From b6c3931ad6554357a108127797c8d7097a93f18f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stijn Tintel Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 17:54:59 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] hostapd: backport extra changes related to KRACK While these changes are not included in the advisory, upstream encourages users to merge them. See http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/hostap/2017-October/037989.html Added 013-Add-hostapd-options-wpa_group_update_count-and-wpa_p.patch so that 016-Optional-AP-side-workaround-for-key-reinstallation-a.patch applies without having to rework it. Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel --- ...ons-wpa_group_update_count-and-wpa_p.patch | 305 ++++++++++++++++++ ...e-against-PTK-reinstalls-in-4-way-ha.patch | 34 ++ ...-and-check-for-this-when-deriving-PT.patch | 53 +++ ...-workaround-for-key-reinstallation-a.patch | 221 +++++++++++++ ...stentcy-checks-for-PTK-component-len.patch | 92 ++++++ ...rmation-in-supplicant-state-machine-.patch | 25 ++ 6 files changed, 730 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/013-Add-hostapd-options-wpa_group_update_count-and-wpa_p.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/014-WPA-Extra-defense-against-PTK-reinstalls-in-4-way-ha.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/015-Clear-PMK-length-and-check-for-this-when-deriving-PT.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/016-Optional-AP-side-workaround-for-key-reinstallation-a.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/017-Additional-consistentcy-checks-for-PTK-component-len.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/018-Clear-BSSID-information-in-supplicant-state-machine-.patch diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/013-Add-hostapd-options-wpa_group_update_count-and-wpa_p.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/013-Add-hostapd-options-wpa_group_update_count-and-wpa_p.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..623c2be345 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/013-Add-hostapd-options-wpa_group_update_count-and-wpa_p.patch @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +From 41f140d38617e1fd3fa88c1667c1bce0cad79224 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Kelleter?= +Date: Thu, 5 Jan 2017 17:00:33 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Add hostapd options wpa_group_update_count and + wpa_pairwise_update_count +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +wpa_group_update_count and wpa_pairwise_update_count can now be used to +set the GTK and PTK rekey retry limits (dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount +and dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount). Defaults set to current +hardcoded value (4). + +Some stations may suffer from frequent deauthentications due to GTK +rekey failures: EAPOL 1/2 frame is not answered during the total timeout +period of currently ~3.5 seconds. For example, a Galaxy S6 with Android +6.0.1 appears to go into power save mode for up to 5 seconds. Increasing +wpa_group_update_count to 6 fixed this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Günther Kelleter +--- + hostapd/config_file.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ + hostapd/hostapd.conf | 11 +++++++++++ + src/ap/ap_config.c | 2 ++ + src/ap/ap_config.h | 2 ++ + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++------------------- + src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 2 ++ + src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c | 2 ++ + src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 4 ++-- + wpa_supplicant/ibss_rsn.c | 2 ++ + wpa_supplicant/mesh_rsn.c | 2 ++ + 10 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hostapd/config_file.c b/hostapd/config_file.c +index 8cfa198c3..02693a5b1 100644 +--- a/hostapd/config_file.c ++++ b/hostapd/config_file.c +@@ -2489,6 +2489,28 @@ static int hostapd_config_fill(struct hostapd_config *conf, + bss->wpa_gmk_rekey = atoi(pos); + } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_ptk_rekey") == 0) { + bss->wpa_ptk_rekey = atoi(pos); ++ } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_group_update_count") == 0) { ++ char *endp; ++ unsigned long val = strtoul(pos, &endp, 0); ++ ++ if (*endp || val < 1 || val > (u32) -1) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "Line %d: Invalid wpa_group_update_count=%lu; allowed range 1..4294967295", ++ line, val); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ bss->wpa_group_update_count = (u32) val; ++ } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_pairwise_update_count") == 0) { ++ char *endp; ++ unsigned long val = strtoul(pos, &endp, 0); ++ ++ if (*endp || val < 1 || val > (u32) -1) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "Line %d: Invalid wpa_pairwise_update_count=%lu; allowed range 1..4294967295", ++ line, val); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = (u32) val; + } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_passphrase") == 0) { + int len = os_strlen(pos); + if (len < 8 || len > 63) { +diff --git a/hostapd/hostapd.conf b/hostapd/hostapd.conf +index 314f3842b..1fb1bd987 100644 +--- a/hostapd/hostapd.conf ++++ b/hostapd/hostapd.conf +@@ -1221,6 +1221,11 @@ own_ip_addr=127.0.0.1 + # (dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict) + #wpa_strict_rekey=1 + ++# The number of times EAPOL-Key Message 1/2 in the RSN Group Key Handshake is ++#retried per GTK Handshake attempt. (dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount) ++# Range 1..4294967295; default: 4 ++#wpa_group_update_count=4 ++ + # Time interval for rekeying GMK (master key used internally to generate GTKs + # (in seconds). + #wpa_gmk_rekey=86400 +@@ -1229,6 +1234,12 @@ own_ip_addr=127.0.0.1 + # PTK to mitigate some attacks against TKIP deficiencies. + #wpa_ptk_rekey=600 + ++# The number of times EAPOL-Key Message 1/4 and Message 3/4 in the RSN 4-Way ++# Handshake are retried per 4-Way Handshake attempt. ++# (dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) ++# Range 1..4294967295; default: 4 ++#wpa_pairwise_update_count=4 ++ + # Enable IEEE 802.11i/RSN/WPA2 pre-authentication. This is used to speed up + # roaming be pre-authenticating IEEE 802.1X/EAP part of the full RSN + # authentication and key handshake before actually associating with a new AP. +diff --git a/src/ap/ap_config.c b/src/ap/ap_config.c +index c2b80ad97..9abcab7fb 100644 +--- a/src/ap/ap_config.c ++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.c +@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ void hostapd_config_defaults_bss(struct hostapd_bss_config *bss) + + bss->wpa_group_rekey = 600; + bss->wpa_gmk_rekey = 86400; ++ bss->wpa_group_update_count = 4; ++ bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = 4; + bss->wpa_key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK; + bss->wpa_pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; + bss->wpa_group = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; +diff --git a/src/ap/ap_config.h b/src/ap/ap_config.h +index 31b1e7762..7495dc96f 100644 +--- a/src/ap/ap_config.h ++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h +@@ -330,6 +330,8 @@ struct hostapd_bss_config { + int wpa_strict_rekey; + int wpa_gmk_rekey; + int wpa_ptk_rekey; ++ u32 wpa_group_update_count; ++ u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count; + int rsn_pairwise; + int rsn_preauth; + char *rsn_preauth_interfaces; +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +index 0bd901fbf..8c082f426 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -60,8 +60,6 @@ static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, + struct wpa_group *group); + static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos); + +-static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount = 4; +-static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount = 4; + static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */ + static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */ + static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */ +@@ -1623,7 +1621,7 @@ static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, + { + int timeout_ms; + int pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE; +- int ctr; ++ u32 ctr; + + if (sm == NULL) + return; +@@ -1640,7 +1638,7 @@ static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, + if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) + sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1; + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry " +- "counter %d)", timeout_ms, ctr); ++ "counter %u)", timeout_ms, ctr); + eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000, (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000, + wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm); + } +@@ -2002,7 +2000,7 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART) + sm->alt_snonce_valid = FALSE; + + sm->TimeoutCtr++; +- if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) { ++ if (sm->TimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) { + /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect + * immediately following this. */ + return; +@@ -2693,7 +2691,7 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING) + sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE; + + sm->TimeoutCtr++; +- if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) { ++ if (sm->TimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) { + /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect + * immediately following this. */ + return; +@@ -2988,11 +2986,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) + sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING); + else if (sm->TimeoutCtr > +- (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) { ++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) { + wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++; +- wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, +- "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached", +- dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount); ++ wpa_auth_vlogger( ++ sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, ++ "PTKSTART: Retry limit %u reached", ++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count); + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT); + } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); +@@ -3016,12 +3015,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) + sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE); + else if (sm->TimeoutCtr > +- (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) { ++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) { + wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++; +- wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, +- "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d " +- "reached", +- dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount); ++ wpa_auth_vlogger( ++ sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, ++ "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %u reached", ++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count); + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT); + } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING); +@@ -3056,7 +3055,7 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING) + SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group); + + sm->GTimeoutCtr++; +- if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount) { ++ if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count) { + /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect + * immediately following this. */ + return; +@@ -3154,7 +3153,7 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP) + !sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED); + else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > +- (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount) ++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR); + else if (sm->TimeoutEvt) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING); +@@ -3614,8 +3613,8 @@ int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, char *buf, size_t