2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
11 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
15 #include <openssl/objects.h>
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
20 #include <openssl/conf.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/provider.h>
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/evp.h"
27 #include "ssl_local.h"
28 #include <openssl/ct.h>
30 DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER)
32 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
34 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
35 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
37 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
41 tls1_generate_master_secret,
42 tls1_change_cipher_state,
43 tls1_final_finish_mac,
44 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
45 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
47 tls1_export_keying_material,
49 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
50 tls_close_construct_packet,
54 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
58 tls1_generate_master_secret,
59 tls1_change_cipher_state,
60 tls1_final_finish_mac,
61 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
62 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
64 tls1_export_keying_material,
65 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
66 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
67 tls_close_construct_packet,
71 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
75 tls1_generate_master_secret,
76 tls1_change_cipher_state,
77 tls1_final_finish_mac,
78 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
79 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
81 tls1_export_keying_material,
82 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
83 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 tls_close_construct_packet,
89 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
92 tls13_setup_key_block,
93 tls13_generate_master_secret,
94 tls13_change_cipher_state,
95 tls13_final_finish_mac,
96 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
97 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
99 tls13_export_keying_material,
100 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
101 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
102 tls_close_construct_packet,
106 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
109 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
110 * http, the cache would over fill
112 return (60 * 60 * 2);
119 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
125 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
127 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
131 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
136 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
137 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
139 s->version = s->method->version;
144 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
145 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
150 {NID_sect163k1, 0x0001},
151 {NID_sect163r1, 0x0002},
152 {NID_sect163r2, 0x0003},
153 {NID_sect193r1, 0x0004},
154 {NID_sect193r2, 0x0005},
155 {NID_sect233k1, 0x0006},
156 {NID_sect233r1, 0x0007},
157 {NID_sect239k1, 0x0008},
158 {NID_sect283k1, 0x0009},
159 {NID_sect283r1, 0x000A},
160 {NID_sect409k1, 0x000B},
161 {NID_sect409r1, 0x000C},
162 {NID_sect571k1, 0x000D},
163 {NID_sect571r1, 0x000E},
164 {NID_secp160k1, 0x000F},
165 {NID_secp160r1, 0x0010},
166 {NID_secp160r2, 0x0011},
167 {NID_secp192k1, 0x0012},
168 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 0x0013},
169 {NID_secp224k1, 0x0014},
170 {NID_secp224r1, 0x0015},
171 {NID_secp256k1, 0x0016},
172 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0x0017},
173 {NID_secp384r1, 0x0018},
174 {NID_secp521r1, 0x0019},
175 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 0x001A},
176 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 0x001B},
177 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 0x001C},
178 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 0x001D},
179 {EVP_PKEY_X448, 0x001E},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, 0x0022},
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, 0x0023},
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, 0x0024},
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, 0x0025},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 0x0026},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 0x0027},
186 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, 0x0028},
187 {NID_ffdhe2048, 0x0100},
188 {NID_ffdhe3072, 0x0101},
189 {NID_ffdhe4096, 0x0102},
190 {NID_ffdhe6144, 0x0103},
191 {NID_ffdhe8192, 0x0104}
195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
196 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
197 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
198 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
199 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
201 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
203 /* The default curves */
204 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
205 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
206 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
207 29, /* X25519 (29) */
208 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
210 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
211 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
214 34, /* GC256A (34) */
215 35, /* GC256B (35) */
216 36, /* GC256C (36) */
217 37, /* GC256D (37) */
218 38, /* GC512A (38) */
219 39, /* GC512B (39) */
220 40, /* GC512C (40) */
222 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
223 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
224 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
225 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
226 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
227 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
230 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
233 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
239 struct provider_group_data_st {
241 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
244 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
245 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
246 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
248 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
249 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
250 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
252 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
253 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
257 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
258 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
260 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
261 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
262 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
264 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
265 (ctx->group_list_max_len
266 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
267 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
269 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
272 ctx->group_list = tmp;
273 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
275 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
276 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
279 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
281 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
282 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
283 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
286 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
287 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
288 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
292 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
293 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
294 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
297 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
298 if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
299 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
303 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
304 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
305 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
308 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
310 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
311 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
312 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
315 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
316 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
317 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
321 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
322 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
323 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
327 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
328 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
329 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
333 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
334 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
335 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
339 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
340 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
341 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
345 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
346 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
347 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
351 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
352 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
353 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
357 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
358 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
360 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
361 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
363 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
364 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
365 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
366 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
367 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
368 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
371 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
372 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
373 ctx->group_list_len++;
376 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
380 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
381 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
382 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
383 ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
388 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
390 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
393 pgd.provider = provider;
394 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
395 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
398 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
400 return OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx);
403 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
407 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
408 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
409 return &ctx->group_list[i];
415 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
416 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id)
421 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
422 * work for groups we don't know about.
