X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?p=oweals%2Ftinc.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fprotocol_auth.c;h=962f68113f667eba33b99b51ec5d335aa63387d5;hp=14914ba8edc1b5eaa25e2ebc3c753f1b1c2e343f;hb=81f5713ab71944d51703653eab7f364fba0c482e;hpb=82ebfc923ddb050c88bdf5d65ac943a15ca8748a diff --git a/src/protocol_auth.c b/src/protocol_auth.c index 14914ba..962f681 100644 --- a/src/protocol_auth.c +++ b/src/protocol_auth.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. - $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.12 2002/09/04 13:48:52 guus Exp $ + $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.20 2003/07/06 17:15:25 guus Exp $ */ #include "config.h" @@ -37,10 +37,6 @@ #include #include -#ifndef HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES -#define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes -#endif - #include "conf.h" #include "net.h" #include "netutl.h" @@ -55,542 +51,537 @@ int send_id(connection_t *c) { -cp - return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name, myself->connection->protocol_version); + cp(); + + return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name, + myself->connection->protocol_version); } int id_h(connection_t *c) { - char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; - int bla; -cp - if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING" %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ID", c->name, c->hostname); - return -1; - } - - /* Check if identity is a valid name */ - - if(check_id(name)) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s"), "ID", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid name"); - return -1; - } - - /* If we set c->name in advance, make sure we are connected to the right host */ - - if(c->name) - { - if(strcmp(c->name, name)) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s is %s instead of %s"), c->hostname, name, c->name); - return -1; - } - } - else - c->name = xstrdup(name); - - /* Check if version matches */ - - if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d"), - c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version); - return -1; - } - - if(bypass_security) - { - if(!c->config_tree) - init_configuration(&c->config_tree); - c->allow_request = ACK; - return send_ack(c); - } - - if(!c->config_tree) - { - init_configuration(&c->config_tree); - - if((bla = read_connection_config(c))) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)"), c->hostname, c->name); - return -1; - } - } - - if(read_rsa_public_key(c)) - { - return -1; - } - - /* Check some options */ - - if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT) - c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT; - - if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY) - c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT; - - c->allow_request = METAKEY; -cp - return send_metakey(c); + char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; + int bla; + + cp(); + + if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ID", c->name, + c->hostname); + return -1; + } + + /* Check if identity is a valid name */ + + if(check_id(name)) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s"), "ID", c->name, + c->hostname, "invalid name"); + return -1; + } + + /* If we set c->name in advance, make sure we are connected to the right host */ + + if(c->name) { + if(strcmp(c->name, name)) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s is %s instead of %s"), c->hostname, name, + c->name); + return -1; + } + } else + c->name = xstrdup(name); + + /* Check if version matches */ + + if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d"), + c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version); + return -1; + } + + if(bypass_security) { + if(!c->config_tree) + init_configuration(&c->config_tree); + c->allow_request = ACK; + return send_ack(c); + } + + if(!c->config_tree) { + init_configuration(&c->config_tree); + + bla = read_connection_config(c); + + if(bla) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)"), c->hostname, + c->name); + return -1; + } + } + + if(read_rsa_public_key(c)) { + return -1; + } + + /* Check some options */ + + if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT) + c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT; + + if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY) + c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT; + + c->allow_request = METAKEY; + + return send_metakey(c); } int send_metakey(connection_t *c) { - char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; - int len, x; -cp - len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key); - - /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */ - - if(!c->outkey) - c->outkey = xmalloc(len); - - if(!c->outctx) - c->outctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->outctx)); -cp - /* Copy random data to the buffer */ - - RAND_bytes(c->outkey, len); - - /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key. - By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds: - - 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k) - - Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor". - This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1). - This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero. - */ - - c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F; - - if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) - { - bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len); - buffer[len*2] = '\0'; - syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer); - } - - /* Encrypt the random data - - We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here. - This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string - with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key. - */ - - if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"), c->name, c->hostname); - return -1; - } -cp - /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */ - - bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len); - buffer[len*2] = '\0'; - - /* Send the meta key */ - - x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY, - c->outcipher?c->outcipher->nid:0, c->outdigest?c->outdigest->type:0, - c->outmaclength, c->outcompression, buffer); - - /* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */ - - if(c->outcipher) - { - EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher, - c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len, - c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len - c->outcipher->iv_len); - - c->status.encryptout = 1; - } -cp - return x; + char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; + int len, x; + + cp(); + + len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key); + + /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */ + + if(!c->outkey) + c->outkey = xmalloc(len); + + if(!c->outctx) + c->outctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->outctx)); + cp(); + /* Copy random data to the buffer */ + + RAND_bytes(c->outkey, len); + + /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key. + By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds: + + 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k) + + Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor". + This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1). + This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero. + */ + + c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F; + + if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) { + bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len); + buffer[len * 2] = '\0'; + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), + buffer); + } + + /* Encrypt the random data + + We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here. + This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string + with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key. + */ + + if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"), + c->name, c->hostname); + return -1; + } + + /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */ + + bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len); + buffer[len * 2] = '\0'; + + /* Send the meta key */ + + x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY, + c->outcipher ? c->outcipher->nid : 0, + c->outdigest ? c->outdigest->type : 0, c->outmaclength, + c->outcompression, buffer); + + /* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */ + + if(c->outcipher) { + EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher, + c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len, + c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len - + c->outcipher->iv_len); + + c->status.encryptout = 1; + } + + return x; } int metakey_h(connection_t *c) { - char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; - int cipher, digest, maclength, compression; - int len; -cp - if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d "MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname); - return -1; - } -cp - len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key); - - /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */ - - if(strlen(buffer) != len*2) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength"); - return -1; - } - - /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */ -cp - if(!c->inkey) - c->inkey = xmalloc(len); - - if(!c->inctx) - c->inctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->inctx)); - - /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */ -cp - hex2bin(buffer,buffer,len); - - /* Decrypt the meta key */ -cp - if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) /* See challenge() */ - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"), c->name, c->hostname); - return -1; - } - - if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) - { - bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len); - buffer[len*2] = '\0'; - syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer); - } - - /* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */ -cp - /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */ - - if(cipher) - { - c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher); - if(!c->incipher) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name, c->hostname); - return -1; + char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; + int cipher, digest, maclength, compression; + int len; + + cp(); + + if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "METAKEY", c->name, + c->hostname); + return -1; + } + + len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key); + + /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */ + + if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength"); + return -1; + } + + /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */ + + if(!c->inkey) + c->inkey = xmalloc(len); + + if(!c->inctx) + c->inctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->inctx)); + + /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */ + + hex2bin(buffer, buffer, len); + + /* Decrypt the meta key */ + + if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { /* See challenge() */ + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"), + c->name, c->hostname); + return -1; + } + + if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) { + bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len); + buffer[len * 2] = '\0'; + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer); } - EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher, - c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len, - c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len - c->incipher->iv_len); - - c->status.decryptin = 1; - } - else - { - c->incipher = NULL; - } - - c->inmaclength = maclength; - - if(digest) - { - c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest); - if(!c->indigest) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name, c->hostname); - return -1; + /* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */ + + /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */ + + if(cipher) { + c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher); + + if(!c->incipher) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name, c->hostname); + return -1; + } + + EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher, + c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len, + c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len - + c->incipher->iv_len); + + c->status.decryptin = 1; + } else { + c->incipher = NULL; } - - if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name, c->hostname); - return -1; + + c->inmaclength = maclength; + + if(digest) { + c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest); + + if(!c->indigest) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name, c->hostname); + return -1; + } + + if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name, c->hostname); + return -1; + } + } else { + c->indigest = NULL; } - } - else - { - c->indigest = NULL; - } - c->incompression = compression; + c->incompression = compression; - c->allow_request = CHALLENGE; -cp - return send_challenge(c); + c->allow_request = CHALLENGE; + + return send_challenge(c); } int send_challenge(connection_t *c) { - char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; - int len, x; -cp - /* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */ + char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; + int len, x; + + cp(); + + /* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */ + + len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key); - len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key); + /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */ - /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */ + if(!c->hischallenge) + c->hischallenge = xmalloc(len); - if(!c->hischallenge) - c->hischallenge = xmalloc(len); -cp - /* Copy random data to the buffer */ + /* Copy random data to the buffer */ - RAND_bytes(c->hischallenge, len); + RAND_bytes(c->hischallenge, len); -cp - /* Convert to hex */ + /* Convert to hex */ - bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len); - buffer[len*2] = '\0'; + bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len); + buffer[len * 2] = '\0'; -cp - /* Send the challenge */ + /* Send the challenge */ - x = send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer); -cp - return x; + x = send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer); + + return x; } int challenge_h(connection_t *c) { - char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; - int len; -cp - if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname); - return -1; - } + char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; + int len; + + cp(); - len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key); + if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHALLENGE", c->name, + c->hostname); + return -1; + } - /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */ + len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key); - if(strlen(buffer) != len*2) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length"); - return -1; - } + /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */ - /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */ + if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, + c->hostname, "wrong challenge length"); + return -1; + } - if(!c->mychallenge) - c->mychallenge = xmalloc(len); + /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */ - /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */ + if(!c->mychallenge) + c->mychallenge = xmalloc(len); - hex2bin(buffer,c->mychallenge,len); + /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */ - c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY; + hex2bin(buffer, c->mychallenge, len); - /* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */ -cp - return send_chal_reply(c); + c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY; + + /* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */ + + return send_chal_reply(c); } int send_chal_reply(connection_t *c) { - char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2+1]; - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; -cp - /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */ + char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1]; + EVP_MD_CTX ctx; + + cp(); + + /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */ - EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key)); - EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, NULL); + EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, + RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key)); + EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, NULL); - /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */ + /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */ - bin2hex(hash,hash,c->indigest->md_size); - hash[c->indigest->md_size*2] = '\0'; + bin2hex(hash, hash, c->indigest->md_size); + hash[c->indigest->md_size * 2] = '\0'; - /* Send the reply */ + /* Send the reply */ -cp - return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash); + return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash); } int chal_reply_h(connection_t *c) { - char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; - char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; -cp - if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHAL_REPLY", c->name, c->hostname); - return -1; - } - - /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */ - - if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size*2) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply length")); - return -1; - } - - /* Convert the hash to binary format */ - - hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size); - - /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */ - - EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key)); - EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, myhash, NULL); - - /* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */ - - if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size)) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply")); - if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) - { - bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); - hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH*2] = '\0'; - syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Expected challenge reply: %s"), hishash); - } - return -1; - } - - /* Identity has now been positively verified. - Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed. - */ - - c->allow_request = ACK; -cp - return send_ack(c); + char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; + char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + EVP_MD_CTX ctx; + + cp(); + + if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHAL_REPLY", c->name, + c->hostname); + return -1; + } + + /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */ + + if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size * 2) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, + c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply length")); + return -1; + } + + /* Convert the hash to binary format */ + + hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size); + + /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */ + + EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key)); + EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, myhash, NULL); + + /* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */ + + if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size)) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, + c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply")); + + if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) { + bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2] = '\0'; + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Expected challenge reply: %s"), hishash); + } + + return -1; + } + + /* Identity has now been positively verified. + Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed. + */ + + c->allow_request = ACK; + + return send_ack(c); } int send_ack(connection_t *c) { - /* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs - to create node_t and edge_t structures. */ - - int x; - struct timeval now; -cp - /* Estimate weight */ - - gettimeofday(&now, NULL); - c->estimated_weight = (now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec - c->start.tv_usec) / 1000; - x = send_request(c, "%d %s %s %d %lx", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight, c->options); -cp - return x; + /* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs + to create node_t and edge_t structures. */ + + int x; + struct timeval now; + + cp(); + + /* Estimate weight */ + + gettimeofday(&now, NULL); + c->estimated_weight = + (now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec - + c->start.tv_usec) / 1000; + x = send_request(c, "%d %s %d %lx", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight, + c->options); + + return x; } void send_everything(connection_t *c) { - avl_node_t *node, *node2; - node_t *n; - subnet_t *s; - edge_t *e; - - /* Send all known subnets */ - - for(node = node_tree->head; node; node = node->next) - { - n = (node_t *)node->data; - - for(node2 = n->subnet_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) - { - s = (subnet_t *)node2->data; - send_add_subnet(c, s); - } - } - - /* Send all known edges */ - - for(node = edge_tree->head; node; node = node->next) - { - e = (edge_t *)node->data; - - send_add_edge(c, e); - } + avl_node_t *node, *node2; + node_t *n; + subnet_t *s; + edge_t *e; + + /* Send all known subnets and edges */ + + for(node = node_tree->head; node; node = node->next) { + n = (node_t *) node->data; + + for(node2 = n->subnet_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) { + s = (subnet_t *) node2->data; + send_add_subnet(c, s); + } + + for(node2 = n->edge_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) { + e = (edge_t *) node2->data; + send_add_edge(c, e); + } + } } int ack_h(connection_t *c) { - char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; - char *hisaddress, *dummy; - int weight; - long int options; - node_t *n; - connection_t *other; - avl_node_t *node; -cp - if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING" %d %lx", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) - { - syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ACK", c->name, c->hostname); - return -1; - } - - /* Check if we already have a node_t for him */ - - n = lookup_node(c->name); - - if(!n) - { - n = new_node(); - n->name = xstrdup(c->name); - node_add(n); - } - else - { - if(n->connection) - { - /* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */ - if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS) - syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection"), n->name, n->hostname); - terminate_connection(n->connection, 0); - } - - /* FIXME: check if information in existing node matches that of the other end of this connection */ - } - - n->connection = c; - c->node = n; - c->options |= options; - - /* Create an edge_t for this connection */ - - c->edge = new_edge(); -cp - c->edge->from = myself; - c->edge->to = n; - sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, &dummy); - c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport); - free(hisaddress); - free(dummy); - c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2; - c->edge->connection = c; - c->edge->options = c->options; -cp - edge_add(c->edge); - - /* Activate this connection */ - - c->allow_request = ALL; - c->status.active = 1; - - if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS) - syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Connection with %s (%s) activated"), c->name, c->hostname); - -cp - /* Send him everything we know */ - - send_everything(c); - - /* Notify others of this connection */ - - for(node = connection_tree->head; node; node = node->next) - { - other = (connection_t *)node->data; - - if(other->status.active && other != c) - send_add_edge(other, c->edge); - } - - /* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */ - - graph(); -cp - return 0; + char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; + char *hisaddress, *dummy; + int weight; + long int options; + node_t *n; + + cp(); + + if(sscanf + (c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %lx", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ACK", c->name, + c->hostname); + return -1; + } + + /* Check if we already have a node_t for him */ + + n = lookup_node(c->name); + + if(!n) { + n = new_node(); + n->name = xstrdup(c->name); + node_add(n); + } else { + if(n->connection) { + /* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */ + if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS) + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection"), + n->name, n->hostname); + terminate_connection(n->connection, 0); + /* Run graph algorithm to purge key and make sure up/down scripts are rerun with new IP addresses and stuff */ + graph(); + } + } + + n->connection = c; + c->node = n; + c->options |= options; + + /* Activate this connection */ + + c->allow_request = ALL; + c->status.active = 1; + + if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS) + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Connection with %s (%s) activated"), c->name, + c->hostname); + + /* Send him everything we know */ + + send_everything(c); + + /* Create an edge_t for this connection */ + + c->edge = new_edge(); + cp(); + c->edge->from = myself; + c->edge->to = n; + sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, &dummy); + c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport); + free(hisaddress); + free(dummy); + c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2; + c->edge->connection = c; + c->edge->options = c->options; + + edge_add(c->edge); + + /* Notify everyone of the new edge */ + + send_add_edge(broadcast, c->edge); + + /* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */ + + graph(); + + return 0; }