Matt Caswell [Fri, 8 May 2020 10:12:10 +0000 (11:12 +0100)]
Correct alignment calculation in ssl3_setup_write
The alignment calculation in ssl3_setup_write incorrectly results in an
alignment allowance of
(-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) bytes. This equals 3
in almost all cases. The maximum alignment actually used in do_ssl3_write
is (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1). This equals 7 bytes in almost all cases. So
there is a potential to overrun the buffer by up to 4 bytes.
Fortunately, the encryption overhead allowed for is 80 bytes which
consists of 16 bytes for the cipher block size and 64 bytes for the MAC
output. However the biggest MAC that we ever produce is HMAC-384 which is
48 bytes - so we have a headroom of 16 bytes (i.e. more than the 4 bytes
of potential overrun).
Thanks to Nagesh Hegde for reporting this.
Fixes #11766
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11768)
(cherry picked from commit
d30ef639647ad263d09740c931a5bfb5a8b6a5f6)
Orgad Shaneh [Mon, 24 Feb 2020 07:02:31 +0000 (09:02 +0200)]
Configure: Avoid SIXTY_FOUR_BIT for linux-mips64
This is a 32-bit ABI build (as opposed to linux64-mips64).
Setting SIXTY_FOUR_BIT breaks hardware optimizations, at least on
octeon processors.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11154)
Bernd Edlinger [Sun, 10 May 2020 04:37:12 +0000 (06:37 +0200)]
Fix rsa8192.pem
Q: How did I do that?
A: That's a long story.
Precondition: I used sage 8.1 for the math, it could probably
done with simple python as well but I did not try.
First I extract numbers from rsa8192.pem:
openssl rsa -in rsa8192.pem -noout -text | sed "s/://g; s/ //g;"
cut&paste the numbers into sage:
modulus
00890d9fd57e81b5ed43283d0ea020
4a1229333d6fb9c37a179375b09c4f
7b5b1cf2eb025979b6d90b709928a0
6725e04caf2b0f7fe94afbdf9f3fa5
66f1ba75c2f6dc488039f410eb5fa8
ab152b8cfdb76791bb853059438edf
ae56bc70a32a9f3e2d883e8b751d08
3797999dc81a9c4d6bdb3a75362fd1
d9c497cf5028dfcdd4cc3eb318e79f
c0db45cbeed955da8a447f0872dee5
65bde4013340e767731441fae4fa54
51356bfbc84e1271b39f111f5f8ef3
a6c8973765b39addef80306194f4ea
89fdfc8e9744866323f6936de89b2f
e2741578b8eb3c41676702fabc50ec
c376e6b7b6e7f94e7d7b5c1bab3c9f
23bb0c8f04d8aca64c309fc063c406
553e1c1421cc45060df7f48c49f5c5
b459d572e273402d6a3ff008657fe9
1936714d1823c5cad53d80630b3216
9bf70feb2ebc1af6a35ee0bf059aed
49c4e367d567e130e2846859b271fd
a8949b182e050819866b8e762ed29f
fb3f7ca14cebfc2488662be4b3980f
c8d31890a05f38ae9690cc7d9d3efc
4808e03da104a8c28bb480bb814995
a6e8b8978ab8350d90b3894e3abf7d
c4ad0956335752c8d6944b38a1715e
7d9950f49e6cdba171fbe651a2ca26
65a7c70b6e8cf3a02c2f93dad8aa95
06481cdb032d04082a5a6c6a733b65
20fa80e2ef57b9cf858ca5ea11e084
bc31a386fc6b099f069786207f80d6
1f2bef294400d59394ad1006431366
a54ae09b0ecd3377dcd8af8fde9b94
fd559b0b7adc5113ba66fc4b3dc842
ee562cfcfd39b4ffc31576635873fc
59535b7aa98605772436c251834e23
4fb2347cc970a49818cac2a9ee95eb
b55fa2da66edd53e11245c6732140a
ae41491288cbf462eef8a807b46d0d
affa38d9ccfe8033d2d4a3cf5c5b82
9df12183f7a05d3650153cd317a017
083ac641c2c3ad11305de0a032be45
c439bd7bbbe3cb97850f9d2c66f72a
4a66e9d434544fc6d294ca3c92627b
e518bfa44e3017ac8ad9c0a26a227d
2e8677da0a4de8edb53ac9530adb63
83c72dbf562dc4d0fea4e492f09eb1
74548381a8686db3aeaaa3a9960cff
25e8c64701115da54fa7a1fb2c566a
fcb4b2a63268d818c3391a62885d13
41b3492c4f0167291b3d026a44e68c
02f2d4d255d4c0906b92a2ced0c0bb
f2bcdceaec1189895af4232dc386c9
75bf3477e5a70d3ab0ac0e5dc37024
0e34a276b155d5e290f77416a1986d
ec47f8c78236ac7df249df9ba21a80
2e6bd75b4fb1c6ffe0f4cf548761a5
6a1fcccee156523a718987f3fdaedc
7171c9050db89a83f24c5a283695b9
c28de6d3b69fc1714b0add335a0ce6
fbbdbd0bbdb01e44969d775105bba3
d2947dca2f291250f9b851e76f514d
dc5a3aa4498e6521314991568860eb
ff1258d8b4aee9ee4159153684c0c0
16c60b17537a50b53cd59aad60678b
d73f0714ab4ccae7416bab417b4907
36d59b2e9f
I used echo `echo "<paste>" ` | sed "s/ //g"
to get everything in one line, put that again
into the clipboard and
then start sage, type N=0x<paste><CR>
sage: N=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
likewise for prime1 (P), prime2 (Q) and
privateExponent (D) and publicExponent (E)
sage: P=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
sage: Q=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
sage: D=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
sage: E=0x10001
check:
sage: is_pseudoprime(P)
True
sage: gcd(N,P)
811194519730394220204949383061971492284209477134487451053533919242408334468793875483685418435472924384137737409878754330061341487239404629370463160720071782806016579636145456953095810661706004899017496722730291178259805745059054744795252171022091469940626116746608128441399036310378334222880519662696558703165249434265697658704322903051581598088400258377253583825209022558177374913570364047051007093402547387492492645729748176160840842076964161794363721255756097675823463557162877865622894488049720201680509519072521257128596878592149455958732762099800396648453225220977153025222265023206761554302369499402146842619059859650958489842850140873473393484632985863967898676228674751576699965523367097641503814266418957281198265955430221973482931544501209059788536033857660452959160612655542331433647351037413298986228798018950712662579341162832440884265576141868775326408627532047094505284395403786932363148262901839514736964209136867574532808481484592060405175685831168554790879720280778881035860464184791941816702480873202940903024652495084770128062224279875598826600084633389722629461385386069921483006677287847102371176994910369378323222717613076771700378608286670543729473076010314569999636269167049088093674649352610884381826740603
sage: N%P
0
>> P seems to be a prime, and is indeed a factor of N.