424 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
426 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
427 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
432 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
437 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
438 * work for groups we don't know about.
440 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
442 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
443 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
448 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
451 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
452 * the number of groups supported.
454 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
457 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
458 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
459 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
460 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
461 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
462 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
463 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
466 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
467 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
471 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
472 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
478 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
479 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
480 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
482 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
483 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
490 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
493 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion)
495 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
501 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
502 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
504 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
507 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
508 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
509 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
511 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
513 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
516 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
517 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
518 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
524 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
525 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
527 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
528 unsigned char gtmp[2];
533 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
534 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
535 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
536 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id), (void *)gtmp);
539 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
540 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
543 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
550 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
551 * if there is no match.
552 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
553 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
554 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
556 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
558 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
559 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
562 /* Can't do anything on client side */
566 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
568 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
569 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
571 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
573 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
574 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
575 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
576 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
577 /* Should never happen */
580 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
584 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
585 * otherwise peer decides.
587 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
588 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
589 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
591 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
592 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
595 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
596 uint16_t id = pref[i];
598 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
599 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
607 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
611 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
612 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
614 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
618 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
619 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
621 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
622 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
623 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
629 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
630 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
633 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
634 unsigned long idmask;
636 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
637 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
639 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
640 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
641 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
655 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
658 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
659 /* TODO(3.0): An arbitrary amount for now. Take another look at this */
660 # define MAX_GROUPLIST 40
664 int nid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
667 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
669 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
675 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
677 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
679 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
681 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
682 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
684 if (nid == NID_undef)
685 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
686 if (nid == NID_undef)
687 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
688 if (nid == NID_undef)
690 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
691 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
693 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
696 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
698 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
699 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
701 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
704 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
708 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
714 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
715 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
717 const uint16_t *groups;
723 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
724 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
725 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
727 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
728 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
730 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
731 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
734 /* Should never happen */
739 if (check_own_groups) {
740 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
741 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
742 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
746 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
749 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
753 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
754 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
757 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
758 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
759 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
760 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
764 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
768 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
772 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
774 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
775 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
776 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
778 *pformats = ecformats_default;
779 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
781 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
783 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
787 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
788 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
792 unsigned char comp_id;
795 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
796 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
798 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
799 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
801 /* Get required compression id */
802 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
803 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
804 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
806 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
811 int field_type = EC_GROUP_get_field_type(grp);
813 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
814 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
815 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
816 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
821 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
822 * supported (see RFC4492).
824 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
827 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
828 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
834 /* Return group id of a key */
835 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
837 int curve_nid = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
839 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
841 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
845 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
846 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
848 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
852 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
855 /* If not EC nothing to do */
856 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
858 /* Check compression */
859 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
861 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
863 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
866 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
869 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
872 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
876 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
877 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
878 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
879 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
880 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
882 return 0; /* Should never happen */
883 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
884 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
893 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
895 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
897 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
898 * is compatible with the client extensions.
900 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
902 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
904 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
906 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
908 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
911 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
912 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
913 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
914 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
921 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
926 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
928 /* Default sigalg schemes */
929 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
931 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
932 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
933 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
934 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
938 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
939 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
940 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
941 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
942 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
943 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
945 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
946 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
947 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
950 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
951 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
953 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
954 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
956 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
957 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
959 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
960 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
961 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
964 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
965 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
966 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
967 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
968 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
974 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
975 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
979 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
981 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
982 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
983 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
984 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
985 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
986 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
987 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
988 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
989 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
990 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
991 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
992 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
993 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
994 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
995 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
996 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
997 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
998 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
999 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1000 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1001 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1003 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1004 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1005 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1006 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1007 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1008 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1009 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1010 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1011 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1012 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1013 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1014 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1015 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1016 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1017 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1018 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1019 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1020 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1021 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1022 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1023 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1024 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1025 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1026 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1027 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1028 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1029 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1030 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1031 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1032 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1033 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1034 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1035 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1037 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1038 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1039 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1040 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1041 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1042 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1043 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1044 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1045 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1046 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1047 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1048 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1049 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1050 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1051 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1054 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1055 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1056 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1057 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1058 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1059 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1060 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1061 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1062 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1063 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1064 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1065 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1066 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1067 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1068 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1069 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1070 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1071 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1072 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1073 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1076 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1077 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1078 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1079 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1080 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1081 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1085 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1086 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1088 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1089 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1090 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1091 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1092 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1093 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1094 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1095 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1096 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1097 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1100 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1103 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1104 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1105 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1106 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1109 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1113 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1114 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1120 * Check hash is available.
