OPENSSL_init_crypto(): check config return code correctly

It was assumed that the config functionality returned a boolean.
However, it may return a negative number on error, so we need to take
that into account.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8679)

(cherry picked from commit e3af453baceee7401ba0c5044a4c3aeaf246406f)

Add the prediction_resistance flag to the documentation.

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8678)

Correct the documentation about SSL_CIPHER_description()

There are some ciphersuites that were introduced in TLSv1.0/TLSv1.1 but
are backwards compatible with SSLv3.

Fixes #8655

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8658)

(cherry picked from commit 69539990a8152e90dbe1df1124263db126b1e6f3)

Use AI_ADDRCONFIG hint with getaddrinfo if available.

This prevents failure of openssl s_server socket binding to wildcard
address on hosts with disabled IPv6.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8550)

(cherry picked from commit b8472b4e67ec7ad49254821f2da578ce588df4e6)

Revert "crypto/rand/rand_win.c: include "e_os.h" to get the default _WIN32_WINNT"

I turns out that this made crypto/rand/rand_win.c to never build with
BCrypt support unless the user sets _WIN32_WINNT.  That wasn't the
intent.

This reverts commit cc8926ec8fcecae89ceab91ef753de93e49568f9.

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8641)

(cherry picked from commit 705a27f7e07c006b167b59070ff635a61f8e0407)

rand_win.c: loosen version requirements for BCryptGenRandom

BCryptGenRandom() is available for Windows Vista and newer versions, see
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptgenrandom

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8639)

(cherry picked from commit 2621e6405d7f4765bc57c86ec441129e7d367f14)

crypto/rand/rand_win.c: include "e_os.h" to get the default _WIN32_WINNT

This helps decide if the BCrypt API should be used or not.

Fixes #8635

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8638)

(cherry picked from commit cc8926ec8fcecae89ceab91ef753de93e49568f9)

Fixed typo in enc.c warning

"warning: iv not use by this cipher" -> "warning: iv not used by this cipher"
CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8608)

(cherry picked from commit 9c119bc6b54f4851898134db28c2a01947b5efba)

fixed public range check in ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8607)

(cherry picked from commit cad8347be23c5e0c0d9eea02d090d42daf2dd7a9)

For the lack of GetModuleHandleEx(), we use DSO route for WinCE.
Revert win32_pathbyaddr() which is used in DSO_dsobyaddr().

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8596)

(cherry picked from commit 9c98aa354df8b144a238346b63de8b82f04175dd)

Circumvent a problem of lacking GetEnvironmentVariable() in WindowsCE.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8596)

(cherry picked from commit 3d098890b23598d1f9455b354f46045a231459cd)

Avoid linking error for InitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount().
Replace it with InitializeCriticalSection()

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8596)

(cherry picked from commit 09305a7d0afcf9ae2d5be459ad6e6433ea85f913)

Avoid linking error on WCE700 for _InterlockedExchangeAdd().
This implementation is referenced to https://www.boost.org/doc/libs/1_69_0/boost/detail/interlocked.hpp

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8596)

(cherry picked from commit 88ffc8dea4e313b6acfd3a9ef3868bee96717cf9)

conn_is_closed should return 1 if get_last_sys_error is WSAECONNRESET
CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8590)

(cherry picked from commit 0b885f72c2b18c57173e134a03ed013cd1ac361e)

Add some checks of OCSP functions

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8308)

(cherry picked from commit 72b89b8e201d17dea0219b4b92df7af7e17f183a)

Make OCSP_id_cmp and OCSP_id_issuer_cmp accept const params

Fixes #8589

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8597)

(cherry picked from commit cc6d92619fc3678817b2e09894683b40860563a7)

Increase rounds of Miller-Rabin testing DH_check

DH_check is used to test the validity of Diffie-Hellman parameter sets (p, q, g). Among the tests performed are primality tests on p and q, for this BN_is_prime_ex is called with the rounds of Miller-Rabin set as default. This will therefore use the average case error estimates derived from the function BN_prime_checks_for_size based on the bit size of the number tested.