sage: is_pseudoprime(Q)
False
sage: gcd(N,Q)
1
sage: ecm(Q)
Found composite factor of 3 digits: 675
Composite cofactor ... has 1231 digits.
Q has a small factor. The large cofactor
is way too large to be factorized (today).
>> Q must be wrong.
sage: pow(pow(2,E,N),D,N)
2
sage: pow(pow(3,E,N),D,N)
3
sage: pow(pow(5,E,N),D,N)
5
sage: pow(pow(7,E,N),D,N)
7
sage: pow(pow(11,E,N),D,N)
11
sage: pow(pow(1000,E,N),D,N)
1000
>> x^D mod N is indeed the inverse of x^E mod N
>> D seems to be correct.
>> now compute
sage: Qcorrect = N/P
sage: is_prime(Qcorrect)
False
sage: is_pseudoprime(Qcorrect)
True
>> surprise, this is a sage artefact.
>> is_prime is supposed to tell if Qcorrect
>> is a provable prime, but these numbers are
>> too large for a proof.
sage: help(Qcorrect)
class Rational
...
>> oops, it is of course not a rational number.
sage: Qcorrect = Integer(N/P)
class Integer
...
>> okay now it is an integer.
sage: is_prime(Qcorrect)
>> takes way too long: press CTRL-C
sage: is_pseudoprime(Qcorrect)
True
>> so the correct Q seems to be a prime.
sage: Q-Qcorrect
4468358315186607582623830645994123175323958284313904132666602205502546750542721902065776801908141680869902222733839989940221831332787838985874881107673910358472026239723185949529735314601712865712198736991916521419325287976337589177915143787138292689484229106140251936135768934015263941567159094923493376
sage: hex(Q-Qcorrect)
'1a10400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000'
>> interesting, now figure out the bits that are flipped in Q:
Q ...
20ddb67189f6dad...
Qcorrect ...
20dd9c6149f6dad...
$ openssl rsa -in rsa8192.pem -outform der -out rsa8192.der
writing RSA key
$ xxd -ps < rsa8192.der > rsa8192.hex
$ sed "s/
20ddb67189f6dad/
20dd9c6149f6dad/" < rsa8192.hex > rsa8192.out
$ diff rsa8192.hex rsa8192.out
100c100
<
10b8095f420ddb67189f6dad62f1257b0f46e353a90eacc145c7db74998a
---
>
10b8095f420dd9c6149f6dad62f1257b0f46e353a90eacc145c7db74998a
>> et voila
$ xxd -ps -r < rsa8192.out > rsa8192.der
$ openssl rsa -inform der -in rsa8192.der -out rsa8192.pem
writing RSA key
$ openssl rsa -check -noout -in rsa8192.pem
RSA key ok
$ git diff
diff --git a/apps/rsa8192.pem b/apps/rsa8192.pem
index
946a6e5..
83d962f 100644
--- a/apps/rsa8192.pem
+++ b/apps/rsa8192.pem
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-
MIISKAIBAAKCBAEAiQ2f1X6Bte1DKD0OoCBKEikzPW+5w3oXk3WwnE97Wxzy6wJZ
ebbZC3CZKKBnJeBMrysPf+lK+9+fP6Vm8bp1wvbcSIA59BDrX6irFSuM/bdnkbuF
MFlDjt+uVrxwoyqfPi2IPot1HQg3l5mdyBqcTWvbOnU2L9HZxJfPUCjfzdTMPrMY
@@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ JH1/Qx7C/mTAMRsN5SkOthnGq0djCNWfPv/3JV0H67Uf5krFlnwLebrgfTYoPPdo
yO7iBUNJzv6Qh22malLp4P8gzACkD7DGlSTnoB5cLwcjmDGg+i9WrUBbOiVTeQfZ
kOj1o+Tz35ndpq/DDUVlqliB9krcxva+QHeJPH53EGI+YVg1nD+s/vUDZ3mQMGX9
DQou2L8uU6RnWNv/BihGcL8QvS4Ty6QyPOUPpD3zc70JQAEcQk9BxQNaELgJX0IN
-22cYn22tYvElew9G41OpDqzBRcfbdJmKXQ2HcroShutYJQRGUpAXHk24fy6JVkIU
+2cYUn22tYvElew9G41OpDqzBRcfbdJmKXQ2HcroShutYJQRGUpAXHk24fy6JVkIU
ojF5U6cwextMja1ZIIZgh9eugIRUeIE7319nQNDzuXWjRCcoBLA25P7wnpHWDRpz
D9ovXCIvdja74lL5psqobV6L5+fbLPkSgXoImKR0LQKCAgAIC9Jk8kxumCyIVGCP
PeM5Uby9M3GMuKrfYsn0Y5e97+kSJF1dpojTodBgR2KQar6eVrvXt+8uZCcIjfx8
@@ -98,4 +97,3 @@ TwEgE67iOb2iIoUpon/NyP4LesMzvdpsu2JFlfz13PmmQ34mFI7tWvOb3NA5DP3c
rMlMLtKfp2w8HlMZpsUlToNCx6CI+tJrohzcs3BAVAbjFAXRKWGijB1rxwyDdHPv
I+/wJTNaRNPQ1M0SwtEL/zJd21y3KSPn4eL+GP3efhlDSjtlDvZqkdAUsU8=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-
>> DONE.
