From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2015 00:54:35 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source
X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_0_0p~5
X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=b2688c91613566db1f42edd4b45f6e17146531b9;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source
of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_pkt.c

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
---

diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 3ed2e9584d..de184e33a3 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -663,7 +663,8 @@ again:
 	 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
 	 */
 	if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
-		*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+		s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
+		s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
 		!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
 		{
 		rr->length = 0;