However, these bounds are only accurate on testing random input. Within this testing scenario, where we are checking the validity of a DH parameter set, we can not assert that these parameters are randomly generated. Thus we must treat them as if they are adversarial in nature and increase the rounds of Miller-Rabin performed.

Generally, each round of Miller-Rabin can declare a composite number prime with probability at most (1/4), thus 64 rounds is sufficient in thwarting known generation techniques (even in safe prime settings - see https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/032 for full analysis). The choice of 64 rounds is also consistent with SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME 64 as used in srp_Verify_N_and_g in openssl/apps/s_client.c.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8593)

(cherry picked from commit 2500c093aa1e9c90c11c415053c0a27a00661d0d)

Don't allow SHAKE128/SHAKE256 with HMAC

See discussion in github issue #8563

Fixes #8563

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8585)

Fix a memory leak in ARIA GCM

Fixes #8567

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8586)

(cherry picked from commit 183f52e29af27285ea4ed7c947b71c83618f8702)

Tolerate 0 byte input length for Update functions

We treat that as automatic success. Other EVP_*Update functions already do
this (e.g. EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_DecryptUpdate etc). EVP_EncodeUpdate is
a bit of an anomoly. That treats 0 byte input length as an error.

Fixes #8576

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8587)

(cherry picked from commit a8274ea351988aa754cb9983b27d7059613ee11e)

Fix three identical grammatical errors

Reported by Mak Kolybabi

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8591)

(cherry picked from commit fc4e500b037fcbe89238b1c9f0c1ccf46a7c6559)

ts(1): digest option is mandatory

not specifying the digest both on command line and in the config file
will lead to response generation aborting with

140617514493760:error:2F098088:time stamp routines:ts_CONF_lookup_fail: \
    cannot find config variable:crypto/ts/ts_conf.c:106:tsr_test::signer_digest

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8421)

(cherry picked from commit 29716a03e8c602d69d6c86558b2903b23edddd9b)

Modify the RSA_private_decrypt functions to check the padding in
constant time with a memory access pattern that does not depend
on secret information.

[extended tests]

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8543)

(cherry picked from commit 9c0cf214e7836eb5aaf1ea5d3cbf6720533f86b5)

Make err_clear_constant_time really constant time

[extended tests]

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8542)

(cherry picked from commit 94dc53a3f7549040dd9e61a25485070c14b41c49)

Cosmetic rand/drbg changes.

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8554)

(cherry picked from commit b3d113ed2993801ee643126118ccf6592ad18ef7)

Providing missing accessor to EVP_PKEY.engine

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8526)

Reorganized signature-scheme detection in 'apps/s_cb.c:security_callback_debug' callback-function.

So far, it only handled hash-and-algorithm pairs from TLS1.2,
now it also handles 'schemes' defined in TLS1.3 like 0x0807=ed25519 or
0x0809=rsa_pss_pss_sha256

Now it prints information in one of these formats:

... Algorithm scheme=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, security bits=128 ... TLS1.3
... Algorithm digest=SHA384, algorithm=DSA, security bits=192  ... TLS1.2
... Algorithm scheme=unknown(0x0e01), security bits=128        ... unhandled case

To implement this added three new lookup-tables: signature_tls13_scheme_list,
signature_tls12_alg_list, signature_tls12_hash_list.

Also minor changes in 'security_callback_debug', eg adding variable 'show_nm'
to indicate if we should show 'nm'.

Also coding-styles fixes from matcaswell

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8445)

(cherry picked from commit 861e45624fe5f16adb11e041a7ac7a1b3229d756)

OPENSSL_config(): restore error agnosticism

Great effort has been made to make initialization more configurable.
However, the behavior of OPENSSL_config() was lost in the process,
having it suddenly generate errors it didn't previously, which is not
how it's documented to behave.

