From: Rich Salz Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2015 00:55:56 +0000 (-0500) Subject: Rename RSA_eay_xxx to rsa_ossl_xxx X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_1_0-pre1~267 X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=bf1605518a085256320ff4a36054445f842d5c1c;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git Rename RSA_eay_xxx to rsa_ossl_xxx Final part of flushing out SSLEay API's. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson --- diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 86c572d162..17241a5360 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ *) All instances of the string "ssleay" in the public API were replaced with OpenSSL (case-matching; e.g., OPENSSL_VERSION for #define's) + Some error codes related to internal RSA_eay API's were renamed. [Rich Salz] *) The demo files in crypto/threads were moved to demo/threads. diff --git a/crypto/rsa/Makefile b/crypto/rsa/Makefile index 65d243d59d..92c4d36d74 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/Makefile +++ b/crypto/rsa/Makefile @@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) GENERAL=Makefile LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a -LIBSRC= rsa_eay.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c \ +LIBSRC= rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c \ rsa_pk1.c rsa_ssl.c rsa_none.c rsa_oaep.c rsa_chk.c rsa_null.c \ rsa_pss.c rsa_x931.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_depr.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \ rsa_pmeth.c rsa_crpt.c rsa_x931g.c -LIBOBJ= rsa_eay.o rsa_gen.o rsa_lib.o rsa_sign.o rsa_saos.o rsa_err.o \ +LIBOBJ= rsa_ossl.o rsa_gen.o rsa_lib.o rsa_sign.o rsa_saos.o rsa_err.o \ rsa_pk1.o rsa_ssl.o rsa_none.o rsa_oaep.o rsa_chk.o rsa_null.o \ rsa_pss.o rsa_x931.o rsa_asn1.o rsa_depr.o rsa_ameth.o rsa_prn.o \ rsa_pmeth.o rsa_crpt.o rsa_x931g.o @@ -125,16 +125,6 @@ rsa_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h rsa_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_depr.o: ../include/internal/cryptlib.h rsa_depr.c -rsa_eay.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h -rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h -rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h -rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h -rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h -rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h -rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/internal/bn_int.h -rsa_eay.o: ../include/internal/cryptlib.h rsa_eay.c rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h @@ -199,6 +189,16 @@ rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_oaep.o: ../include/internal/cryptlib.h rsa_oaep.c +rsa_ossl.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h +rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h +rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h +rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h +rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h +rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h +rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h +rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h +rsa_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/internal/bn_int.h +rsa_ossl.o: ../include/internal/cryptlib.h rsa_ossl.c rsa_pk1.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/internal/constant_time_locl.h rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c deleted file mode 100644 index a09fbf05b4..0000000000 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,922 +0,0 @@ -/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include "internal/cryptlib.h" -#include "internal/bn_int.h" -#include -#include - -#ifndef RSA_NULL - -static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, - BN_CTX *ctx); -static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); -static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); -static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth = { - "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", - RSA_eay_public_encrypt, - RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ - RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ - RSA_eay_private_decrypt, - RSA_eay_mod_exp, - BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery - * if e == 3 */ - RSA_eay_init, - RSA_eay_finish, - RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */ - NULL, - 0, /* rsa_sign */ - 0, /* rsa_verify */ - NULL /* rsa_keygen */ -}; - -const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void) -{ - return (&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); -} - -static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -{ - BIGNUM *f, *ret; - int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); - return -1; - } - - if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - - /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - } - - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - switch (padding) { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); - break; - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (i <= 0) - goto err; - - if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { - /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, - RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) - goto err; - - /* - * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the - * modulus - */ - j = BN_num_bytes(ret); - i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j])); - for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) - to[k] = 0; - - r = num; - err: - if (ctx != NULL) - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); - return (r); -} - -static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - BN_BLINDING *ret; - int got_write_lock = 0; - CRYPTO_THREADID cur; - - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - - if (rsa->blinding == NULL) { - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - got_write_lock = 1; - - if (rsa->blinding == NULL) - rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); - } - - ret = rsa->blinding; - if (ret == NULL) - goto err; - - CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); - if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) { - /* rsa->blinding is ours! */ - - *local = 1; - } else { - /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ - - /* - * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the - * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and - * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING - */ - *local = 0; - - if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) { - if (!got_write_lock) { - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - got_write_lock = 1; - } - - if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) - rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); - } - ret = rsa->mt_blinding; - } - - err: - if (got_write_lock) - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - else - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - return ret; -} - -static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, - BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - if (unblind == NULL) - /* - * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING. - */ - return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); - else { - /* - * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING. - */ - int ret; - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - return ret; - } -} - -static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, - BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - /* - * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex - * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING - * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: - * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and - * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe - * to access the blinding without a lock. - */ - return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); -} - -/* signing */ -static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -{ - BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; - int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - int local_blinding = 0; - /* - * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind - * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store - * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. - */ - BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; - BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; - - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - switch (padding) { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_X931_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (i <= 0) - goto err; - - if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { - /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, - RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { - blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); - if (blinding == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - if (blinding != NULL) { - if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || - ((rsa->p != NULL) && - (rsa->q != NULL) && - (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { - if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) - goto err; - } else { - BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL; - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - local_d = d = BN_new(); - if (d == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - d = rsa->d; - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) { - BN_free(local_d); - goto err; - } - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) { - BN_free(local_d); - goto err; - } - BN_free(local_d); - } - - if (blinding) - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { - BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); - if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0) - res = f; - else - res = ret; - } else - res = ret; - - /* - * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the - * modulus - */ - j = BN_num_bytes(res); - i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j])); - for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) - to[k] = 0; - - r = num; - err: - if (ctx != NULL) - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); - return (r); -} - -static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -{ - BIGNUM *f, *ret; - int j, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - int local_blinding = 0; - /* - * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind - * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store - * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. - */ - BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; - BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; - - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* - * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the - * top '0' bytes - */ - if (flen > num) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, - RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); - goto err; - } - - /* make data into a big number */ - if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, - RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { - blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); - if (blinding == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - if (blinding != NULL) { - if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - /* do the decrypt */ - if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || - ((rsa->p != NULL) && - (rsa->q != NULL) && - (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { - if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) - goto err; - } else { - BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL; - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - local_d = d = BN_new(); - if (d == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - d = rsa->d; - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) { - BN_free(local_d); - goto err; - } - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) { - BN_free(local_d); - goto err; - } - BN_free(local_d); - } - - if (blinding) - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - - p = buf; - j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ - - switch (padding) { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); - break; - case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); - break; - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num); - break; - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (r < 0) - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); - - err: - if (ctx != NULL) - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); - return (r); -} - -/* signature verification */ -static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -{ - BIGNUM *f, *ret; - int i, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); - return -1; - } - - if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - - /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - } - - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* - * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the - * top '0' bytes - */ - if (flen > num) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); - goto err; - } - - if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, - RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) - goto err; - - if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((bn_get_words(ret)[0] & 0xf) != 12)) - if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) - goto err; - - p = buf; - i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); - - switch (padding) { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num); - break; - case RSA_X931_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num); - break; - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (r < 0) - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); - - err: - if (ctx != NULL) - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); - return (r); -} - -static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; - BIGNUM *local_dmp1, *local_dmq1, *local_c, *local_r1; - BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1; - int ret = 0; - - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - - local_dmp1 = BN_new(); - local_dmq1 = BN_new(); - local_c = BN_new(); - local_r1 = BN_new(); - if (local_dmp1 == NULL - || local_dmq1 == NULL || local_c == NULL || local_r1 == NULL) - goto err; - - r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - - { - BIGNUM *local_p = NULL, *local_q = NULL; - BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; - - /* - * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the - * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) - */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - local_p = p = BN_new(); - if (p == NULL) - goto err; - BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - local_q = q = BN_new(); - if (q == NULL) { - BN_free(local_p); - goto err; - } - BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else { - p = rsa->p; - q = rsa->q; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx) - || !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, - CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) { - BN_free(local_p); - BN_free(local_q); - goto err; - } - } - BN_free(local_p); - BN_free(local_q); - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* compute I mod q */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - c = local_c; - BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - } else { - if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - dmq1 = local_dmq1; - BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) - goto err; - - /* compute I mod p */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - c = local_c; - BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) - goto err; - } else { - if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - dmp1 = local_dmp1; - BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p)) - goto err; - - if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) - goto err; - /* - * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the - * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size - */ - if (BN_is_negative(r0)) - if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) - goto err; - - if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - pr1 = local_r1; - BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - pr1 = r1; - if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* - * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p' - * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can - * break the private key operations: the following second correction - * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen - * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve] - */ - if (BN_is_negative(r0)) - if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) - goto err; - if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) - goto err; - - if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) - goto err; - /* - * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will - * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the - * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for - * absolute equality, just congruency. - */ - if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) - goto err; - if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) - if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) - goto err; - if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { - /* - * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak - * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and - * return that instead. - */ - - BIGNUM *local_d = NULL; - BIGNUM *d = NULL; - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - local_d = d = BN_new(); - if (d == NULL) - goto err; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - d = rsa->d; - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) { - BN_free(local_d); - goto err; - } - - BN_free(local_d); - } - } - ret = 1; - err: - BN_free(local_dmp1); - BN_free(local_dmq1); - BN_free(local_c); - BN_free(local_r1); - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - return (ret); -} - -static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) -{ - rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; - return (1); -} - -static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) -{ - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); - return (1); -} - -#endif diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c index f5e650b92a..50fde50836 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c @@ -87,10 +87,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY), "RSA_check_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX), "RSA_check_key_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT), "rsa_cms_decrypt"}, - {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "RSA_eay_private_decrypt"}, - {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "RSA_eay_private_encrypt"}, - {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_eay_public_decrypt"}, - {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_eay_public_encrypt"}, + {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "rsa_ossl_private_decrypt"}, + {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "rsa_ossl_private_encrypt"}, + {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "rsa_ossl_public_decrypt"}, + {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "rsa_ossl_public_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY), "RSA_generate_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY), "rsa_item_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK), "RSA_memory_lock"}, @@ -104,8 +104,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_null_public_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OAEP_TO_CTX), "RSA_OAEP_TO_CTX"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE), "RSA_padding_add_none"}, - {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP), - "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"}, + {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS"}, @@ -136,8 +135,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE), "rsa_pub_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING), "RSA_setup_blinding"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN), "RSA_sign"}, - {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), - "RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"}, + {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), "RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY), "RSA_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), "RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"}, @@ -153,8 +151,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01), "block type is not 01"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02), "block type is not 02"}, - {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN), - "data greater than mod len"}, + {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN), "data greater than mod len"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE), "data too large"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE), "data too large for key size"}, @@ -192,8 +189,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID), "last octet invalid"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT), "no public exponent"}, - {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING), - "null before block missing"}, + {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING), "null before block missing"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q), "n does not equal p q"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR), "oaep decoding error"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE), diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..09a65b80b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c @@ -0,0 +1,921 @@ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "internal/bn_int.h" +#include +#include + +#ifndef RSA_NULL + +static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, + BN_CTX *ctx); +static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa); +static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa); +static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth = { + "OpenSSL PKCS#1 RSA (from Eric Young)", + rsa_ossl_public_encrypt, + rsa_ossl_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ + rsa_ossl_private_encrypt, /* signing */ + rsa_ossl_private_decrypt, + rsa_ossl_mod_exp, + BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery + * if e == 3 */ + rsa_ossl_init, + rsa_ossl_finish, + RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */ + NULL, + 0, /* rsa_sign */ + 0, /* rsa_verify */ + NULL /* rsa_keygen */ +}; + +const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void) +{ + return &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth; +} + +static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + BIGNUM *f, *ret; + int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); + return -1; + } + + if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + + /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + } + + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); + break; + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + default: + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) + goto err; + + if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { + /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, + RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) + goto err; + + /* + * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the + * modulus + */ + j = BN_num_bytes(ret); + i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j])); + for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) + to[k] = 0; + + r = num; + err: + if (ctx != NULL) + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); + return (r); +} + +static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + BN_BLINDING *ret; + int got_write_lock = 0; + CRYPTO_THREADID cur; + + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + + if (rsa->blinding == NULL) { + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + got_write_lock = 1; + + if (rsa->blinding == NULL) + rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); + } + + ret = rsa->blinding; + if (ret == NULL) + goto err; + + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); + if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) { + /* rsa->blinding is ours! */ + + *local = 1; + } else { + /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ + + /* + * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the + * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and + * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING + */ + *local = 0; + + if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) { + if (!got_write_lock) { + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + got_write_lock = 1; + } + + if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) + rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); + } + ret = rsa->mt_blinding; + } + + err: + if (got_write_lock) + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + else + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + return ret; +} + +static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, + BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + if (unblind == NULL) + /* + * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING. + */ + return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); + else { + /* + * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING. + */ + int ret; + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); + ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); + return ret; + } +} + +static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, + BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + /* + * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex + * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING + * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: + * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and + * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe + * to access the blinding without a lock. + */ + return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); +} + +/* signing */ +static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; + int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + int local_blinding = 0; + /* + * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind + * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store + * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. + */ + BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; + BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; + + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_X931_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + default: + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) + goto err; + + if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { + /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, + RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { + blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); + if (blinding == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (blinding != NULL) { + if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || + ((rsa->p != NULL) && + (rsa->q != NULL) && + (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { + if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL; + + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + local_d = d = BN_new(); + if (d == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else + d = rsa->d; + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) { + BN_free(local_d); + goto err; + } + + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) { + BN_free(local_d); + goto err; + } + BN_free(local_d); + } + + if (blinding) + if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) + goto err; + + if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { + BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); + if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0) + res = f; + else + res = ret; + } else + res = ret; + + /* + * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the + * modulus + */ + j = BN_num_bytes(res); + i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j])); + for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) + to[k] = 0; + + r = num; + err: + if (ctx != NULL) + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); + return (r); +} + +static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + BIGNUM *f, *ret; + int j, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + int local_blinding = 0; + /* + * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind + * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store + * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. + */ + BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; + BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; + + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the + * top '0' bytes + */ + if (flen > num) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, + RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + /* make data into a big number */ + if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, + RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { + blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); + if (blinding == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (blinding != NULL) { + if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + /* do the decrypt */ + if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || + ((rsa->p != NULL) && + (rsa->q != NULL) && + (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { + if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL; + + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + local_d = d = BN_new(); + if (d == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else + d = rsa->d; + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) { + BN_free(local_d); + goto err; + } + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) { + BN_free(local_d); + goto err; + } + BN_free(local_d); + } + + if (blinding) + if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) + goto err; + + p = buf; + j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ + + switch (padding) { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); + break; + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); + break; + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num); + break; + default: + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + + err: + if (ctx != NULL) + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); + return (r); +} + +/* signature verification */ +static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + BIGNUM *f, *ret; + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); + return -1; + } + + if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + + /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + } + + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the + * top '0' bytes + */ + if (flen > num) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, + RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) + goto err; + + if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((bn_get_words(ret)[0] & 0xf) != 12)) + if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) + goto err; + + p = buf; + i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); + + switch (padding) { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num); + break; + case RSA_X931_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num); + break; + default: + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + + err: + if (ctx != NULL) + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); + return (r); +} + +static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; + BIGNUM *local_dmp1, *local_dmq1, *local_c, *local_r1; + BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1; + int ret = 0; + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + + local_dmp1 = BN_new(); + local_dmq1 = BN_new(); + local_c = BN_new(); + local_r1 = BN_new(); + if (local_dmp1 == NULL + || local_dmq1 == NULL || local_c == NULL || local_r1 == NULL) + goto err; + + r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + + { + BIGNUM *local_p = NULL, *local_q = NULL; + BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; + + /* + * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the + * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) + */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + local_p = p = BN_new(); + if (p == NULL) + goto err; + BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + local_q = q = BN_new(); + if (q == NULL) { + BN_free(local_p); + goto err; + } + BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else { + p = rsa->p; + q = rsa->q; + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx) + || !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, + CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) { + BN_free(local_p); + BN_free(local_q); + goto err; + } + } + BN_free(local_p); + BN_free(local_q); + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* compute I mod q */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + c = local_c; + BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + dmq1 = local_dmq1; + BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else + dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) + goto err; + + /* compute I mod p */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + c = local_c; + BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + dmp1 = local_dmp1; + BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else + dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p)) + goto err; + + if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) + goto err; + /* + * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the + * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size + */ + if (BN_is_negative(r0)) + if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) + goto err; + + if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + pr1 = local_r1; + BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else + pr1 = r1; + if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* + * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p' + * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can + * break the private key operations: the following second correction + * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen + * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve] + */ + if (BN_is_negative(r0)) + if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) + goto err; + if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) + goto err; + + if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) + goto err; + /* + * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will + * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the + * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for + * absolute equality, just congruency. + */ + if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) + goto err; + if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) + if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) + goto err; + if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { + /* + * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak + * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and + * return that instead. + */ + + BIGNUM *local_d = NULL; + BIGNUM *d = NULL; + + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + local_d = d = BN_new(); + if (d == NULL) + goto err; + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else + d = rsa->d; + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) { + BN_free(local_d); + goto err; + } + + BN_free(local_d); + } + } + ret = 1; + err: + BN_free(local_dmp1); + BN_free(local_dmq1); + BN_free(local_c); + BN_free(local_r1); + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + return (ret); +} + +static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa) +{ + rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; + return (1); +} + +static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa) +{ + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); + return (1); +} + +#endif diff --git a/include/openssl/rsa.h b/include/openssl/rsa.h index 1b3027daf2..2498ff57f5 100644 --- a/include/openssl/rsa.h +++ b/include/openssl/rsa.h @@ -535,10 +535,10 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void); # define RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY 123 # define RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX 160 # define RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT 159 -# define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 101 -# define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 102 -# define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 103 -# define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 104 +# define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 101 +# define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 102 +# define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 103 +# define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 104 # define RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY 105 # define RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY 148 # define RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK 130