Use trusty for travis builds

this works around build failures due to clang
error: unknown warning option '-Wno-extended-offsetof'

[extended tests]

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9425)

Add value_barriers in constant time select functions

The barriers prevent the compiler from narrowing down the
possible value range of the mask and ~mask in the select
statements, which avoids the recognition of the select
and turning it into a conditional load or branch.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9419)

Fix a warning about missing prototype on arm

(cherry picked from commit 5fc89c1af837026b5812526ef6f519bf7ca42f16)

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8243)

Fix building linux-armv4 with --strict-warnings

(cherry picked from commit 0e0f8116e247912f5c48f8b3786e543f37fc1f87)

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8243)

Replace BIO_printf with ASN1_STRING_print in GENERAL_NAME_print

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9101)

Prepare for 1.0.2t-dev

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Prepare for 1.0.2s release

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Update copyright year

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9032)

Add CHANGES for 1.0.2s

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9019)

Change default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit

Fixes: #8737

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
GH: #8741
(cherry picked from commit 70b0b977f73cd70e17538af3095d18e0cf59132e)

RT 4242: reject invalid EC point coordinates

This is a backport of commit 1e2012b7 to 1.0.2. This hardening change
was made to 1.1.0 but was not backported to 1.0.2. Recent CVEs in user
applications have shown this additional hardening in 1.0.2 would be
beneficial.

E.g. see the patch for CVE-2019-9498
https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/0011-EAP-pwd-server-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch

and CVE-2019-9499
https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/0013-EAP-pwd-client-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch

The original commit had this description:

We already test in EC_POINT_oct2point that points are on the curve. To
be on the safe side, move this check to
EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_* so as to also check point coordinates
received through some other method.

We do not check projective coordinates, though, as
- it's unlikely that applications would be receiving this primarily
  internal representation from untrusted sources, and
- it's possible that the projective setters are used in a setting where
  performance matters.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8750)

Add FIPS support for Android Arm 64-bit

Fixes #2490
Fixes #8711

In commit 6db8e3bdc9e, support for Android Arm 64-bit was added to
the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module. For some reason, the corresponding
target 'android64-aarch64' was missing OpenSSL 1.0.2, whence it
could not be built with FIPS support on Android Arm 64-bit.
This commit adds the missing target.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8713)

fixed public range check in ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8607)

(cherry picked from commit cad8347be23c5e0c0d9eea02d090d42daf2dd7a9)

Modify the RSA_private_decrypt functions to check the padding in
constant time with a memory access pattern that does not depend
on secret information.

[extended tests]

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8543)

(cherry picked from commit 9c0cf214e7836eb5aaf1ea5d3cbf6720533f86b5)

Make err_clear_constant_time really constant time

[extended tests]

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8558)

Clear the point S before freeing in ec_mul_consttime

The secret point R can be recovered from S using the equation R = S - P.
The X and Z coordinates should be sufficient for that.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8505)

(cherry picked from commit 502b871ad4eacc96a31f89d9a9470ca2858da998)

Clear the secret point in ecdh_compute_key

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8502)

Fix memory overrun in rsa padding check functions

Backported from d7f5e5ae6d5

Fixes #8364 and #8357

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8438)

Avoid an underflow in ecp_nistp521.c

The function felem_diff_128_64 in ecp_nistp521.c substracts the number |in|
from |out| mod p. In order to avoid underflow it first adds 32p mod p
(which is equivalent to 0 mod p) to |out|. The comments and variable naming
suggest that the original author intended to add 64p mod p. In fact it
has been shown that with certain unusual co-ordinates it is possible to
cause an underflow in this function when only adding 32p mod p while
performing a point double operation. By changing this to 64p mod p the
underflow is avoided.

It turns out to be quite difficult to construct points that satisfy the
underflow criteria although this has been done and the underflow
demonstrated. However none of these points are actually on the curve.
Finding points that satisfy the underflow criteria and are also *on* the
curve is considered significantly more difficult. For this reason we do
not believe that this issue is currently practically exploitable and
therefore no CVE has been assigned.