Fixes #11776
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11783)
(cherry picked from commit
7ef43790617cb08b4bb4141df716dfb37385fe5c)
Tomas Mraz [Mon, 11 May 2020 15:15:40 +0000 (17:15 +0200)]
Replace misleading error message when loading PEM
The error message "short header" when the end line
of PEM data cannot be identified is misleading.
Replace it with already existing "bad end line" error.
Fixes #8815
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11793)
(cherry picked from commit
f523ca66612e6712f287aa4b4ed722a5f2d4d960)
Maximilian Blenk [Tue, 7 Apr 2020 17:33:39 +0000 (19:33 +0200)]
Fix PEM certificate loading that sometimes fails
As described in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/9187, the
loading of PEM certificates sometimes fails if a line of base64
content has the length of a multiple of 254.
The problem is in get_header_and_data(). When such a line with a
length of 254 (or a multiple) has been read, the next read will
only read a newline. Due to this get_header_and_data() expects to be
in the header not in the data area. This commit fixes that by checking
if lines have been read completely or only partially. In case of a
previous partial read, a newline will be ignored.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11741)
(cherry picked from commit
0324ffc5d5d393111288eca2c9d67f2141ed65f5)
Bernd Edlinger [Thu, 23 Apr 2020 23:28:07 +0000 (01:28 +0200)]
Remove AES bitsliced S-box implementation from Boyar and Peralta
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11626)
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre [Wed, 6 May 2020 15:24:13 +0000 (17:24 +0200)]
Fix use-after-free in BIO_C_SET_SSL callback
Since the BIO_SSL structure was renewed by `ssl_free(b)/ssl_new(b)`,
the `bs` pointer needs to be updated before assigning to `bs->ssl`.
Thanks to @suishixingkong for reporting the issue and providing a fix.
Closes #10539
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11746)
(cherry picked from commit
73d6b4efe6835a6c97ce61df6bf339b0903e5b7a)
Kurt Roeckx [Mon, 13 Apr 2020 11:01:29 +0000 (13:01 +0200)]
Improve SSL_shutdown documentation.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11531)
(cherry picked from commit
e307e616f25a6b7b0f343fc1e62a35b2cba888f3)
nia [Thu, 30 Apr 2020 13:43:04 +0000 (14:43 +0100)]
rand_unix.c: Ensure requests to KERN_ARND don't exceed 256 bytes.
Requests for more than 256 bytes will fail.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11689)
(cherry picked from commit
7421f085005e0d7a1dd2fe61b991ff23cef91c22)
nia [Thu, 30 Apr 2020 13:42:09 +0000 (14:42 +0100)]
rand_unix.c: Only enable hack for old FreeBSD versions on FreeBSD
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11689)
(cherry picked from commit
0c27ce7322e15a7e0733d48aaf9c8e1d1249541f)
nia [Thu, 30 Apr 2020 13:41:07 +0000 (14:41 +0100)]
rand_unix.c: Include correct headers for sysctl() on NetBSD
This allows sysctl(KERN_ARND) to be detected properly.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11689)
(cherry picked from commit
e2e4b784e65eaafb133a7db3d344446c43112d41)
Rajat Dipta Biswas [Fri, 24 Apr 2020 16:59:30 +0000 (22:29 +0530)]
Update dgst.pod
Removed "Use the B<pkeyutl> command instead for this." from lines 97-98
Fixes #11633
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11636)
Benjamin Kaduk [Wed, 1 Apr 2020 20:51:40 +0000 (13:51 -0700)]
sslapitest: only compile test when it will be used
The test_ccs_change_cipher() test routine is used only when TLS 1.2
is enabled; to fix the strict-warnings build we should not try to
compile it when TLS 1.2 is disabled, either.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11458)
(cherry picked from commit
fb121631e702352d47049ac8e2e709b11c3318e4)
Richard Levitte [Sat, 25 Apr 2020 02:11:09 +0000 (04:11 +0200)]
fuzz/asn1.c: Add missing #include
<openssl/dsa.h> gets included via ts.h... except when 'no-ts' has been
configured.
Fixes #11597
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11640)
(cherry picked from commit
60ebc0ca5a829e2ae939a9ab13658af202b6dfc7)
Christian Hohnstaedt [Sun, 22 Mar 2020 08:41:30 +0000 (09:41 +0100)]
i2b_PVK_bio: don't set PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE in case of success
but in case of an error
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11380)
(cherry picked from commit
80b94a5adb461f94629d36db351a051b0a890856)
Arne Schwabe [Thu, 23 Apr 2020 10:42:51 +0000 (12:42 +0200)]
Fix type cast in SSL_CTX_set1_groups macro
The macro casts the glist parameter to char*
instead of (int *) like the documentation of the function suggest.
Also the function tls1_set_groups that is called from SSL_CTX_ctrl
takes an int * argument. This looks like a copy&paste error from
SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list function.
CLA: trivial
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11614)
(cherry picked from commit
7ffce852372799b6cd856b711db21332f0048314)
Nicola Tuveri [Tue, 21 Apr 2020 15:34:17 +0000 (18:34 +0300)]
Fix typo from #10631
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11595)
(cherry picked from commit
4692e98bdbaebb6f078e89a75c54395839e68b24)
Nicola Tuveri [Tue, 21 Jan 2020 15:08:16 +0000 (17:08 +0200)]
[BN] harden `BN_copy()` against leaks from memory accesses
`BN_copy()` (and indirectly `BN_dup()`) do not propagate the
`BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag: the propagation has been turned on and off a
few times in the past years, because in some conditions it has shown
unintended consequences in some code paths.
Without turning the propagation on once more, we can still improve
`BN_copy()` by avoiding to leak `src->top` in case `src` is flagged with
`BN_FLG_CONSTTIME`.
In this case we can instead use `src->dmax` as the number of words
allocated for `dst` and for the `memcpy` operation.
Barring compiler or runtime optimizations, if the caller provides `src`
flagged as const time and preallocated to a public size, no leak should
happen due to the copy operation.
