " via %s", opt_proxy);
+ CMP_info2("will contact %s%s", server_buf, proxy_buf);
+
+ if (!transform_opts())
+ goto err;
+
+ if (opt_cmd == CMP_IR || opt_cmd == CMP_CR || opt_cmd == CMP_KUR) {
+ if (opt_newkey == NULL && opt_key == NULL && opt_csr == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("missing -newkey (or -key) to be certified");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (opt_certout == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("-certout not given, nowhere to save certificate");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (opt_cmd == CMP_KUR) {
+ char *ref_cert = opt_oldcert != NULL ? opt_oldcert : opt_cert;
+
+ if (ref_cert == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("missing -oldcert option for certificate to be updated");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (opt_subject != NULL)
+ CMP_warn2("-subject '%s' given, which overrides the subject of '%s' in KUR",
+ opt_subject, ref_cert);
+ }
+ if (opt_cmd == CMP_RR && opt_oldcert == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("missing certificate to be revoked");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (opt_cmd == CMP_P10CR && opt_csr == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("missing PKCS#10 CSR for p10cr");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (opt_recipient == NULL && opt_srvcert == NULL && opt_issuer == NULL
+ && opt_oldcert == NULL && opt_cert == NULL)
+ CMP_warn("missing -recipient, -srvcert, -issuer, -oldcert or -cert; recipient will be set to \"NULL-DN\"");
+
+ if (opt_infotype_s != NULL) {
+ char id_buf[100] = "id-it-";
+
+ strncat(id_buf, opt_infotype_s, sizeof(id_buf) - strlen(id_buf) - 1);
+ if ((opt_infotype = OBJ_sn2nid(id_buf)) == NID_undef) {
+ CMP_err("unknown OID name in -infotype option");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!setup_verification_ctx(ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (opt_msg_timeout >= 0) /* must do this before setup_ssl_ctx() */
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_MSG_TIMEOUT,
+ opt_msg_timeout);
+ if (opt_total_timeout >= 0)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_TOTAL_TIMEOUT,
+ opt_total_timeout);
+
+ if (opt_reqin != NULL || opt_reqout != NULL
+ || opt_rspin != NULL || opt_rspout != NULL || opt_use_mock_srv)
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_transfer_cb(ctx, read_write_req_resp);
+
+ if ((opt_tls_cert != NULL || opt_tls_key != NULL
+ || opt_tls_keypass != NULL || opt_tls_extra != NULL
+ || opt_tls_trusted != NULL || opt_tls_host != NULL)
+ && !opt_tls_used)
+ CMP_warn("TLS options(s) given but not -tls_used");
+ if (opt_tls_used) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot use TLS - sockets not supported\n");
+ goto err;
+#else
+ APP_HTTP_TLS_INFO *info;
+
+ if (opt_tls_cert != NULL
+ || opt_tls_key != NULL || opt_tls_keypass != NULL) {
+ if (opt_tls_key == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("missing -tls_key option");
+ goto err;
+ } else if (opt_tls_cert == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("missing -tls_cert option");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (opt_use_mock_srv) {
+ CMP_err("cannot use TLS options together with -use_mock_srv");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((info = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*info))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_http_cb_arg(ctx, info);
+ /* info will be freed along with CMP ctx */
+ info->server = opt_server;
+ info->port = server_port_s;
+ info->use_proxy = opt_proxy != NULL;
+ info->timeout = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_option(ctx, OSSL_CMP_OPT_MSG_TIMEOUT);
+ info->ssl_ctx = setup_ssl_ctx(ctx, e);
+ if (info->ssl_ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ (void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_http_cb(ctx, app_http_tls_cb);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (!setup_protection_ctx(ctx, e))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!setup_request_ctx(ctx, e))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!set_name(opt_recipient, OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_recipient, ctx, "recipient")
+ || !set_name(opt_expect_sender, OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_expected_sender,
+ ctx, "expected sender"))
+ goto oom;
+
+ if (opt_geninfo != NULL && !handle_opt_geninfo(ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(proxy_host);
+ OPENSSL_free(proxy_port_str);
+ return ret;
+ oom:
+ CMP_err("out of memory");
+ goto err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * write out the given certificate to the output specified by bio.
+ * Depending on options use either PEM or DER format.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
+ */
+static int write_cert(BIO *bio, X509 *cert)
+{
+ if ((opt_certform == FORMAT_PEM && PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, cert))
+ || (opt_certform == FORMAT_ASN1 && i2d_X509_bio(bio, cert)))
+ return 1;
+ if (opt_certform != FORMAT_PEM && opt_certform != FORMAT_ASN1)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "error: unsupported type '%s' for writing certificates\n",
+ opt_certform_s);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * writes out a stack of certs to the given file.
+ * Depending on options use either PEM or DER format,
+ * where DER does not make much sense for writing more than one cert!
+ * Returns number of written certificates on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+static int save_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs, char *destFile, char *desc)
+{
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ int i;
+ int n = sk_X509_num(certs);
+
+ CMP_info3("received %d %s certificate(s), saving to file '%s'",
+ n, desc, destFile);
+ if (n > 1 && opt_certform != FORMAT_PEM)
+ CMP_warn("saving more than one certificate in non-PEM format");
+
+ if (destFile == NULL || (bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL
+ || !BIO_write_filename(bio, (char *)destFile)) {
+ CMP_err1("could not open file '%s' for writing", destFile);
+ n = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if (!write_cert(bio, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) {
+ CMP_err1("cannot write certificate to file '%s'", destFile);
+ n = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ err:
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return n;
+}
+
+static void print_itavs(STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) *itavs)
+{
+ OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav = NULL;
+ char buf[128];
+ int i;
+ int n = sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_num(itavs); /* itavs == NULL leads to 0 */
+
+ if (n == 0) {
+ CMP_info("genp contains no ITAV");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ itav = sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_value(itavs, i);
+ OBJ_obj2txt(buf, 128, OSSL_CMP_ITAV_get0_type(itav), 0);
+ CMP_info1("genp contains ITAV of type: %s", buf);
+ }
+}
+
+static char opt_item[SECTION_NAME_MAX + 1];
+/* get previous name from a comma-separated list of names */
+static const char *prev_item(const char *opt, const char *end)
+{
+ const char *beg;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (end == opt)
+ return NULL;
+ beg = end;
+ while (beg != opt && beg[-1] != ',' && !isspace(beg[-1]))
+ beg--;
+ len = end - beg;
+ if (len > SECTION_NAME_MAX)
+ len = SECTION_NAME_MAX;
+ strncpy(opt_item, beg, len);
+ opt_item[SECTION_NAME_MAX] = '\0'; /* avoid gcc v8 O3 stringop-truncation */
+ opt_item[len] = '\0';
+ if (len > SECTION_NAME_MAX)
+ CMP_warn2("using only first %d characters of section name starting with \"%s\"",
+ SECTION_NAME_MAX, opt_item);
+ while (beg != opt && (beg[-1] == ',' || isspace(beg[-1])))
+ beg--;
+ return beg;
+}
+
+/* get str value for name from a comma-separated hierarchy of config sections */
+static char *conf_get_string(const CONF *src_conf, const char *groups,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ char *res = NULL;
+ const char *end = groups + strlen(groups);
+
+ while ((end = prev_item(groups, end)) != NULL) {
+ if ((res = NCONF_get_string(src_conf, opt_item, name)) != NULL)
+ return res;
+ }
+ return res;
+}
+
+/* get long val for name from a comma-separated hierarchy of config sections */
+static int conf_get_number_e(const CONF *conf_, const char *groups,
+ const char *name, long *result)
+{
+ char *str = conf_get_string(conf_, groups, name);
+ char *tailptr;
+ long res;
+
+ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0')
+ return 0;
+
+ res = strtol(str, &tailptr, 10);
+ if (res == LONG_MIN || res == LONG_MAX || *tailptr != '\0')
+ return 0;
+
+ *result = res;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * use the command line option table to read values from the CMP section
+ * of openssl.cnf. Defaults are taken from the config file, they can be
+ * overwritten on the command line.
+ */
+static int read_config(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ long num = 0;
+ char *txt = NULL;
+ const OPTIONS *opt;
+ int provider_option;
+ int verification_option;
+
+ /*
+ * starting with offset OPT_SECTION because OPT_CONFIG and OPT_SECTION would
+ * not make sense within the config file. They have already been handled.