1121 * TODO(3.0): This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1122 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1123 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1124 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1125 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1127 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1128 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1129 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1133 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1134 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1137 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1138 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1140 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1141 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1144 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1149 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1150 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1154 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1155 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL *s, uint16_t sigalg)
1158 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1160 for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1161 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1162 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1164 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg)
1169 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1170 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1175 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1176 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1179 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1189 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1191 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1192 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1193 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1195 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
1196 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1197 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1203 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1205 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1211 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1212 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1213 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1214 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1215 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1217 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
1223 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1224 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1225 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1227 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1234 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1236 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1239 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1241 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1248 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1249 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1251 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1254 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1256 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1263 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1266 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1268 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1269 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1271 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1273 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1277 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1279 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1281 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1282 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1285 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1287 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1289 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1292 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1296 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1299 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1303 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1304 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1305 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1306 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1308 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1309 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1312 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1313 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1318 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1319 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1320 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1322 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1323 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1324 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1325 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1326 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1327 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1329 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1330 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1336 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1337 * specified EC curve.
1339 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1341 const uint16_t *sigs;
1344 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1345 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1346 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1348 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1349 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1352 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1353 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1357 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1358 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1359 && curve == lu->curve)
1368 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1371 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1373 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1376 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1380 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1381 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
1383 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1384 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1386 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1393 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1394 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1397 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1399 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1400 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1402 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1404 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1407 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1408 /* Should never happen */
1411 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1412 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1413 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1414 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1415 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1418 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1419 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1420 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1422 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1424 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1425 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1428 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1429 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1430 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1432 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1435 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1436 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1437 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1439 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1444 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1446 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1447 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1448 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1449 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1450 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1454 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1455 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1456 int curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
1458 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1460 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1464 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1465 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1466 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1468 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1471 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1472 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1473 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1474 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1476 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1477 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1482 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1484 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1489 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1490 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1491 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1492 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1495 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1496 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1497 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1499 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1502 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1504 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1508 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1509 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1511 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1512 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1513 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1515 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1516 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
1517 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1519 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1522 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1523 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1527 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1529 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1531 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1535 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1537 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1539 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1544 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1545 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1546 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1548 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1551 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1553 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1555 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1556 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1557 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1558 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1559 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1562 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1563 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1564 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1565 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1567 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1569 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1570 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1571 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1578 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1579 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1580 * @c: cipher to check
1581 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1582 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1584 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1586 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1588 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1589 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1591 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1593 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1594 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1597 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1598 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1600 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1601 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1602 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1604 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1607 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1608 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1611 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1614 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1616 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1618 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1621 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1625 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1626 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1627 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1628 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1629 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1630 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1631 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1633 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1634 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1636 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1637 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1638 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1639 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1641 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1642 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1647 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1648 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1649 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1650 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1658 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1660 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1666 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1668 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1673 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1675 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1676 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1677 * point to the resulting session.
1679 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1683 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1686 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1689 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1690 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1693 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1694 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1696 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1697 if (!ticketext->present)
1698 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1700 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1702 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1703 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1707 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1709 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1710 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1711 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1712 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1715 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1716 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1717 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1718 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1719 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1720 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1722 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1723 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1724 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1725 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1726 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1727 * point to the resulting session.
1729 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1730 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1731 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1733 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1734 unsigned char *sdec;
1735 const unsigned char *p;
1736 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1737 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1739 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1740 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1741 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1742 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1744 if (eticklen == 0) {
1746 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1747 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1749 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1752 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1754 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1755 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1756 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1757 * calculate the master secret later.
1759 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1763 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1764 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1765 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1769 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1770 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1772 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1775 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1777 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1781 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1783 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1786 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1789 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1790 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1791 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1793 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1796 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1797 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1798 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1799 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1800 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1803 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1807 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1813 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1815 /* Check key name matches */
1816 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1817 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1818 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1822 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1824 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1825 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1826 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1828 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1829 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1830 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1831 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1832 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1835 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1836 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1840 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1843 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1845 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1849 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1851 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1852 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1856 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1857 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1858 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1859 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1863 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1864 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1867 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1868 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1869 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1870 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1871 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1872 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1873 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1875 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1878 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1880 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1886 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1890 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1892 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1894 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1898 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1899 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1900 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1904 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1905 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1908 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1910 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1915 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1917 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1920 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1921 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
1924 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1925 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1926 * performs any action
1928 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1929 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1930 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1931 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1932 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1933 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1936 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1937 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1938 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1940 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1942 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1943 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1946 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1947 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1948 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1952 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1953 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1954 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1955 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1956 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1960 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1961 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1962 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1963 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1964 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1965 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1966 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1968 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1972 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1976 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1978 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1979 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1980 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1981 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1990 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1991 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1993 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1996 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
1998 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1999 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2001 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
2002 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2003 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2004 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2005 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2008 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2009 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
2012 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2013 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2014 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2015 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2016 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
2019 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2020 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2022 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2025 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2026 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2027 * ciphersuites enabled.
2030 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2033 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
2034 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2035 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2036 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2038 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2039 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2040 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2043 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2051 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2052 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
2053 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2054 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2055 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2059 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2060 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2064 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
2066 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2067 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2068 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2070 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2073 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2074 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2075 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2076 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2081 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2085 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2086 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2087 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2088 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2090 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2093 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2094 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2099 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2100 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2102 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2104 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2107 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2108 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2110 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2111 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2112 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2113 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2121 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2122 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2123 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2124 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2126 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2127 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2128 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2129 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2131 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2132 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2134 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2135 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2146 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2147 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2149 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2150 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2152 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2154 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2156 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2157 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2158 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2159 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2160 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2161 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2162 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2163 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2164 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2165 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2167 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2168 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2171 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2172 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2176 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2177 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2179 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2181 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2185 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2189 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2190 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2194 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2200 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2202 /* Invalid data length */
2203 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2208 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2212 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2220 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2227 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2229 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2230 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2232 /* Should never happen */
2233 if (s->cert == NULL)
2237 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2238 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2240 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2241 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2245 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2247 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2250 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2252 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2255 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2258 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2259 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2260 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2262 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2263 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2265 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2266 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
2267 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2272 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2273 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2274 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2276 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2277 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2278 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2281 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2283 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2287 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2289 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2290 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2292 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2294 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2295 if (psignhash != NULL)
2296 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2298 return (int)numsigalgs;
2301 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2302 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2303 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2305 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2306 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2308 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2309 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2311 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2313 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2315 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2316 if (psignhash != NULL)
2317 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2319 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2321 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2322 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2325 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2326 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2330 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2331 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2334 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2336 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2337 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2338 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2339 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2340 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2341 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2342 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2343 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2345 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2346 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2347 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2350 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2351 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2353 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2355 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2357 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2358 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2359 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2362 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2364 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2366 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2368 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2370 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2371 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2372 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2373 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2374 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2375 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2379 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2381 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2382 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2386 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2393 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2394 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2395 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2397 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2399 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2400 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2404 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2408 /* Reject duplicates */
2409 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2410 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2419 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2420 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2422 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2426 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2430 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2433 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2438 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2442 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2445 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2446 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2447 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2449 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2450 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2451 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2457 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2459 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2464 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2468 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2470 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2471 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2472 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2474 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2476 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2477 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2482 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2487 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2488 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2489 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2491 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2492 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2493 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2499 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2503 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2505 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2507 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2509 if (default_nid == -1)
2511 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2513 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2515 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2517 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2518 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2519 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2521 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2524 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2526 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2527 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2528 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2529 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2530 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2536 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2537 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2539 const X509_NAME *nm;
2541 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2542 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2543 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2550 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2551 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2552 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2553 * attempting to use them.
2556 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2558 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2559 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2560 /* Strict mode flags */
2561 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2562 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2563 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2565 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2570 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2571 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2574 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2575 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2577 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2580 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2582 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2583 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2585 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2587 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2588 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2597 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2600 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2602 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2603 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2605 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2612 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2613 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2614 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2615 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2616 else if (!check_flags)
2621 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2622 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2624 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2627 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2628 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2630 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2634 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2635 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2638 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2639 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2640 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2644 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2645 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2648 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2649 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2650 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2653 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2654 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2655 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2658 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2659 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2660 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2669 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2670 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2672 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2674 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2675 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2676 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2678 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2681 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2688 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2689 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2691 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2692 * so check_flags is always set.
