2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
11 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
15 #include <openssl/objects.h>
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
20 #include <openssl/conf.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/provider.h>
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/evp.h"
27 #include "ssl_local.h"
28 #include <openssl/ct.h>
30 DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER)
32 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
34 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
35 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
37 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
41 tls1_generate_master_secret,
42 tls1_change_cipher_state,
43 tls1_final_finish_mac,
44 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
45 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
47 tls1_export_keying_material,
49 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
50 tls_close_construct_packet,
54 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
58 tls1_generate_master_secret,
59 tls1_change_cipher_state,
60 tls1_final_finish_mac,
61 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
62 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
64 tls1_export_keying_material,
65 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
66 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
67 tls_close_construct_packet,
71 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
75 tls1_generate_master_secret,
76 tls1_change_cipher_state,
77 tls1_final_finish_mac,
78 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
79 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
81 tls1_export_keying_material,
82 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
83 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 tls_close_construct_packet,
89 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
92 tls13_setup_key_block,
93 tls13_generate_master_secret,
94 tls13_change_cipher_state,
95 tls13_final_finish_mac,
96 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
97 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
99 tls13_export_keying_material,
100 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
101 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
102 tls_close_construct_packet,
106 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
109 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
110 * http, the cache would over fill
112 return (60 * 60 * 2);
119 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
125 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
127 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
131 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
136 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
137 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
139 s->version = s->method->version;
144 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
145 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
150 {NID_sect163k1, 0x0001},
151 {NID_sect163r1, 0x0002},
152 {NID_sect163r2, 0x0003},
153 {NID_sect193r1, 0x0004},
154 {NID_sect193r2, 0x0005},
155 {NID_sect233k1, 0x0006},
156 {NID_sect233r1, 0x0007},
157 {NID_sect239k1, 0x0008},
158 {NID_sect283k1, 0x0009},
159 {NID_sect283r1, 0x000A},
160 {NID_sect409k1, 0x000B},
161 {NID_sect409r1, 0x000C},
162 {NID_sect571k1, 0x000D},
163 {NID_sect571r1, 0x000E},
164 {NID_secp160k1, 0x000F},
165 {NID_secp160r1, 0x0010},
166 {NID_secp160r2, 0x0011},
167 {NID_secp192k1, 0x0012},
168 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 0x0013},
169 {NID_secp224k1, 0x0014},
170 {NID_secp224r1, 0x0015},
171 {NID_secp256k1, 0x0016},
172 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0x0017},
173 {NID_secp384r1, 0x0018},
174 {NID_secp521r1, 0x0019},
175 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 0x001A},
176 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 0x001B},
177 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 0x001C},
178 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 0x001D},
179 {EVP_PKEY_X448, 0x001E},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, 0x0022},
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, 0x0023},
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, 0x0024},
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, 0x0025},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 0x0026},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 0x0027},
186 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, 0x0028},
187 {NID_ffdhe2048, 0x0100},
188 {NID_ffdhe3072, 0x0101},
189 {NID_ffdhe4096, 0x0102},
190 {NID_ffdhe6144, 0x0103},
191 {NID_ffdhe8192, 0x0104}
195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
196 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
197 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
198 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
199 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
201 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
203 /* The default curves */
204 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
205 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
206 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
207 29, /* X25519 (29) */
208 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
210 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
211 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
214 34, /* GC256A (34) */
215 35, /* GC256B (35) */
216 36, /* GC256C (36) */
217 37, /* GC256D (37) */
218 38, /* GC512A (38) */
219 39, /* GC512B (39) */
220 40, /* GC512C (40) */
222 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
223 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
224 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
225 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
226 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
227 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
230 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
233 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
239 struct provider_group_data_st {
241 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
244 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
245 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
246 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
248 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
249 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
250 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
252 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
253 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
257 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
258 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
260 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
261 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
262 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
264 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
265 (ctx->group_list_max_len
266 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
267 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
269 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
272 ctx->group_list = tmp;
273 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
275 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
276 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
279 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
281 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
282 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
283 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
286 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
287 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
288 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
292 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
293 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
294 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
297 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
298 if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
299 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
303 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
304 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
305 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
308 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
310 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
311 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
312 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
315 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
316 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
317 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
321 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
322 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
323 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
327 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
328 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
329 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
333 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
334 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
335 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
339 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
340 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
341 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
345 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
346 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
347 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
351 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
352 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
353 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
357 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
358 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
360 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
361 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
363 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
364 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
365 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
366 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
367 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
368 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
371 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
372 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
373 ctx->group_list_len++;
376 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
380 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
381 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
382 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
383 ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
388 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
390 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
393 pgd.provider = provider;
394 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
395 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
398 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
400 return OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx);
403 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
408 /* See if we can identify a nid for this name */
409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
410 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(name);
412 if (nid == NID_undef)
413 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(name);
414 if (nid == NID_undef)
415 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(name);
417 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
418 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
420 && nid == tls1_group_id2nid(ctx->group_list[i].group_id,
422 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
428 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
432 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
433 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
434 return &ctx->group_list[i];
440 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
441 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
449 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
450 * work for groups we don't know about.