+ */
+ for (i = OPT_SECTION - OPT_HELP, opt = &cmp_options[OPT_SECTION];
+ opt->name; i++, opt++) {
+ if (!strcmp(opt->name, OPT_SECTION_STR)
+ || !strcmp(opt->name, OPT_MORE_STR)) {
+ i--;
+ continue;
+ }
+ provider_option = (OPT_PROV__FIRST <= opt->retval
+ && opt->retval < OPT_PROV__LAST);
+ verification_option = (OPT_V__FIRST <= opt->retval
+ && opt->retval < OPT_V__LAST);
+ if (provider_option || verification_option)
+ i--;
+ if (cmp_vars[i].txt == NULL) {
+ CMP_err1("internal: cmp_vars array too short, i=%d", i);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ switch (opt->valtype) {
+ case '-':
+ case 'n':
+ case 'l':
+ if (!conf_get_number_e(conf, opt_section, opt->name, &num)) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ continue; /* option not provided */
+ }
+ break;
+ /*
+ * do not use '<' in cmp_options. Incorrect treatment
+ * somewhere in args_verify() can wrongly set badarg = 1
+ */
+ case '<':
+ case 's':
+ case 'M':
+ txt = conf_get_string(conf, opt_section, opt->name);
+ if (txt == NULL) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ continue; /* option not provided */
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ CMP_err2("internal: unsupported type '%c' for option '%s'",
+ opt->valtype, opt->name);
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (provider_option || verification_option) {
+ int conf_argc = 1;
+ char *conf_argv[3];
+ char arg1[82];
+
+ BIO_snprintf(arg1, 81, "-%s", (char *)opt->name);
+ conf_argv[0] = prog;
+ conf_argv[1] = arg1;
+ if (opt->valtype == '-') {
+ if (num != 0)
+ conf_argc = 2;
+ } else {
+ conf_argc = 3;
+ conf_argv[2] = conf_get_string(conf, opt_section, opt->name);
+ /* not NULL */
+ }
+ if (conf_argc > 1) {
+ (void)opt_init(conf_argc, conf_argv, cmp_options);
+
+ if (provider_option
+ ? !opt_provider(opt_next())
+ : !opt_verify(opt_next(), vpm)) {
+ CMP_err2("for option '%s' in config file section '%s'",
+ opt->name, opt_section);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (opt->valtype) {
+ case '-':
+ case 'n':
+ if (num < INT_MIN || INT_MAX < num) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "integer value out of range for option '%s'\n",
+ opt->name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *cmp_vars[i].num = (int)num;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ *cmp_vars[i].num_long = num;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (txt != NULL && txt[0] == '\0')
+ txt = NULL; /* reset option on empty string input */
+ *cmp_vars[i].txt = txt;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static char *opt_str(char *opt)
+{
+ char *arg = opt_arg();
+
+ if (arg[0] == '\0') {
+ CMP_warn1("argument of -%s option is empty string, resetting option",
+ opt);
+ arg = NULL;
+ } else if (arg[0] == '-') {
+ CMP_warn1("argument of -%s option starts with hyphen", opt);
+ }
+ return arg;
+}
+
+static int opt_nat(void)
+{
+ int result = -1;
+
+ if (opt_int(opt_arg(), &result) && result < 0)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error: argument '%s' must not be negative\n",
+ opt_arg());
+ return result;
+}
+
+/* returns 1 on success, 0 on error, -1 on -help (i.e., stop with success) */
+static int get_opts(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ OPTION_CHOICE o;
+
+ prog = opt_init(argc, argv, cmp_options);
+
+ while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+ switch (o) {
+ case OPT_EOF:
+ case OPT_ERR:
+ goto opt_err;
+ case OPT_HELP:
+ opt_help(cmp_options);
+ return -1;
+ case OPT_CONFIG: /* has already been handled */
+ break;
+ case OPT_SECTION: /* has already been handled */
+ break;
+ case OPT_SERVER:
+ opt_server = opt_str("server");
+ break;
+ case OPT_PROXY:
+ opt_proxy = opt_str("proxy");
+ break;
+ case OPT_NO_PROXY:
+ opt_no_proxy = opt_str("no_proxy");
+ break;
+ case OPT_PATH:
+ opt_path = opt_str("path");
+ break;
+ case OPT_MSG_TIMEOUT:
+ if ((opt_msg_timeout = opt_nat()) < 0)
+ goto opt_err;
+ break;
+ case OPT_TOTAL_TIMEOUT:
+ if ((opt_total_timeout = opt_nat()) < 0)
+ goto opt_err;
+ break;
+ case OPT_TLS_USED:
+ opt_tls_used = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_TLS_CERT:
+ opt_tls_cert = opt_str("tls_cert");
+ break;
+ case OPT_TLS_KEY:
+ opt_tls_key = opt_str("tls_key");
+ break;
+ case OPT_TLS_KEYPASS:
+ opt_tls_keypass = opt_str("tls_keypass");
+ break;
+ case OPT_TLS_EXTRA:
+ opt_tls_extra = opt_str("tls_extra");
+ break;
+ case OPT_TLS_TRUSTED:
+ opt_tls_trusted = opt_str("tls_trusted");
+ break;
+ case OPT_TLS_HOST:
+ opt_tls_host = opt_str("tls_host");
+ break;
+ case OPT_REF:
+ opt_ref = opt_str("ref");
+ break;
+ case OPT_SECRET:
+ opt_secret = opt_str("secret");
+ break;
+ case OPT_CERT:
+ opt_cert = opt_str("cert");
+ break;
+ case OPT_KEY:
+ opt_key = opt_str("key");
+ break;
+ case OPT_KEYPASS:
+ opt_keypass = opt_str("keypass");
+ break;
+ case OPT_DIGEST:
+ opt_digest = opt_str("digest");
+ break;
+ case OPT_MAC:
+ opt_mac = opt_str("mac");
+ break;
+ case OPT_EXTRACERTS:
+ opt_extracerts = opt_str("extracerts");
+ break;
+ case OPT_UNPROTECTED_REQUESTS:
+ opt_unprotected_requests = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case OPT_TRUSTED:
+ opt_trusted = opt_str("trusted");
+ break;
+ case OPT_UNTRUSTED:
+ opt_untrusted = opt_str("untrusted");
+ break;
+ case OPT_SRVCERT:
+ opt_srvcert = opt_str("srvcert");
+ break;
+ case OPT_RECIPIENT:
+ opt_recipient = opt_str("recipient");
+ break;
+ case OPT_EXPECT_SENDER:
+ opt_expect_sender = opt_str("expect_sender");
+ break;
+ case OPT_IGNORE_KEYUSAGE:
+ opt_ignore_keyusage = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_UNPROTECTED_ERRORS:
+ opt_unprotected_errors = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_EXTRACERTSOUT:
+ opt_extracertsout = opt_str("extracertsout");
+ break;
+ case OPT_CACERTSOUT:
+ opt_cacertsout = opt_str("cacertsout");
+ break;
+
+ case OPT_V_CASES:
+ if (!opt_verify(o, vpm))
+ goto opt_err;
+ break;
+ case OPT_CMD:
+ opt_cmd_s = opt_str("cmd");
+ break;
+ case OPT_INFOTYPE:
+ opt_infotype_s = opt_str("infotype");
+ break;
+ case OPT_GENINFO:
+ opt_geninfo = opt_str("geninfo");
+ break;
+
+ case OPT_NEWKEY:
+ opt_newkey = opt_str("newkey");
+ break;
+ case OPT_NEWKEYPASS:
+ opt_newkeypass = opt_str("newkeypass");
+ break;
+ case OPT_SUBJECT:
+ opt_subject = opt_str("subject");
+ break;
+ case OPT_ISSUER:
+ opt_issuer = opt_str("issuer");
+ break;
+ case OPT_DAYS:
+ if ((opt_days = opt_nat()) < 0)
+ goto opt_err;
+ break;
+ case OPT_REQEXTS:
+ opt_reqexts = opt_str("reqexts");
+ break;
+ case OPT_SANS:
+ opt_sans = opt_str("sans");
+ break;
+ case OPT_SAN_NODEFAULT:
+ opt_san_nodefault = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_POLICIES:
+ opt_policies = opt_str("policies");
+ break;
+ case OPT_POLICY_OIDS:
+ opt_policy_oids = opt_str("policy_oids");
+ break;
+ case OPT_POLICY_OIDS_CRITICAL:
+ opt_policy_oids_critical = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_POPO:
+ if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &opt_popo)
+ || opt_popo < OSSL_CRMF_POPO_NONE
+ || opt_popo > OSSL_CRMF_POPO_KEYENC) {
+ CMP_err("invalid popo spec. Valid values are -1 .. 2");
+ goto opt_err;
+ }
+ break;
+ case OPT_CSR:
+ opt_csr = opt_arg();
+ break;
+ case OPT_OUT_TRUSTED:
+ opt_out_trusted = opt_str("out_trusted");
+ break;
+ case OPT_IMPLICIT_CONFIRM:
+ opt_implicit_confirm = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_DISABLE_CONFIRM:
+ opt_disable_confirm = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_CERTOUT:
+ opt_certout = opt_str("certout");
+ break;
+ case OPT_OLDCERT:
+ opt_oldcert = opt_str("oldcert");
+ break;
+ case OPT_REVREASON:
+ if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &opt_revreason)
+ || opt_revreason < CRL_REASON_NONE
+ || opt_revreason > CRL_REASON_AA_COMPROMISE
+ || opt_revreason == 7) {
+ CMP_err("invalid revreason. Valid values are -1 .. 6, 8 .. 10");
+ goto opt_err;
+ }
+ break;
+ case OPT_CERTFORM:
+ opt_certform_s = opt_str("certform");
+ break;
+ case OPT_KEYFORM:
+ opt_keyform_s = opt_str("keyform");
+ break;
+ case OPT_CERTSFORM:
+ opt_certsform_s = opt_str("certsform");
+ break;
+ case OPT_OTHERPASS:
+ opt_otherpass = opt_str("otherpass");
+ break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ case OPT_ENGINE:
+ opt_engine = opt_str("engine");
+ break;
+#endif
+ case OPT_PROV_CASES:
+ if (!opt_provider(o))
+ goto opt_err;
+ break;
+
+ case OPT_BATCH:
+ opt_batch = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_REPEAT:
+ opt_repeat = opt_nat();
+ break;
+ case OPT_REQIN:
+ opt_reqin = opt_str("reqin");
+ break;
+ case OPT_REQOUT:
+ opt_reqout = opt_str("reqout");
+ break;
+ case OPT_RSPIN:
+ opt_rspin = opt_str("rspin");
+ break;
+ case OPT_RSPOUT:
+ opt_rspout = opt_str("rspout");
+ break;
+ case OPT_USE_MOCK_SRV:
+ opt_use_mock_srv = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_PORT:
+ opt_port = opt_str("port");
+ break;
+ case OPT_MAX_MSGS:
+ if ((opt_max_msgs = opt_nat()) < 0)
+ goto opt_err;
+ break;
+ case OPT_SRV_REF:
+ opt_srv_ref = opt_str("srv_ref");
+ break;
+ case OPT_SRV_SECRET:
+ opt_srv_secret = opt_str("srv_secret");
+ break;
+ case OPT_SRV_CERT:
+ opt_srv_cert = opt_str("srv_cert");
+ break;
+ case OPT_SRV_KEY:
+ opt_srv_key = opt_str("srv_key");
+ break;
+ case OPT_SRV_KEYPASS:
+ opt_srv_keypass = opt_str("srv_keypass");
+ break;
+ case OPT_SRV_TRUSTED:
+ opt_srv_trusted = opt_str("srv_trusted");
+ break;
+ case OPT_SRV_UNTRUSTED:
+ opt_srv_untrusted = opt_str("srv_untrusted");
+ break;
+ case OPT_RSP_CERT:
+ opt_rsp_cert = opt_str("rsp_cert");
+ break;
+ case OPT_RSP_EXTRACERTS:
+ opt_rsp_extracerts = opt_str("rsp_extracerts");
+ break;
+ case OPT_RSP_CAPUBS:
+ opt_rsp_capubs = opt_str("rsp_capubs");
+ break;
+ case OPT_POLL_COUNT:
+ opt_poll_count = opt_nat();
+ break;
+ case OPT_CHECK_AFTER:
+ opt_check_after = opt_nat();
+ break;
+ case OPT_GRANT_IMPLICITCONF:
+ opt_grant_implicitconf = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_PKISTATUS:
+ opt_pkistatus = opt_nat();
+ break;
+ case OPT_FAILURE:
+ opt_failure = opt_nat();
+ break;
+ case OPT_FAILUREBITS:
+ opt_failurebits = opt_nat();
+ break;
+ case OPT_STATUSSTRING:
+ opt_statusstring = opt_str("statusstring");
+ break;
+ case OPT_SEND_ERROR:
+ opt_send_error = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_SEND_UNPROTECTED:
+ opt_send_unprotected = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_SEND_UNPROT_ERR:
+ opt_send_unprot_err = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_ACCEPT_UNPROTECTED:
+ opt_accept_unprotected = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_ACCEPT_UNPROT_ERR:
+ opt_accept_unprot_err = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_ACCEPT_RAVERIFIED:
+ opt_accept_raverified = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ argc = opt_num_rest();
+ argv = opt_rest();
+ if (argc != 0) {
+ CMP_err1("unknown parameter %s", argv[0]);
+ goto opt_err;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ opt_err:
+ CMP_err1("use -help for summary of '%s' options", prog);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cmp_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ char *configfile = NULL;
+ int i;
+ X509 *newcert = NULL;
+ ENGINE *e = NULL;
+ char mock_server[] = "mock server:1";
+ int ret = 0; /* default: failure */
+
+ if (argc <= 1) {
+ opt_help(cmp_options);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle OPT_CONFIG and OPT_SECTION upfront to take effect for other opts
+ */
+ for (i = 1; i < argc - 1; i++) {
+ if (*argv[i] == '-') {
+ if (!strcmp(argv[i] + 1, cmp_options[OPT_CONFIG - OPT_HELP].name))
+ opt_config = argv[i + 1];
+ else if (!strcmp(argv[i] + 1,
+ cmp_options[OPT_SECTION - OPT_HELP].name))
+ opt_section = argv[i + 1];
+ }
+ }
+ if (opt_section[0] == '\0') /* empty string */
+ opt_section = DEFAULT_SECTION;
+
+ vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (vpm == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("out of memory");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* read default values for options from config file */
+ configfile = opt_config != NULL ? opt_config : default_config_file;
+ if (configfile && configfile[0] != '\0' /* non-empty string */
+ && (configfile != default_config_file
+ || access(configfile, F_OK) != -1)) {
+ CMP_info1("using OpenSSL configuration file '%s'", configfile);
+ conf = app_load_config(configfile);
+ if (conf == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (strcmp(opt_section, CMP_SECTION) == 0) { /* default */
+ if (!NCONF_get_section(conf, opt_section))
+ CMP_info2("no [%s] section found in config file '%s';"
+ " will thus use just [default] and unnamed section if present",
+ opt_section, configfile);
+ } else {
+ const char *end = opt_section + strlen(opt_section);
+ while ((end = prev_item(opt_section, end)) != NULL) {
+ if (!NCONF_get_section(conf, opt_item)) {
+ CMP_err2("no [%s] section found in config file '%s'",
+ opt_item, configfile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!read_config())
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); /* prevent interference with opt_help() */
+
+ ret = get_opts(argc, argv);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ ret = 0;
+
+ if (opt_batch) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ UI_METHOD *ui_fallback_method;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE
+ ui_fallback_method = UI_OpenSSL();
+# else
+ ui_fallback_method = (UI_METHOD *)UI_null();
+# endif
+ UI_method_set_reader(ui_fallback_method, NULL);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (opt_engine != NULL)
+ e = setup_engine_flags(opt_engine, 0 /* not: ENGINE_METHOD_ALL */, 0);
+
+ if (opt_port != NULL) {
+ if (opt_use_mock_srv) {
+ CMP_err("cannot use both -port and -use_mock_srv options");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (opt_server != NULL) {
+ CMP_err("cannot use both -port and -server options");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((cmp_ctx = OSSL_CMP_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("out of memory");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_log_cb(cmp_ctx, print_to_bio_out)) {
+ CMP_err1("cannot set up error reporting and logging for %s", prog);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((opt_use_mock_srv || opt_port != NULL)) {
+ OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX *srv_ctx;
+
+ if ((srv_ctx = setup_srv_ctx(e)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_transfer_cb_arg(cmp_ctx, srv_ctx);
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_log_cb(OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX_get0_cmp_ctx(srv_ctx),
+ print_to_bio_out)) {
+ CMP_err1("cannot set up error reporting and logging for %s", prog);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ if (opt_port != NULL) { /* act as very basic CMP HTTP server */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot act as server - sockets not supported\n");
+#else
+ BIO *acbio;
+ BIO *cbio = NULL;
+ int msgs = 0;
+
+ if ((acbio = http_server_init_bio(prog, opt_port)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ while (opt_max_msgs <= 0 || msgs < opt_max_msgs) {
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG *req = NULL;
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG *resp = NULL;
+
+ ret = http_server_get_asn1_req(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_MSG),
+ (ASN1_VALUE **)&req, &cbio, acbio,
+ prog, 0, 0);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (ret++ == -1)
+ break; /* fatal error */
+
+ ret = 0;
+ msgs++;
+ if (req != NULL) {
+ resp = OSSL_CMP_CTX_server_perform(cmp_ctx, req);
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(req);
+ if (resp == NULL)
+ break; /* treated as fatal error */
+ ret = http_server_send_asn1_resp(cbio, "application/pkixcmp",
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_MSG),
+ (const ASN1_VALUE *)resp);
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(resp);
+ if (!ret)
+ break; /* treated as fatal error */
+ }
+ BIO_free_all(cbio);
+ cbio = NULL;
+ }
+ BIO_free_all(cbio);
+ BIO_free_all(acbio);
+#endif
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* else act as CMP client */
+
+ if (opt_use_mock_srv) {
+ if (opt_server != NULL) {
+ CMP_err("cannot use both -use_mock_srv and -server options");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (opt_proxy != NULL) {
+ CMP_err("cannot use both -use_mock_srv and -proxy options");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ opt_server = mock_server;
+ opt_proxy = "API";
+ } else {
+ if (opt_server == NULL) {
+ CMP_err("missing -server option");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!setup_client_ctx(cmp_ctx, e)) {
+ CMP_err("cannot set up CMP context");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < opt_repeat; i++) {
+ /* everything is ready, now connect and perform the command! */
+ switch (opt_cmd) {
+ case CMP_IR:
+ newcert = OSSL_CMP_exec_IR_ses(cmp_ctx);
+ if (newcert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case CMP_KUR:
+ newcert = OSSL_CMP_exec_KUR_ses(cmp_ctx);
+ if (newcert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case CMP_CR:
+ newcert = OSSL_CMP_exec_CR_ses(cmp_ctx);
+ if (newcert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case CMP_P10CR:
+ newcert = OSSL_CMP_exec_P10CR_ses(cmp_ctx);
+ if (newcert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case CMP_RR:
+ if (OSSL_CMP_exec_RR_ses(cmp_ctx) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case CMP_GENM:
+ {
+ STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) *itavs;
+
+ if (opt_infotype != NID_undef) {
+ OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav =
+ OSSL_CMP_ITAV_create(OBJ_nid2obj(opt_infotype), NULL);
+ if (itav == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_push0_genm_ITAV(cmp_ctx, itav);
+ }
+
+ if ((itavs = OSSL_CMP_exec_GENM_ses(cmp_ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ print_itavs(itavs);
+ sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_pop_free(itavs, OSSL_CMP_ITAV_free);
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ {
+ /* print PKIStatusInfo (this is in case there has been no error) */
+ int status = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_status(cmp_ctx);
+ char *buf = app_malloc(OSSL_CMP_PKISI_BUFLEN, "PKIStatusInfo buf");
+ const char *string =
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_snprint_PKIStatus(cmp_ctx, buf,
+ OSSL_CMP_PKISI_BUFLEN);
+
+ CMP_print(bio_err,
+ status == OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_accepted ? "info" :
+ status == OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection ? "server error" :
+ status == OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_waiting ? "internal error"
+ : "warning",
+ "received from %s %s %s", opt_server,
+ string != NULL ? string : "<unknown PKIStatus>", "");
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+
+ if (opt_cacertsout != NULL) {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get1_caPubs(cmp_ctx);
+
+ if (sk_X509_num(certs) > 0
+ && save_certs(cmp_ctx, certs, opt_cacertsout, "CA") < 0) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ }
+
+ if (opt_extracertsout != NULL) {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get1_extraCertsIn(cmp_ctx);
+ if (sk_X509_num(certs) > 0
+ && save_certs(cmp_ctx, certs, opt_extracertsout,
+ "extra") < 0) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ }
+
+ if (opt_certout != NULL && newcert != NULL) {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+
+ if (certs == NULL || !sk_X509_push(certs, newcert)
+ || save_certs(cmp_ctx, certs, opt_certout,
+ "enrolled") < 0) {
+ sk_X509_free(certs);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sk_X509_free(certs);
+ }
+ if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_reinit(cmp_ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ /* in case we ended up here on error without proper cleaning */
+ cleanse(opt_keypass);
+ cleanse(opt_newkeypass);
+ cleanse(opt_otherpass);
+ cleanse(opt_tls_keypass);
+ cleanse(opt_secret);
+ cleanse(opt_srv_keypass);
+ cleanse(opt_srv_secret);
+
+ if (ret != 1)
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(cmp_ctx);
+
+ ossl_cmp_mock_srv_free(OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_transfer_cb_arg(cmp_ctx));
+ {
+ APP_HTTP_TLS_INFO *http_tls_info =
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_http_cb_arg(cmp_ctx);
+
+ if (http_tls_info != NULL) {
+ SSL_CTX_free(http_tls_info->ssl_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(http_tls_info);
+ }
+ }
+ X509_STORE_free(OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_certConf_cb_arg(cmp_ctx));
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_free(cmp_ctx);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+ release_engine(e);
+
+ NCONF_free(conf); /* must not do as long as opt_... variables are used */
+ OSSL_CMP_log_close();
+
+ return ret == 0 ? EXIT_FAILURE : EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
--- /dev/null
+=pod
+{- OpenSSL::safe::output_do_not_edit_headers(); -}
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+openssl-cmp - client for the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP, RFC 4210)
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<cmp>
+[B<-help>]
+[B<-config> I<filename>]
+[B<-section> I<names>]
+
+[B<-server> I<address[:port]>]
+[B<-proxy> I<[http[s]://]address[:port][/path]>]
+[B<-no_proxy> I<addresses>]
+[B<-path> I<remote_path>]
+[B<-msg_timeout> I<seconds>]
+[B<-total_timeout> I<seconds>]
+
+[B<-trusted> I<filenames>]
+[B<-untrusted> I<sources>]
+[B<-srvcert> I<filename>]
+[B<-recipient> I<name>]
+[B<-expect_sender> I<name>]
+[B<-ignore_keyusage>]
+[B<-unprotected_errors>]
+[B<-extracertsout> I<filename>]
+[B<-cacertsout> I<filename>]
+
+[B<-ref> I<value>]
+[B<-secret> I<arg>]
+[B<-cert> I<filename>]
+[B<-key> I<filename>]
+[B<-keypass> I<arg>]
+[B<-digest> I<name>]
+[B<-mac> I<name>]
+[B<-extracerts> I<sources>]
+[B<-unprotected_requests>]
+
+[B<-cmd> I<ir|cr|kur|p10cr|rr|genm>]
+[B<-infotype> I<name>]
+[B<-geninfo> I<OID:int:N>]
+
+[B<-newkey> I<filename>]
+[B<-newkeypass> I<arg>]
+[B<-subject> I<name>]
+[B<-issuer> I<name>]
+[B<-days> I<number>]
+[B<-reqexts> I<name>]
+[B<-sans> I<spec>]
+[B<-san_nodefault>]
+[B<-policies> I<name>]
+[B<-policy_oids> I<names>]
+[B<-policy_oids_critical>]
+[B<-popo> I<number>]
+[B<-csr> I<filename>]
+[B<-out_trusted> I<filenames>]
+[B<-verify_hostname> I<cn>]
+[B<-verify_ip> I<ip>]
+[B<-verify_email> I<email>]
+[B<-implicit_confirm>]
+[B<-disable_confirm>]
+[B<-certout> I<filename>]
+
+[B<-oldcert> I<filename>]
+[B<-revreason> I<number>]
+
+[B<-certform> I<PEM|DER>]
+[B<-keyform> I<PEM|DER|P12|ENGINE>]
+[B<-certsform> I<PEM|DER|P12>]
+[B<-otherpass> I<arg>]
+[B<-engine> I<id>]
+{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_provider_synopsis -}
+
+[B<-tls_used>]
+[B<-tls_cert> I<filename>]
+[B<-tls_key> I<filename>]
+[B<-tls_keypass> I<arg>]
+[B<-tls_extra> I<filenames>]
+[B<-tls_trusted> I<filenames>]
+[B<-tls_host> I<name>]
+
+[B<-batch>]
+[B<-repeat> I<number>]
+[B<-reqin>] I<filenames>
+[B<-reqout>] I<filenames>
+[B<-rspin>] I<filenames>
+[B<-rspout>] I<filenames>
+[B<-use_mock_srv>]
+
+[B<-policy> I<arg>]
+[B<-purpose> I<purpose>]
+[B<-verify_name> I<name>]
+[B<-verify_depth> I<num>]
+[B<-auth_level> I<level>]
+[B<-attime> I<timestamp>]
+[B<-ignore_critical>]
+[B<-issuer_checks>]
+[B<-policy_check>]
+[B<-explicit_policy>]
+[B<-inhibit_any>]
+[B<-inhibit_map>]
+[B<-x509_strict>]
+[B<-extended_crl>]
+[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-check_ss_sig>]
+[B<-crl_check>]
+[B<-crl_check_all>]
+[B<-trusted_first>]
+[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
+[B<-suiteB_128>]
+[B<-suiteB_192>]
+[B<-partial_chain>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+[B<-no_check_time>]
+[B<-allow_proxy_certs>]
+
+[B<-port> I<number>]
+[B<-max_msgs> I<number>]
+[B<-srv_ref> I<value>]
+[B<-srv_secret> I<arg>]
+[B<-srv_cert> I<filename>]
+[B<-srv_key> I<filename>]
+[B<-srv_keypass> I<arg>]
+[B<-srv_trusted> I<filenames>]
+[B<-srv_untrusted> I<filenames>]
+[B<-rsp_cert> I<filename>]
+[B<-rsp_extracerts> I<filenames>]
+[B<-rsp_capubs> I<filenames>]
+[B<-poll_count> I<number>]
+[B<-check_after> I<number>]
+[B<-grant_implicitconf>]
+[B<-pkistatus> I<number>]
+[B<-failure> I<number>]
+[B<-failurebits> I<number>]
+[B<-statusstring> I<arg>]
+[B<-send_error>]
+[B<-send_unprotected>]
+[B<-send_unprot_err>]
+[B<-accept_unprotected>]
+[B<-accept_unprot_err>]
+[B<-accept_raverified>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<cmp> command is a client implementation for the Certificate
+Management Protocol (CMP) as defined in RFC4210.
