From: Rich Salz Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2017 13:21:43 +0000 (-0400) Subject: Start to overhaul RAND API X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_1_1-pre1~1042 X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=da8fc25a989cf4f4d26d626a85477e8a9282da12;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git Start to overhaul RAND API Remove unused rand_hw_xor, MD/EVP indirection Make rand_pseudo same as rand. Cleanup formatting and ifdef control Rename some things: - rand_meth to openssl_rand_meth; make it global - source file - lock/init functions, start per-thread state - ossl_meth_init to ossl_rand_init Put state into RAND_STATE structure And put OSSL_RAND_STATE into ossl_typ.h Use "randomness" instead of "entropy" Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3758) --- diff --git a/crypto/rand/build.info b/crypto/rand/build.info index 3ad50e2590..9e0a90b73d 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/build.info +++ b/crypto/rand/build.info @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ LIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ - md_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \ + ossl_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \ rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8cbfae170f..0000000000 --- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,667 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy - * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at - * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html - */ - -#include -#include - -#include "e_os.h" - -#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS)) -# include -#endif -#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) -# include -#endif - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include "rand_lcl.h" - -#include - -#include - -#if defined(BN_DEBUG) || defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION) -# define PREDICT -#endif - -/* #define PREDICT 1 */ - -#define STATE_SIZE 1023 -static size_t state_num = 0, state_index = 0; -static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; -static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; -static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 }; - -static double entropy = 0; -static int initialized = 0; - -static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_lock = NULL; -static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_tmp_lock = NULL; -static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; - -/* May be set only when a thread holds rand_lock (to prevent double locking) */ -static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; -/* access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock */ -/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ -static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID locking_threadid; - -#ifdef PREDICT -int rand_predictable = 0; -#endif - -static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); - -static void rand_cleanup(void); -static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo); -static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L -static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -#endif -static int rand_status(void); - -static RAND_METHOD rand_meth = { - rand_seed, - rand_nopseudo_bytes, - rand_cleanup, - rand_add, -#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L - rand_pseudo_bytes, -#else - NULL, -#endif - rand_status -}; - -DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init) -{ - OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL); - rand_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); - rand_tmp_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); - return rand_lock != NULL && rand_tmp_lock != NULL; -} - -RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void) -{ - return (&rand_meth); -} - -static void rand_cleanup(void) -{ - OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state)); - state_num = 0; - state_index = 0; - OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); - md_count[0] = 0; - md_count[1] = 0; - entropy = 0; - initialized = 0; - CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_lock); - CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_tmp_lock); -} - -static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) -{ - int i, j, k, st_idx; - long md_c[2]; - unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - EVP_MD_CTX *m; - int do_not_lock; - int rv = 0; - - if (!num) - return 1; - -#ifdef PREDICT - if (rand_predictable) - return 1; -#endif - - /* - * (Based on the rand(3) manpage) - * - * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for - * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash - * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function - * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' - * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as - * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' - * (which is incremented after each use). - * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the - * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the - * hash function. - */ - - m = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (m == NULL) - goto err; - - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) - goto err; - - /* check if we already have the lock */ - if (crypto_lock_rand) { - CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); - CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock); - do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); - } else - do_not_lock = 0; - - if (!do_not_lock) - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); - st_idx = state_index; - - /* - * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread - * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's - * _some_ difference - */ - md_c[0] = md_count[0]; - md_c[1] = md_count[1]; - - memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); - - /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ - state_index += num; - if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) { - state_index %= STATE_SIZE; - state_num = STATE_SIZE; - } else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) { - if (state_index > state_num) - state_num = state_index; - } - /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ - - /* - * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we - * will use now, but other threads may use them as well - */ - - md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); - - if (!do_not_lock) - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - - for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) { - j = (num - i); - j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j; - - if (!MD_Init(m)) - goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - goto err; - k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE; - if (k > 0) { - if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k)) - goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k)) - goto err; - } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j)) - goto err; - - /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ - if (!MD_Update(m, buf, j)) - goto err; - /* - * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind - * to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not, - * it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get - * really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very - * insecure keys. - */ - - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))) - goto err; - if (!MD_Final(m, local_md)) - goto err; - md_c[1]++; - - buf = (const char *)buf + j; - - for (k = 0; k < j; k++) { - /* - * Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte - * of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and - * local_md (intermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking - * could hurt performance more than necessary given that - * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the - * random state. - */ - state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k]; - if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) - st_idx = 0; - } - } - - if (!do_not_lock) - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); - /* - * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other - * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented - * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into - * md. - */ - for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) { - md[k] ^= local_md[k]; - } - if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ - entropy += add; - if (!do_not_lock) - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - - rv = 1; - err: - EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); - return rv; -} - -static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) -{ - return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); -} - -static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) -{ - static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; - int i, j, k; - size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num; - int ok; - long md_c[2]; - unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - EVP_MD_CTX *m; -#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS - pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); -#endif - time_t curr_time = time(NULL); - int do_stir_pool = 0; -/* time value for various platforms */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 - FILETIME tv; -# ifdef _WIN32_WCE - SYSTEMTIME t; - GetSystemTime(&t); - SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv); -# else - GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv); -# endif -#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) - struct timespec tv; - clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts); -#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS) - unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc(); - tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); -#else - struct timeval tv; - gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); -#endif - -#ifdef PREDICT - if (rand_predictable) { - unsigned char val = 1; - - for (i = 0; i < num; i++) - buf[i] = val++; - return (1); - } -#endif - - if (num <= 0) - return 1; - - m = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (m == NULL) - goto err_mem; - - /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ - num_ceil = - (1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2); - - /* - * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) - * - * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: - * - * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from - * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to - * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state' - * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept - * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the - * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'. - * - * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the - * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' - * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the - * global 'md'. - */ - - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) - goto err_mem; - - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); - /* - * We could end up in an async engine while holding this lock so ensure - * we don't pause and cause a deadlock - */ - ASYNC_block_pause(); - - /* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock); - locking_threadid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); - crypto_lock_rand = 1; - - if (!initialized) { - RAND_poll(); - initialized = 1; - } - - if (!stirred_pool) - do_stir_pool = 1; - - ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); - if (!ok) { - /* - * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG - * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have - * to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial - * seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though, - * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic* - * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before - * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate - * input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the - * entropy limit has been reached. - */ - entropy -= num; - if (entropy < 0) - entropy = 0; - } - - if (do_stir_pool) { - /* - * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we - * better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly - * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input - * function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more - * suitable for this purpose. - */ - - int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */ - while (n > 0) { -#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 -# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." -#endif -#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */ - /* - * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that - * rand_add expects to have something to hash. - */ - rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); - n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH; - } - if (ok) - stirred_pool = 1; - } - - st_idx = state_index; - st_num = state_num; - md_c[0] = md_count[0]; - md_c[1] = md_count[1]; - memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); - - state_index += num_ceil; - if (state_index > state_num) - state_index %= state_num; - - /* - * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now - * ours (but other threads may use them too) - */ - - md_count[0] += 1; - - /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ - crypto_lock_rand = 0; - ASYNC_unblock_pause(); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - - while (num > 0) { - /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ - j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num; - num -= j; - if (!MD_Init(m)) - goto err; -#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS - if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid)) - goto err; - curr_pid = 0; - } -#endif - if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time)) - goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv)) - goto err; - curr_time = 0; - if (!rand_hw_seed(m)) - goto err; - } - if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))) - goto