A simple setting of default flags fixes this problem.

Fixes #8528

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8533)

(cherry picked from commit 905c9a72a708701597891527b422c7f374125c52)

Updated doc for BN_clear, BN_CTX_end when param is NULL

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8532)

(cherry picked from commit 138ef774fedb567b29d6e5a96541a396cadc6135)

Update pkeyutl documentation about the digest option

DSA can accept other digests other than SHA1. EC ignores the digest option
altogether.

Fixes #8425

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8432)

(cherry picked from commit 6a6d9ecd1dff669c162e8ab940dac5db2e82679d)

apps/speed.c: properly address NO_EC2M on systems without SIGALRM

The ecdh_c array is allocated of the same size as ecdh_choices,
whose size depends on whether the support for binary curves is enabled
or not.  (The same goes for ecdsa_c).
On systems without SIGALRM, ecdh_c is indexed by predefined constants
intended for representing the index of the ciphers in the ecdh_choices
array.
However, in case of NO_EC2M some of the #defined constants won't match
and would actually access the ecdh_c out-of-bounds.

Use enum instead of a macro to define the curve indexes so they're
within the bounds of the ecdh_c array.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8422)

(cherry picked from commit f5c9916742655f872018426838cff4ff04da5321)

apps/speed.c: skip binary curves when compiling with OPENSSL_NO_EC2M

openssl speed doesn't take into account that the library could be
compiled without the support for the binary curves and happily uses
them, which results in EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() errors.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8422)

(cherry picked from commit d61f489b5a8d8369e75ee1e4991b3d4db95d7c7c)

Configure: untabify indentation

The indentation in the Configure file is currently very strange when
viewed in an editor with a tab width of four spaces, because it has
mixed tab-and-whitespace indentation, which was apparently done with
a tab width of eight spaces.

This commit converts all tabs to spaces using expand(1) with default
    settings. To verify that there are only whitespace changes, use

   git show --ignore-space-change  <this commit>

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8512)

Fix compiling error for mips32r6 and mips64r6

There are some compiling errors for mips32r6 and mips64r6:

crypto/bn/bn-mips.S:56: Error: opcode not supported on this processor: mips2 (mips2) `mulu $1,$12,$7'
crypto/mips_arch.h: Assembler messages:
crypto/mips_arch.h:15: Error: junk at end of line, first unrecognized character is `&'

Signed-off-by: Hua Zhang <hua.zhang1974@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8464)

(cherry picked from commit 1b9c5f2e2f283a3b12d02a89c11b8e8d97bc6312)

Add missing '.text' in crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl

Fixes #8495

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8496)

(cherry picked from commit 2864df8f9d3264e19b49a246e272fb513f4c1be3)

Added NULL check to BN_clear() & BN_CTX_end()

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8518)

(cherry picked from commit ce1415ed2ce15305356cd028bcf7b9bc688d6d5c)

Clear the point S before freeing in ec_scalar_mul_ladder

The secret point R can be recovered from S using the equation R = S - P.
The X and Z coordinates should be sufficient for that.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8504)

(cherry picked from commit 8a74bb5c7becbd7492f4445b852602c3e88ba143)

Clear the secret point in ecdh_simple_compute_key

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8501)

(cherry picked from commit 1ff2c992c24c330c0d40708b4169b862563d6aab)

PPC assembly pack: fix copy-paste error in CTR mode

There are two copy-paste errors in handling CTR mode. When dealing
with a 2 or 3 block tail, the code branches to the CBC decryption exit
path, rather than to the CTR exit path.

This can lead to data corruption: in the Linux kernel we have a copy
of this file, and the bug leads to corruption of the IV, which leads
to data corruption when we call the encryption function again later to
encrypt subsequent blocks.

