From: Dmitry Belyavsky Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 14:53:35 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Avoid KCI attack for GOST X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_1_0a~2 X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=d3c9d6e99f075e6fbdab94db00b220cfa08b5c4b;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git Avoid KCI attack for GOST Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards compatibility. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell --- diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c index ff42858ff3..692544b32c 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c @@ -2378,18 +2378,6 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; }; - /* - * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { - if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) { - /* - * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key - * * would be used - */ - ERR_clear_error(); - } - } /* * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context * data @@ -2434,12 +2422,7 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) *len = msglen + 2; } memcpy(*p, tmp, msglen); - /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, - NULL) > 0) { - /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */ - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; - } + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;