buflen) + "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n", + RSN_VERSION, + !!wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey, +- dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount, +- dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount, ++ wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count, ++ wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count, + wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group) * 8, + dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime, + dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold, +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +index 9cbe3889b..0920a169d 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +@@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ struct wpa_auth_config { + int wpa_strict_rekey; + int wpa_gmk_rekey; + int wpa_ptk_rekey; ++ u32 wpa_group_update_count; ++ u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count; + int rsn_pairwise; + int rsn_preauth; + int eapol_version; +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c +index 22518a1f1..394f77a66 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c +@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ static void hostapd_wpa_auth_conf(struct hostapd_bss_config *conf, + wconf->wpa_strict_rekey = conf->wpa_strict_rekey; + wconf->wpa_gmk_rekey = conf->wpa_gmk_rekey; + wconf->wpa_ptk_rekey = conf->wpa_ptk_rekey; ++ wconf->wpa_group_update_count = conf->wpa_group_update_count; ++ wconf->wpa_pairwise_update_count = conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count; + wconf->rsn_pairwise = conf->rsn_pairwise; + wconf->rsn_preauth = conf->rsn_preauth; + wconf->eapol_version = conf->eapol_version; +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +index 065a624ad..cda2c5065 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { + Boolean AuthenticationRequest; + Boolean ReAuthenticationRequest; + Boolean Disconnect; +- int TimeoutCtr; +- int GTimeoutCtr; ++ u32 TimeoutCtr; ++ u32 GTimeoutCtr; + Boolean TimeoutEvt; + Boolean EAPOLKeyReceived; + Boolean EAPOLKeyPairwise; +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/ibss_rsn.c b/wpa_supplicant/ibss_rsn.c +index 521a692ba..954061ae4 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/ibss_rsn.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/ibss_rsn.c +@@ -428,6 +428,8 @@ static int ibss_rsn_auth_init_group(struct ibss_rsn *ibss_rsn, + conf.wpa_group = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; + conf.eapol_version = 2; + conf.wpa_group_rekey = ssid->group_rekey ? ssid->group_rekey : 600; ++ conf.wpa_group_update_count = 4; ++ conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count = 4; + + ibss_rsn->auth_group = wpa_init(own_addr, &conf, &cb, ibss_rsn); + if (ibss_rsn->auth_group == NULL) { +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/mesh_rsn.c b/wpa_supplicant/mesh_rsn.c +index 33040f30b..628382cbf 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/mesh_rsn.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/mesh_rsn.c +@@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ static int __mesh_rsn_auth_init(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, const u8 *addr, + conf.wpa_group = rsn->group_cipher; + conf.eapol_version = 0; + conf.wpa_group_rekey = -1; ++ conf.wpa_group_update_count = 4; ++ conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count = 4; + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + conf.ieee80211w = ieee80211w; + if (ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) +-- +2.13.6 + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/014-WPA-Extra-defense-against-PTK-reinstalls-in-4-way-ha.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/014-WPA-Extra-defense-against-PTK-reinstalls-in-4-way-ha.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..40f6b56965 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/014-WPA-Extra-defense-against-PTK-reinstalls-in-4-way-ha.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From a00e946c1c9a1f9cc65c72900d2a444ceb1f872e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef +Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 23:53:01 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Extra defense against PTK reinstalls in 4-way handshake + +Currently, reinstallations of the PTK are prevented by (1) assuring the +same TPTK is only set once as the PTK, and (2) that one particular PTK +is only installed once. This patch makes it more explicit that point (1) +is required to prevent key reinstallations. At the same time, this patch +hardens wpa_supplicant such that future changes do not accidentally +break this property. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -1728,6 +1728,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k + sm->ptk_set = 1; + os_memcpy(&sm->ptk, &sm->tptk, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); ++ /* ++ * This assures the same TPTK in sm->tptk can never be ++ * copied twice to sm->pkt as the new PTK. In ++ * combination with the installed flag in the wpa_ptk ++ * struct, this assures the same PTK is only installed ++ * once. ++ */ ++ sm->renew_snonce = 1; + } + } + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/015-Clear-PMK-length-and-check-for-this-when-deriving-PT.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/015-Clear-PMK-length-and-check-for-this-when-deriving-PT.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed7d79ec1b --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/015-Clear-PMK-length-and-check-for-this-when-deriving-PT.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From b488a12948751f57871f09baa345e59b23959a41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2017 13:18:02 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Clear PMK length and check for this when deriving PTK + +Instead of setting the default PMK length for the cleared PMK, set the +length to 0 and explicitly check for this when deriving PTK to avoid +unexpected key derivation with an all-zeroes key should it be possible +to somehow trigger PTK derivation to happen before PMK derivation. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/common/wpa_common.c | 5 +++++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 7 ++++--- + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.c ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.c +@@ -225,6 +225,11 @@ int wpa_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t + u8 tmp[WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN]; + size_t ptk_len; + ++ if (pmk_len == 0) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: No PMK set for PT derivation"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + if (os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) < 0) { + os_memcpy(data, addr1, ETH_ALEN); + os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN); +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -584,7 +584,8 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_ + /* Calculate PTK which will be stored as a temporary PTK until it has + * been verified when processing message 3/4. */ + ptk = &sm->tptk; +- wpa_derive_ptk(sm, src_addr, key, ptk); ++ if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm, src_addr, key, ptk) < 0) ++ goto failed; + if (sm->pairwise_cipher == WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) { + u8 buf[8]; + /* Supplicant: swap tx/rx Mic keys */ +@@ -2705,8 +2706,8 @@ void wpa_sm_set_pmk_from_pmksa(struct wp + sm->pmk_len = sm->cur_pmksa->pmk_len; + os_memcpy(sm->pmk, sm->cur_pmksa->pmk, sm->pmk_len); + } else { +- sm->pmk_len = PMK_LEN; +- os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, PMK_LEN); ++ sm->pmk_len = 0; ++ os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, PMK_LEN_MAX); + } + } + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/016-Optional-AP-side-workaround-for-key-reinstallation-a.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/016-Optional-AP-side-workaround-for-key-reinstallation-a.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e413521cd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/016-Optional-AP-side-workaround-for-key-reinstallation-a.patch @@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ +From 6f234c1e2ee1ede29f2412b7012b3345ed8e52d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 18:37:43 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Optional AP side workaround for key reinstallation attacks + +This adds a new hostapd configuration parameter +wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1 that can be used to disable +retransmission of EAPOL-Key frames that are used to install +keys (EAPOL-Key message 3/4 and group message 1/2). This is +similar to setting wpa_group_update_count=1 and +wpa_pairwise_update_count=1, but with no impact to message 1/4 +retries and with extended timeout for messages 4/4 and group +message 2/2 to avoid causing issues with stations that may use +aggressive power saving have very long time in replying to the +EAPOL-Key messages. + +This option can be used to work around key reinstallation attacks +on the station (supplicant) side in cases those station devices +cannot be updated for some reason. By removing the +retransmissions the attacker cannot cause key reinstallation with +a delayed frame transmission. This is related to the station side +vulnerabilities CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079, +CVE-2017-13080, and CVE-2017-13081. + +This workaround might cause interoperability issues and reduced +robustness of key negotiation especially in environments with +heavy traffic load due to the number of attempts to perform the +key exchange is reduced significantly. As such, this workaround +is disabled by default (unless overridden in build +configuration). To enable this, set the parameter to 1. + +It is also possible to enable this in the build by default by +adding the following to the build configuration: + +CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES=1 + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + hostapd/config_file.c | 2 ++ + hostapd/defconfig | 4 ++++ + hostapd/hostapd.conf | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + src/ap/ap_config.c | 6 ++++++ + src/ap/ap_config.h | 1 + + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- + src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 1 + + src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c | 2 ++ + 8 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/hostapd/config_file.c ++++ b/hostapd/config_file.c +@@ -2515,6 +2515,8 @@ static int hostapd_config_fill(struct ho + return 1; + } + bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = (u32) val; ++ } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries") == 0) { ++ bss->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries = atoi(pos); + } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_passphrase") == 0) { + int len = os_strlen(pos); + if (len < 8 || len > 63) { +--- a/hostapd/defconfig ++++ b/hostapd/defconfig +@@ -355,3 +355,7 @@ CONFIG_IPV6=y + # Include internal line edit mode in hostapd_cli. This can be used to provide + # limited command line editing and history support. + #CONFIG_WPA_CLI_EDIT=y ++ ++# Override default value for the wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries configuration ++# parameter. See that parameter in hostapd.conf for more details. ++#CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES=1 +--- a/hostapd/hostapd.conf ++++ b/hostapd/hostapd.conf +@@ -1240,6 +1240,30 @@ own_ip_addr=127.0.0.1 + # Range 1..4294967295; default: 4 + #wpa_pairwise_update_count=4 + ++# Workaround for key reinstallation attacks ++# ++# This parameter can be used to disable retransmission of EAPOL-Key frames that ++# are used to install keys (EAPOL-Key message 3/4 and group message 1/2). This ++# is similar to setting wpa_group_update_count=1 and ++# wpa_pairwise_update_count=1, but with no impact to message 1/4 and with ++# extended timeout on the response to avoid causing issues with stations that ++# may use aggressive power saving have very long time in replying to the ++# EAPOL-Key messages. ++# ++# This option can be used to work around key reinstallation attacks on the ++# station (supplicant) side in cases those station devices cannot be updated ++# for some reason. By removing the retransmissions the attacker cannot cause ++# key reinstallation with a delayed frame transmission. This is related to the ++# station side vulnerabilities CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079, ++# CVE-2017-13080, and CVE-2017-13081. ++# ++# This workaround might cause interoperability issues and reduced robustness of ++# key negotiation especially in environments with heavy traffic load due to the ++# number of attempts to perform the key exchange is reduced significantly. As ++# such, this workaround is disabled by default (unless overridden in build ++# configuration). To enable this, set the parameter to 1. ++#wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1 ++ + # Enable IEEE 802.11i/RSN/WPA2 pre-authentication. This is used to speed up + # roaming be pre-authenticating IEEE 802.1X/EAP part of the full RSN + # authentication and key handshake before actually associating with a new AP. +--- a/src/ap/ap_config.c ++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.c +@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ static void hostapd_config_free_vlan(str + } + + ++#ifndef DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES ++#define DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES 0 ++#endif /* DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES */ ++ + void hostapd_config_defaults_bss(struct hostapd_bss_config *bss) + { + dl_list_init(&bss->anqp_elem); +@@ -57,6 +61,8 @@ void hostapd_config_defaults_bss(struct + bss->wpa_gmk_rekey = 86400; + bss->wpa_group_update_count = 4; + bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = 4; ++ bss->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries = ++ DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES; + bss->wpa_key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK; + bss->wpa_pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; + bss->wpa_group = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; +--- a/src/ap/ap_config.h ++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h +@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ struct hostapd_bss_config { + int wpa_ptk_rekey; + u32 wpa_group_update_count; + u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count; ++ int wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries; + int rsn_pairwise; + int rsn_preauth; + char *rsn_preauth_interfaces; +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wp + static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */ + static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */ + static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */ ++static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans = 4000; /* ms */ + + /* TODO: make these configurable */ + static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200; +@@ -1629,6 +1630,9 @@ static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_au + eapol_key_timeout_first_group; + else + timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq; ++ if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries && ++ (!pairwise || (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))) ++ timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans; + if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) + sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1; + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry " +@@ -2700,6 +2704,11 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING) + sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE; + + sm->TimeoutCtr++; ++ if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries && ++ sm->TimeoutCtr > 1) { ++ /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 */ ++ return; ++ } + if (sm->TimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) { + /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect + * immediately following this. */ +@@ -3027,7 +3036,9 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) + sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE); + else if (sm->TimeoutCtr > +- sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) { ++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count || ++ (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries && ++ sm->TimeoutCtr > 1)) { + wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++; + wpa_auth_vlogger( + sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, +@@ -3067,6 +3078,11 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING + SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group); + + sm->GTimeoutCtr++; ++ if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries && ++ sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1) { ++ /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key group msg 1/2 */ ++ return; ++ } + if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count) { + /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect + * immediately following this. */ +@@ -3165,7 +3181,9 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP) + !sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED); + else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > +- sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count) ++ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count || ++ (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries && ++ sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1)) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR); + else if (sm->TimeoutEvt) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING); +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ struct wpa_auth_config { + int wpa_ptk_rekey; + u32 wpa_group_update_count; + u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count; ++ int wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries; + int rsn_pairwise; + int rsn_preauth; + int eapol_version; +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c +@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ static void hostapd_wpa_auth_conf(struct + wconf->wpa_gmk_rekey = conf->wpa_gmk_rekey; + wconf->wpa_ptk_rekey = conf->wpa_ptk_rekey; + wconf->wpa_group_update_count = conf->wpa_group_update_count; ++ wconf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries = ++ conf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries; + wconf->wpa_pairwise_update_count = conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count; + wconf->rsn_pairwise = conf->rsn_pairwise; + wconf->rsn_preauth = conf->rsn_preauth; diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/017-Additional-consistentcy-checks-for-PTK-component-len.