From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2004 11:18:00 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that the
X-Git-Tag: BEN_FIPS_TEST_6~37
X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=cd52956357f91c9b6e36e7a6340f2b9ba115dae6;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that the
CA setting in each certificate on the chain is correct.  As a side-
effect always do the following basic checks on extensions, not just
when there's an associated purpose to the check:
- if there is an unhandled critical extension (unless the user has
  chosen to ignore this fault)
- if the path length has been exceeded (if one is set at all)
- that certain extensions fit the associated purpose (if one has been
  given)
---

diff --git a/apps/verify.c b/apps/verify.c
index 6a93c018b8..d73280cdd0 100644
--- a/apps/verify.c
+++ b/apps/verify.c
@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 		if (ctx->error == X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT) ok=1;
 		/* Continue after extension errors too */
 		if (ctx->error == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) ok=1;
+		if (ctx->error == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA) ok=1;
 		if (ctx->error == X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED) ok=1;
 		if (ctx->error == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE) ok=1;
 		if (ctx->error == X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT) ok=1;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
index e31ebc6741..b8f5bc0cd7 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
 		return("certificate revoked");
 	case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
 		return ("invalid CA certificate");
+	case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA:
+		return ("invalid non-CA certificate (has CA markings)");
 	case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
 		return ("path length constraint exceeded");
 	case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index e24e10259d..028139bb03 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
-static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 		}
 
 	/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
-	if (ctx->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx);
+	ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
 
 	if (!ok) goto end;
 
@@ -371,15 +371,25 @@ static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
  * with the supplied purpose
  */
 
-static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
 	return 1;
 #else
-	int i, ok=0;
+	int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
 	X509 *x;
 	int (*cb)();
 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
+
+	/* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
+	   -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
+	       use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
+	   0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
+	       used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
+	   1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
+	       all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
+	*/
+	must_be_ca = -1;
 	/* Check all untrusted certificates */
 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
 		{
@@ -394,20 +404,62 @@ static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
 			if (!ok) goto end;
 			}
-		ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i);
-		if ((ret == 0)
-			 || ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
-				&& (ret != 1)))
+		ret = X509_check_ca(x);
+		switch(must_be_ca)
 			{
-			if (i)
+		case -1:
+			if ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+				&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
+				{
+				ret = 0;
 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+				}
 			else
-				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+				ret = 1;
+			break;
+		case 0:
+			if (ret != 0)
+				{
+				ret = 0;
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
+				}
+			else
+				ret = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			if ((ret == 0)
+				|| ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+					&& (ret != 1)))
+				{
+				ret = 0;
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+				}
+			else
+				ret = 1;
+			break;
+			}
+		if (ret == 0)
+			{
 			ctx->error_depth = i;
 			ctx->current_cert = x;
 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
 			if (!ok) goto end;
 			}
+		if (ctx->purpose > 0)
+			{
+			ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose,
+				must_be_ca > 0);
+			if ((ret == 0)
+				|| ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+					&& (ret != 1)))
+				{
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+				ctx->error_depth = i;
+				ctx->current_cert = x;
+				ok=cb(0,ctx);
+				if (!ok) goto end;
+				}
+			}
 		/* Check pathlen */
 		if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
 			   && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1)))
@@ -418,6 +470,8 @@ static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
 			if (!ok) goto end;
 			}
+		/* The next certificate must be a CA */
+		must_be_ca = 1;
 		}
 	ok = 1;
  end:
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
index 198495884c..cb725b64d8 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ struct x509_store_ctx_st      /* X509_STORE_CTX */
 #define		X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION		34
 #define		X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN			35
 #define		X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION	36
+#define		X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA			37
 
 /* The application is not happy */
 #define		X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION		50
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
index b3d1ae5d1c..2b71b4ae43 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@
 
 static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
 
-static int ca_check(const X509 *x);
 static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
 static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
@@ -426,8 +425,14 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
 #define ns_reject(x, usage) \
 	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
 
-static int ca_check(const X509 *x)
+int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
 {
+	if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+		x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+	}
+
 	/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0;
 	if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
@@ -435,10 +440,17 @@ static int ca_check(const X509 *x)
 		/* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
 		else return 0;
 	} else {
+		/* we support V1 roots for...  uh, I don't really know why. */
 		if((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3;
 		/* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
 		else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4;
-		else return 2;
+		/* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
+		else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT
+			 && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5;
+		/* 2 means "I don't know...", which is legal for V1 and V2 */
+		else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_V1) return 2;
+		/* can this still be regarded a CA certificate?  I doubt it */
+		return 0;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -446,14 +458,10 @@ static int ca_check(const X509 *x)
 static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
 {
 	int ca_ret;
-	ca_ret = ca_check(x);
+	ca_ret = X509_check_ca(x);
 	if(!ca_ret) return 0;
 	/* check nsCertType if present */
-	if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
-		if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret;
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if(ca_ret != 2) return ca_ret;
+	if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret;
 	else return 0;
 }
 
@@ -498,14 +506,10 @@ static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
 	if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SMIME)) return 0;
 	if(ca) {
 		int ca_ret;
-		ca_ret = ca_check(x);
+		ca_ret = X509_check_ca(x);
 		if(!ca_ret) return 0;
 		/* check nsCertType if present */
-		if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
-			if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret;
-			return 0;
-		}
-		if(ca_ret != 2) return ca_ret;
+		if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret;
 		else return 0;
 	}
 	if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
@@ -539,7 +543,7 @@ static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
 {
 	if(ca) {
 		int ca_ret;
-		if((ca_ret = ca_check(x)) != 2) return ca_ret;
+		if((ca_ret = X509_check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret;
 		else return 0;
 	}
 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0;
@@ -552,17 +556,9 @@ static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
 
 static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
 {
-	/* Must be a valid CA */
-	if(ca) {
-		int ca_ret;
-		ca_ret = ca_check(x);
-		if(ca_ret != 2) return ca_ret;
-		if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
-			if(x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return ca_ret;
-			return 0;
-		}
-		return 0;
-	}
+	/* Must be a valid CA.  Should we really support the "I don't know"
+	   value (2)? */
+	if(ca) return X509_check_ca(x);
 	/* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
 	return 1;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h b/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h
index fb07a19016..d0f559eae0 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h
@@ -527,6 +527,7 @@ int X509V3_EXT_print_fp(FILE *out, X509_EXTENSION *ext, int flag, int indent);
 
 int X509V3_extensions_print(BIO *out, char *title, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts, unsigned long flag, int indent);
 
+int X509_check_ca(X509 *x);
 int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca);
 int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex);
 int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose);