From: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 13:48:42 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 hack in ssl routines and check for RSA
X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_0_0e~17
X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=e1c3d65f08c1bdf7d5a760c7ec31b3e4cd3e973e;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 hack in ssl routines and check for RSA
using OBJ xref utilities instead of string comparison with OID name.

This removes the arbitrary restriction on using SHA1 only with some ECC
ciphersuites.
---

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index b563a66617..a332c7dd3f 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 signature tests in ssl code and check
+     signature public key algorithm by using OID xref utilities instead.
+     Before this you could only use some ECC ciphersuites with SHA1 only.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
      by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
 
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 912592b8bb..46732791fd 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1833,7 +1833,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
 #endif
 	X509 *x = NULL;
 	EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
-	int signature_nid = 0;
+	int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
 
 	if (c == NULL) return;
 
@@ -1963,18 +1963,15 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
 		    EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
 		EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
 		if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+			{
 			signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+			OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+			}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 		if (ecdh_ok)
 			{
-			const char *sig = OBJ_nid2ln(signature_nid);
-			if (sig == NULL)
-				{
-				ERR_clear_error();
-				sig = "unknown";
-				}
-				
-			if (strstr(sig, "WithRSA"))
+
+			if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa)
 				{
 				mask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
 				mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
@@ -1985,7 +1982,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
 					}
 				}
 
-			if (signature_nid == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1)
+			if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
 				{
 				mask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
 				mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
@@ -2039,7 +2036,7 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
 	unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 	int keysize = 0;
-	int signature_nid = 0;
+	int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
 
 	alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
 	alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
@@ -2057,7 +2054,10 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
 	/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
 	X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
 	if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+		{
 		signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+		OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+		}
 	if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
 		{
 		/* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
@@ -2069,7 +2069,7 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
 		if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe)
 			{
 			/* signature alg must be ECDSA */
-			if (signature_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1)
+			if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
 				return 0;
@@ -2079,13 +2079,7 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
 			{
 			/* signature alg must be RSA */
 
-			const char *sig = OBJ_nid2ln(signature_nid);
-			if (sig == NULL)
-				{
-				ERR_clear_error();
-				sig = "unknown";
-				}
-			if (strstr(sig, "WithRSA") == NULL)
+			if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa)
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
 				return 0;