Andy Polyakov [Fri, 23 Jan 2015 16:27:10 +0000 (17:27 +0100)]
aes/asm/aesni-x86[_64].pl update.
This addresses
- request for improvement for faster key setup in RT#3576;
- clearing registers and stack in RT#3554 (this is more of a gesture to
see if there will be some traction from compiler side);
- more commentary around input parameters handling and stack layout
(desired when RT#3553 was reviewed);
- minor size and single block performance optimization (was lying around);
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
23f6eec71dbd472044db7dc854599f1de14a1f48)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 24 Mar 2015 16:21:21 +0000 (16:21 +0000)]
Fix verify algorithm.
Disable loop checking when we retry verification with an alternative path.
This fixes the case where an intermediate CA is explicitly trusted and part
of the untrusted certificate list. By disabling loop checking for this case
the untrusted CA can be replaced by the explicitly trusted case and
verification will succeed.
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
e5991ec528b1c339062440811e2641f5ea2b328b)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 27 Jan 2015 11:15:15 +0000 (11:15 +0000)]
Add documentation for the -no_alt_chains option for various apps, as well as
the X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag.
Conflicts:
doc/apps/cms.pod
doc/apps/ocsp.pod
doc/apps/s_client.pod
doc/apps/s_server.pod
doc/apps/smime.pod
doc/apps/verify.pod
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 27 Jan 2015 10:50:38 +0000 (10:50 +0000)]
Add -no_alt_chains option to apps to implement the new
X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag. Using this option means that when building
certificate chains, the first chain found will be the one used. Without this
flag, if the first chain found is not trusted then we will keep looking to
see if we can build an alternative chain instead.
Conflicts:
apps/cms.c
apps/ocsp.c
apps/s_client.c
apps/s_server.c
apps/smime.c
apps/verify.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 27 Jan 2015 10:35:27 +0000 (10:35 +0000)]
Add flag to inhibit checking for alternate certificate chains. Setting this
behaviour will force behaviour as per previous versions of OpenSSL
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 27 Jan 2015 10:03:29 +0000 (10:03 +0000)]
In certain situations the server provided certificate chain may no longer be
valid. However the issuer of the leaf, or some intermediate cert is in fact
in the trust store.
When building a trust chain if the first attempt fails, then try to see if
alternate chains could be constructed that are trusted.
RT3637
RT3621
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 16 Apr 2015 15:43:09 +0000 (16:43 +0100)]
Fix encoding bug in i2c_ASN1_INTEGER
Fix bug where i2c_ASN1_INTEGER mishandles zero if it is marked as
negative.
Thanks to Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <huzaifas@redhat.com> and
Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
a0eed48d37a4b7beea0c966caf09ad46f4a92a44)
Emilia Kasper [Wed, 15 Apr 2015 12:18:55 +0000 (14:18 +0200)]
Error out immediately on empty ciphers list.
A 0-length ciphers list is never permitted. The old code only used to
reject an empty ciphers list for connections with a session ID. It
would later error out on a NULL structure, so this change just moves
the alert closer to the problem source.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
3ae91cfb327c9ed689b9aaf7bca01a3f5a0657cb)
Emilia Kasper [Thu, 16 Apr 2015 16:46:52 +0000 (18:46 +0200)]
Use -Wall -Wextra with clang
The disabled set of -Weverything is hard to maintain across versions.
Use -Wall -Wextra but also document other useful warnings that currently trigger.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Viktor Dukhovni [Thu, 16 Apr 2015 05:50:03 +0000 (01:50 -0400)]
Code style: space after 'if'
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <gitlab@openssl.org>
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 15 Apr 2015 23:00:40 +0000 (00:00 +0100)]
Limit depth of nested sequences when generating ASN.1
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
PR#3800
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
c4137b5e828d8fab0b244defb79257619dad8fc7)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 15 Apr 2015 23:21:05 +0000 (00:21 +0100)]
Reject empty generation strings.