+It can be used to request certificates from a CA server,
+update their certificates,
+request certificates to be revoked, and perform other CMP requests.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-help>
+
+Display a summary of all options
+
+=item B<-config> I<filename>
+
+Configuration file to use.
+An empty string C<""> means none.
+Default filename is from the environment variable C<OPENSSL_CONF>.
+
+=item B<-section> I<names>
+
+Section(s) to use within config file defining CMP options.
+An empty string C<""> means no specific section.
+Default is C<cmp>.
+Multiple section names may be given, separated by commas and/or whitespace
+(where in the latter case the whole argument must be enclosed in "...").
+Contents of sections named later may override contents of sections named before.
+In any case, as usual, the C<[default]> section and finally the unnamed
+section (as far as present) can provide per-option fallback values.
+
+=back
+
+
+=head2 Generic message options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-cmd> I<ir|cr|kur|p10cr|rr|genm>
+
+CMP command to execute.
+Currently implemented commands are:
+
+=over 8
+
+=item ir E<nbsp> - Initialization Request
+
+=item cr E<nbsp> - Certificate Request
+
+=item p10cr - PKCS#10 Certification Request (for legacy support)
+
+=item kur E<nbsp>E<nbsp>- Key Update Request
+
+=item rr E<nbsp> - Revocation Request
+
+=item genm - General Message
+
+=back
+
+B<ir> requests initialization of an End Entity into a PKI hierarchy by means of
+issuance of a first certificate.
+
+B<cr> requests issuance of an additional certificate for an End Entity already
+initialized to the PKI hierarchy.
+
+B<p10cr> requests issuance of an additional certificate similarly to B<cr>
+but uses PKCS#10 CSR format.
+
+B<kur> requests (key) update for an existing, given certificate.
+
+B<rr> requests revocation of an existing, given certificate.
+
+B<genm> requests information using a General Message, where optionally
+included B<InfoTypeAndValue>s may be used to state which info is of interest.
+Upon receipt of the General Response, information about all received
+ITAV B<infoType>s is printed to stdout.
+
+=item B<-infotype> I<name>
+
+Set InfoType name to use for requesting specific info in B<genm>,
+e.g., C<signKeyPairTypes>.
+
+=item B<-geninfo> I<OID:int:N>
+
+generalInfo integer values to place in request PKIHeader with given OID,
+e.g., C<1.2.3:int:987>.
+
+=back
+
+
+=head2 Certificate request options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-newkey> I<filename>
+
+The file containing the private or public key for the certificate requested
+in Initialization Request (IR), Certification Request(CR), or
+Key Update Request (KUR).
+Default is the public key in the PKCS#10 CSR given with the B<-csr> option,
+if any, or else the current client key, if given.
+
+=item B<-newkeypass> I<arg>
+
+Pass phrase source for the key given with the B<-newkey> option.
+If not given here, the password will be prompted for if needed.
+
+For more information about the format of B<arg> see the
+B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-subject> I<name>
+
+X509 Distinguished Name (DN) of subject to use in the requested certificate
+template.
+For KUR, it defaults to the subject DN of the reference certificate
+(see B<-oldcert>).
+This default is used for IR and CR only if no SANs are set.
+
+The argument must be formatted as I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>,
+characters may be escaped by C<\>E<nbsp>(backslash), no spaces are skipped.
+
+In case B<-cert> is not set, for instance when using MSG_MAC_ALG,
+the subject DN is also used as sender of the PKI message.
+
+=item B<-issuer> I<name>
+
+X509 issuer Distinguished Name (DN) of the CA server
+to place in the requested certificate template in IR/CR/KUR.
+
+The argument must be formatted as I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>,
+characters may be escaped by C<\>E<nbsp>(backslash), no spaces are skipped.
+
+If neither B<-srvcert> nor B<-recipient> is available,
+the name given in this option is also set as the recipient of the CMP message.
+
+=item B<-days> I<number>
+
+Number of days the new certificate is requested to be valid for, counting from
+the current time of the host.
+Also triggers the explicit request that the
+validity period starts from the current time (as seen by the host).
+
+=item B<-reqexts> I<name>
+
+Name of section in OpenSSL config file defining certificate request extensions.
+
+=item B<-sans> I<spec>
+
+One or more IP addresses, DNS names, or URIs separated by commas or whitespace
+(where in the latter case the whole argument must be enclosed in "...")
+to add as Subject Alternative Name(s) (SAN) certificate request extension.
+If the special element "critical" is given the SANs are flagged as critical.
+Cannot be used if any Subject Alternative Name extension is set via B<-reqexts>.
+
+=item B<-san_nodefault>
+
+When Subject Alternative Names are not given via B<-sans>
+nor defined via B<-reqexts>,
+they are copied by default from the reference certificate (see B<-oldcert>).
+This can be disabled by giving the B<-san_nodefault> option.
+
+=item B<-policies> I<name>
+
+Name of section in OpenSSL config file defining policies to be set
+as certificate request extension.
+This option cannot be used together with B<-policy_oids>.
+
+=item B<-policy_oids> I<names>
+
+One or more OID(s), separated by commas and/or whitespace
+(where in the latter case the whole argument must be enclosed in "...")
+to add as certificate policies request extension.
+This option cannot be used together with B<-policies>.
+
+=item B<-policy_oids_critical>
+
+Flag the policies given with B<-policy_oids> as critical.
+
+=item B<-popo> I<number>
+
+Proof-of-Possession (POPO) method to use for IR/CR/KUR; values: C<-1>..<2> where
+C<-1> = NONE, C<0> = RAVERIFIED, C<1> = SIGNATURE (default), C<2> = KEYENC.
+
+Note that a signature-based POPO can only be produced if a private key
+is provided via the B<-newkey> or B<-key> options.
+
+=item B<-csr> I<filename>
+
+CSR in PKCS#10 format to use in legacy P10CR messages.
+
+=item B<-out_trusted> I<filenames>
+
+Trusted certificate(s) to use for verifying the newly enrolled certificate.
+
+Multiple filenames may be given, separated by commas and/or whitespace
+(where in the latter case the whole argument must be enclosed in "...").
+Each source may contain multiple certificates.
+
+=item B<-verify_hostname> I<name>
+
+When verification of the newly enrolled certificate is enabled (with the
+B<-out_trusted> option), check if any DNS Subject Alternative Name (or if no
+DNS SAN is included, the Common Name in the subject) equals the given B<name>.
