From 1c45b1fef3384b39084882650991ac6e81def3f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?utf8?q?Bodo=20M=C3=B6ller?= Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 14:29:10 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Make sure buffers are large enough even for weird parameters Submitted by: Nils Larsch --- crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c b/crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c index 8060115202..2d46914cb1 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c @@ -96,10 +96,34 @@ int RSA_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off) char str[128]; const char *s; unsigned char *m=NULL; - int i,ret=0; + int ret=0; + size_t buf_len=0, i; - i=RSA_size(x); - m=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)i+10); + if (x->n) + buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->n); + if (x->e) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->e))) + buf_len = i; + if (x->d) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->d))) + buf_len = i; + if (x->p) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->p))) + buf_len = i; + if (x->q) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->q))) + buf_len = i; + if (x->dmp1) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->dmp1))) + buf_len = i; + if (x->dmq1) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->dmq1))) + buf_len = i; + if (x->iqmp) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->iqmp))) + buf_len = i; + + m=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len+10); if (m == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -161,22 +185,25 @@ int DSA_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off) { char str[128]; unsigned char *m=NULL; - int i,ret=0; - BIGNUM *bn=NULL; + int ret=0; + size_t buf_len=0,i; - if (x->p != NULL) - bn=x->p; - else if (x->priv_key != NULL) - bn=x->priv_key; - else if (x->pub_key != NULL) - bn=x->pub_key; - - /* larger than needed but what the hell :-) */ - if (bn != NULL) - i=BN_num_bytes(bn)*2; - else - i=256; - m=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)i+10); + if (x->p) + buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->p); + if (x->q) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->q))) + buf_len = i; + if (x->g) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->g))) + buf_len = i; + if (x->priv_key) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->priv_key))) + buf_len = i; + if (x->pub_key) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->pub_key))) + buf_len = i; + + m=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len+10); if (m == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRINT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -281,10 +308,15 @@ int DHparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DH *x) int DHparams_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x) { unsigned char *m=NULL; - int reason=ERR_R_BUF_LIB,i,ret=0; + int reason=ERR_R_BUF_LIB,ret=0; + size_t buf_len=0, i; - i=BN_num_bytes(x->p); - m=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)i+10); + if (x->p) + buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->p); + if (x->g) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->g))) + buf_len = i; + m=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len+10); if (m == NULL) { reason=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; @@ -334,10 +366,18 @@ int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x) int DSAparams_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x) { unsigned char *m=NULL; - int reason=ERR_R_BUF_LIB,i,ret=0; + int reason=ERR_R_BUF_LIB,ret=0; + size_t buf_len=0,i; - i=BN_num_bytes(x->p); - m=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)i+10); + if (x->p) + buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->p); + if (x->q) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->q))) + buf_len = i; + if (x->g) + if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->g))) + buf_len = i; + m=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len+10); if (m == NULL) { reason=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; -- 2.25.1