2694 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2695 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2696 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2700 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2701 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2702 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2703 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2705 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2712 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2713 else if (check_flags)
2714 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2716 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2717 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2718 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2719 else if (!check_flags)
2722 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2723 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2724 else if (strict_mode) {
2725 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2726 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2727 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2728 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2730 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2737 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2738 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2741 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2742 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2743 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2744 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2745 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2746 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2749 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2752 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2753 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2754 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2758 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2761 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2764 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2766 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2767 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2769 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2770 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2771 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2773 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2774 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2775 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2776 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2777 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2782 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2785 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2787 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2788 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2792 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2793 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2795 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2798 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2802 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2805 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2806 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2813 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2814 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2816 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2817 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2818 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2819 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2820 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2821 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2822 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2823 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2824 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2827 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2828 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2830 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2834 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2838 int dh_secbits = 80;
2839 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2840 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2841 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2846 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2848 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2856 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2861 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2862 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2863 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2864 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2865 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2866 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2867 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2868 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2870 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2871 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2881 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2884 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2887 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2888 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2889 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2890 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2892 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2895 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2897 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2900 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2902 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2903 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2904 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2905 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2907 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2909 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2910 if (nid == NID_undef)
2913 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2915 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2918 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2921 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2923 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2924 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2926 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2927 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2929 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2930 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2935 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2936 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2937 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2940 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2942 int rv, start_idx, i;
2944 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2949 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2953 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2954 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2955 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2963 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2964 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2967 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2969 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2970 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2972 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2974 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2975 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2976 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2979 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2983 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
2984 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
2986 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
2988 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2991 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2992 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
2996 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
2997 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3000 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
3006 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3007 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3009 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3010 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3012 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3013 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3018 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
3019 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3020 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3021 * signing certificate.
3023 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3030 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3031 * a viable public key is permitted.
3037 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3038 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3039 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3040 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3041 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3043 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3045 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3048 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3051 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3052 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3056 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3057 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3059 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3064 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3067 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3068 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3071 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3075 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3076 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3077 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3079 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3081 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3088 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3089 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3090 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3092 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3093 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3094 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3095 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3096 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3098 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3099 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
3101 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3102 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3105 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3106 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3108 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3111 curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3112 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3117 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3118 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3119 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
3125 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3132 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3133 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3135 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3136 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3138 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3139 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3140 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3142 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
3144 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3147 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3148 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3150 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3151 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3156 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3160 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3161 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3163 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3166 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3168 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3172 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3175 evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3180 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3183 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3184 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3187 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3190 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3192 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3193 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3196 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3197 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3199 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3200 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3201 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3203 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
3206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3207 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3213 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3214 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3215 * we have to assume GOST support.
3217 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
3218 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3222 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3223 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3227 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3231 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3235 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3236 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3241 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3243 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3244 size_t sent_sigslen;
3246 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3249 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3250 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3254 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3255 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3256 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3257 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3258 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3261 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
3265 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3266 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3271 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3275 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3281 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3282 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3283 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3284 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3288 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3290 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3291 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3293 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3297 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3301 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3303 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3304 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3306 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3310 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3314 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3316 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3320 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3322 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3324 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3325 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3330 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3331 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3332 ret->old_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3333 if (ret->old_ctx == NULL)
3338 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
3339 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac)) == NULL)
3344 EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ret->ctx);
3350 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3353 EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->ctx);
3354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3355 HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->old_ctx);
3361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3362 HMAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3364 return ctx->old_ctx;
3368 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3373 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3375 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
3377 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3378 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3379 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
3380 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3381 if (EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
3384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3385 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3386 return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->old_ctx, key, len,
3387 EVP_get_digestbyname(md), NULL);
3392 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3394 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3395 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3397 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3398 return HMAC_Update(ctx->old_ctx, data, len);
3403 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3406 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3407 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3409 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL) {
3412 if (HMAC_Final(ctx->old_ctx, md, &l) > 0) {
3422 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3424 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3425 return EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx);
3426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3427 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3428 return HMAC_size(ctx->old_ctx);