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
111b60bea01d234b5873488c19ff2b9c5d4d58e9)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 10 Apr 2015 15:49:33 +0000 (16:49 +0100)]
Fix ssl_get_prev_session overrun
If OpenSSL is configured with no-tlsext then ssl_get_prev_session can read
past the end of the ClientHello message if the session_id length in the
ClientHello is invalid. This should not cause any security issues since the
underlying buffer is 16k in size. It should never be possible to overrun by
that many bytes.
This is probably made redundant by the previous commit - but you can never be
too careful.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
5e0a80c1c9b2b06c2d203ad89778ce1b98e0b5ad)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 10 Apr 2015 16:25:27 +0000 (17:25 +0100)]
Check for ClientHello message overruns
The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make
sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have
security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still
needs to be fixed.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
c9642eb1ff79a30e2c7632ef8267cc34cc2b0d79)
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 11 Apr 2015 14:39:13 +0000 (16:39 +0200)]
do_dirname: Don't change gen on failures
It would set gen->d.dirn to a freed pointer in case X509V3_NAME_from_section
failed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
8ec5c5dd361343d9017eff8547b19e86e4944ebc)
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 11 Apr 2015 15:08:38 +0000 (17:08 +0200)]
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free: Check param for NULL
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
(cherry picked from commit
f49baeff50d0be9c8d86aed6fb4a08841aa3da41)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 2 Apr 2015 12:45:14 +0000 (13:45 +0100)]
Don't set *pval to NULL in ASN1_item_ex_new.
While *pval is usually a pointer in rare circumstances it can be a long
value. One some platforms (e.g. WIN64) where
sizeof(long) < sizeof(ASN1_VALUE *) this will write past the field.
*pval is initialised correctly in the rest of ASN1_item_ex_new so setting it
to NULL is unecessary anyway.
Thanks to Julien Kauffmann for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
f617b4969a9261b9d7d381670aefbe2cf766a2cb)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 10 Apr 2015 01:33:44 +0000 (02:33 +0100)]
Fix ECDH key identifier support.
PR#3789
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
7a317fa07cf3d9952c574e7d214d371798fee42a)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 10 Apr 2015 01:31:16 +0000 (02:31 +0100)]
Fix ECDH detection, add ECDH keyid test.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
9fdbc9df76a68a30df349c53f1ceeb915f82948c)
Richard Levitte [Wed, 8 Apr 2015 17:26:11 +0000 (19:26 +0200)]
Have mkerr.pl treat already existing multiline string defs properly
Since source reformat, we ended up with some error reason string
definitions that spanned two lines. That in itself is fine, but we
sometimes edited them to provide better strings than what could be
automatically determined from the reason macro, for example:
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
"Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
However, mkerr.pl didn't treat those two-line definitions right, and
they ended up being retranslated to whatever the macro name would
indicate, for example:
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
"No gost certificate sent by peer"},
Clearly not what we wanted. This change fixes this problem.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
2cfdfe0918f03f8323c9523a2beb2b363ae86ca7)
Richard Levitte [Wed, 1 Apr 2015 09:36:18 +0000 (11:36 +0200)]
Ignore the non-dll windows specific build directories
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
37d92b1b2bb6e6e04d62d6f7774a2d8190a99174)
Richard Levitte [Sat, 4 Apr 2015 14:53:44 +0000 (16:53 +0200)]
Appease clang -Wshadow
The macros BSWAP4 and BSWAP8 have statetemnt expressions
implementations that use local variable names that shadow variables
outside the macro call, generating warnings like this
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:263:14: warning: declaration shadows a local variable
[-Wshadow]
seqnum = BSWAP8(blocks[0].q[0]);
^
../modes/modes_lcl.h:41:29: note: expanded from macro 'BSWAP8'
^
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:223:12: note: previous declaration is here
size_t ret = 0;
^
Have clang be quiet by modifying the macro variable names slightly
(suffixing them with an underscore).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
2da2a4349c1598ad0648405fe175e7846d893c45)
Richard Levitte [Sat, 4 Apr 2015 14:33:20 +0000 (16:33 +0200)]
Appease clang -Wgnu-statement-expression
We use GNU statement expressions in crypto/md32_common.h, surrounded
by checks that GNU C is indeed used to compile. It seems that clang,
at least on Linux, pretends to be GNU C, therefore finds the statement
expressions and then warns about them.
