Ensure compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0.

[oweals/tinc.git] / src / protocol_key.c

diff --git a/src/protocol_key.c b/src/protocol_key.c
index 4f1e1b76c2cf374169ab8c91ea00957448f6a251..5f71d1ca29feca7368a76bc9e9c7d58eaafd23db 100644 (file)
--- a/src/protocol_key.c
+++ b/src/protocol_key.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ bool send_ans_key(node_t *to) {
        }
 
        if(to->incipher)
-               EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&to->inctx, to->incipher, NULL, (unsigned char *)to->inkey, (unsigned char *)to->inkey + to->incipher->key_len);
+               EVP_DecryptInit_ex(to->inctx, to->incipher, NULL, (unsigned char *)to->inkey, (unsigned char *)to->inkey + EVP_CIPHER_key_length(to->incipher));
 
        // Reset sequence number and late packet window
        mykeyused = true;
@@ -178,8 +178,8 @@ bool send_ans_key(node_t *to) {
 
        return send_request(to->nexthop->connection, "%d %s %s %s %d %d %d %d", ANS_KEY,
                        myself->name, to->name, key,
-                       to->incipher ? to->incipher->nid : 0,
-                       to->indigest ? to->indigest->type : 0, to->inmaclength,
+                       to->incipher ? EVP_CIPHER_nid(to->incipher) : 0,
+                       to->indigest ? EVP_MD_type(to->indigest) : 0, to->inmaclength,
                        to->incompression);
 }
 
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c) {
                        return true;
                }
 
-               if(from->outkeylength != from->outcipher->key_len + from->outcipher->iv_len) {
+               if(from->outkeylength != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(from->outcipher) + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(from->outcipher)) {
                        logger(LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses wrong keylength!", from->name,
                                   from->hostname);
                        return true;
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c) {
                        return true;
                }
 
-               if(from->outmaclength > from->outdigest->md_size || from->outmaclength < 0) {
+               if(from->outmaclength > EVP_MD_size(from->outdigest) || from->outmaclength < 0) {
                        logger(LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!",
                                   from->name, from->hostname);
                        return true;
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c) {
        from->outcompression = compression;
 
        if(from->outcipher)
-               if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&from->outctx, from->outcipher, NULL, (unsigned char *)from->outkey, (unsigned char *)from->outkey + from->outcipher->key_len)) {
+               if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(from->outctx, from->outcipher, NULL, (unsigned char *)from->outkey, (unsigned char *)from->outkey + EVP_CIPHER_key_length(from->outcipher))) {
                        logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of key from %s (%s): %s",
                                        from->name, from->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
                        return true;