From: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2012 15:42:46 +0000 (-0400)
Subject: block uid/gid changes during posix_spawn
X-Git-Tag: v0.9.7~37
X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=d5304147b983f309ed0c9050e3b8b6f2c9f87f43;p=oweals%2Fmusl.git

block uid/gid changes during posix_spawn

usage of vfork creates a situation where a process of lower privilege
may momentarily have write access to the memory of a process of higher
privilege.

consider the case of a multi-threaded suid program which is calling
posix_spawn in one thread while another thread drops the elevated
privileges then runs untrusted (relative to the elevated privilege)
code as the original invoking user. this untrusted code can then
potentially modify the data the child process will use before calling
exec, for example changing the pathname or arguments that will be
passed to exec.

note that if vfork is implemented as fork, the lock will not be held
until the child execs, but since memory is not shared it does not
matter.
---

diff --git a/src/process/posix_spawn.c b/src/process/posix_spawn.c
index 604756e9..8a6ff6db 100644
--- a/src/process/posix_spawn.c
+++ b/src/process/posix_spawn.c
@@ -5,9 +5,16 @@
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include "syscall.h"
 #include "fdop.h"
+#include "libc.h"
 
 extern char **environ;
 
+static void dummy_0()
+{
+}
+weak_alias(dummy_0, __acquire_ptc);
+weak_alias(dummy_0, __release_ptc);
+
 pid_t __vfork(void);
 
 int __posix_spawnx(pid_t *restrict res, const char *restrict path,
@@ -24,7 +31,10 @@ int __posix_spawnx(pid_t *restrict res, const char *restrict path,
 	if (!attr) attr = &dummy_attr;
 
 	sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, (void *)(uint64_t []){-1}, &oldmask);
+
+	__acquire_ptc();
 	pid = __vfork();
+	__release_ptc();
 
 	if (pid) {
 		sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldmask, 0);