The solution is to have clang be quiet about it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
04958e84d8079fa57a782db70f003c38b5b156fd)
Richard Levitte [Sat, 4 Apr 2015 14:22:26 +0000 (16:22 +0200)]
Appease clang -Wempty-translation-unit
ebcdic.c:284:7: warning: ISO C requires a translation unit to contain at least one
declaration [-Wempty-translation-unit]
^
1 warning generated.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
c25dea53e9db2b4956c315f85dae3f1c2854fd2b)
Emilia Kasper [Wed, 1 Apr 2015 15:08:45 +0000 (17:08 +0200)]
Harden SSLv2-supporting servers against Bleichenbacher's attack.
There is no indication that the timing differences are exploitable in
OpenSSL, and indeed there is some indication (Usenix '14) that they
are too small to be exploitable. Nevertheless, be careful and apply
the same countermeasures as in s3_srvr.c
Thanks to Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel and Yuval Shavitt for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 23 Jan 2015 16:04:19 +0000 (17:04 +0100)]
modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl: up to 90% performance improvement.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
7eeeb49e1103533bc81c234eb19613353866e474)
Andy Polyakov [Sat, 28 Mar 2015 21:01:59 +0000 (22:01 +0100)]
sha/asm/sha*-armv8.pl: add Denver and X-Gene esults.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
be5a87a1b00aceba5484a7ec198ac622c9283def)
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 3 Mar 2015 21:05:25 +0000 (22:05 +0100)]
aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: optimize for Cortex-A5x.
ARM has optimized Cortex-A5x pipeline to favour pairs of complementary
AES instructions. While modified code improves performance of post-r0p0
Cortex-A53 performance by >40% (for CBC decrypt and CTR), it hurts
original r0p0. We favour later revisions, because one can't prevent
future from coming. Improvement on post-r0p0 Cortex-A57 exceeds 50%,
while new code is not slower on r0p0, or Apple A7 for that matter.
[Update even SHA results for latest Cortex-A53.]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
94376cccb4ed5b376220bffe0739140ea9dad8c8)
Douglas E Engert [Wed, 25 Mar 2015 23:52:28 +0000 (23:52 +0000)]
Ensure EC private keys retain leading zeros
RFC5915 requires the use of the I2OSP primitive as defined in RFC3447
for storing an EC Private Key. This converts the private key into an
OCTETSTRING and retains any leading zeros. This commit ensures that those
leading zeros are present if required.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
30cd4ff294252c4b6a4b69cbef6a5b4117705d22)
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 13 Mar 2015 10:12:19 +0000 (11:12 +0100)]
ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: update commentary with before-after performance data.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
b06a6f7cc44baa0c17207a8f72c4ac360be7b555)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 25 Feb 2015 11:30:43 +0000 (11:30 +0000)]
Fix bug in s_client. Previously default verify locations would only be loaded
if CAfile or CApath were also supplied and successfully loaded first.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 10 Feb 2015 13:15:25 +0000 (13:15 +0000)]
Fix HMAC to pass invalid key len test
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 10 Feb 2015 13:15:05 +0000 (13:15 +0000)]
Add HMAC test for invalid key len
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 10 Feb 2015 11:39:52 +0000 (11:39 +0000)]
Ensure that both the MD and key have been initialised before attempting to
create an HMAC
Inspired by BoringSSL commit
2fe7f2d0d9a6fcc75b4e594eeec306cc55acd594
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/hmac/hmac.c
Matt Caswell [Tue, 10 Feb 2015 12:38:04 +0000 (12:38 +0000)]
Add more HMAC tests
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 26 Feb 2015 16:28:59 +0000 (16:28 +0000)]
Fix RAND_(pseudo_)?_bytes returns
Ensure all calls to RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes have their return
value checked correctly
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 5 Feb 2015 13:59:16 +0000 (13:59 +0000)]
Add ticket length before buffering DTLS message
In ssl3_send_new_session_ticket the message to be sent is constructed. We
skip adding the length of the session ticket initially, then call
ssl_set_handshake_header, and finally go back and add in the length of the
ticket. Unfortunately, in DTLS, ssl_set_handshake_header also has the side
effect of buffering the message for subsequent retransmission if required.