452 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
454 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
455 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
457 if (!include_unknown)
459 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
462 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
467 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
468 * work for groups we don't know about.
470 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
472 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
473 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
478 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
481 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
482 * the number of groups supported.
484 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
487 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
488 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
489 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
490 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
491 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
492 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
493 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
496 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
497 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
501 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
502 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
508 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
509 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
510 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
512 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
513 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
520 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
523 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion)
525 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
531 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
532 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
534 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
537 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
538 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
539 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
541 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
543 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
546 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
547 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
548 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
554 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
555 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
557 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
558 unsigned char gtmp[2];
563 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
564 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
565 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
566 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
569 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
570 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
573 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
580 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
581 * if there is no match.
582 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
583 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
584 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
586 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
588 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
589 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
592 /* Can't do anything on client side */
596 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
598 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
599 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
601 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
603 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
604 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
605 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
606 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
607 /* Should never happen */
610 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
614 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
615 * otherwise peer decides.
617 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
618 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
619 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
621 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
622 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
625 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
626 uint16_t id = pref[i];
628 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
629 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
637 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
641 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
642 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
644 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
648 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
649 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
651 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
652 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
653 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
656 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
659 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
663 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
664 unsigned long idmask;
666 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
667 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
669 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
670 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
671 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
685 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
688 /* TODO(3.0): An arbitrary amount for now. Take another look at this */
689 # define MAX_GROUPLIST 40
694 uint16_t gid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
697 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
699 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
706 if (garg->gidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
708 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
710 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
713 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
716 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
717 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
719 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
723 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
724 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
732 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
738 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
741 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
745 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
749 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
750 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
752 const uint16_t *groups;
758 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
759 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
760 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
762 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
763 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
765 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
766 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
769 /* Should never happen */
774 if (check_own_groups) {
775 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
776 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
777 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
781 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
784 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
788 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
789 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
792 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
793 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
794 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
795 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
799 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
803 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
807 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
809 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
810 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
811 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
813 *pformats = ecformats_default;
814 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
816 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
818 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
822 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
823 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
827 unsigned char comp_id;
830 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
831 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
833 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
834 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
836 /* Get required compression id */
837 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
838 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
839 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
841 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
846 int field_type = EC_GROUP_get_field_type(grp);
848 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
849 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
850 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
851 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
856 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
857 * supported (see RFC4492).
859 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
862 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
863 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
869 /* Return group id of a key */
870 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
872 int curve_nid = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
874 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
876 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
880 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
881 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
883 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
887 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
890 /* If not EC nothing to do */
891 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
893 /* Check compression */
894 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
896 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
898 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
901 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
904 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
907 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
911 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
912 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
913 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
914 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
915 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
917 return 0; /* Should never happen */
918 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
919 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
928 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
930 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
932 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
933 * is compatible with the client extensions.
935 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
937 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
939 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
941 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
943 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
946 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
947 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
948 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
949 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
956 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
961 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
963 /* Default sigalg schemes */
964 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
966 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
967 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
968 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
969 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
973 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
974 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
975 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
976 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
977 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
978 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
980 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
981 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
982 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
985 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
986 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
988 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
989 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
991 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
994 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
995 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
999 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1000 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1001 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1002 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1003 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1008 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1009 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1010 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1014 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1016 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1017 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1018 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1019 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1020 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1021 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1022 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1023 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1024 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1025 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1026 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1027 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1028 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1029 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1030 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1031 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1032 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1033 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1034 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1035 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1036 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1038 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1039 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1040 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1041 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1042 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1043 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1044 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1045 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1046 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1047 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1048 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1049 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1050 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1051 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1052 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1053 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1054 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1055 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1056 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1057 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1058 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1059 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1060 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1061 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1062 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1063 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1064 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1065 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1066 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1067 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1068 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1069 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1070 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1072 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1073 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1074 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1075 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1076 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1077 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1078 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1079 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1080 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1081 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1082 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1083 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1084 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1085 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1086 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1088 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1089 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1090 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1091 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1092 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1093 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1094 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1095 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1096 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1097 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1098 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1099 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1100 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1101 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1102 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1103 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1104 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1105 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1106 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1107 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1108 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1111 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1112 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1113 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1114 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1115 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1116 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1120 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1121 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1123 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1124 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1125 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1126 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1127 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1128 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1129 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1130 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1131 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1132 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1135 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1138 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1139 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1140 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1141 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1144 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1148 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1149 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1155 * Check hash is available.