(cherry picked from commit
2d9167ed0b588dacbdd0303fb6041ffe1d8b3a92)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11127)
Nicola Tuveri [Tue, 21 Jan 2020 15:00:41 +0000 (17:00 +0200)]
[EC] harden EC_KEY against leaks from memory accesses
We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key,
so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM`
holding the secret scalar.
This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
the called specifically set it.
The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer.
In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by
manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that
inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated
correctly and should not generate unintended consequences.
Setting the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag alone is never enough, we also have
to preallocate the `BIGNUM` internal buffer to a fixed public size big
enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
accesses.
Fixed Length
------------
The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
secret scalars.
For preallocating the `BIGNUM` storage we look at the number of "words"
required for the internal representation of the order, and we
preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
might temporarily overflow the order length.
Future work
-----------
A separate commit addresses further hardening of `BN_copy()` (and
indirectly `BN_dup()`).
(cherry picked from commit
0401d766afcd022748763f5614188301c9856c6e)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11127)
Nicola Tuveri [Mon, 6 Jan 2020 23:19:13 +0000 (01:19 +0200)]
[EC] Constify internal EC_KEY pointer usage
A pair of internal functions related to EC_KEY handling could benefit
from declaring `EC_KEY *` variables as `const`, providing clarity for
callers and readers of the code, in addition to enlisting the compiler
in preventing some mistakes.
(cherry picked from commit
cd701de96a147260c2290d85af8a0656120a8ff8)
In master `id2_ECParameters` and most of the ASN1 public functions have
been properly constified in their signature.
Unfortunately this has been deemed not doable in a patch release for
1.1.1 as, in subtle ways, this would break API compatibility.
See the discussion at https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9347 for
more details about this.
This constification commit should still be portable w.r.t. our criteria,
as the constification happens only on internal functions.
The fix here is to explicitly discard the const qualifier before the
call to `i2d_ECParameters`, which should be safe anyway because we can
expect `i2d_ECParameters()` to treat the first argument as if it was
const.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11127)
Dirk-Willem van Gulik [Fri, 10 Jan 2020 17:35:49 +0000 (18:35 +0100)]
Add setter equivalents to X509_REQ_get0_signature
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10563)
(cherry picked from commit
c72e59349f50ee00a1bf8605ada17dfccb8b3b1a)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 21 Apr 2020 12:24:21 +0000 (13:24 +0100)]
Prepare for 1.1.1h-dev
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 21 Apr 2020 12:22:39 +0000 (13:22 +0100)]
Prepare for 1.1.1g release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 21 Apr 2020 09:49:12 +0000 (10:49 +0100)]
Update copyright year
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Benjamin Kaduk [Fri, 10 Apr 2020 19:27:28 +0000 (12:27 -0700)]
Fix NULL dereference in SSL_check_chain() for TLS 1.3
In the tls1_check_sig_alg() helper function, we loop through the list of
"signature_algorithms_cert" values received from the client and attempt
to look up each one in turn in our internal table that maps wire
codepoint to string-form name, digest and/or signature NID, etc., in
order to compare the signature scheme from the peer's list against what
is used to sign the certificates in the certificate chain we're
checking. Unfortunately, when the peer sends a value that we don't
support, the lookup returns NULL, but we unconditionally dereference the
lookup result for the comparison, leading to an application crash
triggerable by an unauthenticated client.
Since we will not be able to say anything about algorithms we don't
recognize, treat NULL return from lookup as "does not match".
We currently only apply the "signature_algorithm_cert" checks on TLS 1.3
connections, so previous TLS versions are unaffected. SSL_check_chain()
is not called directly from libssl, but may be used by the application
inside a callback (e.g., client_hello or cert callback) to verify that a
candidate certificate chain will be acceptable to the client.
CVE-2020-1967
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Benjamin Kaduk [Fri, 10 Apr 2020 19:27:28 +0000 (12:27 -0700)]
Add test for CVE-2020-1967
Add to test_sslsigalgs a TLSProxy test that injects a
"signature_algorithms_cert" extension that contains an unallocated
codepoint.
The test currently fails, since s_server segfaults instead of
ignoring the unrecognized value.
Since "signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" are very
similar, also add the analogous test for "signature_algorithms".
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 21 Apr 2020 09:33:43 +0000 (10:33 +0100)]
Update CHANGES and NEWS for release of 1.1.1g
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Bernd Edlinger [Thu, 26 Mar 2020 19:56:57 +0000 (20:56 +0100)]
Add a CHANGES entry for AES constant time
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11411)
Bernd Edlinger [Thu, 9 Jan 2020 22:02:54 +0000 (23:02 +0100)]
Add AES consttime code for no-asm configurations
This adds optional constant time support for AES
when building openssl for no-asm.
Enable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11411)
Tomas Mraz [Thu, 16 Apr 2020 10:07:35 +0000 (12:07 +0200)]
s_time: Allow using -CAfile option as in other commands
The s_time command in difference from all the other similar
commands supported -cafile option instead of -CAfile.
Add the -CAfile option and keep -cafile only for backwards
compatibility.
Fixes #11552
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11555)
Richard Levitte [Thu, 16 Apr 2020 08:20:58 +0000 (10:20 +0200)]
INSTALL: document 'no-ui-console' rather than 'no-ui'
The UI interface itself is never disabled, but the console backend may
be. 'no-ui' is a deprecated backward compatibility alias for
'no-ui-console'.
Fixes #11551
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11554)
Kochise [Mon, 16 Mar 2020 19:04:04 +0000 (20:04 +0100)]
Windows: Add type casting in CRYPTO_atomic_add to remove warning
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11337)
(cherry picked from commit
7da7b27eec58d1efc7012f002c45ddbdd61a5e79)
scott [Thu, 9 Apr 2020 11:36:37 +0000 (12:36 +0100)]
BIO_do_accept: correct error return value
`BIO_do_accept` was returning incorrect values when unable to bind to a port.