By adding the ticket length after the call to ssl_set_handshake_header the
message that is buffered is incomplete, causing an invalid message to be
sent on retransmission.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
4f9fab6bd0253416eeace5a45142c7c4a83bc511)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Matt Caswell [Thu, 5 Feb 2015 13:54:37 +0000 (13:54 +0000)]
Ensure last_write_sequence is saved in DTLS1.2
In DTLS, immediately prior to epoch change, the write_sequence is supposed
to be stored in s->d1->last_write_sequence. The write_sequence is then reset
back to
00000000. In the event of retransmits of records from the previous
epoch, the last_write_sequence is restored. This commit fixes a bug in
DTLS1.2 where the write_sequence was being reset before last_write_sequence
was saved, and therefore retransmits are sent with incorrect sequence
numbers.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
d5d0a1cb1347d4a8547e78aec56c50c528186e50)
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 14 Mar 2015 22:23:26 +0000 (23:23 +0100)]
Don't send a for ServerKeyExchange for kDHr and kDHd
The certificate already contains the DH parameters in that case.
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() would fail in that case anyway.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
93f1c13619c5b41f2dcfdbf6ae666f867922a87a)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 24 Mar 2015 13:15:33 +0000 (13:15 +0000)]
Fix OCSP tests.
OCSP verification changes mean the OCSP tests now need -trusted_first
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 13 Mar 2015 14:16:32 +0000 (14:16 +0000)]
Configuration file examples.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
7b68c30da01b4eedcd546f81844156646387cacb)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Sun, 22 Mar 2015 17:34:56 +0000 (17:34 +0000)]
Make OCSP response verification more flexible.
If a set of certificates is supplied to OCSP_basic_verify use those in
addition to any present in the OCSP response as untrusted CAs when
verifying a certificate chain.
PR#3668
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
4ca5efc2874e094d6382b30416824eda6dde52fe)
Mike Frysinger [Sat, 21 Mar 2015 09:08:41 +0000 (05:08 -0400)]
Fix malloc define typo
Fix compilation failure when SCTP is compiled due to incorrect define.
Reported-by: Conrad Kostecki <ck+gentoobugzilla@bl4ckb0x.de>
URL: https://bugs.gentoo.org/543828
RT#3758
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
7c82e339a677f8546e1456c7a8f6788598a9de43)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 20 Mar 2015 15:10:16 +0000 (15:10 +0000)]
Don't check curves that haven't been sent
Don't check that the curve appears in the list of acceptable curves for the
peer, if they didn't send us such a list (RFC 4492 does not require that the
extension be sent).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
b79d24101e3b5904b3770d60e32bdd6edc558337)
Andy Polyakov [Mon, 23 Mar 2015 12:34:03 +0000 (13:34 +0100)]
sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl: adapt for use in Linux kernel context.
