From 68b5330040e8fe529b8750098d30bfa06e596a20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 13:06:34 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] PR: 2628 Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann
<seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Reviewed by: steve
Send alert instead of assertion failure for incorrectly formatted DTLS
fragments.
---
ssl/d1_both.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index 68172a9dda..9f898d6997 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -793,7 +793,13 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
- OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
+ if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
/* parse the message fragment header */
dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
@@ -865,7 +871,12 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
/* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the
* handshake to fail */
- OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
+ if (i != (int)frag_len)
+ {
+ al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
*ok = 1;
--
2.25.1