From: Guus Sliepen Date: Fri, 25 May 2001 12:45:37 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Merged PROTOCOL, NETWORK and SECURITY2 with the texinfo manual. X-Git-Tag: release-1.0pre4~2 X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=f0c64a3dac3b0469ea05fa5d44a1e7bdbfa64900;p=oweals%2Ftinc.git Merged PROTOCOL, NETWORK and SECURITY2 with the texinfo manual. --- diff --git a/doc/tinc.texi b/doc/tinc.texi index c3c4a78..eadb151 100644 --- a/doc/tinc.texi +++ b/doc/tinc.texi @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ \input texinfo @c -*-texinfo-*- -@c $Id: tinc.texi,v 1.8.4.17 2001/05/25 10:06:13 guus Exp $ +@c $Id: tinc.texi,v 1.8.4.18 2001/05/25 12:45:37 guus Exp $ @c %**start of header @setfilename tinc.info @settitle tinc Manual @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Copyright @copyright{} 1998-2001 Ivo Timmermans , Guus Sliepen and Wessel Dankers . -$Id: tinc.texi,v 1.8.4.17 2001/05/25 10:06:13 guus Exp $ +$Id: tinc.texi,v 1.8.4.18 2001/05/25 12:45:37 guus Exp $ Permission is granted to make and distribute verbatim copies of this manual provided the copyright notice and this permission notice are @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Copyright @copyright{} 1998-2001 Ivo Timmermans , Guus Sliepen and Wessel Dankers . -$Id: tinc.texi,v 1.8.4.17 2001/05/25 10:06:13 guus Exp $ +$Id: tinc.texi,v 1.8.4.18 2001/05/25 12:45:37 guus Exp $ Permission is granted to make and distribute verbatim copies of this manual provided the copyright notice and this permission notice are @@ -1336,28 +1336,29 @@ files are bound to be in a different directory. @menu -* The Connection:: +* The connection:: +* The meta-protocol:: * Security:: @end menu @c ================================================================== -@node The Connection, Security, Technical information, Technical information -@section The basic philosophy of the way tinc works -@cindex connection +@node The connection, The meta-protocol, Technical information, Technical information +@section The connection +@cindex connection tinc is a daemon that takes VPN data and transmit that to another host computer over the existing Internet infrastructure. @menu -* Protocol Preview:: -* The Meta-connection:: +* The UDP tunnel:: +* The meta-connection:: @end menu @c ================================================================== -@node Protocol Preview, The Meta-connection, The Connection, The Connection -@subsection A preview of the way the tinc works +@node The UDP tunnel, The meta-connection, The connection, The connection +@subsection The UDP tunnel @cindex ethertap @cindex frame type @@ -1401,7 +1402,7 @@ set the MAC address of your tap interface to that address. @c ================================================================== -@node The Meta-connection, , Protocol Preview, The Connection +@node The meta-connection, , The UDP tunnel, The connection @subsection The meta-connection Having only an UDP connection available is not enough. Though suitable @@ -1433,8 +1434,105 @@ three ACKs sent instead of just one. Furthermore, if there would be a timeout, both TCP streams would sense the timeout, and both would start re-sending packets. + +@c ================================================================== +@node The meta-protocol, Security, The connection, Technical information +@section The meta-protocol + +The meta protocol is used to tie all tinc daemons together, and +exchange information about which tinc daemon serves which virtual +subnet. + +The meta protocol consists of requests that can be sent to the other +side. Each request has a unique number and several parameters. All +requests are represented in the standard ASCII character set. It is +possible to use tools such as telnet or netcat to connect to a tinc +daemon and to read and write requests by hand, provided that one +understands the numeric codes sent. + +The authentication scheme is described in @ref{Authentication protocol}. After a +succesful authentication, the server and the client will exchange all the +information about other tinc daemons and subnets they know of, so that both +sides (and all the other tinc daemons behind them) have their information +synchronised. + +@cindex ADD_HOST +@cindex ADD_SUBNET +@example +daemon message +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +origin ADD_HOST daemon a329e18c:655 0 + | | +--> options + | +---------> real address:port + +-------------------> name of new tinc daemon +origin ADD_SUBNET daemon 1,0a010100/ffffff00 + | | | +--> netmask + | | +----------> vpn IPv4 network address + | +----------------> subnet type (1=IPv4) + +--------------------> owner of this subnet +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +@end example + +@cindex DEL_HOST +@cindex DEL_SUBNET +In case daemons leave the VPN, DEL_HOST and DEL_SUBNET messages with exactly +the same syntax are sent to inform the other daemons of the departure. + +The keys used to encrypt VPN packets are not sent out directly. This is +because it would generate a lot of traffic on VPNs with many daemons, and +chances are that not every tinc daemon will ever send a packet to every +other daemon. Instead, if a daemon needs a key it sends a request for it +via the meta connection of the nearest hop in the direction of the +destination. If any hop on the way has already learned the key, it will +act as a proxy and forward it's copy back to the requestor. + +@cindex REQ_KEY +@cindex ANS_KEY +@cindex KEY_CHANGED +@example +daemon message +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +daemon REQ_KEY origin destination + | +--> name of the tinc daemon it wants the key from + +----------> name of the daemon that wants the key +daemon ANS_KEY origin destination e4ae0b0a82d6e0078179b5290c62c7d0 + | | \______________________________/ + | | +--> 128 bits key + | +--> name of the daemon that wants the key + +----------> name of the daemon that uses this key +daemon KEY_CHANGED origin + +--> daemon that has changed it's packet key +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +@end example + +There is also a mechanism to check if hosts are still alive. Since network +failures or a crash can cause a daemon to be killed without properly +shutting down the TCP connection, this is necessary to keep an up to date +connection list. PINGs are sent at regular intervals, except when there +is also some other traffic. A little bit of salt (random data) is added +with each PING and PONG message, to make sure that long sequences of PING/PONG +messages without any other traffic won't result in known plaintext. + +@cindex PING +@cindex PONG +@example +daemon message +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +origin PING 9e76 + \__/ + +--> 2 bytes of salt (random data) +dest. PONG 3b8d + \__/ + +--> 2 bytes of salt (random data) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +@end example + +This basically covers what is sent over the meta connection by +tinc. + + @c ================================================================== -@node Security, , The Connection, Technical information +@node Security, , The meta-protocol, Technical information @section About tinc's encryption and other security-related issues. @cindex TINC @@ -1452,12 +1550,146 @@ tinc uses blowfish encryption in CBC mode and a small amount of salt at the beginning of each packet to make sure eavesdroppers cannot get any information at all from the packets they can intercept. +@menu +* Authentication protocol:: +* Encryption of network packets:: +@end menu + + +@c ================================================================== +@node Authentication protocol, Encryption of network packets, Security, Security +@subsection Authentication protocol + @cindex authentication -Another important part is the authentication done prior to allowing other -tinc daemons to connect. This is done by a challenge/response handshake -involving RSA encryption. -The details of the authentication can be found in a file called @file{doc/SECURITY2} -in the source of tinc. +A new scheme for authentication in tinc has been devised, which offers some +improvements over the protocol used in 1.0pre2 and 1.0pre3. Explanation is +below. + +@example +daemon message +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +client + +server + +client ID client 10 0 + | | +-> options + | +---> version + +--------> name of tinc daemon + +server ID server 10 0 + | | +-> options + | +---> version + +--------> name of tinc daemon + +client META_KEY 5f0823a93e35b69e...7086ec7866ce582b + \_________________________________/ + +-> RSAKEYLEN bits totally random string S1, + encrypted with server's public RSA key + +server META_KEY 6ab9c1640388f8f0...45d1a07f8a672630 + \_________________________________/ + +-> RSAKEYLEN bits totally random string S2, + encrypted with client's public RSA key + +From now on: + - the client will encrypt outgoing traffic using S1 + - the server will encrypt outgoing traffic using S2 + +client CHALLENGE da02add1817c1920989ba6ae2a49cecbda0 + \_________________________________/ + +-> CHALLEN bits totally random string H1 + +server CHALLENGE 57fb4b2ccd70d6bb35a64c142f47e61d57f + \_________________________________/ + +-> CHALLEN bits totally random string H2 + +client CHAL_REPLY 816a86 + +-> 160 bits SHA1 of H2 + +server CHAL_REPLY 928ffe + +-> 160 bits SHA1 of H1 +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +@end example + +This new scheme has several improvements, both in efficiency and security. + +First of all, the server sends exactly the same kind of messages over the wire +as the client. The previous versions of tinc first authenticated the client, +and then the server. This scheme even allows both sides to send their messages +simultaneously, there is no need to wait for the other to send something first. +This means that any calculations that need to be done upon sending or receiving +a message can also be done in parallel. This is especially important when doing +RSA encryption/decryption. Given that these calculations are the main part of +the CPU time spent for the authentication, speed is improved by a factor 2. + +Second, only one RSA encrypted message is sent instead of two. This reduces the +amount of information attackers can see (and thus use for a cryptographic +attack). It also improves speed by a factor two, making the total speedup a +factor 4. + +Third, and most important: +The symmetric cipher keys are exchanged first, the challenge is done +afterwards. In the previous authentication scheme, because a man-in-the-middle +could pass the challenge/chal_reply phase (by just copying the messages between +the two real tinc daemons), but no information was exchanged that was really +needed to read the rest of the messages, the challenge/chal_reply phase was of +no real use. The man-in-the-middle was only stopped by the fact that only after +the ACK messages were encrypted with the symmetric cipher. Potentially, it +could even send it's own symmetric key to the server (if it knew the server's +public key) and read some of the metadata the server would send it (it was +impossible for the mitm to read actual network packets though). The new scheme +however prevents this. + +This new scheme makes sure that first of all, symmetric keys are exchanged. The +rest of the messages are then encrypted with the symmetric cipher. Then, each +side can only read received messages if they have their private key. The +challenge is there to let the other side know that the private key is really +known, because a challenge reply can only be sent back if the challenge is +decrypted correctly, and that can only be done with knowledge of the private +key. + +Fourth: the first thing that is send via the symmetric cipher encrypted +connection is a totally random string, so that there is no known plaintext (for +an attacker) in the beginning of the encrypted stream. + + +@c ================================================================== +@node Encryption of network packets, , Authentication protocol, Security +@subsection Encryption of network packet +@cindex encryption + +A data packet can only be sent if the encryption key is known to both +parties, and the connection is activated. If the encryption key is not +known, a request is sent to the destination using the meta connection +to retreive it. The packet is stored in a queue while waiting for the +key to arrive. + +@cindex UDP +The UDP packet containing the network packet from the VPN has the following layout: + +@example +... | IP header | UDP header | salt | VPN packet | UDP trailer + \___________________/ + | + V + Encrypted with symmetric cipher +@end example + +So, the entire UDP payload is encrypted using a symmetric cipher (blowfish in CBC mode). +2 bytes of salt (random data) are added in front of the actual VPN packet, +so that two VPN packets with (almost) the same content do not seem to be +the same for eavesdroppers. +2 bytes of salt may not seem much, but you can encrypt 65536 identical packets +now without an attacker being able to see that they were identical. +Given a MTU of 1500 this means 96 Megabyte of data. + +There is no @emph{extra} provision against replay attacks or alteration of packets. +However, the VPN packets, normally UDP or TCP packets themselves, contain +checksums and sequence numbers. +Since those checksums and sequence numbers are encrypted, +they automatically become @emph{cryptographically secure}. +The kernel will handle any checksum errors and duplicate packets. @c ==================================================================