In cooperation with Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro) and Sami Tolvanen (Google).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
2ecd32a1f8f0643ae7b38f59bbaf9f0d6ef326fe)
Matt Caswell [Sun, 22 Mar 2015 15:58:00 +0000 (15:58 +0000)]
Fix no-ec with no-ec2m
Fix builds config'd with no-ec and no-ec2m. Technically this combination is
redundant - but the fix is straight forward. Fix from OpenWrt.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 3 Mar 2015 16:08:58 +0000 (16:08 +0000)]
Add DTLS tests to make test
Updated test/testssl script to include the new DTLS capability in ssltest.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
3c381e54233be3d0dcbce7cc853c4767d979fe90)
David Woodhouse [Tue, 3 Mar 2015 15:47:08 +0000 (15:47 +0000)]
Add DTLS support to ssltest
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
98b8cdd32277cea829c31034a53f2487f750615d)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssltest.c
David Woodhouse [Tue, 3 Mar 2015 15:39:26 +0000 (15:39 +0000)]
Add DTLS to SSL_get_version
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
504e643e0996fb842ac183023c3a6b9049af50ea)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_lib.c
Matt Caswell [Thu, 19 Mar 2015 13:34:56 +0000 (13:34 +0000)]
Prepare for 1.0.2b-dev
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 19 Mar 2015 13:31:16 +0000 (13:31 +0000)]
Prepare for 1.0.2a release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 19 Mar 2015 13:31:16 +0000 (13:31 +0000)]
make update
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 19 Mar 2015 11:35:33 +0000 (11:35 +0000)]
Fix unsigned/signed warnings
Fix some unsigned/signed warnings introduced as part of the fix
for CVE-2015-0293
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 19 Mar 2015 10:16:32 +0000 (10:16 +0000)]
Fix a failure to NULL a pointer freed on error.
Reported by the LibreSSL project as a follow on to CVE-2015-0209
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2015 16:50:16 +0000 (16:50 +0000)]
Update NEWS file
Update the NEWS file with the latest entries from CHANGES ready for the
release.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2015 16:36:37 +0000 (16:36 +0000)]
Update CHANGES for release
Update CHANGES file with all the latest fixes ready for the release.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2015 16:44:44 +0000 (16:44 +0000)]
Fix discrepancy in NEWS file
There was a discrepancy between the 1.0.2 version of NEWS and the 1.0.1
version. This fixes it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2015 15:58:40 +0000 (15:58 +0000)]
Fix CHANGES discrepancies
There were some discrepancies in the CHANGES file between the 1.0.1 version
and 1.0.2. This corrects it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Wed, 18 Mar 2015 09:48:03 +0000 (09:48 +0000)]
Remove overlapping CHANGES/NEWS entries
Remove entries from CHANGES and NEWS from letter releases that occur *after*
the next point release. Without this we get duplicate entries for the same
issue appearing multiple times.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Emilia Kasper [Wed, 4 Mar 2015 17:05:02 +0000 (09:05 -0800)]
Fix reachable assert in SSLv2 servers.
This assert is reachable for servers that support SSLv2 and export ciphers.
Therefore, such servers can be DoSed by sending a specially crafted
SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY.
Also fix s2_srvr.c to error out early if the key lengths are malformed.
These lengths are sent unencrypted, so this does not introduce an oracle.
CVE-2015-0293
This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper of
the OpenSSL development team.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Emilia Kasper [Fri, 27 Feb 2015 15:52:23 +0000 (16:52 +0100)]
PKCS#7: avoid NULL pointer dereferences with missing content
In PKCS#7, the ASN.1 content component is optional.
This typically applies to inner content (detached signatures),
however we must also handle unexpected missing outer content
correctly.
This patch only addresses functions reachable from parsing,
decryption and verification, and functions otherwise associated
with reading potentially untrusted data.
Correcting all low-level API calls requires further work.
CVE-2015-0289
Thanks to Michal Zalewski (Google) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Dr. Stephen Henson [Mon, 9 Mar 2015 23:11:45 +0000 (23:11 +0000)]
Fix ASN1_TYPE_cmp
Fix segmentation violation when ASN1_TYPE_cmp is passed a boolean type. This
can be triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
CVE-2015-0286
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 10 Mar 2015 16:38:32 +0000 (16:38 +0000)]
Fix DHE Null CKE vulnerability
If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE
cipher being used and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message being sent
by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack.