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/017-Additional-consistentcy-checks-for-PTK-component-len.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9655b5cb1f --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/017-Additional-consistentcy-checks-for-PTK-component-len.patch @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +From a6ea665300919d6a3af22b1f4237203647fda93a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 00:01:11 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Additional consistentcy checks for PTK component lengths + +Verify that TK, KCK, and KEK lengths are set to consistent values within +struct wpa_ptk before using them in supplicant. This is an additional +layer of protection against unexpected states. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/common/wpa_common.c | 6 ++++++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ + 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.c ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.c +@@ -93,6 +93,12 @@ int wpa_eapol_key_mic(const u8 *key, siz + { + u8 hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN]; + ++ if (key_len == 0) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: KCK not set - cannot calculate MIC"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + switch (ver) { + #ifndef CONFIG_FIPS + case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4: +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -710,6 +710,11 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(st + + alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher); + keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher); ++ if (keylen <= 0 || (unsigned int) keylen != sm->ptk.tk_len) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: TK length mismatch: %d != %lu", ++ keylen, (long unsigned int) sm->ptk.tk_len); ++ return -1; ++ } + rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher); + + if (sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) { +@@ -730,6 +735,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(st + + /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */ + os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN); ++ sm->ptk.tk_len = 0; + sm->ptk.installed = 1; + + if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) { +@@ -1699,9 +1705,10 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k + os_memcpy(mic, key + 1, mic_len); + if (sm->tptk_set) { + os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len); +- wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->tptk.kck, sm->tptk.kck_len, sm->key_mgmt, +- ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)); +- if (os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) { ++ if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->tptk.kck, sm->tptk.kck_len, ++ sm->key_mgmt, ++ ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)) < 0 || ++ os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) { + wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, + "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC " + "when using TPTK - ignoring TPTK"); +@@ -1724,9 +1731,10 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k + + if (!ok && sm->ptk_set) { + os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len); +- wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->ptk.kck, sm->ptk.kck_len, sm->key_mgmt, +- ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)); +- if (os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) { ++ if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->ptk.kck, sm->ptk.kck_len, ++ sm->key_mgmt, ++ ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)) < 0 || ++ os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) { + wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, + "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC - " + "dropping packet"); +@@ -3689,6 +3697,11 @@ int fils_process_assoc_resp(struct wpa_s + + alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher); + keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher); ++ if (keylen <= 0 || (unsigned int) keylen != sm->ptk.tk_len) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: TK length mismatch: %u != %lu", ++ keylen, (long unsigned int) sm->ptk.tk_len); ++ goto fail; ++ } + rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher); + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Set TK to driver", + sm->ptk.tk, keylen); diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/018-Clear-BSSID-information-in-supplicant-state-machine-.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/018-Clear-BSSID-information-in-supplicant-state-machine-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..808d34586b --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/018-Clear-BSSID-information-in-supplicant-state-machine-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +From c0fe5f125a9d4a6564e1f4956ccc3809bf2fd69d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 01:15:24 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Clear BSSID information in supplicant state machine on + disconnection + +This fixes a corner case where RSN pre-authentication candidate from +scan results was ignored if the station was associated with that BSS +just before running the new scan for the connection. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -2662,6 +2662,7 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_s + wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm); + + sm->msg_3_of_4_ok = 0; ++ os_memset(sm->bssid, 0, ETH_ALEN); + } + + -- 2.25.1