Fixes #7717
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11505)
(cherry picked from commit
0437435a960123be1ced766d18d715f939698345)
Rich Salz [Fri, 10 Apr 2020 15:51:02 +0000 (11:51 -0400)]
Don't compile commands if disabled
Rather than wrapping whole files in "ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx" we handle
the changes in build.info
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11518)
Jake Maynard [Wed, 30 Oct 2019 15:27:04 +0000 (11:27 -0400)]
Add manpage entry for X509_check_purpose()
Fixes #10263
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10301)
(cherry picked from commit
eacd30a703b52f5b3e8e70b58f99bd1128458c7c)
Jim Newsome [Tue, 7 Apr 2020 21:29:53 +0000 (16:29 -0500)]
Update RAND_METHOD definition in man page
The `add` and `seed` callbacks were changed to return `int` instead of
`void` in
b6dcdbfc94c482f6c15ba725754fc9e827e41851 (first included in
tag OpenSSL_1_1_0-pre1).
The `add` callback was changed to take a `double` instead of an `int`
in
853f757ecea74a271a7c5cdee3f3b5fe0d3ae863.
CLA: trivial
Fixes: #10199
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11486)
(cherry picked from commit
ae3254287ff87e484c7fd8f757cad1440ee8f5ff)
Pauli [Wed, 8 Apr 2020 02:33:47 +0000 (12:33 +1000)]
Fix AES-CTR_DRBG on 1.1.1.
The backport of the timing information leak fix uses u32 which is defined
in crypto/modes/modes_local.h in 1.1.1 and include/crypto/modes.h for 3.0.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11489)
Patrick Steuer [Sat, 22 Feb 2020 00:20:09 +0000 (01:20 +0100)]
AES CTR-DRGB: do not leak timing information
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11147)
(cherry picked from commit
069165d10646a22000c596095cc04d43bbf1f807)
Pauli [Sun, 5 Apr 2020 23:23:00 +0000 (09:23 +1000)]
Integer overflow in ASN1_STRING_set.
Addressing a potential integer overflow condition.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11473)
(cherry picked from commit
96218269f4c2da82f143727fb7697d572c190bc5)
Billy Brumley [Wed, 1 Apr 2020 18:15:58 +0000 (21:15 +0300)]
[crypto/ec] blind coordinates in ec_wNAF_mul for robustness
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nicola.tuveri@ibm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11439)
(cherry picked from commit
c61ced5ec50fc68707c7cea79f7df1d170f03f13)
Bernd Edlinger [Mon, 6 Apr 2020 08:41:36 +0000 (10:41 +0200)]
Fix the error handling in EC_POINTs_mul
This was pointed out by a false-positive
-fsanitizer warning ;-)
However from the cryptographical POV the
code is wrong:
A point R^0 on the wrong curve
is infinity on the wrong curve.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11475)
(cherry picked from commit
1eb9b54af7e00fa12196411964ce742ea8677766)
William Brawner [Sun, 5 Apr 2020 16:39:41 +0000 (09:39 -0700)]
Ensure ECDSA_size always returns >= 0
Fixes #10484
Signed-off-by: William Brawner <me@wbrawner.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11472)
Tomas Mraz [Fri, 3 Apr 2020 08:24:40 +0000 (10:24 +0200)]
Add test cases for the non CA certificate with pathlen:0
Accept verification without -x509_strict and reject it with it.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11463)
(cherry picked from commit
3cb55fe47c3398b81956e4fe20c4004524d47519)
Tomas Mraz [Thu, 2 Apr 2020 15:31:21 +0000 (17:31 +0200)]
Set X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION error for invalid basic constraints
If we encounter certificate with basic constraints CA:false,
pathlen present and X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is set we set
X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION error.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11463)
(cherry picked from commit
fa86e2ee3533bb7fa9f3c62c38920cf960e9fec0)
Tomas Mraz [Thu, 2 Apr 2020 13:56:12 +0000 (15:56 +0200)]
Allow certificates with Basic Constraints CA:false, pathlen:0
Do not mark such certificates with EXFLAG_INVALID although they
violate the RFC 5280, they are syntactically correct and
openssl itself can produce such certificates without any errors
with command such as:
openssl x509 -req -signkey private.pem -in csr.pem -out cert.pem \
-extfile <(echo "basicConstraints=CA:FALSE,pathlen:0")
With the commit
ba4356ae4002a04e28642da60c551877eea804f7 the
EXFLAG_INVALID causes openssl to not consider such certificate
even as leaf self-signed certificate which is breaking existing
installations.
Fixes: #11456
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11463)
(cherry picked from commit
428cf5ff83a48d0b51c97476586b2cbd053b6302)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 2 Apr 2020 08:58:59 +0000 (09:58 +0100)]
Expand the XTS documentation
Explain that XTS does not support streaming, and that the IV value is the
tweak.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11461)
(cherry picked from commit
70d80ef9898ddbe03841efd2df2f526b71829d7f)
Billy Brumley [Sat, 28 Mar 2020 18:35:43 +0000 (20:35 +0200)]
[crypto/ec] Ladder tweaks
- Convert to affine coords on ladder entry. This lets us use more efficient
ladder step formulae.
- Convert to affine coords on ladder exit. This prevents the current code
awkwardness where conversion happens twice during serialization: first to
fetch the buffer size, then again to fetch the coords.
- Instead of projectively blinding the input point, blind both accumulators
independently.
(cherry picked from commit
a4a93bbfb0e679eaa249f77c7c4e7e823ca870ef)
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11435)
Billy Brumley [Sun, 29 Mar 2020 07:38:37 +0000 (10:38 +0300)]
[test] Make sm2_internal_test less fragile to changes in the ec module
Since these are KATs, the trailing randomness consumed by the ec module
does not really matter. So make the fake random buffer circular.