CVE-2015-1787
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 3 Mar 2015 13:20:57 +0000 (13:20 +0000)]
Fix for CVE-2015-0291
If a client renegotiates using an invalid signature algorithms extension
it will crash a server with a NULL pointer dereference.
Thanks to David Ramos of Stanford University for reporting this bug.
CVE-2015-0291
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
Dr. Stephen Henson [Mon, 9 Mar 2015 23:16:33 +0000 (23:16 +0000)]
Reject invalid PSS parameters.
Fix a bug where invalid PSS parameters are not rejected resulting in a
NULL pointer exception. This can be triggered during certificate
verification so could be a DoS attack against a client or a server
enabling client authentication.
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issues.
CVE-2015-0208
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Dr. Stephen Henson [Mon, 23 Feb 2015 02:32:44 +0000 (02:32 +0000)]
Free up ADB and CHOICE if already initialised.
CVE-2015-0287
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:09:04 +0000 (16:09 +0000)]
Fix Seg fault in DTLSv1_listen
The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes
the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to
loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received
with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen
means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invokation to the
next that can lead to a segmentation fault. Erorrs processing the initial
ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could
be that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only
server.
CVE-2015-0207
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Mon, 2 Mar 2015 09:27:10 +0000 (09:27 +0000)]
Multiblock corrupted pointer fix
OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This
feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES
NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause
OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when
using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a
socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection.
However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation
fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack.
CVE-2015-0290
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 17 Mar 2015 15:55:11 +0000 (15:55 +0000)]
Add support for ServerInfo SSL_CONF option.
Add support for ServerInfo SSL_CONF option and update documentation. This
was wrongly omitted from the 1.0.2 release.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 12 Mar 2015 14:09:00 +0000 (14:09 +0000)]
Dead code removal from apps
Some miscellaneous removal of dead code from apps. Also fix an issue with
error handling with pkcs7.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
11abf92259e899f4f7da4a3e80781e84b0fb1a64)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 12 Mar 2015 14:08:21 +0000 (14:08 +0000)]
Remove dead code from crypto
Some miscellaneous removal of dead code from lib crypto.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
b7573c597c1932ef709b2455ffab47348b5c54e5)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 12 Mar 2015 16:42:55 +0000 (16:42 +0000)]
Fix seg fault in s_time
Passing a negative value for the "-time" option to s_time results in a seg
fault. This commit fixes it so that time has to be greater than 0.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
dfef52f6f277327e118fdd0fe34486852c2789b6)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 12 Mar 2015 14:37:26 +0000 (14:37 +0000)]
Add sanity check to PRF
The function tls1_PRF counts the number of digests in use and partitions
security evenly between them. There always needs to be at least one digest
in use, otherwise this is an internal error. Add a sanity check for this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
668f6f08c62177ab5893fc26ebb67053aafdffc8)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 12 Mar 2015 12:54:44 +0000 (12:54 +0000)]
Fix memset call in stack.c
The function sk_zero is supposed to zero the elements held within a stack.
It uses memset to do this. However it calculates the size of each element
as being sizeof(char **) instead of sizeof(char *). This probably doesn't
make much practical difference in most cases, but isn't a portable
assumption.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
7132ac830fa08d9a936e011d7c541b0c52115b33)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 12 Mar 2015 11:25:03 +0000 (11:25 +0000)]
Move malloc fail checks closer to malloc
Move memory allocation failure checks closer to the site of the malloc in
dgst app. Only a problem if the debug flag is set...but still should be
fixed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
be1477adc97e76f4b83ed8075589f529069bd5d1)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 12 Mar 2015 11:10:47 +0000 (11:10 +0000)]
Add malloc failure checks
Add some missing checks for memory allocation failures in ca app.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
a561bfe944c0beba73551731cb98af70dfee3549)
Carl Jackson [Sat, 31 Jan 2015 10:22:47 +0000 (02:22 -0800)]
Fix regression in ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t
Previously, ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t would return 1 if s > t, -1 if
s < t, and 0 if s == t.