1156 * TODO(3.0): This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1157 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1158 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1159 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1160 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1162 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1163 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1164 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1168 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1169 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1172 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1173 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1175 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1176 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1179 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1184 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1185 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1189 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1190 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL *s, uint16_t sigalg)
1193 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1195 for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1196 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1197 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1199 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg)
1204 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1205 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1210 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1211 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1214 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1224 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1226 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1227 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1228 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1230 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
1231 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1232 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1238 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1240 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1246 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1247 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1248 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1249 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1250 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1252 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
1258 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1259 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1260 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1262 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1269 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1271 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1274 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1276 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1283 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1284 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1286 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1289 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1291 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1298 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1301 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1303 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1304 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1306 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1308 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1312 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1314 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1316 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1317 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1320 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1322 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1324 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1327 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1331 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1334 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1338 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1340 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1341 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1343 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1344 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1347 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1348 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1353 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1354 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1355 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1357 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1358 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1359 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1360 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1361 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1362 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1364 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1365 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1371 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1372 * specified EC curve.
1374 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1376 const uint16_t *sigs;
1379 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1380 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1381 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1383 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1384 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1387 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1388 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1392 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1393 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1394 && curve == lu->curve)
1403 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1406 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1408 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1411 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1415 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1416 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
1418 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1419 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1421 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1428 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1429 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1432 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1434 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1435 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1437 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1439 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1442 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1443 /* Should never happen */
1446 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1447 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1448 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1450 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1453 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1454 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1455 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1457 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1459 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1460 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1463 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1464 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1465 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1467 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1470 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1471 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1472 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1474 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1479 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1481 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1482 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1484 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1485 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1489 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1490 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1491 int curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
1493 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1495 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1499 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1500 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1501 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1503 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1506 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1507 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1508 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1509 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1511 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1512 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1517 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1519 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1524 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1525 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1526 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1527 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1530 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1531 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1532 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1534 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1537 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1539 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1543 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1544 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1546 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1547 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1548 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1550 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1551 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
1552 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1554 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1557 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1558 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1562 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1564 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1566 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1570 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1572 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1574 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1579 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1580 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1581 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1583 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1586 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1588 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1590 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1591 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1592 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1593 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1594 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1597 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1598 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1599 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1600 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1602 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1604 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1605 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1606 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1613 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1614 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1615 * @c: cipher to check
1616 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1617 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1619 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1621 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1623 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1624 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1626 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1628 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1629 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1632 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1633 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1635 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1636 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1637 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1639 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1642 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1643 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1646 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1649 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1651 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1653 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1656 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1660 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1661 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1662 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1663 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1664 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1665 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1666 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1668 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1669 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1671 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1672 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1673 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1674 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1676 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1677 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1682 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1683 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1684 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1685 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1693 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1694 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1695 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1698 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1701 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1703 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1708 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1710 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1711 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1712 * point to the resulting session.
1714 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1718 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1721 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1724 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1725 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1728 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1729 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1731 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1732 if (!ticketext->present)
1733 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1735 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1737 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1738 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1742 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1744 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1745 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1746 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1747 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1750 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1751 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1752 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1753 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1754 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1755 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1757 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1758 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1759 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1760 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1761 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1762 * point to the resulting session.
1764 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1765 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1766 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1768 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1769 unsigned char *sdec;
1770 const unsigned char *p;
1771 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1772 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1774 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1775 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1776 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1777 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1779 if (eticklen == 0) {
1781 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1782 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1784 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1787 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1789 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1790 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1791 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1792 * calculate the master secret later.