Originally reported to the Linux kernel by Ondrej Mosnáček <omosnacek@gmail.com>

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8510)

(cherry picked from commit f643deac417a3ccb27f77670bb2b136de49079d9)

coverity fixes for bntest.c

Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8508)

(cherry picked from commit e2f5081116d8b3dadd602fcf611bc6584ab395f7)

VMS: only use the high precision on VMS v8.4 and up

Fixes #8487
Amends #7230

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8488)

(cherry picked from commit 355417eb4611014767480e5d3e96b1b08eb02700)

Fix memory leak in ectest

Fixes #8462

(cherry picked from commit 81d61a62faa809e6c51f5fc2b86fb0d31146fd5e)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8466)

Fix memory leaks in pkread.c demo file

Also make various changes to bring the file into line with current coding
style.

Fixes #8456

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8457)

(cherry picked from commit 81cd023f1dc5a8c9094f8e91c1e85e3c9b98a551)

fix truncation of integers on 32bit AIX

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8417)

(cherry picked from commit 98f29466dc1ed7f80b9b8750309a41b5a1150d25)

Fix two spelling errors

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8447)

(cherry picked from commit 3dcbb6c4a395d56dfa561145d89017ff958bb18e)

Update documentation of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8365)

(cherry picked from commit f0e4a860d0b350e10a1ee3898445cac85af8ea16)

Do the error handling in pkey_rsa_decrypt in constant time

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8365)

(cherry picked from commit 049e64cbb08df1fbf256bb79e950e8d0959de091)

Add a simple test for RSA_SSLV23_PADDING

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8365)

(cherry picked from commit ac6fff700a9799c25902165e2594fd46826f3ee3)

Update documentation regarding required output buffer memory size
of RSA_private_decrypt/RSA_public_encrypt.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8365)

(cherry picked from commit b89fdeb2f7d4471cbfd8a579945754327a4e06a8)

Fix memory overrun in rsa padding check functions

Fixes #8364 and #8357

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8365)

(cherry picked from commit d7f5e5ae6d53f1387a42d210806cf5e9ed0882d6)

Limit DEVRANDOM_WAIT to linux

Fixes #8416

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8428)

(cherry picked from commit 596521f48826892ddd62322726f6f2a2a52db652)

Add a test for underflow in ecp_nistp521.c

The previous commit fixed an underflow that may occur in ecp_nistp521.c.
This commit adds a test for that condition. It is heavily based on an
original test harness by Billy Brumley.

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8405)

(cherry picked from commit 6855b496b205c067ecb276221c31c6212f4fdbae)

Avoid an underflow in ecp_nistp521.c

The function felem_diff_128_64 in ecp_nistp521.c substracts the number |in|
from |out| mod p. In order to avoid underflow it first adds 32p mod p
(which is equivalent to 0 mod p) to |out|. The comments and variable naming
suggest that the original author intended to add 64p mod p. In fact it
has been shown that with certain unusual co-ordinates it is possible to
cause an underflow in this function when only adding 32p mod p while
performing a point double operation. By changing this to 64p mod p the
underflow is avoided.

It turns out to be quite difficult to construct points that satisfy the
underflow criteria although this has been done and the underflow
demonstrated. However none of these points are actually on the curve.
Finding points that satisfy the underflow criteria and are also *on* the
curve is considered significantly more difficult. For this reason we do
not believe that this issue is currently practically exploitable and
therefore no CVE has been assigned.

This only impacts builds using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 Configure
option.

With thanks to Bo-Yin Yang, Billy Brumley and Dr Liu for their significant
help in investigating this issue.

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8405)

(cherry picked from commit 13fbce17fc9f02e2401fc3868f3f8e02d6647e5f)

Update ChaCha20-Poly1305 documentation

Correctly describe the maximum IV length.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)

(cherry picked from commit 27d5631236325c3fd8a3bd06af282ac496aac64b)

Test an overlong ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)

(cherry picked from commit a4f0b50eafb256bb802f2724fc7f7580fb0fbabc)

Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305

ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
ignored.

It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
reused nonce.

Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
affected.

Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe
because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.