This behavior was broken in a refactor [0], resulting in the opposite
time comparison behavior.
[0]:
904348a4922333106b613754136305db229475ea
PR#3706
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
da27006df06853a33b132133699a7aa9d4277920)
Andy Polyakov [Sat, 21 Feb 2015 12:51:56 +0000 (13:51 +0100)]
Avoid reading an unused byte after the buffer
Other curves don't have this problem.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
9fbbdd73c58c29dc46cc314f7165e45e6d43fd60)
Emilia Kasper [Sat, 14 Mar 2015 04:10:13 +0000 (21:10 -0700)]
Fix undefined behaviour in shifts.
Td4 and Te4 are arrays of u8. A u8 << int promotes the u8 to an int first then shifts.
If the mathematical result of a shift (as modelled by lhs * 2^{rhs}) is not representable
in an integer, behaviour is undefined. In other words, you can't shift into the sign bit
of a signed integer. Fix this by casting to u32 whenever we're shifting left by 24.
(For consistency, cast other shifts, too.)
Caught by -fsanitize=shift
Submitted by Nick Lewycky (Google)
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
8b37e5c14f0eddb10c7f91ef91004622d90ef361)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Sun, 1 Mar 2015 15:25:39 +0000 (15:25 +0000)]
additional configuration documentation
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
3d764db7a24e3dca1a3ee57202ce3c818d592141)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 11 Mar 2015 23:30:52 +0000 (23:30 +0000)]
ASN.1 print fix.
When printing out an ASN.1 structure if the type is an item template don't
fall thru and attempt to interpret as a primitive type.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
5dc1247a7494f50c88ce7492518bbe0ce6f124fa)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 11 Mar 2015 17:01:38 +0000 (17:01 +0000)]
SSL_check_chain fix
If SSL_check_chain is called with a NULL X509 object or a NULL EVP_PKEY
or the type of the public key is unrecognised then the local variable
|cpk| in tls1_check_chain does not get initialised. Subsequently an
attempt is made to deref it (after the "end" label), and a seg fault will
result.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
d813f9eb383a93e472e69750cd1edbb170205ad2)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 11 Mar 2015 20:50:20 +0000 (20:50 +0000)]
Fix missing return checks in v3_cpols.c
Fixed assorted missing return value checks in c3_cpols.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
c5f2b5336ab72e40ab91e2ca85639f51fa3178c6)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 11 Mar 2015 20:19:08 +0000 (20:19 +0000)]
Fix dsa_pub_encode
The return value from ASN1_STRING_new() was not being checked which could
lead to a NULL deref in the event of a malloc failure. Also fixed a mem
leak in the error path.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
0c7ca4033dcf5398334d4b78a7dfb941c8167a40)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 11 Mar 2015 20:08:16 +0000 (20:08 +0000)]
Fix dh_pub_encode
The return value from ASN1_STRING_new() was not being checked which could
lead to a NULL deref in the event of a malloc failure. Also fixed a mem
leak in the error path.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
6aa8dab2bbfd5ad3cfc0d07fe5d7243635d5b2a2)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 11 Mar 2015 19:41:01 +0000 (19:41 +0000)]
Fix asn1_item_print_ctx
The call to asn1_do_adb can return NULL on error, so we should check the
return value before attempting to use it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
34a7ed0c39aa3ab67eea1e106577525eaf0d7a00)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 11 Mar 2015 16:00:01 +0000 (16:00 +0000)]
ASN1_primitive_new NULL param handling
ASN1_primitive_new takes an ASN1_ITEM * param |it|. There are a couple
of conditional code paths that check whether |it| is NULL or not - but
later |it| is deref'd unconditionally. If |it| was ever really NULL then
this would seg fault. In practice ASN1_primitive_new is marked as an
internal function in the public header file. The only places it is ever
used internally always pass a non NULL parameter for |it|. Therefore, change
the code to sanity check that |it| is not NULL, and remove the conditional
checking.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
9e488fd6ab2c295941e91a47ab7bcd346b7540c7)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 11 Mar 2015 15:41:52 +0000 (15:41 +0000)]
Fix EVP_DigestInit_ex with NULL digest
Calling EVP_DigestInit_ex which has already had the digest set up for it
should be possible. You are supposed to be able to pass NULL for the type.
