From c11d372b3b7080dc153902f14a0d4b402e2dfc92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Billy Brumley Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2018 17:45:51 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] make EC_GROUP_do_inverse_ord more robust Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6116) --- crypto/ec/ec_lib.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c | 41 +++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c index d0393e8bad..76f05a040a 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c @@ -1017,13 +1017,80 @@ int ec_group_simple_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group) return BN_num_bits(group->order); } +static int ec_field_inverse_mod_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, + BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + BIGNUM *exp = NULL; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new()) == NULL) + return 0; + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + exp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (exp == NULL) + goto err; + + /* Check if optimized inverse is implemented */ + if (group->mont_data != NULL) { + /*- + * We want inverse in constant time, therefore we utilize the fact + * order must be prime and use Fermats Little Theorem instead. + */ + if (!BN_set_word(exp, 2)) + goto err; + if (!BN_sub(exp, group->order, exp)) + goto err; + /*- + * Exponent X is public. + * No need for scatter-gather or BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. + */ + if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, x, exp, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data)) + goto err; + /* Inverse of zero doesn't exist. Let the fallback catch it. */ + if (BN_is_zero(r)) + ret = 0; + else + ret = 1; + } + + /*- + * Fallback to classic inverse, blinded. + * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is a don't care here. + */ + if (ret == 0) { + do { + if (!BN_priv_rand_range(exp, group->order)) + goto err; + } while (BN_is_zero(exp)); + + /* r := x * exp */ + if (!BN_mod_mul(r, x, exp, group->order, ctx)) + goto err; + /* r := 1/(x * exp) */ + if (!BN_mod_inverse(r, r, group->order, ctx)) + goto err; + /* r := exp/(x * exp) = 1/x */ + if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, exp, group->order, ctx)) + goto err; + + ret = 1; + } + + err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + int EC_GROUP_do_inverse_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *res, BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->field_inverse_mod_ord != NULL) return group->meth->field_inverse_mod_ord(group, res, x, ctx); else - return 0; + return ec_field_inverse_mod_ord(group, res, x, ctx); } /*- diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c index cdd0cf0228..f7f80b3a2b 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c @@ -136,34 +136,10 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, } while (BN_is_zero(r)); - /* Check if optimized inverse is implemented */ - if (EC_GROUP_do_inverse_ord(group, k, k, ctx) == 0) { - /* compute the inverse of k */ - if (group->mont_data != NULL) { - /* - * We want inverse in constant time, therefore we utilize the fact - * order must be prime and use Fermats Little Theorem instead. - */ - if (!BN_set_word(X, 2)) { - ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!BN_mod_sub(X, order, X, order, ctx)) { - ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - BN_set_flags(X, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(k, k, X, order, ctx, - group->mont_data)) { - ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - } else { - if (!BN_mod_inverse(k, k, order, ctx)) { - ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - } + /* compute the inverse of k */ + if (!EC_GROUP_do_inverse_ord(group, k, k, ctx)) { + ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; } /* clear old values if necessary */ @@ -449,12 +425,9 @@ int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, goto err; } /* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */ - /* Check if optimized inverse is implemented */ - if (EC_GROUP_do_inverse_ord(group, u2, sig->s, ctx) == 0) { - if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) { - ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } + if (!EC_GROUP_do_inverse_ord(group, u2, sig->s, ctx)) { + ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; } /* digest -> m */ i = BN_num_bits(order); -- 2.25.1