From 9083142acee8819e95fc8b6ddeefae19b06a4c82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?utf8?q?Lutz=20J=C3=A4nicke?= Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2007 07:27:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Prepare OpenSSL 0.9.8g: cherry pick http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=16674 Avoid shadow and signed/unsigned warnings. Submitted by: steve --- ssl/d1_both.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index 22bd28a4bb..ca61c18853 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -297,9 +297,9 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case * we'll ignore the result anyway */ - unsigned char *p = &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]; const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; - int len; + int xlen; if (frag_off == 0 && s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { @@ -311,15 +311,15 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) l2n3(0,p); l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p); p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - len = ret; + xlen = ret; } else { p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - len = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } - ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, len); + ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen); } if (ret == s->init_num) @@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) * the potential damage caused by malformed overlaps. */ if ((unsigned int)s->init_num >= msg_hdr->msg_len) { - unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; unsigned long msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; /* reconstruct message header as if it was @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok) if (al==0) /* no alert */ { - unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len); } @@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) if ( frag_len > 0) { - unsigned char *p=s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[frag_off],frag_len,0); -- 2.25.1