However currently this seg faults.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
a01087027bd0c5ec053d4eabd972bd942bfcd92f)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 11 Mar 2015 15:31:16 +0000 (15:31 +0000)]
Fix error handling in bn_exp
In the event of an error |rr| could be NULL. Therefore don't assume you can
use |rr| in the error handling code.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
8c5a7b33c6269c3bd6bc0df6b4c22e4fba03b485)
Andy Polyakov [Mon, 9 Feb 2015 10:46:19 +0000 (11:46 +0100)]
evp/e_aes.c: fix SPARC T4-specific problem:
- SIGSEGV/ILL in CCM (RT#3688);
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 10 Mar 2015 23:15:15 +0000 (23:15 +0000)]
Fix seg fault in ASN1_generate_v3/ASN1_generate_nconf
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
ac5a110621ca48f0bebd5b4d76d081de403da29e)
Matt Caswell [Mon, 9 Mar 2015 13:59:58 +0000 (13:59 +0000)]
Cleanse buffers
Cleanse various intermediate buffers used by the PRF (backported version
from master).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Emilia Kasper [Wed, 4 Mar 2015 21:05:53 +0000 (13:05 -0800)]
Harmonize return values in dtls1_buffer_record
Ensure all malloc failures return -1.
Reported by Adam Langley (Google).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
06c6a2b4a3a6e64303caa256398dd2dc16f9c35a)
Richard Godbee [Sun, 21 Sep 2014 06:14:11 +0000 (02:14 -0400)]
BIO_debug_callback: Fix output on 64-bit machines
BIO_debug_callback() no longer assumes the hexadecimal representation of
a pointer fits in 8 characters.
Signed-off-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
460e920d8a274e27aab36346eeda6685a42c3314)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 26 Feb 2015 11:56:00 +0000 (11:56 +0000)]
Prevent handshake with unseeded PRNG
Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a
handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
- Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the
user has not seeded manually
- A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
SSL_client_methodv23)
- A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data
from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random
(e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA)
If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore
the output may be predictable.
For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
succeed on an unpatched platform:
openssl s_client -psk
1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
CVE-2015-0285
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
e1b568dd2462f7cacf98f3d117936c34e2849a6b)
Dmitry-Me [Sun, 1 Jun 2014 17:30:52 +0000 (21:30 +0400)]
Fix wrong numbers being passed as string lengths
Signed-off-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
0b142f022e2c5072295e00ebc11c5b707a726d74)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:57:24 +0000 (16:57 +0000)]
update ordinals
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
David Woodhouse [Mon, 2 Mar 2015 16:20:15 +0000 (16:20 +0000)]
Wrong SSL version in DTLS1_BAD_VER ClientHello
Since commit
741c9959 ("DTLS revision."), we put the wrong protocol
version into our ClientHello for DTLS1_BAD_VER. The old DTLS
code which used ssl->version was replaced by the more generic SSL3 code
which uses ssl->client_version. The Cisco ASA no longer likes our
ClientHello.
RT#3711
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
f7683aaf36341dc65672ac2ccdbfd4a232e3626d)
Matt Caswell [Mon, 2 Mar 2015 14:34:19 +0000 (14:34 +0000)]
Fix DTLS1_BAD_VER regression
Commit
9cf0f187 in HEAD, and
68039af3 in 1.0.2, removed a version check
from dtls1_buffer_message() which was needed to distinguish between DTLS
1.x and Cisco's pre-standard version of DTLS (DTLS1_BAD_VER).
Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
RT#3703
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
5178a16c4375471d25e1f5ef5de46febb62a5529)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Sun, 8 Mar 2015 17:31:48 +0000 (17:31 +0000)]
fix warning
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>