From: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 16:19:03 +0000 (+0200) Subject: rand: move drbg_{ctr,hash,hmac}.c without change to preserve history X-Git-Tag: openssl-3.0.0-alpha4~17 X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=a998b85a4f0e706fa6a07b7feab557d9e570d372;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git rand: move drbg_{ctr,hash,hmac}.c without change to preserve history Reviewed-by: Paul Dale (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11682) --- diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c deleted file mode 100644 index 33e1b324c6..0000000000 --- a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,503 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy - * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at - * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include "crypto/modes.h" -#include "internal/thread_once.h" -#include "rand_local.h" - -/* - * Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG. - */ -static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr) -{ - unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[0]; - u32 n = 16, c = 1; - - do { - --n; - c += p[n]; - p[n] = (u8)c; - c >>= 8; - } while (n); -} - -static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) -{ - size_t i, n; - - if (in == NULL || inlen == 0) - return; - - /* - * Any zero padding will have no effect on the result as we - * are XORing. So just process however much input we have. - */ - n = inlen < ctr->keylen ? inlen : ctr->keylen; - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) - ctr->K[i] ^= in[i]; - if (inlen <= ctr->keylen) - return; - - n = inlen - ctr->keylen; - if (n > 16) { - /* Should never happen */ - n = 16; - } - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) - ctr->V[i] ^= in[i + ctr->keylen]; -} - -/* - * Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3 - */ -__owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, int len) -{ - int i, outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) - out[i] ^= in[i]; - - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, len) - || outlen != len) - return 0; - return 1; -} - - -/* - * Handle several BCC operations for as much data as we need for K and X - */ -__owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in) -{ - unsigned char in_tmp[48]; - unsigned char num_of_blk = 2; - - memcpy(in_tmp, in, 16); - memcpy(in_tmp + 16, in, 16); - if (ctr->keylen != 16) { - memcpy(in_tmp + 32, in, 16); - num_of_blk = 3; - } - return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in_tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * num_of_blk); -} - -/* - * Initialise BCC blocks: these have the value 0,1,2 in leftmost positions: - * see 10.3.1 stage 7. - */ -__owur static int ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr) -{ - unsigned char bltmp[48] = {0}; - unsigned char num_of_blk; - - memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48); - num_of_blk = ctr->keylen == 16 ? 2 : 3; - bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 1) + 3] = 1; - bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2) + 3] = 2; - return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, bltmp, num_of_blk * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -} - -/* - * Process several blocks into BCC algorithm, some possibly partial - */ -__owur static int ctr_BCC_update(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, - const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) -{ - if (in == NULL || inlen == 0) - return 1; - - /* If we have partial block handle it first */ - if (ctr->bltmp_pos) { - size_t left = 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos; - - /* If we now have a complete block process it */ - if (inlen >= left) { - memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, left); - if (!ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp)) - return 0; - ctr->bltmp_pos = 0; - inlen -= left; - in += left; - } - } - - /* Process zero or more complete blocks */ - for (; inlen >= 16; in += 16, inlen -= 16) { - if (!ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, in)) - return 0; - } - - /* Copy any remaining partial block to the temporary buffer */ - if (inlen > 0) { - memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, inlen); - ctr->bltmp_pos += inlen; - } - return 1; -} - -__owur static int ctr_BCC_final(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr) -{ - if (ctr->bltmp_pos) { - memset(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, 0, 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos); - if (!ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp)) - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -__owur static int ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, - const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len, - const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len, - const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len) -{ - static unsigned char c80 = 0x80; - size_t inlen; - unsigned char *p = ctr->bltmp; - int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - - if (!ctr_BCC_init(ctr)) - return 0; - if (in1 == NULL) - in1len = 0; - if (in2 == NULL) - in2len = 0; - if (in3 == NULL) - in3len = 0; - inlen = in1len + in2len + in3len; - /* Initialise L||N in temporary block */ - *p++ = (inlen >> 24) & 0xff; - *p++ = (inlen >> 16) & 0xff; - *p++ = (inlen >> 8) & 0xff; - *p++ = inlen & 0xff; - - /* NB keylen is at most 32 bytes */ - *p++ = 0; - *p++ = 0; - *p++ = 0; - *p = (unsigned char)((ctr->keylen + 16) & 0xff); - ctr->bltmp_pos = 8; - if (!ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in1, in1len) - || !ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in2, in2len) - || !ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in3, in3len) - || !ctr_BCC_update(ctr, &c80, 1) - || !ctr_BCC_final(ctr)) - return 0; - /* Set up key K */ - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, -1)) - return 0; - /* X follows key K */ - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen, - AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX, - AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; - if (ctr->keylen != 16) - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen, - ctr->KX + 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -/* - * NB the no-df Update in SP800-90A specifies a constant input length - * of seedlen, however other uses of this algorithm pad the input with - * zeroes if necessary and have up to two parameters XORed together, - * so we handle both cases in this function instead. - */ -__owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len, - const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len, - const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen) -{ - RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; - int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - unsigned char V_tmp[48], out[48]; - unsigned char len; - - /* correct key is already set up. */ - memcpy(V_tmp, ctr->V, 16); - inc_128(ctr); - memcpy(V_tmp + 16, ctr->V, 16); - if (ctr->keylen == 16) { - len = 32; - } else { - inc_128(ctr); - memcpy(V_tmp + 32, ctr->V, 16); - len = 48; - } - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, out, &outlen, V_tmp, len) - || outlen != len) - return 0; - memcpy(ctr->K, out, ctr->keylen); - memcpy(ctr->V, out + ctr->keylen, 16); - - if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) { - /* If no input reuse existing derived value */ - if (in1 != NULL || nonce != NULL || in2 != NULL) - if (!ctr_df(ctr, in1, in1len, nonce, noncelen, in2, in2len)) - return 0; - /* If this a reuse input in1len != 0 */ - if (in1len) - ctr_XOR(ctr, ctr->KX, drbg->seedlen); - } else { - ctr_XOR(ctr, in1, in1len); - ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len); - } - - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1) - || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -__owur static int drbg_ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen, - const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen, - const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen) -{ - RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; - - if (entropy == NULL) - return 0; - - memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K)); - memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V)); - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)) - return 0; - - inc_128(ctr); - if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen)) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -__owur static int drbg_ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) -{ - RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; - - if (entropy == NULL) - return 0; - - inc_128(ctr); - if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0)) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter) -{ - u32 n = 12, c = 1; - - do { - --n; - c += counter[n]; - counter[n] = (u8)c; - c >>= 8; - } while (n); -} - -__owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) -{ - RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; - unsigned int ctr32, blocks; - int outl, buflen; - - if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) { - inc_128(ctr); - - if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) - return 0; - /* This means we reuse derived value */ - if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) { - adin = NULL; - adinlen = 1; - } - } else { - adinlen = 0; - } - - inc_128(ctr); - - if (outlen == 0) { - inc_128(ctr); - - if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) - return 0; - return 1; - } - - memset(out, 0, outlen); - - do { - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, - NULL, NULL, NULL, ctr->V, -1)) - return 0; - - /*- - * outlen has type size_t while EVP_CipherUpdate takes an - * int argument and thus cannot be guaranteed to process more - * than 2^31-1 bytes at a time. We process such huge generate - * requests in 2^30 byte chunks, which is the greatest multiple - * of AES block size lower than or equal to 2^31-1. - */ - buflen = outlen > (1U << 30) ? (1U << 30) : outlen; - blocks = (buflen + 15) / 16; - - ctr32 = GETU32(ctr->V + 12) + blocks; - if (ctr32 < blocks) { - /* 32-bit counter overflow into V. */ - if (ctr32 != 0) { - blocks -= ctr32; - buflen = blocks * 16; - ctr32 = 0; - } - ctr96_inc(ctr->V); - } - PUTU32(ctr->V + 12, ctr32); - - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ctr, out, &outl, out, buflen) - || outl != buflen) - return 0; - - out += buflen; - outlen -= buflen; - } while (outlen); - - if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) -{ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ecb); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ctr); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_df); - EVP_CIPHER_free(drbg->data.ctr.cipher_ecb); - EVP_CIPHER_free(drbg->data.ctr.cipher_ctr); - OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.ctr, sizeof(drbg->data.ctr)); - return 1; -} - -static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_ctr_meth = { - drbg_ctr_instantiate, - drbg_ctr_reseed, - drbg_ctr_generate, - drbg_ctr_uninstantiate -}; - -int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg) -{ - RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; - size_t keylen; - EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ecb = NULL; - EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ctr = NULL; - - switch (drbg->type) { - default: - /* This can't happen, but silence the compiler warning. */ - return 0; - case NID_aes_128_ctr: - keylen = 16; - cipher_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-128-ECB", ""); - cipher_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-128-CTR", ""); - break; - case