From 5553a12735e11bc9aa28727afe721e7236788aab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Viktor Dukhovni Date: Tue, 17 May 2016 18:25:40 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] Ensure verify error is set when X509_verify_cert() fails Set ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM when verificaiton cannot continue due to malloc failure. Similarly for issuer lookup failures and caller errors (bad parameters or invalid state). Also, when X509_verify_cert() returns <= 0 make sure that the verification status does not remain X509_V_OK, as a last resort set it it to X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, just in case some code path returns an error without setting an appropriate value of ctx->error. Add new and some missing error codes to X509 error -> SSL alert switch. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson --- crypto/x509/x509_txt.c | 5 +++++ crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h | 7 +++++-- crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c | 6 ++++++ ssl/s3_both.c | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c index 3d46d3ff83..4475715178 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c @@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n) case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: return ("IP address mismatch"); + case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: + return ("Invalid certificate verification context"); + case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: + return ("Issuer certificate lookup error"); + default: BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "error number %ld", n); return (buf); diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index 4d34dbac93..f3fe255187 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (ctx->cert == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; return -1; } if (ctx->chain != NULL) { @@ -207,6 +208,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) * cannot do another one. */ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; return -1; } @@ -219,6 +221,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ok = -1; goto err; } @@ -229,6 +232,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (ctx->untrusted != NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ok = -1; goto err; } @@ -253,8 +257,10 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) */ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) { ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); - if (ok < 0) + if (ok < 0) { + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; goto err; + } /* * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up * again later. @@ -271,6 +277,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (xtmp != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ok = -1; goto err; } @@ -352,14 +359,17 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) break; ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); - if (ok < 0) + if (ok < 0) { + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; goto err; + } if (ok == 0) break; x = xtmp; if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { X509_free(xtmp); X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ok = -1; goto err; } @@ -386,8 +396,10 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) while (j-- > 1) { xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); - if (ok < 0) + if (ok < 0) { + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; goto err; + } /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ if (ok > 0) { /* @@ -515,6 +527,10 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) sk_X509_free(sktmp); if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); + + /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */ + if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; return ok; } @@ -736,12 +752,19 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; if (nc) { rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); - if (rv != X509_V_OK) { + switch (rv) { + case X509_V_OK: + continue; + case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: + ctx->error = rv; + return 0; + default: ctx->error = rv; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; + break; } } } @@ -1630,6 +1653,7 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); if (ret == 0) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ @@ -1658,7 +1682,12 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { ctx->current_cert = NULL; - ctx->error = X509_V_OK; + /* + * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed + * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then + * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier + * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. + */ if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) return 0; } diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h index 2663e1c0a3..f54ecc5b41 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h @@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); # define X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION 47 # define X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION 48 # define X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX 49 +# define X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION 50 # define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE 51 # define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX 52 # define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX 53 @@ -386,8 +387,10 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); # define X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH 63 # define X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH 64 -/* The application is not happy */ -# define X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION 50 +/* Caller error */ +# define X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL 65 +/* Issuer lookup error */ +# define X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP 66 /* Certificate verify flags */ diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c index 94cfed0509..1290dec9bb 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c @@ -1211,6 +1211,11 @@ int v3_addr_subset(IPAddrBlocks *a, IPAddrBlocks *b) /* * Core code for RFC 3779 2.3 path validation. + * + * Returns 1 for success, 0 on error. + * + * When returning 0, ctx->error MUST be set to an appropriate value other than + * X509_V_OK. */ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, @@ -1245,6 +1250,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, if ((child = sk_IPAddressFamily_dup(ext)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ret = 0; goto done; } diff --git a/ssl/s3_both.c b/ssl/s3_both.c index 09d0661e81..4b636b0e9b 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_both.c +++ b/ssl/s3_both.c @@ -535,6 +535,9 @@ int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: + case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: + case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: + case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: @@ -548,7 +551,10 @@ int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; break; + case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: + case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: + case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; break; case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: -- 2.25.1