This only impacts builds using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 Configure
option.

With thanks to Bo-Yin Yang, Billy Brumley and Dr Liu for their significant
help in investigating this issue.

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8405)

(cherry picked from commit 13fbce17fc9f02e2401fc3868f3f8e02d6647e5f)

Prepare for 1.0.2s-dev

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Prepare for 1.0.2r release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Updates CHANGES and NEWS for the new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Clarify that SSL_shutdown() must not be called after a fatal error

Follow on from CVE-2019-1559

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Go into the error state if a fatal alert is sent or received

If an application calls SSL_shutdown after a fatal alert has occured and
then behaves different based on error codes from that function then the
application may be vulnerable to a padding oracle.

CVE-2019-1559

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Update copyright year

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8348)

Ensure bn_cmp_words can handle the case where n == 0

Thanks to David Benjamin who reported this, performed the analysis and
suggested the patch. I have incorporated some of his analysis in the
comments below.

This issue can cause an out-of-bounds read. It is believed that this was
not reachable until the recent "fixed top" changes. Analysis has so far
only identified one code path that can encounter this - although it is
possible that others may be found. The one code path only impacts 1.0.2 in
certain builds. The fuzzer found a path in RSA where iqmp is too large. If
the input is all zeros, the RSA CRT logic will multiply a padded zero by
iqmp. Two mitigating factors:

- Private keys which trip this are invalid (iqmp is not reduced mod p).
Only systems which take untrusted private keys care.
- In OpenSSL 1.1.x, there is a check which rejects the oversize iqmp,
so the bug is only reproducible in 1.0.2 so far.

Fortunately, the bug appears to be relatively harmless. The consequences of
bn_cmp_word's misbehavior are:

- OpenSSL may crash if the buffers are page-aligned and the previous page is
non-existent.
- OpenSSL will incorrectly treat two BN_ULONG buffers as not equal when they
are equal.
- Side channel concerns.

The first is indeed a concern and is a DoS bug. The second is fine in this
context. bn_cmp_word and bn_cmp_part_words are used to compute abs(a0 - a1)
in Karatsuba. If a0 = a1, it does not matter whether we use a0 - a1 or
a1 - a0. The third would be worth thinking about, but it is overshadowed
by the entire Karatsuba implementation not being constant time.

Due to the difficulty of tripping this and the low impact no CVE is felt
necessary for this issue.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8326)

(cherry picked from commit 576129cd72ae054d246221f111aabf42b9c6d76d)

Clear BN_FLG_CONSTTIME on BN_CTX_get()

(cherry picked from commit c8147d37ccaaf28c430d3fb45a14af36597e48b8)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8295)

Test for constant-time flag leakage in BN_CTX

This commit adds a simple unit test to make sure that the constant-time
flag does not "leak" among BN_CTX frames:

- test_ctx_consttime_flag() initializes (and later frees before
  returning) a BN_CTX object, then it calls in sequence
  test_ctx_set_ct_flag() and test_ctx_check_ct_flag() using the same
  BN_CTX object.
- test_ctx_set_ct_flag() starts a frame in the given BN_CTX and sets the
  BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on some of the BIGNUMs obtained from the frame
  before ending it.
- test_ctx_check_ct_flag() then starts a new frame and gets a number of
  BIGNUMs from it. In absence of leaks, none of the BIGNUMs in the new
  frame should have BN_FLG_CONSTTIME set.

In actual BN_CTX usage inside libcrypto the leak could happen at any
depth level in the BN_CTX stack, with varying results depending on the
patterns of sibling trees of nested function calls sharing the same
BN_CTX object, and the effect of unintended BN_FLG_CONSTTIME on the
called BN_* functions.

This simple unit test abstracts away this complexity and verifies that
the leak does not happen between two sibling functions sharing the same
BN_CTX object at the same level of nesting.

(manually cherry picked from commit fe16ae5f95fa86ddb049a8d1e2caee0b80b32282)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8295)

Move stray POD file into the fold

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8273)

cygwin: drop explicit O_TEXT

Cygwin binaries should not enforce text mode these days, just
use text mode if the underlying mount point requests it

CLA: trivial

Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8249)

test/evp_test.c: use EVP_DecryptUpdate when decrypting, even for AAD

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7856)

make update

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7856)

Prevent calling decryption in an encryption context and vice versa

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7856)

make update

Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7974)

Makefile.org: prevent .bak files to become part of the tarball

Fixes #7903

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7910)

doc/man3: remove copy&paste leftover

Fixes #7883

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7884)

(cherry picked from commit 00eb879f74971e3c048286ef44f6f544676f90d7)

Fixed typo (vi leftover).

There was a trailing :w at a line, which didn't make sense in context
of the sentence/styling. Removed it, because I think it's a leftover
vi command.

CLA: trivial
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7875)

(cherry picked from commit 143b631639f95822e5e00768254fa35c787f6396)

Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0() stricter about its input

It turns out that the strictness that was implemented in
EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() (see Github openssl/openssl#6880) was badly placed
for some usages, and that it's better to do this check only when the
method is getting registered.

Fixes #7758

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7847)

(cherry picked from commit a86003162138031137727147c9b642d99db434b1)

rsa/rsa_ssl.c: make RSA_padding_check_SSLv23 constant-time.

Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 603221407ddc6404f8c417c6beadebf84449074c)

Resolved conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c

(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7737)

rsa/rsa_oaep.c: remove memcpy calls from RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP.

And make RSAErr call unconditional.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 75f5e944be97f28867e7c489823c889d89d0bd06)

Resolved conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c

(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7737)

rsa/rsa_pk1.c: remove memcpy calls from RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2.

And make RSAErr call unconditional.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e875b0cf2f10bf2adf73e0c2ec81428290f4660c)

Resolved conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c

(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7737)

rsa/rsa_eay.c: make RSAerr call in rsa_ossl_private_decrypt unconditional.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 89072e0c2a483f2ad678e723e112712567b0ceb1)

(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7737)

err/err.c: add err_clear_last_constant_time.

Expected usage pattern is to unconditionally set error and then
wipe it if there was no actual error.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f658a3b64d8750642f4975090740865f770c2a1b)

Resolved conflicts:
crypto/err/err.c
crypto/constant_time_locl.h

(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7737)

Docs fixup: some man3 pages had unindented code in SYNOPSIS

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7744)

(cherry picked from commit 7b4a3515a4ddb567d48000e61d7cb640d0c5f261)

Honour mandatory digest on private key in tls1_process_sigalgs()

If the private key says it can only support one specific digest, then
don't ask it to perform a different one.

Fixes: #7348

(cherry picked from commit 2d263a4a73f852005b16359873475d48755999ad
 and reworked for 1.0.2)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7610)

Stop marking default digest for EC keys as mandatory

ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID is documented to return 2 for a mandatory
digest algorithm, when the key can't support any others. That isn't true
here, so return 1 instead.

Partially fixes #7348

(cherry picked from commit eb7eb1378cd15c4652884b3701d4c0ef27b5b8a6)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7610)

rsa/rsa_eay.c: cache MONT_CTX for public modulus earlier.

Blinding is performed more efficiently and securely if MONT_CTX for public
modulus is available by the time blinding parameter are instantiated. So
make sure it's the case.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(manually cherry picked from commit 2cc3f68cde77af23c61fbad65470602ee86f2575)

(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7586)

VMS: ensure x509_time_test is built

A lacking DCL variable to indicate where it's located was missing.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7685)

Prepare for 1.0.2r-dev

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Prepare for 1.0.2q release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

make update

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Update copyright year

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7671)

Update CHANGES and NEWS for new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7667)

VMS: ensure crypto/getenv.c is included in the build

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7665)

DSA: Check for sanity of input parameters

dsa_builtin_paramgen2 expects the L parameter to be greater than N,
otherwise the generation will get stuck in an infinite loop.

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3afd38b277a806b901e039c6ad281c5e5c97ef67)

(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7493)

CVE-2018-5407 fix: ECC ladder

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7593)

Fix 'no-ecdh' build

Fixes #3302

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7606)

Properly handle duplicated messages from the next epoch

Since 3884b47b7c we may attempt to buffer a record from the next epoch
that has already been buffered. Prior to that this never occurred.

We simply ignore a failure to buffer a duplicated record.

Fixes #6902

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7415)

Add a constant time flag to one of the bignums to avoid a timing leak.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7549)

(cherry picked from commit 00496b6423605391864fbbd1693f23631a1c5239)

Merge to 1.0.2: DSA mod inverse fix.

There is a side channel attack against the division used to calculate one of
the modulo inverses in the DSA algorithm. This change takes advantage of the
primality of the modulo and Fermat's little theorem to calculate the inverse
without leaking information.

Thanks to Samuel Weiser for finding and reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7512)

Merge DSA reallocation timing fix CVE-2018-0734.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7513)

md_rand.c: don't stop polling until properly initialized

Previously, the RNG sets `initialized=1` after the first call to
RAND_poll(), although its criterion for being initialized actually
is whether condition `entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED` is true.

This commit now assigns `initialized=(entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED)`,
which has the effect that on the next call, RAND_poll() will be
called again, if it previously failed to obtain enough entropy.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7439)

Apply self-imposed path length also to root CAs

Also, some readers of the code find starting the count at 1 for EE
cert confusing (since RFC5280 counts only non-self-issued intermediate
CAs, but we also counted the leaf).  Therefore, never count the EE
cert, and adjust the path length comparison accordinly.  This may
be more clear to the reader.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit dc5831da59e9bfad61ba425d886a0b06ac160cd6)

Only CA certificates can be self-issued

At the bottom of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-12 and
top of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-13 (last paragraph
of above https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-3.3), we see:

   This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
   certificates and end entity certificates.  CA certificates may be
   further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued
   certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
   CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
   entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
   the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which
   the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued certificates
   are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
   signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
   signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
   certificate.  Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public
   key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
   are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue certificates.

that the term "self-issued" is only applicable to CAs, not end-entity
certificates.  In https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.9
the description of path length constraints says:

   The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA boolean is
   asserted and the key usage extension, if present, asserts the
   keyCertSign bit (Section 4.2.1.3).  In this case, it gives the
   maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that may
   follow this certificate in a valid certification path.  (Note: The
   last certificate in the certification path is not an intermediate
   certificate, and is not included in this limit.  Usually, the last
   certificate is an end entity certificate, but it can be a CA
   certificate.)

This makes it clear that exclusion of self-issued certificates from
the path length count applies only to some *intermediate* CA
certificates.  A leaf certificate whether it has identical issuer
and subject or whether it is a CA or not is never part of the
intermediate certificate count.  The handling of all leaf certificates
must be the same, in the case of our code to post-increment the
path count by 1, so that we ultimately reach a non-self-issued
intermediate it will be the first one (not zeroth) in the chain
of intermediates.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ed422a2d0196ada0f5c1b6e296f4a4e5ed69577f)

rsa/rsa_ossl.c: fix and extend commentary [skip ci].

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7123)

(cherry picked from commit d1c008f66bad435b18aa45aa59f72bed7c682849)

util/domd: omit superfluous shift in -MD handling.

While reviewing last modification in GH#6261 Richard actually spotted
the inconsistency, but withdrew the remark, correct one in aftermath...

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7298)

Access `group->mont_data` conditionally in EC_GROUP_set_generator()

It appears that, in FIPS mode, `ec_precompute_mont_data()` always failed
but the error was ignored until commit e3ab8cc from #6810.

The actual problem lies in the fact that access to the `mont_data` field
of an `EC_GROUP` struct should always be guarded by an
`EC_GROUP_VERSION(group)` check to avoid OOB accesses, because `group`
might come from the FIPS module, which does not define the `mont_data`
field inside the EC_GROUP structure.

This commit adds the required check before any access to
`group->mont_data` in `EC_GROUP_set_generator()`.

Fixes #7127

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7135)

Merge 1.0.2 setuid calls to getenv(3) safety.

Manual merge of #7047 to 1.0.2-stable.

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7300)

Use gethostbyname_r if available

Fixes #7228

The function BIO_get_host_ip uses gethostbyname, which is not thread safe
and hence we grab a lock. In multi-threaded applications, this lock sometimes
causes performance bottlenecks.
This patch uses the function gethostbyname_r (thread safe version), when
available.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7250)

Document OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT macro

This commit documents the OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT which is currently
missing in the man page.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7301)

(cherry picked from commit 7c69495712e3dc9aa8db38271f0c3faeb2037165)

crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c: remove unnecessary redefinition of BN_ULONG

This module includes bn.h via other headers, so it picks up the
definition from there and doesn't need to define them locally (any
more?).  Worst case scenario, the redefinition may be different and
cause all sorts of compile errors.

Fixes #7227

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7287)

(cherry picked from commit dda5396aaec315bdbcb080e42fb5cd0191f2ad72)

drbg_get_entropy: force a reseed before calling ssleay_rand_bytes()

Fixes #7240

In FIPS mode, the default FIPS DRBG uses the drbg_get_entropy()
callback to reseed itself, which is provided by the wrapping
libcrypto library. This callback in turn uses ssleay_rand_bytes()
to generate random bytes.

Now ssleay_rand_bytes() calls RAND_poll() once on first call to
seed itself, but RAND_poll() is never called again (unless the
application calls RAND_poll() explicitely). This implies that
whenever the DRBG reseeds itself (which happens every 2^14
generate requests) this happens without obtaining fresh random
data from the operating system's entropy sources.

This patch forces a reseed from system entropy sources on every
call to drbg_get_entropy(). In contrary to the automatic reseeding
of the DRBG in master, this reseeding does not break applications
running in a chroot() environment (see c7504aeb640a), because the
SSLEAY PRNG does not maintain an error state. (It does not even
check the return value of RAND_poll() on its instantiation.)

In the worst case, if no random device is available for reseeding,
no fresh entropy will be added to the SSLEAY PRNG but it will happily
continue to generate random bytes as 'entropy' input for the DRBG's
reseeding, which is just as good (or bad) as before this patch.

To prevent ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system() (and hence RAND_poll())
from being called twice during instantiation, a separate
drbg_get_nonce() callback has been introduced, which is identical
with the previous implementation of drbg_get_entropy().

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7259)

crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c: make sure to recognise ENXIO and EIO too

These both indicate that the file descriptor we're trying to use as a
terminal isn't, in fact, a terminal.

Fixes #7271

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7272)

(cherry picked from commit 276bf8620ce35a613c856f2b70348f65ffe94067)
(cherry picked from commit ad1730359220cef5903d16c7f58b602fc3713414)

Make the config script fail with an error code if Configure failed

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7166)

(cherry picked from commit e13dc23cc0fd64c304c25a67d5fa516a77f9e8f1)

CAPI engine: add support for RSA_NO_PADDING

Since the SSL code started using RSA_NO_PADDING, the CAPI engine became
unusable.  This change fixes that.

Fixes #7131

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7132)

Check the return value from ASN1_INTEGER_set

Found by Coverity

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7169)

(cherry picked from commit 512d811719fc955f574090af4c3586a9aba46fa7)

openssl req: don't try to report bits

With the introduction of -pkeyopt, the number of bits may change
without |newkey| being updated.  Unfortunately, there is no API to
retrieve the information from a EVP_PKEY_CTX either, so chances are
that we report incorrect information.  For the moment, it's better not
to try to report the number of bits at all.

Fixes #7086

Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7096)

(cherry picked from commit 17147181bd3f97c53592e2a5c9319b854b954039)

VMS: add missing x509_time test to test scripts

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7112)

Clarify the EVP_DigestSignInit docs

They did not make it clear how the memory management works for the |pctx|
parameter.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7043)

Fix example in crl(1) man page

The default input format is PEM, so explicit "-inform DER" is needed to
read DER-encoded CRL.

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7094)

(cherry picked from commit 785e614a95a134831f213749332bcf40c4920f69)
(cherry picked from commit e25fc6b5b2b99ed02f8966192c94c820b6f69add)

The req documentation incorrectly states that we default to md5

Just remove that statement. It's not been true since 2005.

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6906)

Check the return from BN_sub() in BN_X931_generate_Xpq().

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7088)

(cherry picked from commit 6bcfcf16bf6aef4f9ec267d8b86ae1bffd8deab9)

Remove redundant ASN1_INTEGER_set call

This trivial patch removes a duplicated call to ASN1_INTEGER_set.

Fixes Issue #6977

Signed-off-by: Eric Brown <browne@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6984)

(cherry picked from commit 59701e6363531cddef5b2114c0127b8453deb1f3)

bn/bn_lib.c: conceal even memmory access pattern in bn2binpad.

(cherry picked from commit 324b95605225410763fe63f7cff36eb46ca54ee9)

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)

bn/bn_blind.c: use Montgomery multiplication when possible.

(cherry picked from commit e02c519cd32a55e6ad39a0cfbeeda775f9115f28)

Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_blind.c

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)

rsa/rsa_eay.c: implement variant of "Smooth CRT-RSA."

In [most common] case of p and q being of same width, it's possible to
replace CRT modulo operations with Montgomery reductions. And those are
even fixed-length Montgomery reductions...

(cherry picked from commit 41bfd5e7c8ac3a0874a94e4d15c006ad5eb48e59)

Resolved conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)

crypto/bn: add more fixed-top routines.

Add bn_mul_fixed_top, bn_from_mont_fixed_top, bn_mod_sub_fixed_top.
Switch to bn_{mul|sqr}_fixed_top in bn_mul_mont_fixed_top and remove
memset in bn_from_montgomery_word.

(cherry picked from commit fcc4ee09473cac511eca90faa003661c7786e4f9)

Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
crypto/bn_int.h

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)

document the -no_ecdhe option in s_server man page

the option is provided in the -help message of the s_server utility
but it is not documented in the man page, this fixes it

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7046)

x509v3/v3_purp.c: resolve Thread Sanitizer nit.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6916)

(cherry picked from commit 0da7358b0757fa35f2c3a8f51fa036466ae50fd7)

Resolved conflicts:
crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c

Prepare for 1.0.2q-dev

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Prepare for 1.0.2p release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

make update

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN(): correct error module

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6957)

Update copyright year

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6955)

Updates to CHANGES and NEWS for the new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6951)

i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN(): allocate memory if the user didn't provide a buffer

Just as was done recently for i2d_ASN1_OBJECT, we also make
i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN comply with the documentation.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6943)

i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(): allocate memory if the user didn't provide a buffer

Since 0.9.7, all i2d_ functions were documented to allocate an output
buffer if the user didn't provide one, under these conditions (from
the 1.0.2 documentation):

    For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if B<*out> is B<NULL> memory will be
    allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this
    case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the
    data just written.

i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was found not to do this, and would crash if a NULL
output buffer was provided.

Fixes #6914

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6918)

(cherry picked from commit 6114041540d8d1fecaf23a861788c3c742d3b467)

rsa/*: switch to BN_bn2binpad.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6889)

(cherry picked from commit 582ad5d4d9b7703eb089016935133e3a18ea8205)

Resolved conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c

bn/bn_lib.c address Coverity nit in bn2binpad.

It was false positive, but one can as well view it as readability issue.
Switch even to unsigned indices because % BN_BYTES takes 4-6 instructions
with signed dividend vs. 1 (one) with unsigned.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6889)

(cherry picked from commit 83e034379fa3f6f0d308ec75fbcb137e26154aec)

bn/bn_lib.c: add computationally constant-time bn_bn2binpad.

"Computationally constant-time" means that it might still leak
information about input's length, but only in cases when input
is missing complete BN_ULONG limbs. But even then leak is possible
only if attacker can observe memory access pattern with limb
granularity.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6889)

(cherry picked from commit 89d8aade5f4011ddeea7827f08ec544c914f275a)

Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lib.c