+
+=item B<-verify_ip> I<ip>
+
+When verification of the newly enrolled certificate is enabled (with the
+B<-out_trusted> option), check if there is
+an IP address Subject Alternative Name matching the given IP address.
+
+=item B<-verify_email> I<email>
+
+When verification of the newly enrolled certificate is enabled (with the
+B<-out_trusted> option), check if there is
+an email address Subject Alternative Name matching the given email address.
+
+=item B<-implicit_confirm>
+
+Request implicit confirmation of newly enrolled certificates.
+
+=item B<-disable_confirm>
+
+Do not send certificate confirmation message for newly enrolled certificate
+without requesting implicit confirmation
+to cope with broken servers not supporting implicit confirmation correctly.
+B<WARNING:> This leads to behavior violating RFC 4210.
+
+=item B<-certout> I<filename>
+
+The file where the newly enrolled certificate should be saved.
+
+=back
+
+
+=head2 Certificate revocation options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-oldcert> I<filename>
+
+The certificate to be updated (i.e., renewed or re-keyed) in Key Update Request
+(KUR) messages or to be revoked in Revocation Request (RR) messages.
+It must be given for RR, while for KUR it defaults to B<-cert>.
+
+The reference certificate determined in this way, if any, is also used for
+deriving default subject DN and Subject Alternative Names for IR, CR, and KUR.
+Its issuer, if any, is used as default recipient in the CMP message header
+if neither B<-srvcert>, B<-recipient>, nor B<-issuer> is available.
+
+=item B<-revreason> I<number>
+
+Set CRLReason to be included in revocation request (RR); values: C<0>..C<10>
+or C<-1> for none (which is the default).
+
+Reason numbers defined in RFC 5280 are:
+
+ CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED {
+ unspecified (0),
+ keyCompromise (1),
+ cACompromise (2),
+ affiliationChanged (3),
+ superseded (4),
+ cessationOfOperation (5),
+ certificateHold (6),
+ -- value 7 is not used
+ removeFromCRL (8),
+ privilegeWithdrawn (9),
+ aACompromise (10)
+ }
+
+=back
+
+
+=head2 Message transfer options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-server> I<[http[s]://]address[:port]>
+
+The IP address or DNS hostname and optionally port (defaulting to 80 or 443)
+of the CMP server to connect to using HTTP(S) transport.
+The optional "http://" or "https://" prefix is ignored.
+
+=item B<-proxy> I<[http[s]://]address[:port][/path]>
+
+The HTTP(S) proxy server to use for reaching the CMP server unless B<no_proxy>
+applies, see below.
+The optional "http://" or "https://" prefix and any trailing path are ignored.
+Defaults to the environment variable C<http_proxy> if set, else C<HTTP_PROXY>
+in case no TLS is used, otherwise C<https_proxy> if set, else C<HTTPS_PROXY>.
+
+=item B<-no_proxy> I<addresses>
+List of IP addresses and/or DNS names of servers
+not to use an HTTP(S) proxy for, separated by commas and/or whitespace
+(where in the latter case the whole argument must be enclosed in "...").
+Default is from the environment variable C<no_proxy> if set, else C<NO_PROXY>.
+
+=item B<-path> I<remote_path>
+
+HTTP path at the CMP server (aka CMP alias) to use for POST requests.
+Defaults to "/".
+
+=item B<-msg_timeout> I<seconds>
+
+Number of seconds (or 0 for infinite) a CMP request-response message round trip
+is allowed to take before a timeout error is returned.
+Default is 120.
+
+=item B<-total_timeout> I<seconds>
+
+Maximum number seconds an overall enrollment transaction may take,
+including attempts polling for certificates on C<waiting> PKIStatus.
+Default is 0 (infinite).
+
+=back
+
+
+=head2 Server authentication options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-trusted> I<filenames>
+
+When verifying signature-based protection of CMP response messages,
+these are the CA certificate(s) to trust while checking certificate chains
+during CMP server authentication.
+This option gives more flexibility than the B<-srvcert> option because
+it does not pin down the expected CMP server by allowing only one certificate.
+
+Multiple filenames may be given, separated by commas and/or whitespace
+(where in the latter case the whole argument must be enclosed in "...").
+Each source may contain multiple certificates.
+
+=item B<-untrusted> I<sources>
+
+Non-trusted intermediate certificate(s) that may be useful
+for constructing the TLS client certificate chain (if TLS is enabled) and
+for building certificate chains while verifying the CMP server certificate
+(when checking signature-based CMP message protection)
+and while verifying the newly enrolled certificate.
+These may get added to the extraCerts field sent in requests as far as needed.
+
+Multiple filenames may be given, separated by commas and/or whitespace.
+Each file may contain multiple certificates.
+
+=item B<-srvcert> I<filename>
+
+The specific CMP server certificate to use and directly trust (even if it is
+expired) when verifying signature-based protection of CMP response messages.
+May be set alternatively to the B<-trusted> option
+if the certificate is available and only this one shall be accepted.
+
+If set, the issuer of the certificate is also used as the recipient of the CMP
+request and as the expected sender of the CMP response,
+overriding any potential B<-recipient> option.
+
+=item B<-recipient> I<name>
+
+This option may be used to explicitly set the Distinguished Name (DN)
+of the CMP message recipient, i.e., the CMP server (usually a CA or RA entity).
+
+The argument must be formatted as I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>,
+characters may be escaped by C<\>E<nbsp>(backslash), no spaces are skipped.
+
+If a CMP server certificate is given with the B<-srvcert> option, its subject
+name is taken as the recipient name and the B<-recipient> option is ignored.
+If neither of the two are given, the recipient of the PKI message is
+determined in the following order: from the B<-issuer> option if present,
+the issuer of old cert given with the B<-oldcert> option if present,
+the issuer of the client certificate (B<-cert> option) if present.
+
+The recipient field in the header of CMP messagese is mandatory.
+If none of the options that enable the derivation of the recipient name are
+given, no suitable value for the recipient in the PKIHeader is available.
+As a last resort it is set to NULL-DN.
+
+When a response is received, its sender must match the recipient of the request.
+
+=item B<-expect_sender> I<name>
+
+Distinguished Name (DN) of the expected sender of CMP response messages when
+MSG_SIG_ALG is used for protection.
+This can be used to ensure that only a particular entity is accepted
+as the CMP server, and attackers are not able to use arbitrary certificates
+of a trusted PKI hierarchy to fraudulently pose as a CMP server.
+Note that this option gives slightly more freedom than B<-srvcert>,
+which pins down the server to a particular certificate,
+while B<-expect_sender> I<name> will continue to match after updates of the
+server cert.
+
+The argument must be formatted as I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>,
+characters may be escaped by C<\>E<nbsp>(backslash), no spaces are skipped.
+
+If not given, the subject DN of B<-srvcert>, if provided, will be used.
+
+=item B<-ignore_keyusage>
+
+Ignore key usage restrictions in CMP signer certificates when verifying
+signature-based protection of incoming CMP messages,
+else C<digitalSignature> must be allowed for signer certificate.
+
+=item B<-unprotected_errors>
+
+Accept missing or invalid protection of negative responses from the server.
+This applies to the following message types and contents:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item * error messages
+
+=item * negative certificate responses (IP/CP/KUP)
+
+=item * negative revocation responses (RP)
+
+=item * negative PKIConf messages
+
+=back
+
+B<WARNING:> This setting leads to unspecified behavior and it is meant
+exclusively to allow interoperability with server implementations violating
+RFC 4210, e.g.:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item * section 5.1.3.1 allows exceptions from protecting only for special
+cases:
+"There MAY be cases in which the PKIProtection BIT STRING is deliberately not
+used to protect a message [...] because other protection, external to PKIX, will
+be applied instead."
+
+=item * section 5.3.21 is clear on ErrMsgContent: "The CA MUST always sign it
+with a signature key."
+
+=item * appendix D.4 shows PKIConf message having protection
+
+=back
+
+=item B<-extracertsout> I<filename>
+
+The file where to save any extra certificates received in the extraCerts field
+of response messages.
+
+=item B<-cacertsout> I<filename>
+
+The file where to save any CA certificates received in the caPubs field of
+Initializiation Response (IP) messages.
+
+=back
+
+
+=head2 Client authentication options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-ref> I<value>
+
+Reference number/string/value to use as fallback senderKID; this is required
+if no sender name can be determined from the B<-cert> or <-subject> options and
+is typically used when authenticating with pre-shared key (password-based MAC).