(cherry picked from commit
09736245b174a37abb87fb7ceb55462d940ff2bb)
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11435)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 31 Mar 2020 12:19:19 +0000 (13:19 +0100)]
Prepare for 1.1.1g-dev
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 31 Mar 2020 12:17:45 +0000 (13:17 +0100)]
Prepare for 1.1.1f release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 31 Mar 2020 10:28:51 +0000 (11:28 +0100)]
Update copyright year
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11445)
Viktor Szakats [Wed, 11 Sep 2019 10:02:56 +0000 (10:02 +0000)]
fix generated Makefile for Windows builds made on *nix (1.1.1d)
The fix consists of putting all destination directories
between double-quotes to make the default (and any custom)
prefixes containing spaces to work when doing 'make install'.
Also enable CI test with x86 mingw cross-build.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11434)
Tomas Mraz [Wed, 25 Mar 2020 13:18:13 +0000 (14:18 +0100)]
Document the revert of the proper reporting of an unexpected EOF
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11400)
Tomas Mraz [Wed, 25 Mar 2020 13:15:31 +0000 (14:15 +0100)]
Partially revert "Detect EOF while reading in libssl"
This partially reverts commit
db943f43a60d1b5b1277e4b5317e8f288e7a0a3a.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11400)
Richard Könning [Fri, 20 Mar 2020 19:17:50 +0000 (20:17 +0100)]
Use ctx2 instead ctx.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11372)
(cherry picked from commit
402b00d57921a0c8cd641b190d36bf39ea5fb592)
Bernd Edlinger [Sat, 4 Jan 2020 14:54:53 +0000 (15:54 +0100)]
Fix error handling in x509v3_cache_extensions and related functions
Basically we use EXFLAG_INVALID for all kinds of out of memory and
all kinds of parse errors in x509v3_cache_extensions.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10756)
FdaSilvaYY [Sat, 6 Apr 2019 09:16:59 +0000 (19:16 +1000)]
Coverity: fix two minor NPD issues.
Found by Coverity.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8274)
(cherry picked from commit
23dc8feba817560485da00d690d7b7b9e5b15682)
Bernd Edlinger [Mon, 15 Jul 2019 18:48:38 +0000 (20:48 +0200)]
Add a CHANGES entry for BN_generate_prime_ex
BN_generate_prime_ex no longer avoids factors 3..17863 in p-1
when not computing safe primes.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9387)
Bernd Edlinger [Wed, 10 Jul 2019 19:33:48 +0000 (21:33 +0200)]
Update documentation of BN_generate_prime_ex
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9387)
Bernd Edlinger [Fri, 5 Jul 2019 09:55:56 +0000 (11:55 +0200)]
Merge probable_prime_dh_safe with bn_probable_prime_dh
This should avoid half of the trial divisions in probable_prime_dh_safe
and avoid bn_probable_prime_dh generating primes with special properties.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9387)
Bernd Edlinger [Thu, 4 Jul 2019 12:52:41 +0000 (14:52 +0200)]
Add a parameter to probable_prime if we look for a safe prime
Currently probable_prime makes sure that p-1 does not have
any prime factors from 3..17863, which is useful for safe primes,
but not necessarily for the general case.
Issue was initially reported here:
MIRONOV, I. Factoring RSA Moduli II.
https://windowsontheory.org/2012/05/17/factoring-rsa-moduli-part-ii/
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9387)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2020 14:32:46 +0000 (14:32 +0000)]
Prepare for 1.1.1f-dev
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2020 14:31:17 +0000 (14:31 +0000)]
Prepare for 1.1.1e release
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2020 13:59:29 +0000 (13:59 +0000)]
Update copyright year
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11344)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2020 11:24:20 +0000 (11:24 +0000)]
Update CHANGES for the new release
Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11342)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2020 10:11:28 +0000 (10:11 +0000)]
Update NEWS for the new release
Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11342)
Ben Kaduk [Mon, 16 Mar 2020 18:02:14 +0000 (11:02 -0700)]
sslapitest: don't leak the SSL_CTX pair
We have no need for a new set of SSL_CTXs in test_ccs_change_cipher(), so
just keep using the original ones. Also, fix a typo in a comment.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11336)
(cherry picked from commit
b3e6d666e351d45e93d29fe3813245b92a0f5815)
Benjamin Kaduk [Fri, 6 Mar 2020 21:19:45 +0000 (13:19 -0800)]
Add test that changes ciphers on CCS
The TLS (pre-1.3) ChangeCipherState message is usually used to indicate
the switch from the unencrypted to encrypted part of the handshake.
However, it can also be used in cases where there is an existing
session (such as during resumption handshakes) or when changing from
one cipher to a different one (such as during renegotiation when the
cipher list offered by the client has changed). This test serves
to exercise such situations, allowing us to detect whether session
objects are being modified in cases when they must remain immutable
for thread-safety purposes.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943)
(cherry picked from commit
3cd14e5e65011660ad8e3603cf871c8366b565fd)
Benjamin Kaduk [Fri, 24 Jan 2020 21:44:27 +0000 (13:44 -0800)]
Code to thread-safety in ChangeCipherState
The server-side ChangeCipherState processing stores the new cipher
in the SSL_SESSION object, so that the new state can be used if
this session gets resumed. However, writing to the session is only
thread-safe for initial handshakes, as at other times the session
object may be in a shared cache and in use by another thread at the
same time. Reflect this invariant in the code by only writing to
s->session->cipher when it is currently NULL (we do not cache sessions
with no cipher). The code prior to this change would never actually
change the (non-NULL) cipher value in a session object, since our
server enforces that (pre-TLS-1.3) resumptions use the exact same
cipher as the initial connection, and non-abbreviated renegotiations
have produced a new session object before we get to this point.
Regardless, include logic to detect such a condition and abort the
handshake if it occurs, to avoid any risk of inadvertently using
the wrong cipher on a connection.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943)
(cherry picked from commit
2e3ec2e1578977fca830a47fd7f521e290540e6d)
Benjamin Kaduk [Fri, 24 Jan 2020 21:25:53 +0000 (13:25 -0800)]
Don't write to the session when computing TLS 1.3 keys
TLS 1.3 maintains a separate keys chedule in the SSL object, but
was writing to the 'master_key_length' field in the SSL_SESSION
when generating the per-SSL master_secret. (The generate_master_secret
SSL3_ENC_METHOD function needs an output variable for the master secret
length, but the TLS 1.3 implementation just uses the output size of
the handshake hash function to get the lengths, so the only natural-looking
thing to use as the output length was the field in the session.
