char * const argv[])
{
enum tpm2_startup_types mode;
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ int ret;
+ ret = get_tpm(&dev);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
if (argc != 2)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
}
- return report_return_code(tpm2_startup(mode));
+ return report_return_code(tpm2_startup(dev, mode));
}
static int do_tpm2_self_test(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[])
{
enum tpm2_yes_no full_test;
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ int ret;
+ ret = get_tpm(&dev);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
if (argc != 2)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
}
- return report_return_code(tpm2_self_test(full_test));
+ return report_return_code(tpm2_self_test(dev, full_test));
}
static int do_tpm2_clear(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
u32 handle = 0;
const char *pw = (argc < 3) ? NULL : argv[2];
const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0;
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = get_tpm(&dev);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
if (argc < 2 || argc > 3)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
else
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
- return report_return_code(tpm2_clear(handle, pw, pw_sz));
+ return report_return_code(tpm2_clear(dev, handle, pw, pw_sz));
}
static int do_tpm2_pcr_extend(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
if (argc != 3)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
- ret = uclass_first_device_err(UCLASS_TPM, &dev);
+ ret = get_tpm(&dev);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (index >= priv->pcr_count)
return -EINVAL;
- rc = tpm2_pcr_extend(index, digest);
+ rc = tpm2_pcr_extend(dev, index, digest);
unmap_sysmem(digest);
if (argc != 3)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
- ret = uclass_first_device_err(UCLASS_TPM, &dev);
+ ret = get_tpm(&dev);
if (ret)
return ret;
data = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0), 0);
- rc = tpm2_pcr_read(index, priv->pcr_select_min, data, &updates);
+ rc = tpm2_pcr_read(dev, index, priv->pcr_select_min, data, &updates);
if (!rc) {
- printf("PCR #%u content (%d known updates):\n", index, updates);
+ printf("PCR #%u content (%u known updates):\n", index, updates);
print_byte_string(data, TPM2_DIGEST_LEN);
}
u8 *data;
size_t count;
int i, j;
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = get_tpm(&dev);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
if (argc != 5)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
data = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0), 0);
count = simple_strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 0);
- rc = tpm2_get_capability(capability, property, data, count);
+ rc = tpm2_get_capability(dev, capability, property, data, count);
if (rc)
goto unmap_data;
return report_return_code(rc);
}
+static int do_tpm_dam_reset(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
+ char *const argv[])
+{
+ const char *pw = (argc < 2) ? NULL : argv[1];
+ const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0;
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = get_tpm(&dev);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (argc > 2)
+ return CMD_RET_USAGE;
+
+ if (pw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return report_return_code(tpm2_dam_reset(dev, pw, pw_sz));
+}
+
+static int do_tpm_dam_parameters(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
+ char *const argv[])
+{
+ const char *pw = (argc < 5) ? NULL : argv[4];
+ const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0;
+ /*
+ * No Dictionary Attack Mitigation (DAM) means:
+ * maxtries = 0xFFFFFFFF, recovery_time = 1, lockout_recovery = 0
+ */
+ unsigned long int max_tries;
+ unsigned long int recovery_time;
+ unsigned long int lockout_recovery;
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = get_tpm(&dev);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (argc < 4 || argc > 5)
+ return CMD_RET_USAGE;
+
+ if (pw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (strict_strtoul(argv[1], 0, &max_tries))
+ return CMD_RET_USAGE;
+
+ if (strict_strtoul(argv[2], 0, &recovery_time))
+ return CMD_RET_USAGE;
+
+ if (strict_strtoul(argv[3], 0, &lockout_recovery))
+ return CMD_RET_USAGE;
+
+ log(LOGC_NONE, LOGL_INFO, "Changing dictionary attack parameters:\n");
+ log(LOGC_NONE, LOGL_INFO, "- maxTries: %lu", max_tries);
+ log(LOGC_NONE, LOGL_INFO, "- recoveryTime: %lu\n", recovery_time);
+ log(LOGC_NONE, LOGL_INFO, "- lockoutRecovery: %lu\n", lockout_recovery);
+
+ return report_return_code(tpm2_dam_parameters(dev, pw, pw_sz, max_tries,
+ recovery_time,
+ lockout_recovery));
+}
+
+static int do_tpm_change_auth(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
+ char *const argv[])
+{
+ u32 handle;
+ const char *newpw = argv[2];
+ const char *oldpw = (argc == 3) ? NULL : argv[3];
+ const ssize_t newpw_sz = strlen(newpw);