1794 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1798 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1799 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1800 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1804 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1805 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1807 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1810 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1812 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1816 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1818 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1821 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1824 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1825 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1826 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1828 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1831 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1832 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1833 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1834 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1835 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1838 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1842 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1848 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1850 /* Check key name matches */
1851 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1852 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1853 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1857 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1859 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1860 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1861 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1863 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1864 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1865 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1866 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1867 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1870 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1871 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1875 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1878 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1880 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1884 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1886 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1887 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1891 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1892 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1893 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1894 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1898 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1899 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1902 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1903 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1904 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1905 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1906 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1907 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1908 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1910 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1913 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1915 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1921 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1925 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1927 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1929 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1933 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1934 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1935 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1939 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1940 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1943 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1945 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1950 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1952 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1955 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1956 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
1959 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1960 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1961 * performs any action
1963 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1964 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1965 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1966 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1967 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1968 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1971 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1972 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1973 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1975 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1977 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1978 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1981 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1982 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1983 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1987 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1988 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1989 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1990 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1991 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1995 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1996 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1997 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1998 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1999 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2000 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2001 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2003 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2007 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2011 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2013 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2014 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2015 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2016 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2025 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2026 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2028 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2031 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2033 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2034 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2036 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
2037 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2038 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2039 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2040 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2043 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2044 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
2047 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2048 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2049 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2050 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2051 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
2054 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2055 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2057 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2060 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2061 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2062 * ciphersuites enabled.
2065 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2068 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
2069 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2070 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2071 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2073 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2074 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2075 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2078 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2086 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2087 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
2088 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2089 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2090 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2094 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2095 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2099 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
2101 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2102 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2103 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2105 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2108 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2109 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2110 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2111 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2116 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2120 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2121 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2122 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2123 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2125 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2128 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2129 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2134 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2135 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2137 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2139 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2142 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2143 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2145 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2146 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2147 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2148 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2156 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2157 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2158 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2159 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2161 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2162 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2163 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2164 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2166 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2167 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2169 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2170 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2181 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2182 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2184 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2185 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2187 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2189 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2191 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2192 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2193 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2194 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2195 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2196 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2197 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2198 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2199 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2200 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2202 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2203 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2206 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2207 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2211 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2212 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2214 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2216 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2220 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2224 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2225 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2229 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2235 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2237 /* Invalid data length */
2238 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2243 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2247 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2255 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2262 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2264 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2265 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2267 /* Should never happen */
2268 if (s->cert == NULL)
2272 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2273 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2275 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2276 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2280 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2282 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2285 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2287 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2290 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2293 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2294 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2295 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2297 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2298 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2300 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2301 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
2302 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2307 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2308 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2309 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2311 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2312 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2313 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2316 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2318 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2322 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2324 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2325 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2327 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2329 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2330 if (psignhash != NULL)
2331 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2333 return (int)numsigalgs;
2336 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2337 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2338 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2340 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2341 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2343 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2344 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2346 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2348 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2350 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2351 if (psignhash != NULL)
2352 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2354 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2356 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2357 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2360 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2361 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2365 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2366 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2369 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2371 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2372 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2373 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2374 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2375 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2376 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2377 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2378 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2380 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2381 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2382 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2385 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2386 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2388 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2390 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2392 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2393 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2394 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2397 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2399 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2401 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2403 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2405 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2406 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2407 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2408 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2409 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2410 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2414 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2416 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2417 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2421 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2428 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2429 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2430 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2432 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2434 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2435 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2439 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2443 /* Reject duplicates */
2444 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2445 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2454 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2455 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2457 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2461 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2465 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2468 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2473 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2477 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2480 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2481 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2482 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2484 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2485 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2486 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2492 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2494 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2499 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2503 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2505 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2506 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2507 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2509 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2511 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2512 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2517 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2522 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2523 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2524 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2526 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2527 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2528 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2534 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2538 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2540 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2542 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2544 if (default_nid == -1)
2546 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2548 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2550 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2552 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2553 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2554 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2556 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2559 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2561 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2562 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2563 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2564 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2565 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2571 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2572 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2574 const X509_NAME *nm;
2576 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2577 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2578 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2585 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2586 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2587 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2588 * attempting to use them.