err; - - k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num; - if (k > 0) { - if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k)) - goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k)) - goto err; - } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) - goto err; - if (!MD_Final(m, local_md)) - goto err; - - for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) { - /* may compete with other threads */ - state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i]; - if (st_idx >= st_num) - st_idx = 0; - if (i < j) - *(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2]; - } - } - - if (!MD_Init(m) - || !MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)) - || !MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - goto err; - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); - /* - * Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine - */ - ASYNC_block_pause(); - if (!MD_Update(m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(m, md)) { - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - goto err; - } - ASYNC_unblock_pause(); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - - EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); - if (ok) - return (1); - else if (pseudo) - return 0; - else { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); - ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " - "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html"); - return (0); - } - err: - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); - return 0; - err_mem: - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); - return 0; - -} - -static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -{ - return rand_bytes(buf, num, 0); -} - -#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L -/* - * pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable - */ -static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -{ - return rand_bytes(buf, num, 1); -} -#endif - -static int rand_status(void) -{ - CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur; - int ret; - int do_not_lock; - - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) - return 0; - - cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); - /* - * check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll() - * implementation calls RAND_status()) - */ - if (crypto_lock_rand) { - CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock); - do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); - } else - do_not_lock = 0; - - if (!do_not_lock) { - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); - /* - * Prevent deadlocks in case we end up in an async engine - */ - ASYNC_block_pause(); - - /* - * prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again - */ - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock); - locking_threadid = cur; - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); - crypto_lock_rand = 1; - } - - if (!initialized) { - RAND_poll(); - initialized = 1; - } - - ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED; - - if (!do_not_lock) { - /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ - crypto_lock_rand = 0; - - ASYNC_unblock_pause(); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - } - - return ret; -} - -/* - * rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only - * currently supports rdrand. - */ - -/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */ - -#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \ - defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ - defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \ - && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND) - -# define RDRAND_CALLS 4 - -size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void); -extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; - -static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -{ - int i; - if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32)))) - return 1; - for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++) { - size_t rnd; - rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); - if (rnd == 0) - return 1; - if (!MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t))) - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */ - -void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num) -{ - size_t rnd; - if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32)))) - return; - while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) { - rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); - if (rnd == 0) - return; - *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd; - buf += sizeof(size_t); - num -= sizeof(size_t); - } - if (num) { - rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); - if (rnd == 0) - return; - while (num) { - *buf ^= rnd & 0xff; - rnd >>= 8; - buf++; - num--; - } - } -} - -#else - -static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -{ - return 1; -} - -void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num) -{ - return; -} - -#endif diff --git a/crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c b/crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..016653d227 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c @@ -0,0 +1,614 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include +#include + +#include "e_os.h" + +#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS)) +# include +#endif +#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) +# include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "rand_lcl.h" + +#if defined(BN_DEBUG) || defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION) +# define PREDICT 1 +#endif + +#define STATE_SIZE 1023 + +typedef struct ossl_rand_state_st OSSL_RAND_STATE; + +struct ossl_rand_state_st { + size_t num; + size_t index; + unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned char md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + long md_count[2]; +}; + +static OSSL_RAND_STATE global_state; +static double randomness = 0; +static int initialized = 0; +static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_lock = NULL; +static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_tmp_lock = NULL; +static CRYPTO_ONCE ossl_rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; +static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL key; + +/* May be set only when a thread holds rand_lock (to prevent double locking) */ +static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; +/* + * access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock; + * valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set + */ +static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID locking_threadid; + +#ifdef PREDICT +int rand_predictable = 0; +#endif + +static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); + +static void rand_thread_cleanup(void *arg) +{ + OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = arg; + + OPENSSL_clear_free(sp, sizeof(*sp)); +} + +DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_ossl_rand_init) +{ + int ret = 1; + + OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL); + rand_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + ret &= rand_lock != NULL; + rand_tmp_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + ret &= rand_tmp_lock != NULL; + ret &= CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&key, rand_thread_cleanup) == 1; + return ret; +} + +RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void) +{ + return &openssl_rand_meth; +} + +static void rand_cleanup(void) +{ + OPENSSL_cleanse(&global_state, sizeof(global_state)); + randomness = 0; + initialized = 0; + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_lock); + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_tmp_lock); +} + +static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) +{ + int i, j, k, st_idx; + long md_c[2]; + unsigned char local_md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + EVP_MD_CTX *m; + int do_not_lock; + int rv = 0; + OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state; + + if (!num) + return 1; + +#ifdef PREDICT + if (rand_predictable) + return 1; +#endif + + /* + * (Based on the rand(3) manpage) + * + * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for + * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash + * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function + * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' + * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as + * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' + * (which is incremented after each use). + * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the + * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the + * hash function. + */ + + m = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (m == NULL) + goto err; + + if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init)) + goto err; + + /* check if we already have the lock */ + if (crypto_lock_rand) { + CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); + CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock); + do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur); + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); + } else + do_not_lock = 0; + + if (!do_not_lock) + CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); + st_idx = sp->index; + + /* + * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread + * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's + * _some_ difference + */ + md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0]; + md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1]; + + memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md)); + + /* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */ + sp->index += num; + if (sp->index >= STATE_SIZE) { + sp->index %= STATE_SIZE; + sp->num = STATE_SIZE; + } else if (sp->num < STATE_SIZE) { + if (sp->index > sp->num) + sp->num = sp->index; + } + /* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */ + + /* + * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we + * will use now, but other threads may use them as well + */ + + sp->md_count[1] += (num / RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); + + if (!do_not_lock) + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); + + for (i = 0; i < num; i += RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) { + j = (num - i); + j = (j > RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH : j; + + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + goto err; + k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE; + if (k > 0) { + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j - k)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k)) + goto err; + } else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j)) + goto err; + + /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO EVP_DigestUpdate()! */ + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, buf, j)) + goto err; + /* + * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind + * to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not, + * it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get + * really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very + * insecure keys. + */ + + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c))) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL)) + goto err; + md_c[1]++; + + buf = (const char *)buf + j; + + for (k = 0; k < j; k++) { + /* + * Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte + * of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and + * local_md (intermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking + * could hurt performance more than necessary given that + * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the + * random state. + */ + sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k]; + if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) + st_idx = 0; + } + } + + if (!do_not_lock) + CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); + /* + * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other + * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented + * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much randomness as fits into + * md. + */ + for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(sp->md); k++) { + sp->md[k] ^= local_md[k]; + } + if (randomness < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ + randomness += add; + if (!do_not_lock) + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); + + rv = 1; + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); + return rv; +} + +static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) +{ + return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); +} + +static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) +{ + static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; + int i, j, k; + size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num; + int ok; + long md_c[2]; + unsigned char local_md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + EVP_MD_CTX *m; + OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state; +#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS + pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); +#endif + time_t curr_time = time(NULL); + int do_stir_pool = 0; +/* time value for various platforms */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 + FILETIME tv; +# ifdef _WIN32_WCE + SYSTEMTIME t; + GetSystemTime(&t); + SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv); +# else + GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv); +# endif +#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) + struct timespec tv; + clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts); +#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS) + unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc(); + tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); +#else + struct timeval tv; + gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); +#endif + +#ifdef PREDICT + if (rand_predictable) { + unsigned char val = 1; + + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) + buf[i] = val++; + return (1); + } +#endif + + if (num <= 0) + return 1; + + m = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (m == NULL) + goto err_mem; + + /* round upwards to multiple of RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ + num_ceil = + (1 + (num - 1) / (RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2); + + /* + * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) + * + * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: + * + * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from + * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to + * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state' + * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept + * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the + * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'. + * + * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the + * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' + * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the + * global 'md'. + */ + + if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init)) + goto err_mem; + + CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); + /* + * We could end up in an async engine while holding this lock so ensure + * we don't pause and cause a deadlock + */ + ASYNC_block_pause(); + + /* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ + CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock); + locking_threadid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); + crypto_lock_rand = 1; + + if (!initialized) { + RAND_poll(); + initialized = 1; + } + + if (!stirred_pool) + do_stir_pool = 1; + + ok = (randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED); + if (!ok) { + /* + * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG + * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have + * to decrease the randomness estimate. Once we've had enough initial + * seeding we don't bother to adjust the randomness count, though, + * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic* + * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before + * we have enough randomness. Randomness should be collected in a + * separate input pool and be transferred to the output pool only + * when the randomness limit has been reached. + */ + randomness -= num; + if (randomness < 0) + randomness = 0; + } + + if (do_stir_pool) { + /* + * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we + * better make sure that the required randomness gets 'evenly + * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input + * function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more + * suitable for this purpose. + */ + + int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */ + while (n > 0) { +#if RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 +# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." +#endif +#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH */ + /* + * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that + * rand_add expects to have something to hash. + */ + rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); + n -= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH; + } + if (ok) + stirred_pool = 1; + } + + st_idx = sp->index; + st_num = sp->num; + md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0]; + md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1]; + memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof sp->md); + + sp->index += num_ceil; + if (sp->index > sp->num) + sp->index %= sp->num; + + /* + * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now + * ours (but other threads may use them too) + */ + + sp->md_count[0] += 1; + + /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ + crypto_lock_rand = 0; + ASYNC_unblock_pause(); + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); + + while (num > 0) { + /* num_ceil -= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 */ + j = (num >= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num; + num -= j; + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL)) + goto err; +#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS + if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid)) + goto err; + curr_pid = 0; + } +#endif + if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv)) + goto err; + curr_time = 0; + if (!rand_hw_seed(m)) + goto err; + } + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c))) + goto err; + + k = (st_idx + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num; + if (k > 0) { + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k)) + goto err; + } else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL)) + goto err; + + for (i = 0; i < RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) { + /* may compete with other threads */ + sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i]; + if (st_idx >= st_num) + st_idx = 0; + if (i < j) + *(buf++) = local_md[i + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2]; + } + } + + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c)) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + goto err; + CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); + /* + * Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine + */ + ASYNC_block_pause(); + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md)) + || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, sp->md, NULL)) { + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); + goto err; + } + ASYNC_unblock_pause(); + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); + + EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); + if (ok) + return (1); + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); + ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " + "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html"); + return (0); + err: + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); + return 0; + err_mem: + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); + return 0; + +} + +static int rand_status(void) +{ + CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur; + int ret; + int do_not_lock; + + if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init)) + return 0; + + cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); + /* + * check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll() + * implementation calls RAND_status()) + */ + if (crypto_lock_rand) { + CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock); + do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur); + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); + } else + do_not_lock = 0; + + if (!do_not_lock) { + CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); + /* + * Prevent deadlocks in case we end up in an async engine + */ + ASYNC_block_pause(); + + /* + * prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again + */ + CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock); + locking_threadid = cur; + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); + crypto_lock_rand = 1; + } + + if (!initialized) { + RAND_poll(); + initialized = 1; + } + + ret = randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED; + + if (!do_not_lock) { + /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ + crypto_lock_rand = 0; + + ASYNC_unblock_pause(); + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only + * currently supports rdrand. + */ +#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \ + defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ + defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND) + +# define RDRAND_CALLS 4 + +size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void); +extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; + +static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) +{ + int i; + if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32)))) + return 1; + for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++) { + size_t rnd; + rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); + if (rnd == 0) + return 1; + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t))) + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +#else + +static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) +{ + return 1; +} + +#endif + + +RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth = { + rand_seed, + rand_bytes, + rand_cleanup, + rand_add, + rand_bytes, + rand_status +}; diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h index d98c90e2ac..69c9630122 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h @@ -10,37 +10,15 @@ #ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H # define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H -# define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32 /* require 256 bits = 32 bytes of randomness */ - -# if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND) -# define USE_SHA1_RAND -# endif +/* we require 256 bits of randomness */ +# define RANDOMNESS_NEEDED (256 / 8) # include -# define MD_Update(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) -# define MD_Final(a,b) EVP_DigestFinal_ex(a,b,NULL) -# if defined(USE_MD5_RAND) -# include -# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH -# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md5(), NULL) -# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md5(), NULL) -# elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) -# include -# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH -# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_sha1(), NULL) -# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_sha1(), NULL) -# elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) -# include -# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH -# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_mdc2(), NULL) -# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_mdc2(), NULL) -# elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND) -# include -# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH -# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md2(), NULL) -# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md2(), NULL) -# endif +# include + +# define RAND_DIGEST EVP_sha1() +# define RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH -void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num); +extern RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth; #endif diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c index 84d6b5d6c7..1a1e2829b3 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c @@ -14,17 +14,19 @@ #include "internal/rand.h" #include #include "internal/thread_once.h" +#include "rand_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */ -static ENGINE *funct_ref = NULL; -static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock = NULL; +static ENGINE *funct_ref; +static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock; #endif -static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth = NULL; -static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock = NULL; -static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; +static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock; +static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth; +static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; -DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init) + +DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init) { int ret = 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE @@ -36,9 +38,22 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init) return ret; } +void rand_cleanup_int(void) +{ + const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth; + + if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL) + meth->cleanup(); + RAND_set_rand_method(NULL); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock); +#endif + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock); +} + int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth) { - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) + if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) return 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock); @@ -55,25 +70,26 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void) { const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL; - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) + if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) return NULL; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock); - if (!default_RAND_meth) { + if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND(); - if (e) { - default_RAND_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e); - if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) { - ENGINE_finish(e); - e = NULL; - } - } - if (e) + ENGINE *e; + + /* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */ + if ((e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND()) != NULL + && (tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e)) != NULL) { funct_ref = e; - else + default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth; + } else { + ENGINE_finish(e); + default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth; + } +#else + default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth; #endif - default_RAND_meth = RAND_OpenSSL(); } tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock); @@ -85,10 +101,10 @@ int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine) { const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL; - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) + if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) return 0; - if (engine) { + if (engine != NULL) { if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) return 0; tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine); @@ -106,55 +122,48 @@ int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine) } #endif -void rand_cleanup_int(void) -{ - const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth; - if (meth && meth->cleanup) - meth->cleanup(); - RAND_set_rand_method(NULL); - CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock); -#endif -} - void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); - if (meth && meth->seed) + + if (meth->seed != NULL) meth->seed(buf, num); } -void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy) +void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); - if (meth && meth->add) - meth->add(buf, num, entropy); + + if (meth->add != NULL) + meth->add(buf, num, randomness); } int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); - if (meth && meth->bytes) + + if (meth->bytes != NULL) return