+ const ssize_t oldpw_sz = oldpw ? strlen(oldpw) : 0;
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = get_tpm(&dev);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (argc < 3 || argc > 4)
+ return CMD_RET_USAGE;
+
+ if (newpw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN || oldpw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT", argv[1]))
+ handle = TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT;
+ else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_ENDORSEMENT", argv[1]))
+ handle = TPM2_RH_ENDORSEMENT;
+ else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_OWNER", argv[1]))
+ handle = TPM2_RH_OWNER;
+ else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_PLATFORM", argv[1]))
+ handle = TPM2_RH_PLATFORM;
+ else
+ return CMD_RET_USAGE;
+
+ return report_return_code(tpm2_change_auth(dev, handle, newpw, newpw_sz,
+ oldpw, oldpw_sz));
+}
+
+static int do_tpm_pcr_setauthpolicy(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
+ char * const argv[])
+{
+ u32 index = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0);
+ char *key = argv[2];
+ const char *pw = (argc < 4) ? NULL : argv[3];
+ const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0;
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = get_tpm(&dev);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (strlen(key) != TPM2_DIGEST_LEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (argc < 3 || argc > 4)
+ return CMD_RET_USAGE;
+
+ return report_return_code(tpm2_pcr_setauthpolicy(dev, pw, pw_sz, index,
+ key));
+}
+
+static int do_tpm_pcr_setauthvalue(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag,
+ int argc, char * const argv[])
+{
+ u32 index = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0);
+ char *key = argv[2];
+ const ssize_t key_sz = strlen(key);
+ const char *pw = (argc < 4) ? NULL : argv[3];
+ const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0;
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = get_tpm(&dev);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (strlen(key) != TPM2_DIGEST_LEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (argc < 3 || argc > 4)
+ return CMD_RET_USAGE;
+
+ return report_return_code(tpm2_pcr_setauthvalue(dev, pw, pw_sz, index,
+ key, key_sz));
+}
+
static cmd_tbl_t tpm2_commands[] = {
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(info, 0, 1, do_tpm_info, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(init, 0, 1, do_tpm_init, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_extend, 0, 1, do_tpm2_pcr_extend, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_read, 0, 1, do_tpm_pcr_read, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(get_capability, 0, 1, do_tpm_get_capability, "", ""),
+ U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(dam_reset, 0, 1, do_tpm_dam_reset, "", ""),
+ U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(dam_parameters, 0, 1, do_tpm_dam_parameters, "", ""),
+ U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(change_auth, 0, 1, do_tpm_change_auth, "", ""),
+ U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_setauthpolicy, 0, 1,
+ do_tpm_pcr_setauthpolicy, "", ""),
+ U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_setauthvalue, 0, 1,
+ do_tpm_pcr_setauthvalue, "", ""),
};
-cmd_tbl_t *get_tpm_commands(unsigned int *size)
+cmd_tbl_t *get_tpm2_commands(unsigned int *size)
{
*size = ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_commands);
return tpm2_commands;
}
-U_BOOT_CMD(tpm, CONFIG_SYS_MAXARGS, 1, do_tpm, "Issue a TPMv2.x command",
+U_BOOT_CMD(tpm2, CONFIG_SYS_MAXARGS, 1, do_tpm, "Issue a TPMv2.x command",
"<command> [<arguments>]\n"
"\n"
"info\n"
" <property>: property\n"
" <addr>: address to store <count> entries of 4 bytes\n"
" <count>: number of entries to retrieve\n"
+"dam_reset [<password>]\n"
+" If the TPM is not in a LOCKOUT state, reset the internal error counter.\n"
+" <password>: optional password\n"
+"dam_parameters <max_tries> <recovery_time> <lockout_recovery> [<password>]\n"
+" If the TPM is not in a LOCKOUT state, set the DAM parameters\n"
+" <maxTries>: maximum number of failures before lockout,\n"
+" 0 means always locking\n"
+" <recoveryTime>: time before decrement of the error counter,\n"
+" 0 means no lockout\n"
+" <lockoutRecovery>: time of a lockout (before the next try),\n"
+" 0 means a reboot is needed\n"
+" <password>: optional password of the LOCKOUT hierarchy\n"
+"change_auth <hierarchy> <new_pw> [<old_pw>]\n"
+" <hierarchy>: the hierarchy\n"
+" <new_pw>: new password for <hierarchy>\n"
+" <old_pw>: optional previous password of <hierarchy>\n"
+"pcr_setauthpolicy|pcr_setauthvalue <pcr> <key> [<password>]\n"
+" Change the <key> to access PCR #<pcr>.\n"
+" hierarchy and may be empty.\n"
+" /!\\WARNING: untested function, use at your own risks !\n"
+" <pcr>: index of the PCR\n"
+" <key>: secret to protect the access of PCR #<pcr>\n"
+" <password>: optional password of the PLATFORM hierarchy\n"
);
projects / oweals / u-boot.git / blobdiff