CVE-2019-1543

Fixes #8345

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)

(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6)

Don't write the tick_identity to the session

Sessions must be immutable once they can be shared with multiple threads.
We were breaking that rule by writing the ticket index into it during the
handshake. This can lead to incorrect behaviour, including failed
connections in multi-threaded environments.

Reported by David Benjamin.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8383)

(cherry picked from commit c96ce52ce293785b54a42d119c457aef739cc2ce)

openssl_strerror_r: Fix handling of GNU strerror_r

GNU strerror_r may return either a pointer to a string that the function
stores in buf, or a pointer to some (immutable) static string in which case
buf is unused.

In such a case we need to set buf manually.

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8371)

(cherry picked from commit e3b35d2b29e9446af83fcaa534e67e7b04a60d7a)

Fix seeding from random device w/o getrandom syscall

Use select to wait for /dev/random in readable state,
but do not actually read anything from /dev/random,
use /dev/urandom first.

Use linux define __NR_getrandom instead of the
glibc define SYS_getrandom, in case the kernel headers
are more current than the glibc headers.

Fixes #8215

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8251)

(cherry picked from commit 38023b87f037f4b832c236dfce2a76272be08763)

deps: add s390 asm rules for OpenSSL-1.1.1

Generate asm files with Makefile rules.

From:
- https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/0d9a86c7cb3566b22becc656691282402f5026c0

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8351)

Configure: support a few more "make variables" defaulting from env

CFLAGS, CXXFLAGS, CPPFLAGS, LDFLAGS, and LDLIBS

(cherry picked from commit 8e7984e5783877c58cddc7b4e668401580ab4467)

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8359)

.travis.yml: change -std=c89 to -ansi

For C, -ansi is equivalent to -std=c90
For C++, -ansi is equivalent to -std=c++98

We also place -ansi in CPPFLAGS instead of the usual command line config,
to avoid getting it when linking (clang complains)

(cherry picked from commit 874f785988c17991051d36a0407a87b36c463a94)

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8359)

Configuration: divide devteam flags into language specific sets

Some of the devteam flags are not for C++

(cherry picked from commit e373c70a3e535b560f6b6bade914a724aa975c55)

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8359)

Do buildtests on our public header files with C++ as well

This ensures that we don't mistakenly use C++ keywords anywhere public.

Related to #8313

(cherry picked from commit 9f27d4bf32c0465270e1922365b21825a0f7a42a)

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8359)

Configure: make --strict-warnings a regular user provided compiler option

This makes `--strict-warnings` into a compiler pseudo-option, i.e. it
gets treated the same way as any other compiler option given on the
configuration command line, but is retroactively replaced by actual
compiler warning options, depending on what compiler is used.

This makes it easier to see in what order options are given to the
compiler from the configuration command line, i.e. this:

    ./config -Wall --strict-warnings

would give the compiler flags in the same order as they're given,
i.e.:

    -Wall -Werror -Wno-whatever ...

instead of what we got previously:

    -Werror -Wno-whatever ... -Wall

(cherry picked from commit fcee53948b7f9a5951d42f4ee321e706ea6b4b84)

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8359)

cfi build fixes in x86-64 ghash assembly

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8281)

(cherry picked from commit 54d00677f305375eee65a0c9edb5f0980c5f020f)

Make the padlock engine build correctly

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8220)

(cherry picked from commit 149c12d5e41b238ce4af6d1b6b3a767b40293bd7)

Ensure configured module specific and application specific defines are used

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8220)

(cherry picked from commit 2fce15b58b2502a614529707eb45b6e5cac4eb15)

Add PADLOCK_ASM to dso_defines rather than lib_defines

Since the padlock code is an engine, the assembler is for a module,
not a library link to when building a program...  there's a
distinction.

