From b723a7b11bef9a467bbde4534d66a4c7e1c28331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" Date: Sun, 7 May 2006 12:27:48 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Don't check for padding bug if compression is negotiated. PR: 1204 --- CHANGES | 8 +++++++- ssl/t1_enc.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index ee9e4250f6..c9c1c50cdb 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -4,7 +4,13 @@ Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [xx XXX xxxx] - *) + *) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding + bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not + necessarily true if compresssion is enabled and can result in false + positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient + code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by + now or any which still have the bug do not support compression. + [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b [04 May 2006] diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c index c544c76495..e0ce681574 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -628,7 +628,15 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) { ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */ i++; - if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) + /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet + * may not be of even length so the padding bug check + * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been + * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed + * now or no buggy implementation supports compression + * [steve] + */ + if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) + && !s->expand) { /* First packet is even in size, so check */ if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, -- 2.25.1