This would potentially involve writing to a SSL_SESSION object that was
in the cache (i.e., resumed) and shared with other threads, though.
The thread-safety impact should be minimal, since TLS 1.3 requires the
hash from the original handshake to be associated with the resumption
PSK and used for the subsequent connection. This means that (in the
resumption case) the value being written would be the same value that was
previously there, so the only risk would be on architectures that can
produce torn writes/reads for aligned size_t values.
Since the value is essentially ignored anyway, just provide the
address of a local dummy variable to generate_master_secret() instead.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943)
(cherry picked from commit
d74014c4b8740f28a54b562f799ad1e754b517b9)
Benjamin Kaduk [Fri, 24 Jan 2020 21:25:02 +0000 (13:25 -0800)]
Fix whitespace nit in ssl_generate_master_secret()
Use a space after a comma.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943)
(cherry picked from commit
1866a0d380fc361d9be2ca0509de0f2281505db5)
Benjamin Kaduk [Fri, 17 Jan 2020 19:15:59 +0000 (11:15 -0800)]
doc: fix spelling of TYPE_get_ex_new_index
The generated macros are TYPE_get_ex_new_index() (to match
CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index()), not TYPE_get_new_ex_index(), even though
the latter spelling seems more natural.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943)
(cherry picked from commit
fe41c06e69613b1a4814b3e3cdbf460f2678ec99)
Benjamin Kaduk [Thu, 16 Jan 2020 22:37:44 +0000 (14:37 -0800)]
Additional updates to SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.pod
Generally modernize the language.
Refer to TLS instead of SSL/TLS, and try to have more consistent
usage of commas and that/which.
Reword some descriptions to avoid implying that a list of potential
reasons for behavior is an exhaustive list.
Clarify how get_session_cb() is only called on servers (i.e., in general,
and that it's given the session ID proposed by the client).
Clarify the semantics of the get_cb()'s "copy" argument.
The behavior seems to have changed in commit
8876bc054802b043a3ec95554b6c5873291770be, though the behavior prior
to that commit was not to leave the reference-count unchanged if
*copy was not written to -- instead, libssl seemed to assume that the
callback already had incremented the reference count.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943)
(cherry picked from commit
06f876837a8ec76b28c42953731a156c0c3700e2)
Jakub Jelen [Tue, 10 Mar 2020 14:15:28 +0000 (15:15 +0100)]
doc: Update the reference from draft to RFC
CLA: trivial
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11299)
(cherry picked from commit
c08dea30d4d127412097b39d9974ba6090041a7c)
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre [Sun, 1 Mar 2020 23:25:29 +0000 (00:25 +0100)]
doc: document that 'openssl rand' is cryptographically secure
(cherry picked from commit
88398d2a358f)
Additionally, remove an outdated paragraph mentioning the .rnd
file, which is obsolete in 1.1.1 since the RANDFILE entry was
removed from openssl.cnf in commit
1fd6afb571e8.
Also borrow some text from 'openssl(1)/Random State Options'
on master (commit
a397aca43598) to emphasize that it is not
necessary anymore to restore and save the RNG state using the
'-rand' and '-writerand' options.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11251)
Matt Caswell [Mon, 9 Mar 2020 09:07:11 +0000 (09:07 +0000)]
Revert "Create a new embeddedSCTs1 that's signed using SHA256"
This reverts commit
b98efebeb2d4265bd6638d5947fe365500121e03.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11282)
Matt Caswell [Mon, 9 Mar 2020 09:05:27 +0000 (09:05 +0000)]
Revert "Stop accepting certificates signed using SHA1 at security level 1"
This reverts commit
68436f0a8964e911eb4f864bc8b31d7ca4d29585.
The OMC did not vote in favour of backporting this to 1.1.1, so this
change should be reverted.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11282)
James Peach [Thu, 5 Mar 2020 07:43:54 +0000 (07:43 +0000)]
docs: fix typo in SSL functions
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11253)
(cherry picked from commit
9f44e96e245993c8e7aaa9fadf1d6713c9c60915)
Richard Levitte [Wed, 8 Jan 2020 10:08:06 +0000 (11:08 +0100)]
DOC: Make EVP_SignInit.pod conform with man-pages(7)
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit
03d65ca2095777cf6314ad813eb7de5779c9b93d)
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11232)
Richard Levitte [Wed, 8 Jan 2020 10:04:15 +0000 (11:04 +0100)]
DOC: New file for EVP_PKEY_size(), EVP_PKEY_bits() and EVP_PKEY_security_bits()
We change the description to be about the key rather than the
signature. How the key size is related to the signature is explained
in the description of EVP_SignFinal() anyway.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit
6942a0d6feb8d3dcbbc6a1ec6be9de7ab2df1530)
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11232)
Bastian Germann [Thu, 13 Feb 2020 10:58:27 +0000 (11:58 +0100)]
apps x509: passing PKCS#11 URL as -signkey
OpenSSL 1.1.0 has extended option checking, and rejects passing a PKCS#11
engine URL to "-signkey" option. The actual code is ready to take it.
Change the option parsing to allow an engine URL to be passed and modify
the manpage accordingly.
CLA: trivial
(cherry picked from commit
16d560439d8b1be5082228a87576a8f79b3525ac)
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11173)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 5 Mar 2020 09:21:56 +0000 (09:21 +0000)]
Clarify the usage of EVP_PKEY_get_raw_[private|public]_key()
EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key() and EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key() expect
the size of the key buffer to be populated in the |*len| parameter on
entry - but the docs made no mention of this.
Fixes #11245
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11254)
(cherry picked from commit
f529fc7d53bf4228fae61cb1efe73d97fe3eb35f)
Richard Levitte [Tue, 3 Mar 2020 21:51:29 +0000 (22:51 +0100)]
DOC: Fixups of X509_LOOKUP.pod
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11120)
Richard Levitte [Fri, 31 Jan 2020 14:35:46 +0000 (15:35 +0100)]
DOC: Add documentation related to X509_LOOKUPs
Most of all, the base X509_LOOKUP functionality is now documented.