Fixes #2311

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8220)

(cherry picked from commit 88780b1c5f6000fe6731fec74efe697bcf493b6c)

Fix the default digest algorthm of SM2

Currently SM2 shares the ameth with EC, so the current default digest
algorithm returned is SHA256. This fixes the default digest algorithm of
SM2 to SM3, which is the only valid digest algorithm for SM2 signature.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8186)

(cherry picked from commit e766f4a0531bffdab8ad2038279b755928d7a40a)

Revert "Configure: stop forcing use of DEFINE macros in headers"

Github PR #8246 provides a better solution to the problem.

This reverts commit f11ffa505f8a9345145a26a05bf77b012b6941bd.

[extended tests]

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8247)

(cherry picked from commit 4089b4340701e3c13e07169e67a7d14519c98658)

[test] modernize ecdsatest and extend ECDSA sign KATs

(cherry picked from commit 1a31d8017ee7e8df0eca76fee601b826699c9ac1)

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8314)

Fix trivial typo in EVP_DigestVerifyInit doc

(cherry picked from commit b3883f77df33989b0d4298ca9a21d8595dd9a8c9)

Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8319)

Prepare for 1.1.1c-dev

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Prepare for 1.1.1b release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Clarify that SSL_shutdown() must not be called after a fatal error

Follow on from CVE-2019-1559

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Update copyright year

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8347)

e_devcrypto: set digest input_blocksize

This restores the behavior of previous versions of the /dev/crypto
engine, in alignment with the default implementation.

Reported-by: Gerard Looije <lglooije@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8306)

eng_devcrypto: close open session on init

cipher_init may be called on an already initialized context, without a
necessary cleanup.  This separates cleanup from initialization, closing
an eventual open session before creating a new one.

Move the /dev/crypto session cleanup code to its own function.

Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8306)

Update NEWS for new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8344)

Disable 02-test_errstr.t on msys/mingw as well as MSWin32

There is too high a risk that perl and OpenSSL are linked with
different C RTLs, and thereby get different messages for even the most
mundane error numbers.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8343)

(cherry picked from commit 565a19eef35926b4b9675f6cc3964fb290a5b380)

VMS: disable the shlibload test for now

test/shlibloadtest.c needs added code for VMS shared libraries

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8342)

Rearrange the inclusion of curve448/curve448_lcl.h

The real cause for this change is that test/ec_internal_test.c
includes ec_lcl.h, and including curve448/curve448_lcl.h from there
doesn't work so well with compilers who always do inclusions relative
to the C file being compiled.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8334)

Ensure bn_cmp_words can handle the case where n == 0

Thanks to David Benjamin who reported this, performed the analysis and
suggested the patch. I have incorporated some of his analysis in the
comments below.

This issue can cause an out-of-bounds read. It is believed that this was
not reachable until the recent "fixed top" changes. Analysis has so far
only identified one code path that can encounter this - although it is
possible that others may be found. The one code path only impacts 1.0.2 in
certain builds. The fuzzer found a path in RSA where iqmp is too large. If
the input is all zeros, the RSA CRT logic will multiply a padded zero by
iqmp. Two mitigating factors:

- Private keys which trip this are invalid (iqmp is not reduced mod p).
Only systems which take untrusted private keys care.
- In OpenSSL 1.1.x, there is a check which rejects the oversize iqmp,
so the bug is only reproducible in 1.0.2 so far.

Fortunately, the bug appears to be relatively harmless. The consequences of
bn_cmp_word's misbehavior are:

- OpenSSL may crash if the buffers are page-aligned and the previous page is
non-existent.
- OpenSSL will incorrectly treat two BN_ULONG buffers as not equal when they
are equal.
- Side channel concerns.

The first is indeed a concern and is a DoS bug. The second is fine in this
context. bn_cmp_word and bn_cmp_part_words are used to compute abs(a0 - a1)
in Karatsuba. If a0 = a1, it does not matter whether we use a0 - a1 or
a1 - a0. The third would be worth thinking about, but it is overshadowed
by the entire Karatsuba implementation not being constant time.