+
+=item B<-secret> I<arg>
+
+Source of secret value to use for creating PBM-based protection of outgoing
+messages and for verifying any PBM-based protection of incoming messages.
+PBM stands for Password-Based Message Authentication Code.
+This takes precedence over the B<-cert> option.
+
+For more information about the format of B<arg> see the
+B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-cert> I<filename>
+
+The client's current certificate.
+Requires the corresponding key to be given with B<-key>.
+The subject of this certificate will be used as the "sender" field
+of outgoing CMP messages, while B<-subjectName> may provide a fallback value.
+When using signature-based message protection, this "protection certificate"
+will be included first in the extraCerts field of outgoing messages.
+In Initialization Request (IR) messages this can be used for authenticating
+using an external entity certificate as defined in appendix E.7 of RFC 4210.
+For Key Update Request (KUR) messages this is also used as
+the certificate to be updated if the B<-oldcert> option is not given.
+If the file includes further certs, they are appended to the untrusted certs.
+These may get added to the extraCerts field sent in requests as far as needed.
+
+=item B<-key> I<filename>
+
+The corresponding private key file for the client's current certificate given in
+the B<-cert> option.
+This will be used for signature-based message protection unless
+the B<-secret> option indicating PBM or B<-unprotected_requests> is given.
+
+=item B<-keypass> I<arg>
+
+Pass phrase source for the private key given with the B<-key> option.
+Also used for B<-cert> and B<-oldcert> in case it is an encrypted PKCS#12 file.
+If not given here, the password will be prompted for if needed.
+
+For more information about the format of B<arg> see the
+B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-digest> I<name>
+
+Specifies name of supported digest to use in RFC 4210's MSG_SIG_ALG
+and as the one-way function (OWF) in MSG_MAC_ALG.
+If applicable, this is used for message protection and
+Proof-of-Possession (POPO) signatures.
+To see the list of supported digests, use B<openssl list -digest-commands>.
+Defaults to C<sha256>.
+
+=item B<-mac> I<name>
+
+Specifies the name of the MAC algorithm in MSG_MAC_ALG.
+To get the names of supported MAC algorithms use B<openssl list -mac-algorithms>
+and possibly combine such a name with the name of a supported digest algorithm,
+e.g., hmacWithSHA256.
+Defaults to C<hmac-sha1> as per RFC 4210.
+
+=item B<-extracerts> I<sources>
+
+Certificates to append in the extraCerts field when sending messages.
+
+Multiple filenames or URLs may be given, separated by commas and/or whitespace
+(where in the latter case the whole argument must be enclosed in "...").
+Each source may contain multiple certificates.
+
+=item B<-unprotected_requests>
+
+Send messages without CMP-level protection.
+
+=back
+
+
+=head2 Credentials format options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-certform> I<PEM|DER>
+
+File format to use when saving a certificate to a file.
+Default value is PEM.
+
+=item B<-keyform> I<PEM|DER|P12>
+
+Format to assume when reading key files.
+Default value is PEM.
+
+=item B<-certsform> I<PEM|DER|P12>
+
+Format to try first when reading multiple certificates from file(s).
+Default value is PEM.
+
+=item B<-otherpass> I<arg>
+
+Pass phrase source for certificate given with the B<-trusted>, B<-untrusted>,
+B<-out_trusted>, B<-extracerts>, B<-tls_extra>, or B<-tls_trusted> options.
+If not given here, the password will be prompted for if needed.
+
+For more information about the format of B<arg> see the
+B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-engine> I<id>
+
+Specifying a crypto engine B<id> will lead to obtaining a functional
+reference to the specified engine, initializing it if needed.
+The engine will be used for all algorithms supported for keys
+prefixed by C<engine:>.
+Engines may be defined in the OpenSSL config file as usual in an engine section.
+
+Options specifying keys, like B<-key>, B<-newkey>, B<-tls_key> can prefix
+C<engine:> to engine-specific identifiers for security tokens objects held by
+the engine.
+ The following example utilizes the RFC 7512 PKCS #11 URI scheme
+as supported, e.g., by libp11:
+C<-key engine:pkcs11:object=my-private-key;type=private;pin-value=1234>
+
+{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_provider_item -}
+
+=back
+
+
+=head2 TLS options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-tls_used>
+
+Enable using TLS (even when other TLS_related options are not set)
+when connecting to CMP server.
+
+=item B<-tls_cert> I<filename>
+
+Client's TLS certificate.
+If the file includes further certificates,
+they are used for constructing the client cert chain provided to the TLS server.
+
+=item B<-tls_key> I<filename>
+
+Private key for the client's TLS certificate.
+
+=item B<-tls_keypass> I<arg>
+
+Pass phrase source for client's private TLS key B<tls_key>.
+Also used for B<-tls_cert> in case it is an encrypted PKCS#12 file.
+If not given here, the password will be prompted for if needed.
+
+For more information about the format of B<arg> see the
+B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-tls_extra> I<filenames>
+
+Extra certificates to provide to TLS server during TLS handshake
+
+=item B<-tls_trusted> I<filenames>
+
+Trusted certificate(s) to use for verifying the TLS server certificate.
+This implies hostname validation.
+
+Multiple filenames may be given, separated by commas and/or whitespace
+(where in the latter case the whole argument must be enclosed in "...").
+Each source may contain multiple certificates.
+
+=item B<-tls_host> I<name>
+
+Address to be checked during hostname validation.
+This may be a DNS name or an IP address.
+If not given it defaults to the B<-server> address.
+
+=back
+
+
+=head2 Client-side debugging options
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-batch>
+
+Do not interactively prompt for input, for instance when a password is needed.
+This can be useful for batch processing and testing.
+
+=item B<-repeat> I<number>
+
+Invoke the command the given number of times with the same parameters.
+Default is one invocation.
+
+=item B<-reqin> I<filenames>
+
+Take sequence of CMP requests from file(s).
+Multiple filenames may be given, separated by commas and/or whitespace
+(where in the latter case the whole argument must be enclosed in "...").
+As many files are read as needed for a complete transaction.
+
+=item B<-reqout> I<filenames>
+
+Save sequence of CMP requests to file(s).
+Multiple filenames may be given, separated by commas and/or whitespace.
+As many files are written as needed to store the complete transaction.
+
+=item B<-rspin> I<filenames>
+
+Process sequence of CMP responses provided in file(s), skipping server.
+Multiple filenames may be given, separated by commas and/or whitespace.
+As many files are read as needed for the complete transaction.
+
+=item B<-rspout> I<filenames>
+
+Save sequence of CMP responses to file(s).
+Multiple filenames may be given, separated by commas and/or whitespace.
+As many files are written as needed to store the complete transaction.
+
+=item B<-use_mock_srv>
+
+Use the internal mock server for testing the client.
+This works at API level, bypassing HTTP transport.
+
+=back
+
+
+=head2 Certificate verification options, for both CMP and TLS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-policy>, B<-purpose>, B<-verify_name>, B<-verify_depth>,
+B<-attime>,
+B<-ignore_critical>, B<-issuer_checks>,
+B<-policy_check>,
+B<-explicit_policy>, B<-inhibit_any>, B<-inhibit_map>,
+B<-x509_strict>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-use_deltas>,
+B<-policy_print>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
+B<-trusted_first>,
+B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_192>,
+B<-partial_chain>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-no_check_time>,
+B<-auth_level>,
+B<-allow_proxy_certs>
+
+Set various options of certificate chain verification.
+See L<openssl(1)/Verification Options> for details.
+
+=back
+
+
+=head2 Mock server options, for testing purposes only
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-port> I<number>
+
+Act as CMP HTTP server mock-up listening on the given port.
+
+=item B<-max_msgs> I<number>
+
+Maximum number of CMP (request) messages the CMP HTTP server mock-up
+should handle, which must be non-negative.
+The default value is 0, which means that no limit is imposed.
+In any case the server terminates on internal errors, but not when it
+detects a CMP-level error that it can successfully answer with an error message.
+
+=item B<-srv_ref> I<value>
+
+Reference value to use as senderKID of server in case no B<-srv_cert> is given.
+
+=item B<-srv_secret> I<arg>
+
+Password source for server authentication with a pre-shared key (secret).
+
+=item B<-srv_cert> I<filename>
+
+Certificate of the server.
+
+=item B<-srv_key> I<filename>
+
+Private key used by the server for signing messages.
+
+=item B<-srv_keypass> I<arg>
+
+Server private key (and cert) file pass phrase source.