2591 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2593 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2594 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2595 /* Strict mode flags */
2596 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2597 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2598 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2600 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2605 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2606 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2609 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2610 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2612 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2615 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2617 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2618 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2620 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2622 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2623 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2632 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2635 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2637 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2638 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2640 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2647 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2648 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2649 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2650 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2651 else if (!check_flags)
2656 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2657 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2659 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2662 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2663 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2665 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2669 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2670 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2673 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2674 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2675 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2679 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2680 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2683 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2684 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2685 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2688 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2689 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2690 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2693 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2694 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2695 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2704 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2705 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2707 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2709 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2710 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2711 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2713 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2716 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2723 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2724 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2726 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2727 * so check_flags is always set.
2729 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2730 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2731 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2735 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2736 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2737 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2738 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2740 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2747 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2748 else if (check_flags)
2749 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2751 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2752 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2753 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2754 else if (!check_flags)
2757 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2758 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2759 else if (strict_mode) {
2760 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2761 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2762 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2763 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2765 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2772 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2773 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2776 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2777 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2778 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2779 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2780 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2781 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2784 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2787 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2788 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2789 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2793 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2796 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2799 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2801 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2802 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2804 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2805 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2806 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2808 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2809 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2810 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2811 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2812 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2817 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2820 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2822 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2823 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2827 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2828 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2830 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2833 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2837 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2840 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2841 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2848 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2849 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2851 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2852 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2853 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2854 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2855 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2856 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2857 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2858 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2859 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2862 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2863 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2865 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2869 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2873 int dh_secbits = 80;
2874 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2875 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2876 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2881 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2883 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2891 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2896 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2897 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2898 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2899 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2900 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2901 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2902 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2903 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2905 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2906 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2916 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2919 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2922 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2923 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2924 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2925 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2927 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2930 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2932 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2935 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2937 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2938 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2939 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2940 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2942 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2944 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2945 if (nid == NID_undef)
2948 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2950 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2953 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2956 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2958 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2959 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2961 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2962 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2964 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2965 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2970 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2971 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2972 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2975 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2977 int rv, start_idx, i;
2979 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2984 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2988 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2989 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2990 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2998 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2999 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3002 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3004 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3005 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3007 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3009 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3010 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3011 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3014 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3018 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3019 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3021 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3023 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3026 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3027 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3031 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
3032 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3035 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
3041 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3042 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3044 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3045 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3047 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3048 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3053 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
3054 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3055 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3056 * signing certificate.
3058 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3065 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3066 * a viable public key is permitted.
3072 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3073 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3074 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3075 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3076 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3078 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3080 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3083 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3086 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3087 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3091 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3092 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3094 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3099 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3102 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3103 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3106 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3110 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3111 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3112 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3114 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3116 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3123 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3124 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3125 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3127 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3128 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3129 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3130 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3131 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3133 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3134 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
3136 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3137 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3140 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3141 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3143 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3146 curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3147 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3152 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3153 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3154 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
3160 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3167 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3168 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3170 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3171 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3173 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3174 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3175 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3177 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
3179 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3182 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3183 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3185 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3186 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3191 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3195 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3196 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3198 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3201 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3203 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3207 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3210 evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3215 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3218 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3219 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3222 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3225 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3227 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3228 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3231 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3232 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3234 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3235 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3236 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3238 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
3241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3242 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3248 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3249 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3250 * we have to assume GOST support.
3252 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
3253 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3257 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3258 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3262 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3266 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3270 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3271 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3276 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3278 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3279 size_t sent_sigslen;
3281 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3285 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3289 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3290 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3291 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3292 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3293 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3296 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
3300 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3301 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3306 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3310 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3316 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3317 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3318 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3319 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3323 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3325 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3326 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3328 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3332 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3336 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3338 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3339 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3341 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3345 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3349 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3351 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3355 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3357 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3359 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3360 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3365 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3366 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3367 ret->old_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3368 if (ret->old_ctx == NULL)
3373 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
3374 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac)) == NULL)
3379 EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ret->ctx);
3385 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3388 EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->ctx);
3389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3390 HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->old_ctx);
3396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3397 HMAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3399 return ctx->old_ctx;
3403 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3408 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3410 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
3412 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3413 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3414 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
3415 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3416 if (EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
3419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3420 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3421 return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->old_ctx, key, len,
3422 EVP_get_digestbyname(md), NULL);
3427 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3429 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3430 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3432 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3433 return HMAC_Update(ctx->old_ctx, data, len);
3438 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3441 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3442 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3444 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL) {
3447 if (HMAC_Final(ctx->old_ctx, md, &l) > 0) {
3457 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3459 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3460 return EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx);
3461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3462 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3463 return HMAC_size(ctx->old_ctx);