From da6ce182795432c4ffb658d87ff2de6967b4e5e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 11:54:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] PR: 2006 Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann Approved by: steve@openssl.org Do not use multiple DTLS records for a single user message --- ssl/d1_pkt.c | 67 ++++++--------------------------------------------- ssl/ssl.h | 1 + ssl/ssl_err.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c index 0f67f77b1d..ff92535980 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c +++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c @@ -1213,7 +1213,6 @@ err: int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { - unsigned int n,tot; int i; if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) @@ -1227,31 +1226,14 @@ dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) } } - tot = s->s3->wnum; - n = len - tot; - - while( n) + if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { - /* dtls1_write_bytes sends one record at a time, sized according to - * the currently known MTU */ - i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len); - if (i <= 0) return i; - - if ((i == (int)n) || - (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && - (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) - { - /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment - * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ - s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; - return tot+i; - } - - tot += i; - n-=i; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG); + return -1; } - return tot; + i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len); + return i; } @@ -1292,46 +1274,13 @@ have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ -int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) +int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len) { - const unsigned char *buf=buf_; - unsigned int tot,n,nw; int i; - unsigned int mtu; + OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - tot=s->s3->wnum; - - n=(len-tot); - - /* handshake layer figures out MTU for itself, but data records - * are also sent through this interface, so need to figure out MTU */ -#if 0 - mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU, 0, NULL); - mtu += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; /* HM already inserted */ -#endif - mtu = s->d1->mtu; - - if (mtu > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) - mtu = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; - - if (n > mtu) - nw=mtu; - else - nw=n; - - i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); - if (i <= 0) - { - s->s3->wnum=tot; - return i; - } - - if ( (int)s->s3->wnum + i == len) - s->s3->wnum = 0; - else - s->s3->wnum += i; - + i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0); return i; } diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h index 7a554a0a92..9e2b439476 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/ssl/ssl.h @@ -1898,6 +1898,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281 #define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148 #define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149 +#define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 318 #define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID 309 #define SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER 310 #define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 150 diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c index f8f678fb08..f965463bfa 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_err.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c @@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),"decryption failed or bad record mac"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),"dh public value length is wrong"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED) ,"digest check failed"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG) ,"dtls message too big"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID),"duplicate compression id"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER),"ecgroup too large for cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"encrypted length too long"}, -- 2.25.1