meth->bytes(buf, num); RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); - return (-1); + return -1; } #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); - if (meth && meth->pseudorand) + + if (meth->pseudorand != NULL) return meth->pseudorand(buf, num); - return (-1); + return -1; } #endif int RAND_status(void) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); - if (meth && meth->status) + + if (meth->status != NULL) return meth->status(); return 0; } diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c index 241f287fd1..bfdd3e6efa 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1); curr_uid = 0; - for (i = 0; i < (ENTROPY_NEEDED * 4); i++) { + for (i = 0; i < (RANDOMNESS_NEEDED * 4); i++) { /* * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus * interference, etc. @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) unsigned long l; pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); # if defined(DEVRANDOM) || (!defined(OPENSS_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)) - unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED]; + unsigned char tmpbuf[RANDOMNESS_NEEDED]; int n = 0; # endif # ifdef DEVRANDOM @@ -144,12 +144,12 @@ int RAND_poll(void) # ifdef DEVRANDOM memset(randomstats, 0, sizeof(randomstats)); /* - * Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have + * Use a randomness device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have * this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block if it runs * out of random entries. */ - for (i = 0; (i < OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)) && (n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); i++) { + for (i = 0; (i < OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)) && (n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED); i++) { if ((fd = open(randomfiles[i], O_RDONLY # ifdef O_NONBLOCK | O_NONBLOCK @@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) if (try_read) { r = read(fd, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n, - ENTROPY_NEEDED - n); + RANDOMNESS_NEEDED - n); if (r > 0) n += r; } else @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) } while ((r > 0 || (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) && usec != 0 - && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); + && n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED); close(fd); } @@ -255,16 +255,15 @@ int RAND_poll(void) # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD) /* - * Use an EGD socket to read entropy from an EGD or PRNGD entropy - * collecting daemon. + * Use an EGD socket to read randomness from the daemon. */ - for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED; + for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED; egdsocket++) { int r; r = RAND_query_egd_bytes(*egdsocket, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n, - ENTROPY_NEEDED - n); + RANDOMNESS_NEEDED - n); if (r > 0) n += r; } diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c index 9c462dd374..ec99dbfe26 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c @@ -7,16 +7,11 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -/* - * Modified by VMS Software, Inc (2016) - * Eliminate looping through all processes (performance) - * Add additional randomizations using rand() function - */ - -#include -#include "rand_lcl.h" +#include "e_os.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) +# include +# include "rand_lcl.h" # include # include # include @@ -34,9 +29,9 @@ # define PTR_T __void_ptr64 # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 -# else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ +# else # define PTR_T void * -# endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ +# endif static struct items_data_st { short length, code; /* length is number of bytes */ @@ -52,27 +47,22 @@ static struct items_data_st { {4, JPI$_PPGCNT}, {4, JPI$_WSPEAK}, {4, JPI$_FINALEXC}, - {0, 0} /* zero terminated */ + {0, 0} }; int RAND_poll(void) { - /* determine the number of items in the JPI array */ - struct items_data_st item_entry; - int item_entry_count = sizeof(items_data)/sizeof(item_entry); - + int item_entry_count = OSSL_NELEM(items_data); /* Create the JPI itemlist array to hold item_data content */ - struct { short length, code; int *buffer; int *retlen; - } item[item_entry_count], *pitem; /* number of entries in items_data */ - + } item[item_entry_count], *pitem; struct items_data_st *pitems_data; - int data_buffer[(item_entry_count*2)+4]; /* 8 bytes per entry max */ + int data_buffer[(item_entry_count * 2) + 4]; /* 8 bytes per entry max */ int iosb[2]; int sys_time[2]; int *ptr; @@ -80,53 +70,46 @@ int RAND_poll(void) int tmp_length = 0; int total_length = 0; - pitems_data = items_data; - pitem = item; - - /* Setup itemlist for GETJPI */ - while (pitems_data->length) { + pitems_data = items_data; + for (pitem = item; pitems_data->length != 0; pitem++) { pitem->length = pitems_data->length; pitem->code = pitems_data->code; pitem->buffer = &data_buffer[total_length]; pitem->retlen = 0; /* total_length is in longwords */ - total_length += pitems_data->length/4; + total_length += pitems_data->length / 4; pitems_data++; - pitem ++; } pitem->length = pitem->code = 0; /* Fill data_buffer with various info bits from this process */ - /* and twist that data to seed the SSL random number init */ + if (sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, NULL, NULL, item, &iosb, 0, 0) != SS$_NORMAL) + return 0; - if (sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, NULL, NULL, item, &iosb, 0, 0) == SS$_NORMAL) { - for (i = 0; i < total_length; i++) { - sys$gettim((struct _generic_64 *)&sys_time[0]); - srand(sys_time[0] * data_buffer[0] * data_buffer[1] + i); + /* Now twist that data to seed the SSL random number init */ + for (i = 0; i < total_length; i++) { + sys$gettim((struct _generic_64 *)&sys_time[0]); + srand(sys_time[0] * data_buffer[0] * data_buffer[1] + i); - if (i == (total_length - 1)) { /* for JPI$_FINALEXC */ - ptr = &data_buffer[i]; - for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { - data_buffer[i + j] = ptr[j]; - /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */ - data_buffer[i + j] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand()); - tmp_length++; - } - } else { + if (i == (total_length - 1)) { /* for JPI$_FINALEXC */ + ptr = &data_buffer[i]; + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + data_buffer[i + j] = ptr[j]; /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */ - data_buffer[i] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand()); + data_buffer[i + j] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand()); + tmp_length++; } + } else { + /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */ + data_buffer[i] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand()); } - - total_length += (tmp_length - 1); - - /* size of seed is total_length*4 bytes (64bytes) */ - RAND_add((PTR_T) data_buffer, total_length*4, total_length * 2); - } else { - return 0; } + total_length += (tmp_length - 1); + + /* size of seed is total_length*4 bytes (64bytes) */ + RAND_add((PTR_T)data_buffer, total_length * 4, total_length * 2); return 1; }