From ba8bdea7712e100048142783d225a849ed4c1be6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" Date: Wed, 26 Dec 2012 16:01:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] add suite B chain validation flags and associated verify errors (backport from HEAD) --- CHANGES | 4 ++ crypto/x509/x509.h | 5 ++ crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c | 124 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ crypto/x509/x509_txt.c | 13 +++++ crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 20 +++++++ crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h | 14 +++++ 6 files changed, 180 insertions(+) diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 08a67fbd1b..dafce7715a 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ OID NID. [Steve Henson] + *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check + algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert. + [Steve Henson] + *) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509.h b/crypto/x509/x509.h index ea310b4e80..191f5ab6a6 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509.h +++ b/crypto/x509/x509.h @@ -965,6 +965,11 @@ int X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(X509_REVOKED *r, ASN1_TIME *tm); int X509_REQ_check_private_key(X509_REQ *x509,EVP_PKEY *pkey); int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x509,EVP_PKEY *pkey); +int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, + X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, + unsigned long flags); +int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, + unsigned long flags); int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b); unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a); diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c index 352aa37434..4f18a1bcdd 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c @@ -341,3 +341,127 @@ int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) return 1; return 0; } + +/* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and + * the NID of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is + * a pointer to a flags field which must contain the suite B verification + * flags. + */ + +static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) + { + const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; + int curve_nid; + if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) + grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); + if (!grp) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; + curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); + /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ + if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) /* P-384 */ + { + /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with + * curve. + */ + if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; + if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; + /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ + *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; + } + else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) /* P-256 */ + { + if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; + if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; + } + else + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; + + return X509_V_OK; + } + +int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, + unsigned long flags) + { + int rv, i, sign_nid; + EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; + unsigned long tflags; + if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) + return X509_V_OK; + tflags = flags; + /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ + if (x == NULL) + { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); + i = 1; + } + else + i = 0; + + if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) + { + rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; + /* Correct error depth */ + i = 0; + goto end; + } + + pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); + /* Check EE key only */ + rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); + if (rv != X509_V_OK) + { + /* Correct error depth */ + i = 0; + goto end; + } + for(; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) + { + sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); + if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) + { + rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; + goto end; + } + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); + rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); + if (rv != X509_V_OK) + goto end; + } + + /* Final check: root CA signature */ + rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); + end: + if (pk) + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + if (rv != X509_V_OK) + { + /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ + if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM + || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) + i--; + /* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing + * P-384 with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. + */ + if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) + rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; + if (perror_depth) + *perror_depth = i; + } + return rv; + } + +int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) + { + int sign_nid; + if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) + return X509_V_OK; + sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); + return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); + } + diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c index e444176e90..699f72ef76 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c @@ -184,6 +184,19 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n) case X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR: return("CRL path validation error"); + case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION: + return("Suite B: certificate version invalid"); + case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM: + return("Suite B: invalid public key algorithm"); + case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE: + return("Suite B: invalid ECC curve"); + case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM: + return("Suite B: invalid signature algorithm"); + case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED: + return("Suite B: curve not allowed for this LOS"); + case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256: + return("Suite B: cannot sign P-384 with P-256"); + case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: return("Hostname mismatch"); case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index 1b3c62ef7d..33adb43465 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -408,6 +408,17 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); if(!ok) goto end; + i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, + ctx->param->flags); + if (i != X509_V_OK) + { + ctx->error = i; + ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); + ok = cb(0, ctx); + if (!ok) + goto end; + } + /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ if (ctx->verify != NULL) ok=ctx->verify(ctx); @@ -1529,6 +1540,15 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) } else { + int rv; + rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); + if (rv != X509_V_OK) + { + ctx->error=rv; + ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); + if (!ok) + goto err; + } /* Verify CRL signature */ if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h index 40089cf50f..5703045216 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h @@ -360,6 +360,14 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); #define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX 53 #define X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR 54 +/* Suite B mode algorithm violation */ +#define X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION 56 +#define X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM 57 +#define X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE 58 +#define X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 59 +#define X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED 60 +#define X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256 61 + /* Host, email and IP check errors */ #define X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH 62 #define X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH 63 @@ -402,6 +410,12 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); #define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE 0x4000 /* Use trusted store first */ #define X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST 0x8000 +/* Suite B 128 bit only mode: not normally used */ +#define X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY 0x10000 +/* Suite B 192 bit only mode */ +#define X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS 0x20000 +/* Suite B 128 bit mode allowing 192 bit algorithms */ +#define X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS 0x30000 /* Allow partial chains if at least one certificate is in trusted store */ #define X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN 0x80000 -- 2.25.1