Due to the difficulty of tripping this and the low impact no CVE is felt
necessary for this issue.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8326)

(cherry picked from commit 576129cd72ae054d246221f111aabf42b9c6d76d)

Windows: Call TerminateProcess, not ExitProcess

Ty Baen-Price explains:

> Problem and Resolution:
> The following lines of code make use of the Microsoft API ExitProcess:
>
> ```
> Apps\Speed.c line 335: ExitProcess(ret);
> Ms\uplink.c line 22: ExitProcess(1);
> ```
>
> These function calls are made after fatal errors are detected and
> program termination is desired. ExitProcess(), however causes
> _orderly_ shutdown of a process and all its threads, i.e. it unloads
> all dlls and runs all destructors. See MSDN for details of exactly
> what happens
> (https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682658(v=vs.85).aspx).
> The MSDN page states that ExitProcess should never be called unless
> it is _known to be safe_ to call it. These calls should simply be
> replaced with calls to TerminateProcess(), which is what should be
> called for _disorderly_ shutdown.
>
> An example of usage:
>
> ```
> TerminateProcess(GetCurrentProcess(), exitcode);
> ```
>
> Effect of Problem:
> Because of a compilation error (wrong c++ runtime), my program
> executed the uplink.c ExitProcess() call. This caused the single
> OpenSSL thread to start executing the destructors of all my dlls,
> and their objects. Unfortunately, about 30 other threads were
> happily using those objects at that time, eventually causing a
> 0xC0000005 ACCESS_VIOLATION. Obviously an ACCESS_VIOLATION is the
> best case scenario, as I'm sure you can imagine at the consequences
> of undiscovered memory corruption, even in a terminating process.

And on the subject of `TerminateProcess()` being asynchronous:

> That is technically true, but I think it's probably synchronous
> "enough" for your purposes, since a call to TerminateProcess
> suspends execution of all threads in the target process. This means
> it's really only asynchronous if you're calling TerminateProcess one
> some _other_ process. If you're calling TerminateProcess on your own
> process, you'll never return from the TerminateProcess call.

Fixes #2489
Was originally RT-4526

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8301)

(cherry picked from commit 925795995018bddb053e863db8b5c52d2a9005d9)

Don't restrict the number of KeyUpdate messages we can process

Prior to this commit we were keeping a count of how many KeyUpdates we
have processed and failing if we had had too many. This simplistic approach
is not sufficient for long running connections. Since many KeyUpdates
would not be a particular good DoS route anyway, the simplest solution is
to simply remove the key update count.

Fixes #8068

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8299)

(cherry picked from commit 3409a5ff8a44ddaf043d83ed22e657ae871be289)

engines/dasync: add explaining comments about AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1

Fixes #7950

It was reported that there might be a null pointer dereference in the
implementation of the dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1() cipher, because
EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1() can return a null pointer if AES-NI is
not available. It took some analysis to find out that this is not
an issue in practice, and these comments explain the reason to comfort
further NPD hunters.

Detected by GitHub user @wurongxin1987 using the Sourcebrella Pinpoint
static analyzer.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8305)

(cherry picked from commit a4a0a1eb43cfccd128d085932a567e0482fbfe47)

Fix a grammar nit in CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index.pod

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8303)

(cherry picked from commit 84712024da5e5485e8397afc763555355bddf960)

Fix dasync engine

The aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1 cipher in the dasync engine is broken. Probably
by commit e38c2e8535 which removed use of the "enc" variable...but not
completely.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8291)

(cherry picked from commit 695dd3a332fdd54b873fd0d08f9ae720141f24cd)

SSL_CONF_cmd: fix doc for NoRenegotiation

The option is a flag for Options, not a standalone setting.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8292)

(cherry picked from commit 4ac5e43da6d9ee828240e6d347c48c8fae6573a2)

Clear BN_FLG_CONSTTIME on BN_CTX_get()

(cherry picked from commit c8147d37ccaaf28c430d3fb45a14af36597e48b8)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8253)

Test for constant-time flag leakage in BN_CTX

This commit adds a simple unit test to make sure that the constant-time
flag does not "leak" among BN_CTX frames:

- test_ctx_consttime_flag() initializes (and later frees before
  returning) a BN_CTX object, then it calls in sequence
  test_ctx_set_ct_flag() and test_ctx_check_ct_flag() using the same
  BN_CTX object. The process is run twice, once with a "normal"
  BN_CTX_new() object, then with a BN_CTX_secure_new() one.
- test_ctx_set_ct_flag() starts a frame in the given BN_CTX and sets the
  BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on some of the BIGNUMs obtained from the frame
  before ending it.
- test_ctx_check_ct_flag() then starts a new frame and gets a number of
  BIGNUMs from it. In absence of leaks, none of the BIGNUMs in the new
  frame should have BN_FLG_CONSTTIME set.

In actual BN_CTX usage inside libcrypto the leak could happen at any
depth level in the BN_CTX stack, with varying results depending on the
patterns of sibling trees of nested function calls sharing the same
BN_CTX object, and the effect of unintended BN_FLG_CONSTTIME on the
called BN_* functions.

This simple unit test abstracts away this complexity and verifies that
the leak does not happen between two sibling functions sharing the same
BN_CTX object at the same level of nesting.

(cherry picked from commit fe16ae5f95fa86ddb049a8d1e2caee0b80b32282)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8253)

[test] unit test for field_inv function pointer in EC_METHOD

(cherry picked from commit 8f58ede09572dcc6a7e6c01280dd348240199568)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8262)

SCA hardening for mod. field inversion in EC_GROUP

This commit adds a dedicated function in `EC_METHOD` to access a modular
field inversion implementation suitable for the specifics of the
implemented curve, featuring SCA countermeasures.

The new pointer is defined as:
`int (*field_inv)(const EC_GROUP*, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX*)`
and computes the multiplicative inverse of `a` in the underlying field,
storing the result in `r`.

Three implementations are included, each including specific SCA
countermeasures:
  - `ec_GFp_simple_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through
    blinding.
  - `ec_GFp_mont_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through Fermat's
    Little Theorem (FLT) inversion.
  - `ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv()`, that uses `BN_GF2m_mod_inv()` which
    already features SCA hardening through blinding.

From a security point of view, this also helps addressing a leakage
previously affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates.

This commit also adds a new error reason code (i.e.,
`EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT`) to improve consistency between the three
implementations as all of them could fail for the same reason but
through different code paths resulting in inconsistent error stack
states.

Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit e0033efc30b0f00476bba8f0fa5512be5dc8a3f1)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8262)

Don't set SNI by default if hostname is not dNS name

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8175)

(cherry picked from commit 8e981051ceecd10754f8f6d1291414a7453c8fac)

Fix reference to symbol 'main'.

The AIX binder needs to be instructed that the output will have no entry
point (see AIX' ld manual: -e in the Flags section; autoexp and noentry
in the Binder section).

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8282)

(cherry picked from commit c1b3846242fc1a7791beca42f548c325c35e269b)

Add a test for interleaving app data with handshake data in TLSv1.3

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8191)

(cherry picked from commit 73e62d40eb53f2bad98dea0083c217dbfad1a335)

Don't interleave handshake and other record types in TLSv1.3

In TLSv1.3 it is illegal to interleave handshake records with non handshake
records.

Fixes #8189

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8191)

(cherry picked from commit 3d35e3a253a2895f263333bb4355760630a31955)

cygwin: drop explicit O_TEXT

Cygwin binaries should not enforce text mode these days, just
use text mode if the underlying mount point requests it

Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8248)

(cherry picked from commit 9b57e4a1ef356420367d843f1ba96037f88316b8)

Add missing dots in dgst man page

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #8142
(cherry picked from commit e3ac3654892246d7492f1012897e42ad7efd13ce)