From: Schanzenbach, Martin Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2016 20:34:22 +0000 (+0100) Subject: -fix verifymessage X-Git-Tag: gnunet-0.11.0rc0~24^2~130^2~2 X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=e2351f98490794db3e04c83106899781feb3edf2;p=oweals%2Fgnunet.git -fix verifymessage --- diff --git a/src/credential/credential.h b/src/credential/credential.h index 2acaf73a5..8b5cf6db9 100644 --- a/src/credential/credential.h +++ b/src/credential/credential.h @@ -49,6 +49,16 @@ struct VerifyMessage */ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdsaPublicKey issuer_key; + /** + * Length of the issuer attribute + */ + uint16_t issuer_attribute_len; + + /** + * Length of the subject attribute + */ + uint16_t subject_attribute_len; + /** * Unique identifier for this request (for key collisions). */ diff --git a/src/credential/credential_api.c b/src/credential/credential_api.c index 344bb6e63..b6c585c72 100644 --- a/src/credential/credential_api.c +++ b/src/credential/credential_api.c @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_verify (struct GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_Handle *handle, LOG (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, "Trying to verify `%s' in CREDENTIAL\n", issuer_attribute); - nlen = strlen (issuer_attribute) + 1 + strlen (subject_attribute) + 1; + nlen = strlen (issuer_attribute) + strlen (subject_attribute) + 1; if (nlen >= GNUNET_SERVER_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE - sizeof (*vr)) { GNUNET_break (0); @@ -395,10 +395,12 @@ GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_verify (struct GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_Handle *handle, v_msg->id = htonl (vr->r_id); v_msg->subject_key = *subject_key; v_msg->issuer_key = *issuer_key; + v_msg->issuer_attribute_len = htons(strlen(issuer_attribute)); + v_msg->subject_attribute_len = htons(strlen(subject_attribute)); GNUNET_memcpy (&v_msg[1], issuer_attribute, strlen (issuer_attribute)); - GNUNET_memcpy (((char*)&v_msg[1]) + strlen (issuer_attribute) + 1, + GNUNET_memcpy (((char*)&v_msg[1]) + strlen (issuer_attribute), subject_attribute, strlen (subject_attribute)); GNUNET_CONTAINER_DLL_insert (handle->verify_head, diff --git a/src/credential/gnunet-service-credential.c b/src/credential/gnunet-service-credential.c index aa3c02003..117156379 100644 --- a/src/credential/gnunet-service-credential.c +++ b/src/credential/gnunet-service-credential.c @@ -217,9 +217,7 @@ check_verify (void *cls, const struct VerifyMessage *v_msg) { size_t msg_size; - size_t attr_len; - const char* s_attr; - const char* i_attr; + const char* attrs; msg_size = ntohs (v_msg->header.size); if (msg_size < sizeof (struct VerifyMessage)) @@ -227,17 +225,16 @@ check_verify (void *cls, GNUNET_break (0); return GNUNET_SYSERR; } - i_attr = (const char *) &v_msg[1]; - if ( ('\0' != i_attr[v_msg->header.size - sizeof (struct VerifyMessage) - 1]) || - (strlen (i_attr) > GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_MAX_LENGTH) ) + if ((ntohs (v_msg->issuer_attribute_len) > GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_MAX_LENGTH) || + (ntohs (v_msg->subject_attribute_len) > GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_MAX_LENGTH)) { GNUNET_break (0); return GNUNET_SYSERR; } - attr_len = strlen (i_attr); - s_attr = ((const char *) &v_msg[1]) + attr_len + 1; - if ( ('\0' != s_attr[v_msg->header.size - sizeof (struct VerifyMessage) - 1]) || - (strlen (s_attr) > GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_MAX_LENGTH) ) + attrs = (const char *) &v_msg[1]; + + if ( ('\0' != attrs[ntohs(v_msg->header.size) - sizeof (struct VerifyMessage) - 1]) || + (strlen (attrs) > GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_MAX_LENGTH * 2) ) { GNUNET_break (0); return GNUNET_SYSERR; @@ -266,7 +263,6 @@ send_lookup_response (void* cls, struct VerifyResultMessage *rmsg; const struct GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_CredentialRecordData *crd; struct CredentialRecordEntry *cr_entry; - int cred_verified; cred_record_count = 0; for (i=0; i < rd_count; i++) @@ -293,7 +289,6 @@ send_lookup_response (void* cls, &crd->purpose, &crd->sig, &crd->issuer_key)) { - cred_verified = GNUNET_YES; break; } @@ -372,12 +367,12 @@ static void handle_verify (void *cls, const struct VerifyMessage *v_msg) { + char attrs[GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_MAX_LENGTH*2 + 1]; char issuer_attribute[GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_MAX_LENGTH + 1]; char subject_attribute[GNUNET_CREDENTIAL_MAX_LENGTH + 1]; - size_t issuer_attribute_len; struct VerifyRequestHandle *vrh; struct GNUNET_SERVICE_Client *client = cls; - char *attrptr = issuer_attribute; + char *attrptr = attrs; const char *utf_in; GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, @@ -385,10 +380,11 @@ handle_verify (void *cls, utf_in = (const char *) &v_msg[1]; GNUNET_STRINGS_utf8_tolower (utf_in, attrptr); - issuer_attribute_len = strlen (utf_in); - utf_in = (const char *) (&v_msg[1] + issuer_attribute_len + 1); - attrptr = subject_attribute; - GNUNET_STRINGS_utf8_tolower (utf_in, attrptr); + + GNUNET_memcpy (issuer_attribute, attrs, ntohs (v_msg->issuer_attribute_len)); + issuer_attribute[ntohs (v_msg->issuer_attribute_len)] = '\0'; + GNUNET_memcpy (subject_attribute, attrs+strlen(issuer_attribute), ntohs (v_msg->subject_attribute_len)); + subject_attribute[ntohs (v_msg->subject_attribute_len)] = '\0'; vrh = GNUNET_new (struct VerifyRequestHandle); GNUNET_CONTAINER_DLL_insert (vrh_head, vrh_tail, vrh); vrh->client = client;