Furthermore, the names X509_LOOKUP_METHOD and X509_STORE are added for
reference.
Some functions were moved from X509_LOOKUP_meth_new.pod
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11120)
Patrick Steuer [Tue, 3 Mar 2020 12:29:03 +0000 (13:29 +0100)]
crypto/ec/curve448/eddsa.c: fix EBCDIC platforms
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11229)
(cherry picked from commit
af7f656cd91d99d62567e2b20c61f07cb4d81d0b)
Patrick Steuer [Tue, 3 Mar 2020 16:40:07 +0000 (17:40 +0100)]
aes-s390x.pl: fix stg offset caused by typo in perlasm
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11234)
(cherry picked from commit
7b2ce4a6e817e4385ff77fea0c6e349294c7b756)
Bernd Edlinger [Wed, 4 Mar 2020 10:42:17 +0000 (11:42 +0100)]
This works around a gcc-9 crash
It happens when configured with ./config -ftest-coverage
see: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94029
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11246)
Scott Arciszewski [Mon, 24 Feb 2020 20:29:12 +0000 (12:29 -0800)]
Fix comment placement in ecp_nistp256.ci
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11175)
(cherry picked from commit
c590be6f12d0b725863961e41bc64a81c8cf30d6)
Bastian Germann [Mon, 17 Feb 2020 11:50:08 +0000 (12:50 +0100)]
apps x509: restrict CAkeyform option to OPT_FMT_PDE
CAkeyform may be set to PEM, DER or ENGINE, but the current options
are not using the proper optionformat 'E' (OPT_FMT_PDE) for this.
Set the valtype for CAkeyform to 'E' and use OPT_FMT_PDE when extracting
the option value.
This amends
bf4006a6f9 ("Fix regression on x509 keyform argument") which
did the same thing for keyform and changed the manpage synopsis entries
for both keyform and CAkeyform but did not change the option section.
Hence, change the option section.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11172)
Richard Levitte [Mon, 24 Feb 2020 13:56:26 +0000 (14:56 +0100)]
VMS: mitigate for the C++ compiler that doesn't understand certain pragmas
This only affects __DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H and __DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H,
which are used automatically by HP and VSI C/C++ compilers.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11159)
Matt Turner [Tue, 18 Feb 2020 18:08:27 +0000 (10:08 -0800)]
config: Drop linux-alpha-gcc+bwx
Its entry in Configuration/10-main.conf was dropped in commit
7ead0c89185c ("Configure: fold related configurations more aggressively
and clean-up.") probably because all but one of its bn_ops were removed
(RC4_CHAR remained). Benchmarks on an Alpha EV7 indicate that RC4_INT is
better than RC4_CHAR so rather than restoring the configuation, remove
it from config.
CLA: trivial
Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/697840
(cherry picked from commit
19ded1a717b6c72c3db241f06787a353f1190755)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11130)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 24 Jan 2020 16:07:51 +0000 (16:07 +0000)]
Teach more BIOs how to handle BIO_CTRL_EOF
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10882)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 17 Jan 2020 17:39:19 +0000 (17:39 +0000)]
Detect EOF while reading in libssl
If we hit an EOF while reading in libssl then we will report an error
back to the application (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) but errno will be 0. We add
an error to the stack (which means we instead return SSL_ERROR_SSL) and
therefore give a hint as to what went wrong.
Contains a partial fix for #10880
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10882)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 18 Feb 2020 16:08:30 +0000 (16:08 +0000)]
Add *.d.tmp files to .gitignore
These are temporary files generated by the build process that should not
be checked in.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11122)
(cherry picked from commit
7b5108dff4cfde059ca278147a188fb6254603d1)
Simon Cornish [Fri, 14 Feb 2020 22:16:09 +0000 (14:16 -0800)]
Handle max_fragment_length overflow for DTLS
Allow for encryption overhead in early DTLS size check
and send overflow if validated record is too long
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11096)
(cherry picked from commit
cc0663f697b05ed121a728241f0502250429802d)
David Benjamin [Mon, 17 Feb 2020 02:21:27 +0000 (12:21 +1000)]
Do not silently truncate files on perlasm errors
If one of the perlasm xlate drivers crashes, OpenSSL's build will
currently swallow the error and silently truncate the output to however
far the driver got. This will hopefully fail to build, but better to
check such things.
Handle this by checking for errors when closing STDOUT (which is a pipe
to the xlate driver).
This is the OpenSSL 1.1.1 version of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10883 and
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10930.
Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10931)
Kurt Roeckx [Sun, 9 Feb 2020 18:28:15 +0000 (19:28 +0100)]
Check that
ed25519 and ed448 are allowed by the security level
Signature algorithms not using an MD weren't checked that they're
allowed by the security level.
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
GH: #11062
Kurt Roeckx [Thu, 2 Jan 2020 22:16:30 +0000 (23:16 +0100)]
Generate new Ed488 certificates
Create a whole chain of Ed488 certificates so that we can use it at security
level 4 (192 bit). We had an 2048 bit RSA (112 bit, level 2) root sign the
Ed488 certificate using SHA256 (128 bit, level 3).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #10785
(cherry picked from commit
77c4d3972400adf1bcb76ceea359f5453cc3e8e4)
Richard Levitte [Sun, 19 Jan 2020 02:19:31 +0000 (03:19 +0100)]
DOC: document in more detail what a BIO_read_ex() via BIO_f_buffer() does
The BIO_f_buffer() documentation tells in enough detail how it affects
BIO_gets(), but not how it affects BIO_read_ex(). This change
remedies that.
Fixes #10859
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10890)
(cherry picked from commit
9a4fd80ee0ad1833879b6a55c9c4673eeb8446a3)
Richard Levitte [Thu, 13 Feb 2020 12:11:50 +0000 (13:11 +0100)]
VMS: Correct error reporting in crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
The future style that's coming with OpenSSL 3.0 was used, we need to
revert that back to "traditional" style.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11088)
projects / oweals / openssl.git / log