From: Dr. Stephen Henson Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2016 13:26:03 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Check for errors in BN_bn2dec() X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_0_2i~85 X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=e36f27ddb80a48e579783bc29fb3758988342b71;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git Check for errors in BN_bn2dec() If an oversize BIGNUM is presented to BN_bn2dec() it can cause BN_div_word() to fail and not reduce the value of 't' resulting in OOB writes to the bn_data buffer and eventually crashing. Fix by checking return value of BN_div_word() and checking writes don't overflow buffer. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug. CVE-2016-2182 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson (cherry picked from commit 07bed46f332fce8c1d157689a2cdf915a982ae34) Conflicts: crypto/bn/bn_print.c --- diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_print.c b/crypto/bn/bn_print.c index bfa31efc56..b44403ecfd 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_print.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_print.c @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a) char *p; BIGNUM *t = NULL; BN_ULONG *bn_data = NULL, *lp; + int bn_data_num; /*- * get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer @@ -120,9 +121,9 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a) */ i = BN_num_bits(a) * 3; num = (i / 10 + i / 1000 + 1) + 1; - bn_data = - (BN_ULONG *)OPENSSL_malloc((num / BN_DEC_NUM + 1) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); - buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num + 3); + bn_data_num = num / BN_DEC_NUM + 1; + bn_data = OPENSSL_malloc(bn_data_num * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num + 3); if ((buf == NULL) || (bn_data == NULL)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2DEC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; @@ -143,7 +144,11 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a) i = 0; while (!BN_is_zero(t)) { *lp = BN_div_word(t, BN_DEC_CONV); + if (*lp == (BN_ULONG)-1) + goto err; lp++; + if (lp - bn_data >= bn_data_num) + goto err; } lp--; /*