+
+=item B<-srv_trusted> I<filenames>
+
+Trusted certificates for client authentication.
+
+=item B<-srv_untrusted> I<filenames>
+
+Intermediate certs for constructing chains for CMP protection by client.
+
+=item B<-rsp_cert> I<filename>
+
+Certificate to be returned as mock enrollment result.
+
+=item B<-rsp_extracerts> I<filenames>
+
+Extra certificates to be included in mock certification responses.
+
+=item B<-rsp_capubs> I<filenames>
+
+CA certificates to be included in mock Initialization Response (IP) message.
+
+=item B<-poll_count> I<number>
+
+Number of times the client must poll before receiving a certificate.
+
+=item B<-check_after> I<number>
+
+The checkAfter value (number of seconds to wait) to include in poll response.
+
+
+=item B<-grant_implicitconf>
+
+Grant implicit confirmation of newly enrolled certificate.
+
+=item B<-pkistatus> I<number>
+
+PKIStatus to be included in server response.
+Valid range is 0 (accepted) .. 6 (keyUpdateWarning).
+
+=item B<-failure> I<number>
+
+A single failure info bit number to be included in server response.
+Valid range is 0 (badAlg) .. 26 (duplicateCertReq).
+
+=item B<-failurebits> I<number>
+Number representing failure bits to be included in server response.
+Valid range is 0 .. 2^27 - 1.
+
+=item B<-statusstring> I<arg>
+
+Text to be included as status string in server response.
+
+=item B<-send_error>
+
+Force server to reply with error message.
+
+=item B<-send_unprotected>
+
+Send response messages without CMP-level protection.
+
+=item B<-send_unprot_err>
+
+In case of negative responses, server shall send unprotected error messages,
+certificate responses (IP/CP/KUP), and revocation responses (RP).
+WARNING: This setting leads to behavior violating RFC 4210.
+
+=item B<-accept_unprotected>
+
+Accept missing or invalid protection of requests.
+
+=item B<-accept_unprot_err>
+
+Accept unprotected error messages from client.
+
+=item B<-accept_raverified>
+
+Accept RAVERIFED as proof-of-possession (POPO).
+
+=back
+
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When setting up CMP configurations and experimenting with enrollment options
+typically various errors occur until the configuration is correct and complete.
+When the CMP server reports an error the client will by default
+check the protection of the CMP response message.
+Yet some CMP services tend not to protect negative responses.
+In this case the client will reject them, and thus their contents are not shown
+although they usually contain hints that would be helpful for diagnostics.
+For assisting in such cases the CMP client offers a workaround via the
+B<-unprotected_errors> option, which allows accepting such negative messages.
+
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+=head2 Simple examples using the default OpenSSL configuration file
+
+This CMP client implementation comes with demonstrative CMP sections
+in the example configuration file F<openssl/apps/openssl.cnf>,
+which can be used to interact conveniently with the Insta Demo CA.
+
+In order to enroll an initial certificate from that CA it is sufficient
+to issue the following shell commands.
+
+ cd /path/to/openssl
+ export OPENSSL_CONF=openssl.cnf
+ wget 'http://pki.certificate.fi:8080/install-ca-cert.html/ca-certificate.crt\
+ ?ca-id=632&download-certificate=1' -O insta.ca.crt
+ openssl genrsa -out insta.priv.pem
+ openssl cmp -section insta
+
+This should produce the file F<insta.cert.pem> containing a new certificate
+for the private key held in F<insta.priv.pem>.
+It can be viewed using, e.g.,
+
+ openssl x509 -noout -text -in insta.cert.pem
+
+In case the network setup requires using an HTTP proxy it may be given as usual
+via the environment variable B<http_proxy> or via the B<proxy> option or
+the CMP command-line argument B<-proxy>, for example
+
+ -proxy http://192.168.1.1:8080
+
+In the Insta Demo CA scenario both clients and the server may use the pre-shared
+secret "insta" and the reference value "3078" to authenticate to each other.
+
+Alternatively, CMP messages may be protected in signature-based manner,
+where the trust anchor in this case is F<insta.ca.crt>
+and the client may use any certificate already obtained from that CA,
+as specified in the B<[signature]> section of the example configuration.
+This can be used in combination with the B<[insta]> section simply by
+
+ openssl cmp -section insta,signature
+
+By default the CMP IR message type is used, yet CR works equally here.
+This may be specified directly at the command line:
+
+ openssl cmp -section insta -cmd cr
+
+or by referencing in addition the B<[cr]> section of the example configuration:
+
+ openssl cmp -section insta,cr
+
+In order to update the enrolled certificate one may call
+
+ openssl cmp -section insta,kur
+
+using with PBM-based protection or
+
+ openssl cmp -section insta,kur,signature
+
+using signature-based protection.
+
+In a similar way any previously enrolled certificate may be revoked by
+
+ openssl cmp -section insta,rr -trusted insta.ca.crt
+
+or
+
+ openssl cmp -section insta,rr,signature
+
+Many more options can be used in the configuration file
+and/or on the command line.
+
+
+=head2 Certificate enrollment
+
+The following examples at first do not make use of a configuration file.
+They assume that a CMP server can be contacted on the local TCP port 80
+and accepts requests under the alias "/pkix/".
+
+For enrolling its very first certificate the client generates a first client key
+and sends an initial request message to the local CMP server
+using a pre-shared secret key for mutual authentication.
+In this example the client does not have the CA certificate yet,
+so we specify the name of the CA with the B<-recipient> option
+and save any CA certificates that we may receive in the C<capubs.pem> file.
+
+In below command line usage examples the C<\> at line ends is just used
+for formatting; each of the command invocations should be on a single line.
+
+ openssl genrsa -out cl_key.pem
+ openssl cmp -cmd ir -server 127.0.0.1:80 -path pkix/ \
+ -ref 1234 -secret pass:1234-5678-1234-5678 \
+ -recipient "/CN=CMPserver" \
+ -newkey cl_key.pem -subject "/CN=MyName" \
+ -cacertsout capubs.pem -certout cl_cert.pem
+
+
+=head2 Certificate update
+
+Then, when the client certificate and its related key pair needs to be updated,
+the client can send a key update request taking the certs in C<capubs.pem>
+as trusted for authenticating the server and using the previous cert and key
+for its own authentication.
+Then it can start using the new cert and key.
+
+ openssl genrsa -out cl_key_new.pem
+ openssl cmp -cmd kur -server 127.0.0.1:80 -path pkix/ \
+ -trusted capubs.pem \
+ -cert cl_cert.pem -key cl_key.pem \
+ -newkey cl_key_new.pem -certout cl_cert.pem
+ cp cl_key_new.pem cl_key.pem
+
+This command sequence can be repated as often as needed.
+
+
+=head2 Requesting information from CMP server
+
+Requesting "all relevant information" with an empty General Message.
+This prints information about all received ITAV B<infoType>s to stdout.
+
+ openssl cmp -cmd genm -server 127.0.0.1 -path pkix/ \
+ -ref 1234 -secret pass:1234-5678-1234-5678 \
+ -recipient "/CN=CMPserver"
+
+
+=head2 Using a custom configuration file
+
+For CMP client invocations, in particular for certificate enrollment,
+usually many parameters need to be set, which is tedious and error-prone to do
+on the command line.
+Therefore the client offers the possibility to read
+options from sections of the OpenSSL config file, usually called B<openssl.cnf>.
+The values found there can still be extended and even overridden by any
+subsequently loaded sections and on the command line.
+
+After including in the configuration file the following sections:
+
+ [cmp]
+ server = 127.0.0.1
+ path = pkix/
+ trusted = capubs.pem
+ cert = cl_cert.pem
+ key = cl_key.pem
+ newkey = cl_key.pem
+ certout = cl_cert.pem
+
+ [cmp-init]
+ recipient = "/CN=CMPserver"
+ trusted =
+ cert =
+ key =
+ ref = 1234
+ secret = pass:1234-5678-1234-567
+ subject = "/CN=MyName"
+ cacertsout = capubs.pem
+
+the above enrollment invocations reduce to
+
+ openssl cmp -section cmp,cmp-init
+ openssl cmp -cmd kur -newkey cl_key_new.pem
+
+and the above genm call reduces to
+
+ openssl cmp -section cmp,cmp-init -cmd genm
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<openssl-genrsa(1)>, L<openssl-ecparam(1)>, L<openssl-list(1)>,
+L<openssl-req(1)>, L<openssl-x509(1)>, L<x509v3_config(5)>
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2007-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff