Kurt Cancemi [Thu, 7 May 2015 20:12:33 +0000 (16:12 -0400)]
Add missing NULL check in X509V3_parse_list()
Matt's note: I added a call to X509V3err to Kurt's original patch.
RT#3840
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
344c271eb339fc2982e9a3584a94e51112d84584)
Bjoern D. Rasmussen [Sun, 10 May 2015 05:51:29 +0000 (07:51 +0200)]
Fix for memcpy() and strcmp() being undefined.
clang says: "s_cb.c:958:9: error: implicitly declaring library function
'memcpy'"
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
8f744cceff5bce8cb00a6ddd739c1bbb85c142ea)
Conflicts:
apps/s_cb.c
Matt Caswell [Sat, 9 May 2015 05:51:25 +0000 (13:51 +0800)]
Check sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null return value
If sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null() returns NULL then ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list()
should also return NULL.
Based on an original patch by mrpre <mrpre@163.com>.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
14def5f5375594830597cc153e11c6017f6adddf)
Viktor Dukhovni [Thu, 7 May 2015 17:43:36 +0000 (13:43 -0400)]
Fix typo in valid_star
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 30 Apr 2015 10:50:08 +0000 (11:50 +0100)]
Add more error state transitions (DTLS)
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state for DTLS.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
cefc93910c4c0f7fa9f8c1f8f7aad084a7fa87d2)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_srvr.c
Matt Caswell [Thu, 30 Apr 2015 10:32:35 +0000 (11:32 +0100)]
Add more error state transitions (client)
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the client
side.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
cc273a93617a5c1e69cb5db6f655e463f8e31806)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
Matt Caswell [Thu, 30 Apr 2015 10:11:04 +0000 (11:11 +0100)]
Add more error state transitions
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the server
side.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
cf9b0b6fb253fd40225d7c648a08646686e62d2d)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Matt Caswell [Thu, 23 Apr 2015 19:01:33 +0000 (20:01 +0100)]
Add Error state
Reusing an SSL object when it has encountered a fatal error can
have bad consequences. This is a bug in application code not libssl
but libssl should be more forgiving and not crash.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
a89db885e0d8aac3a9df1bbccb0c1ddfd8b2e10a)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl_stat.c
Matt Caswell [Mon, 4 May 2015 22:15:46 +0000 (23:15 +0100)]
Remove libcrypto to libssl dependency
Remove dependency on ssl_locl.h from v3_scts.c, and incidentally fix a build problem with
kerberos (the dependency meant v3_scts.c was trying to include krb5.h, but without having been
passed the relevanant -I flags to the compiler)
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
d13bd6130bd856e9f512c43499e5fc70943bf133)
Conflicts:
crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
Richard Levitte [Mon, 4 May 2015 15:34:40 +0000 (17:34 +0200)]
RT2943: Check sizes if -iv and -K arguments
RT2943 only complains about the incorrect check of -K argument size,
we might as well do the same thing with the -iv argument.
Before this, we only checked that the given argument wouldn't give a
bitstring larger than EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH. we can be more precise and
check against the size of the actual cipher used.
(cherry picked from commit
8920a7cd04f43b1a090d0b0a8c9e16b94c6898d4)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Rich Salz [Mon, 4 May 2015 14:34:51 +0000 (10:34 -0400)]
Fix cut/paste error
Was memset with wrong sizeof.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
23b0fa5ab6b6b9f0a9350e24ac5ddb8275802617)
Gilles Khouzam [Sat, 2 May 2015 02:20:42 +0000 (22:20 -0400)]
RT3820: Don't call GetDesktopWindow()
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
bed2edf1cb73f1fe2c11029acc694086bc14443e)
Rich Salz [Sat, 2 May 2015 02:06:07 +0000 (22:06 -0400)]
RT3776: Wrong size for malloc
Use sizeof *foo parameter, to avoid these errors.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
53ba0a9e91ad203de2943edaf1090ab17ec435fa)
Hanno Böck [Sat, 2 May 2015 02:27:20 +0000 (22:27 -0400)]
Fix uninitialized variable.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
539ed89f686866b82a9ec9a4c3b112878d29cd73)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 29 Apr 2015 12:22:18 +0000 (13:22 +0100)]
Fix buffer overrun in RSA signing
The problem occurs in EVP_PKEY_sign() when using RSA with X931 padding.
It is only triggered if the RSA key size is smaller than the digest length.
So with SHA512 you can trigger the overflow with anything less than an RSA
512 bit key. I managed to trigger a 62 byte overflow when using a 16 bit RSA
key. This wasn't sufficient to cause a crash, although your mileage may
vary.
In practice RSA keys of this length are never used and X931 padding is very
rare. Even if someone did use an excessively short RSA key, the chances of
them combining that with a longer digest and X931 padding is very
small. For these reasons I do not believe there is a security implication to
this. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
34166d41892643a36ad2d1f53cc0025e2edc2a39)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 29 Apr 2015 08:58:10 +0000 (09:58 +0100)]
Add sanity check to print_bin function
Add a sanity check to the print_bin function to ensure that the |off|
argument is positive. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
3deeeeb61b0c5b9b5f0993a67b7967d2f85186da)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 28 Apr 2015 14:28:23 +0000 (15:28 +0100)]
Add sanity check to ssl_get_prev_session
Sanity check the |len| parameter to ensure it is positive. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
cb0f400b0cea2d2943f99b1e89c04ff6ed748cd5)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 28 Apr 2015 14:19:50 +0000 (15:19 +0100)]
Sanity check the return from final_finish_mac
The return value is checked for 0. This is currently safe but we should
really check for <= 0 since -1 is frequently used for error conditions.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
c427570e5098e120cbcb66e799f85c317aac7b91)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Matt Caswell [Mon, 27 Apr 2015 14:41:42 +0000 (15:41 +0100)]
Add sanity check in ssl3_cbc_digest_record
For SSLv3 the code assumes that |header_length| > |md_block_size|. Whilst
this is true for all SSLv3 ciphersuites, this fact is far from obvious by
looking at the code. If this were not the case then an integer overflow
would occur, leading to a subsequent buffer overflow. Therefore I have
added an explicit sanity check to ensure header_length is always valid.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
29b0a15a480626544dd0c803d5de671552544de6)
Matt Caswell [Mon, 27 Apr 2015 14:41:03 +0000 (15:41 +0100)]
Clarify logic in BIO_*printf functions
The static function dynamically allocates an output buffer if the output
grows larger than the static buffer that is normally used. The original
logic implied that |currlen| could be greater than |maxlen| which is
incorrect (and if so would cause a buffer overrun). Also the original
logic would call OPENSSL_malloc to create a dynamic buffer equal to the
size of the static buffer, and then immediately call OPENSSL_realloc to
make it bigger, rather than just creating a buffer than was big enough in
the first place. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
9d9e37744cd5119f9921315864d1cd28717173cd)
Matt Caswell [Mon, 27 Apr 2015 10:13:56 +0000 (11:13 +0100)]
Sanity check EVP_EncodeUpdate buffer len
There was already a sanity check to ensure the passed buffer length is not
zero. Extend this to ensure that it also not negative. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
b86d7dca69f5c80abd60896c8ed3039fc56210cc)
Matt Caswell [Mon, 27 Apr 2015 10:07:06 +0000 (11:07 +0100)]
Sanity check EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD
The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at
least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at
least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to
represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
c8269881093324b881b81472be037055571f73f3)
Conflicts:
ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
Matt Caswell [Mon, 27 Apr 2015 10:04:56 +0000 (11:04 +0100)]
Sanity check DES_enc_write buffer length
Add a sanity check to DES_enc_write to ensure the buffer length provided
is not negative. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
873fb39f20b6763daba226b74e83fb194924c7bf)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 29 Apr 2015 15:15:40 +0000 (16:15 +0100)]
Add length sanity check in SSLv2 n_do_ssl_write()
Fortify flagged up a problem in n_do_ssl_write() in SSLv2. Analysing the
code I do not believe there is a real problem here. However the logic flows
are complicated enough that a sanity check of |len| is probably worthwhile.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 21 Apr 2015 10:28:41 +0000 (11:28 +0100)]
Revert "Fix verify algorithm."
This reverts commit
47daa155a31b0a54ce09ad2ed4d55fad74096dab.
The above commit was backported to the 1.0.2 branch as part of backporting
the alternative chain verify algorithm changes. However it has been pointed
out (credit to Shigeki Ohtsu) that this is unnecessary in 1.0.2 as this
commit is a work around for loop checking that only exists in master.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Emilia Kasper [Mon, 27 Apr 2015 16:49:43 +0000 (18:49 +0200)]
NISTZ256: use EC_POINT API and check errors.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
6038354cf8ca0792420c1ac0ce50d6d2f0aedebf)
Emilia Kasper [Mon, 27 Apr 2015 14:16:15 +0000 (16:16 +0200)]
NISTZ256: don't swallow malloc errors
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
a4d5269e6d0dba0c276c968448a3576f7604666a)
Emilia Kasper [Mon, 27 Apr 2015 13:41:52 +0000 (15:41 +0200)]
NISTZ256: set Z_is_one to boolean 0/1 as is customary.
Cosmetic, no real effect.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
4446044a793a9103a4bc70c0214005e6a4463767)
Emilia Kasper [Fri, 24 Apr 2015 14:53:30 +0000 (16:53 +0200)]
Error checking and memory leak fixes in NISTZ256.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting these issues.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Emilia Kasper [Fri, 24 Apr 2015 13:38:24 +0000 (15:38 +0200)]
Fix error checking and memory leaks in NISTZ256 precomputation.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting these issues.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
53dd4ddf71ad79a64be934ca19445b1cf560adab)
Emilia Kasper [Fri, 24 Apr 2015 13:19:15 +0000 (15:19 +0200)]
Correctly set Z_is_one on the return value in the NISTZ256 implementation.
Also add a few comments about constant-timeness.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Loganaden Velvindron [Wed, 22 Apr 2015 15:16:30 +0000 (16:16 +0100)]
Fix CRYPTO_strdup
The function CRYPTO_strdup (aka OPENSSL_strdup) fails to check the return
value from CRYPTO_malloc to see if it is NULL before attempting to use it.
This patch adds a NULL check.
RT3786
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
37b0cf936744d9edb99b5dd82cae78a7eac6ad60)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
20d21389c8b6f5b754573ffb6a4dc4f3986f2ca4)
Emilia Kasper [Tue, 21 Apr 2015 16:12:58 +0000 (18:12 +0200)]
Repair EAP-FAST session resumption
EAP-FAST session resumption relies on handshake message lookahead
to determine server intentions. Commits
980bc1ec6114f5511b20c2e6ca741e61a39b99d6
and
7b3ba508af5c86afe43e28174aa3c53a0a24f4d9
removed the lookahead so broke session resumption.
This change partially reverts the commits and brings the lookahead back
in reduced capacity for TLS + EAP-FAST only. Since EAP-FAST does not
support regular session tickets, the lookahead now only checks for a
Finished message.
Regular handshakes are unaffected by this change.
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
6e3d015363ed09c4eff5c02ad41153387ffdf5af)
Emilia Kasper [Tue, 14 Apr 2015 15:42:42 +0000 (17:42 +0200)]
Initialize variable
newsig may be used (freed) uninitialized on a malloc error.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
68249414405500660578b337f1c8dd5dd4bb5bcc)
Emilia Kasper [Thu, 16 Apr 2015 16:07:58 +0000 (18:07 +0200)]
make update
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Richard Levitte [Wed, 25 Mar 2015 13:41:58 +0000 (14:41 +0100)]
Initialised 'ok' and redo the logic.
The logic with how 'ok' was calculated didn't quite convey what's "ok",
so the logic is slightly redone to make it less confusing.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
06affe3dac65592a341547f5a47e52cedb7b71f8)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 13 Mar 2015 16:48:01 +0000 (16:48 +0000)]
Fix return checks in GOST engine
Filled in lots of return value checks that were missing the GOST engine, and
added appropriate error handling.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
8817e2e0c998757d3bd036d7f45fe8d0a49fbe2d)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 13 Mar 2015 15:04:54 +0000 (15:04 +0000)]
Fix misc NULL derefs in sureware engine
Fix miscellaneous NULL pointer derefs in the sureware engine.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
7b611e5fe8eaac9512f72094c460f3ed6040076a)
Andy Polyakov [Mon, 20 Apr 2015 15:49:29 +0000 (17:49 +0200)]
aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl: fix typo affecting Windows build.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
7be6bc68c6baef87d4d730c2505a05810a5a1684)
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 23 Jan 2015 16:27:10 +0000 (17:27 +0100)]
aes/asm/aesni-x86[_64].pl update.
This addresses
- request for improvement for faster key setup in RT#3576;
- clearing registers and stack in RT#3554 (this is more of a gesture to
see if there will be some traction from compiler side);
- more commentary around input parameters handling and stack layout
(desired when RT#3553 was reviewed);
- minor size and single block performance optimization (was lying around);
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
23f6eec71dbd472044db7dc854599f1de14a1f48)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 24 Mar 2015 16:21:21 +0000 (16:21 +0000)]
Fix verify algorithm.
Disable loop checking when we retry verification with an alternative path.
This fixes the case where an intermediate CA is explicitly trusted and part
of the untrusted certificate list. By disabling loop checking for this case
the untrusted CA can be replaced by the explicitly trusted case and
verification will succeed.
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
e5991ec528b1c339062440811e2641f5ea2b328b)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 27 Jan 2015 11:15:15 +0000 (11:15 +0000)]
Add documentation for the -no_alt_chains option for various apps, as well as
the X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag.
Conflicts:
doc/apps/cms.pod
doc/apps/ocsp.pod
doc/apps/s_client.pod
doc/apps/s_server.pod
doc/apps/smime.pod
doc/apps/verify.pod
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 27 Jan 2015 10:50:38 +0000 (10:50 +0000)]
Add -no_alt_chains option to apps to implement the new
X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag. Using this option means that when building
certificate chains, the first chain found will be the one used. Without this
flag, if the first chain found is not trusted then we will keep looking to
see if we can build an alternative chain instead.
Conflicts:
apps/cms.c
apps/ocsp.c
apps/s_client.c
apps/s_server.c
apps/smime.c
apps/verify.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 27 Jan 2015 10:35:27 +0000 (10:35 +0000)]
Add flag to inhibit checking for alternate certificate chains. Setting this
behaviour will force behaviour as per previous versions of OpenSSL
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 27 Jan 2015 10:03:29 +0000 (10:03 +0000)]
In certain situations the server provided certificate chain may no longer be
valid. However the issuer of the leaf, or some intermediate cert is in fact
in the trust store.
When building a trust chain if the first attempt fails, then try to see if
alternate chains could be constructed that are trusted.
RT3637
RT3621
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 16 Apr 2015 15:43:09 +0000 (16:43 +0100)]
Fix encoding bug in i2c_ASN1_INTEGER
Fix bug where i2c_ASN1_INTEGER mishandles zero if it is marked as
negative.
Thanks to Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <huzaifas@redhat.com> and
Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
a0eed48d37a4b7beea0c966caf09ad46f4a92a44)
Emilia Kasper [Wed, 15 Apr 2015 12:18:55 +0000 (14:18 +0200)]
Error out immediately on empty ciphers list.
A 0-length ciphers list is never permitted. The old code only used to
reject an empty ciphers list for connections with a session ID. It
would later error out on a NULL structure, so this change just moves
the alert closer to the problem source.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
3ae91cfb327c9ed689b9aaf7bca01a3f5a0657cb)
Emilia Kasper [Thu, 16 Apr 2015 16:46:52 +0000 (18:46 +0200)]
Use -Wall -Wextra with clang
The disabled set of -Weverything is hard to maintain across versions.
Use -Wall -Wextra but also document other useful warnings that currently trigger.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Viktor Dukhovni [Thu, 16 Apr 2015 05:50:03 +0000 (01:50 -0400)]
Code style: space after 'if'
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <gitlab@openssl.org>
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 15 Apr 2015 23:00:40 +0000 (00:00 +0100)]
Limit depth of nested sequences when generating ASN.1
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
PR#3800
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
c4137b5e828d8fab0b244defb79257619dad8fc7)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 15 Apr 2015 23:21:05 +0000 (00:21 +0100)]
Reject empty generation strings.
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
111b60bea01d234b5873488c19ff2b9c5d4d58e9)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 10 Apr 2015 15:49:33 +0000 (16:49 +0100)]
Fix ssl_get_prev_session overrun
If OpenSSL is configured with no-tlsext then ssl_get_prev_session can read
past the end of the ClientHello message if the session_id length in the
ClientHello is invalid. This should not cause any security issues since the
underlying buffer is 16k in size. It should never be possible to overrun by
that many bytes.
This is probably made redundant by the previous commit - but you can never be
too careful.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
5e0a80c1c9b2b06c2d203ad89778ce1b98e0b5ad)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 10 Apr 2015 16:25:27 +0000 (17:25 +0100)]
Check for ClientHello message overruns
The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make
sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have
security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still
needs to be fixed.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
c9642eb1ff79a30e2c7632ef8267cc34cc2b0d79)
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 11 Apr 2015 14:39:13 +0000 (16:39 +0200)]
do_dirname: Don't change gen on failures
It would set gen->d.dirn to a freed pointer in case X509V3_NAME_from_section
failed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
8ec5c5dd361343d9017eff8547b19e86e4944ebc)
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 11 Apr 2015 15:08:38 +0000 (17:08 +0200)]
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free: Check param for NULL
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
(cherry picked from commit
f49baeff50d0be9c8d86aed6fb4a08841aa3da41)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 2 Apr 2015 12:45:14 +0000 (13:45 +0100)]
Don't set *pval to NULL in ASN1_item_ex_new.
While *pval is usually a pointer in rare circumstances it can be a long
value. One some platforms (e.g. WIN64) where
sizeof(long) < sizeof(ASN1_VALUE *) this will write past the field.
*pval is initialised correctly in the rest of ASN1_item_ex_new so setting it
to NULL is unecessary anyway.
Thanks to Julien Kauffmann for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
f617b4969a9261b9d7d381670aefbe2cf766a2cb)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 10 Apr 2015 01:33:44 +0000 (02:33 +0100)]
Fix ECDH key identifier support.
PR#3789
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
7a317fa07cf3d9952c574e7d214d371798fee42a)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 10 Apr 2015 01:31:16 +0000 (02:31 +0100)]
Fix ECDH detection, add ECDH keyid test.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
9fdbc9df76a68a30df349c53f1ceeb915f82948c)
Richard Levitte [Wed, 8 Apr 2015 17:26:11 +0000 (19:26 +0200)]
Have mkerr.pl treat already existing multiline string defs properly
Since source reformat, we ended up with some error reason string
definitions that spanned two lines. That in itself is fine, but we
sometimes edited them to provide better strings than what could be
automatically determined from the reason macro, for example:
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
"Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
However, mkerr.pl didn't treat those two-line definitions right, and
they ended up being retranslated to whatever the macro name would
indicate, for example:
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
"No gost certificate sent by peer"},
Clearly not what we wanted. This change fixes this problem.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
2cfdfe0918f03f8323c9523a2beb2b363ae86ca7)
Richard Levitte [Wed, 1 Apr 2015 09:36:18 +0000 (11:36 +0200)]
Ignore the non-dll windows specific build directories
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
37d92b1b2bb6e6e04d62d6f7774a2d8190a99174)
Richard Levitte [Sat, 4 Apr 2015 14:53:44 +0000 (16:53 +0200)]
Appease clang -Wshadow
The macros BSWAP4 and BSWAP8 have statetemnt expressions
implementations that use local variable names that shadow variables
outside the macro call, generating warnings like this
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:263:14: warning: declaration shadows a local variable
[-Wshadow]
seqnum = BSWAP8(blocks[0].q[0]);
^
../modes/modes_lcl.h:41:29: note: expanded from macro 'BSWAP8'
^
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:223:12: note: previous declaration is here
size_t ret = 0;
^
Have clang be quiet by modifying the macro variable names slightly
(suffixing them with an underscore).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
2da2a4349c1598ad0648405fe175e7846d893c45)
Richard Levitte [Sat, 4 Apr 2015 14:33:20 +0000 (16:33 +0200)]
Appease clang -Wgnu-statement-expression
We use GNU statement expressions in crypto/md32_common.h, surrounded
by checks that GNU C is indeed used to compile. It seems that clang,
at least on Linux, pretends to be GNU C, therefore finds the statement
expressions and then warns about them.
The solution is to have clang be quiet about it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
04958e84d8079fa57a782db70f003c38b5b156fd)
Richard Levitte [Sat, 4 Apr 2015 14:22:26 +0000 (16:22 +0200)]
Appease clang -Wempty-translation-unit
ebcdic.c:284:7: warning: ISO C requires a translation unit to contain at least one
declaration [-Wempty-translation-unit]
^
1 warning generated.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
c25dea53e9db2b4956c315f85dae3f1c2854fd2b)
Emilia Kasper [Wed, 1 Apr 2015 15:08:45 +0000 (17:08 +0200)]
Harden SSLv2-supporting servers against Bleichenbacher's attack.
There is no indication that the timing differences are exploitable in
OpenSSL, and indeed there is some indication (Usenix '14) that they
are too small to be exploitable. Nevertheless, be careful and apply
the same countermeasures as in s3_srvr.c
Thanks to Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel and Yuval Shavitt for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 23 Jan 2015 16:04:19 +0000 (17:04 +0100)]
modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl: up to 90% performance improvement.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
7eeeb49e1103533bc81c234eb19613353866e474)
Andy Polyakov [Sat, 28 Mar 2015 21:01:59 +0000 (22:01 +0100)]
sha/asm/sha*-armv8.pl: add Denver and X-Gene esults.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
be5a87a1b00aceba5484a7ec198ac622c9283def)
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 3 Mar 2015 21:05:25 +0000 (22:05 +0100)]
aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: optimize for Cortex-A5x.
ARM has optimized Cortex-A5x pipeline to favour pairs of complementary
AES instructions. While modified code improves performance of post-r0p0
Cortex-A53 performance by >40% (for CBC decrypt and CTR), it hurts
original r0p0. We favour later revisions, because one can't prevent
future from coming. Improvement on post-r0p0 Cortex-A57 exceeds 50%,
while new code is not slower on r0p0, or Apple A7 for that matter.
[Update even SHA results for latest Cortex-A53.]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
94376cccb4ed5b376220bffe0739140ea9dad8c8)
Douglas E Engert [Wed, 25 Mar 2015 23:52:28 +0000 (23:52 +0000)]
Ensure EC private keys retain leading zeros
RFC5915 requires the use of the I2OSP primitive as defined in RFC3447
for storing an EC Private Key. This converts the private key into an
OCTETSTRING and retains any leading zeros. This commit ensures that those
leading zeros are present if required.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
30cd4ff294252c4b6a4b69cbef6a5b4117705d22)
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 13 Mar 2015 10:12:19 +0000 (11:12 +0100)]
ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: update commentary with before-after performance data.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
b06a6f7cc44baa0c17207a8f72c4ac360be7b555)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 25 Feb 2015 11:30:43 +0000 (11:30 +0000)]
Fix bug in s_client. Previously default verify locations would only be loaded
if CAfile or CApath were also supplied and successfully loaded first.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 10 Feb 2015 13:15:25 +0000 (13:15 +0000)]
Fix HMAC to pass invalid key len test
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 10 Feb 2015 13:15:05 +0000 (13:15 +0000)]
Add HMAC test for invalid key len
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 10 Feb 2015 11:39:52 +0000 (11:39 +0000)]
Ensure that both the MD and key have been initialised before attempting to
create an HMAC
Inspired by BoringSSL commit
2fe7f2d0d9a6fcc75b4e594eeec306cc55acd594
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/hmac/hmac.c
Matt Caswell [Tue, 10 Feb 2015 12:38:04 +0000 (12:38 +0000)]
Add more HMAC tests
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 26 Feb 2015 16:28:59 +0000 (16:28 +0000)]
Fix RAND_(pseudo_)?_bytes returns
Ensure all calls to RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes have their return
value checked correctly
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 5 Feb 2015 13:59:16 +0000 (13:59 +0000)]
Add ticket length before buffering DTLS message
In ssl3_send_new_session_ticket the message to be sent is constructed. We
skip adding the length of the session ticket initially, then call
ssl_set_handshake_header, and finally go back and add in the length of the
ticket. Unfortunately, in DTLS, ssl_set_handshake_header also has the side
effect of buffering the message for subsequent retransmission if required.
By adding the ticket length after the call to ssl_set_handshake_header the
message that is buffered is incomplete, causing an invalid message to be
sent on retransmission.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
4f9fab6bd0253416eeace5a45142c7c4a83bc511)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Matt Caswell [Thu, 5 Feb 2015 13:54:37 +0000 (13:54 +0000)]
Ensure last_write_sequence is saved in DTLS1.2
In DTLS, immediately prior to epoch change, the write_sequence is supposed
to be stored in s->d1->last_write_sequence. The write_sequence is then reset
back to
00000000. In the event of retransmits of records from the previous
epoch, the last_write_sequence is restored. This commit fixes a bug in
DTLS1.2 where the write_sequence was being reset before last_write_sequence
was saved, and therefore retransmits are sent with incorrect sequence
numbers.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
d5d0a1cb1347d4a8547e78aec56c50c528186e50)
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 14 Mar 2015 22:23:26 +0000 (23:23 +0100)]
Don't send a for ServerKeyExchange for kDHr and kDHd
The certificate already contains the DH parameters in that case.
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() would fail in that case anyway.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
93f1c13619c5b41f2dcfdbf6ae666f867922a87a)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 24 Mar 2015 13:15:33 +0000 (13:15 +0000)]
Fix OCSP tests.
OCSP verification changes mean the OCSP tests now need -trusted_first
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 13 Mar 2015 14:16:32 +0000 (14:16 +0000)]
Configuration file examples.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
7b68c30da01b4eedcd546f81844156646387cacb)
Dr. Stephen Henson [Sun, 22 Mar 2015 17:34:56 +0000 (17:34 +0000)]
Make OCSP response verification more flexible.
If a set of certificates is supplied to OCSP_basic_verify use those in
addition to any present in the OCSP response as untrusted CAs when
verifying a certificate chain.
PR#3668
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
4ca5efc2874e094d6382b30416824eda6dde52fe)
Mike Frysinger [Sat, 21 Mar 2015 09:08:41 +0000 (05:08 -0400)]
Fix malloc define typo
Fix compilation failure when SCTP is compiled due to incorrect define.
Reported-by: Conrad Kostecki <ck+gentoobugzilla@bl4ckb0x.de>
URL: https://bugs.gentoo.org/543828
RT#3758
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
7c82e339a677f8546e1456c7a8f6788598a9de43)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 20 Mar 2015 15:10:16 +0000 (15:10 +0000)]
Don't check curves that haven't been sent
Don't check that the curve appears in the list of acceptable curves for the
peer, if they didn't send us such a list (RFC 4492 does not require that the
extension be sent).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
b79d24101e3b5904b3770d60e32bdd6edc558337)
Andy Polyakov [Mon, 23 Mar 2015 12:34:03 +0000 (13:34 +0100)]
sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl: adapt for use in Linux kernel context.
In cooperation with Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro) and Sami Tolvanen (Google).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
2ecd32a1f8f0643ae7b38f59bbaf9f0d6ef326fe)
Matt Caswell [Sun, 22 Mar 2015 15:58:00 +0000 (15:58 +0000)]
Fix no-ec with no-ec2m
Fix builds config'd with no-ec and no-ec2m. Technically this combination is
redundant - but the fix is straight forward. Fix from OpenWrt.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 3 Mar 2015 16:08:58 +0000 (16:08 +0000)]
Add DTLS tests to make test
Updated test/testssl script to include the new DTLS capability in ssltest.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
3c381e54233be3d0dcbce7cc853c4767d979fe90)
David Woodhouse [Tue, 3 Mar 2015 15:47:08 +0000 (15:47 +0000)]
Add DTLS support to ssltest
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
98b8cdd32277cea829c31034a53f2487f750615d)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssltest.c
David Woodhouse [Tue, 3 Mar 2015 15:39:26 +0000 (15:39 +0000)]
Add DTLS to SSL_get_version
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit
504e643e0996fb842ac183023c3a6b9049af50ea)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_lib.c
Matt Caswell [Thu, 19 Mar 2015 13:34:56 +0000 (13:34 +0000)]
Prepare for 1.0.2b-dev
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 19 Mar 2015 13:31:16 +0000 (13:31 +0000)]
Prepare for 1.0.2a release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 19 Mar 2015 13:31:16 +0000 (13:31 +0000)]
make update
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 19 Mar 2015 11:35:33 +0000 (11:35 +0000)]
Fix unsigned/signed warnings
Fix some unsigned/signed warnings introduced as part of the fix
for CVE-2015-0293
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Thu, 19 Mar 2015 10:16:32 +0000 (10:16 +0000)]
Fix a failure to NULL a pointer freed on error.
Reported by the LibreSSL project as a follow on to CVE-2015-0209
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2015 16:50:16 +0000 (16:50 +0000)]
Update NEWS file
Update the NEWS file with the latest entries from CHANGES ready for the
release.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2015 16:36:37 +0000 (16:36 +0000)]
Update CHANGES for release
Update CHANGES file with all the latest fixes ready for the release.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2015 16:44:44 +0000 (16:44 +0000)]
Fix discrepancy in NEWS file
There was a discrepancy between the 1.0.2 version of NEWS and the 1.0.1
version. This fixes it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Tue, 17 Mar 2015 15:58:40 +0000 (15:58 +0000)]
Fix CHANGES discrepancies
There were some discrepancies in the CHANGES file between the 1.0.1 version
and 1.0.2. This corrects it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Matt Caswell [Wed, 18 Mar 2015 09:48:03 +0000 (09:48 +0000)]
Remove overlapping CHANGES/NEWS entries
Remove entries from CHANGES and NEWS from letter releases that occur *after*
the next point release. Without this we get duplicate entries for the same
issue appearing multiple times.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Emilia Kasper [Wed, 4 Mar 2015 17:05:02 +0000 (09:05 -0800)]
Fix reachable assert in SSLv2 servers.
This assert is reachable for servers that support SSLv2 and export ciphers.
Therefore, such servers can be DoSed by sending a specially crafted
SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY.
Also fix s2_srvr.c to error out early if the key lengths are malformed.
These lengths are sent unencrypted, so this does not introduce an oracle.
CVE-2015-0293
This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper of
the OpenSSL development team.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Emilia Kasper [Fri, 27 Feb 2015 15:52:23 +0000 (16:52 +0100)]
PKCS#7: avoid NULL pointer dereferences with missing content
In PKCS#7, the ASN.1 content component is optional.
This typically applies to inner content (detached signatures),
however we must also handle unexpected missing outer content
correctly.
This patch only addresses functions reachable from parsing,
decryption and verification, and functions otherwise associated
with reading potentially untrusted data.
Correcting all low-level API calls requires further work.
CVE-2015-0289
Thanks to Michal Zalewski (Google) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>