From bfce617770d1a4b1e3942842a1da828c46a1c8ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Levitte Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2002 20:11:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Recent changes. --- CHANGES | 6 ++++++ crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c | 9 +++++---- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 5aff39d71f..9042dac243 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -4,6 +4,12 @@ Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.6f [XX xxx XXXX] + *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX + and get fix the header length calculation. + [Florian Weimer , + Alon Kantor (and others), + Steve Henson] + *) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer overflow checks added in 0.9.6e. This prevents DoS (the assertions could call abort()). diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c index 1fe3fbc1fa..e4a56a926a 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ */ #include +#include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include @@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ int ASN1_get_object(unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag, int *pclass, (int)(omax+ *pp)); #endif - if (*plength > (omax - (*pp - p))) + if (*plength > (omax - (p - *pp))) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); /* Set this so that even if things are not long enough @@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ err: static int asn1_get_length(unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl, int max) { unsigned char *p= *pp; - long ret=0; + unsigned long ret=0; int i; if (max-- < 1) return(0); @@ -170,10 +171,10 @@ static int asn1_get_length(unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl, int max) else ret=i; } - if (ret < 0) + if (ret > LONG_MAX) return 0; *pp=p; - *rl=ret; + *rl=(long)ret; return(1); } -- 2.25.1