From aad61c0a57a3b6371496034db61675abcdb81811 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adam Langley Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 14:44:20 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Fix return code for truncated DTLS fragment. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that *ok was zero. I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses |s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can see. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper --- ssl/d1_both.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index 4d8d2d15ba..29df26e99a 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -776,7 +776,9 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment,frag_len,0); - if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + i = -1; + if (i<=0) goto err; } -- 2.25.1