From 31db43df0859210a32af3708df08f0149c46ede0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2009 15:01:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Update from 0.9.8-stable. --- CHANGES | 5 +++++ crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 13 +++++-------- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 1b3a16b479..cf7c58ce50 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -793,6 +793,11 @@ Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert(): + it just wastes time without adding any security. As a useful side effect + self signed root CAs with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode. + [Steve Henson] + *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index 9ff66cff13..dd4065b0ce 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -1609,7 +1609,11 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) while (n >= 0) { ctx->error_depth=n; - if (!xs->valid) + + /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates. It + * doesn't add any security and just wastes time. + */ + if (!xs->valid && xs != xi) { if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { @@ -1619,13 +1623,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (!ok) goto end; } else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) - /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert, - * this is a waste of time. That check should - * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be - * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but - * we don't verify again and again in SSL - * handshakes and the like once the cert has - * been declared trusted. */ { ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; ctx->current_cert=xs; -- 2.25.1