NID_aes_192_ctr: - keylen = 24; - cipher_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-192-ECB", ""); - cipher_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-192-CTR", ""); - break; - case NID_aes_256_ctr: - keylen = 32; - cipher_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-256-ECB", ""); - cipher_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-256-CTR", ""); - break; - } - if (cipher_ecb == NULL || cipher_ctr == NULL) - return 0; - - EVP_CIPHER_free(ctr->cipher_ecb); - ctr->cipher_ecb = cipher_ecb; - EVP_CIPHER_free(ctr->cipher_ctr); - ctr->cipher_ctr = cipher_ctr; - - ctr->keylen = keylen; - if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL) - ctr->ctx_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - if (ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL) - ctr->ctx_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL || ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL - || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, - ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) - || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, - ctr->cipher_ctr, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)) - return 0; - - drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth; - drbg->strength = keylen * 8; - drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16; - - if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) { - /* df initialisation */ - static const unsigned char df_key[32] = { - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, - 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, - 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f - }; - - if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL) - ctr->ctx_df = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL) - return 0; - /* Set key schedule for df_key */ - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df, - ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1)) - return 0; - - drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen; - drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; - drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2; - drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; - drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; - drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; - } else { -#ifdef FIPS_MODULE - RANDerr(RAND_F_DRBG_CTR_INIT, - RAND_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_MANDATORY_FOR_FIPS); - return 0; -#else - drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->seedlen; - drbg->max_entropylen = drbg->seedlen; - /* Nonce not used */ - drbg->min_noncelen = 0; - drbg->max_noncelen = 0; - drbg->max_perslen = drbg->seedlen; - drbg->max_adinlen = drbg->seedlen; -#endif - } - - drbg->max_request = 1 << 16; - - return 1; -} diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_hash.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_hash.c deleted file mode 100644 index f087d88965..0000000000 --- a/crypto/rand/drbg_hash.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,360 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy - * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at - * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include "internal/thread_once.h" -#include "prov/providercommon.h" -#include "rand_local.h" - -/* 440 bits from SP800-90Ar1 10.1 table 2 */ -#define HASH_PRNG_SMALL_SEEDLEN (440/8) -/* Determine what seedlen to use based on the block length */ -#define MAX_BLOCKLEN_USING_SMALL_SEEDLEN (256/8) -#define INBYTE_IGNORE ((unsigned char)0xFF) - - -/* - * SP800-90Ar1 10.3.1 Derivation function using a Hash Function (Hash_df). - * The input string used is composed of: - * inbyte - An optional leading byte (ignore if equal to INBYTE_IGNORE) - * in - input string 1 (A Non NULL value). - * in2 - optional input string (Can be NULL). - * in3 - optional input string (Can be NULL). - * These are concatenated as part of the DigestUpdate process. - */ -static int hash_df(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char inbyte, - const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, - const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len, - const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len) -{ - RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; - EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = hash->ctx; - unsigned char *vtmp = hash->vtmp; - /* tmp = counter || num_bits_returned || [inbyte] */ - unsigned char tmp[1 + 4 + 1]; - int tmp_sz = 0; - size_t outlen = drbg->seedlen; - size_t num_bits_returned = outlen * 8; - /* - * No need to check outlen size here, as the standard only ever needs - * seedlen bytes which is always less than the maximum permitted. - */ - - /* (Step 3) counter = 1 (tmp[0] is the 8 bit counter) */ - tmp[tmp_sz++] = 1; - /* tmp[1..4] is the fixed 32 bit no_of_bits_to_return */ - tmp[tmp_sz++] = (unsigned char)((num_bits_returned >> 24) & 0xff); - tmp[tmp_sz++] = (unsigned char)((num_bits_returned >> 16) & 0xff); - tmp[tmp_sz++] = (unsigned char)((num_bits_returned >> 8) & 0xff); - tmp[tmp_sz++] = (unsigned char)(num_bits_returned & 0xff); - /* Tack the additional input byte onto the end of tmp if it exists */ - if (inbyte != INBYTE_IGNORE) - tmp[tmp_sz++] = inbyte; - - /* (Step 4) */ - for (;;) { - /* - * (Step 4.1) out = out || Hash(tmp || in || [in2] || [in3]) - * (where tmp = counter || num_bits_returned || [inbyte]) - */ - if (!(EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, hash->md, NULL) - && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, tmp, tmp_sz) - && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, in, inlen) - && (in2 == NULL || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, in2, in2len)) - && (in3 == NULL || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, in3, in3len)))) - return 0; - - if (outlen < hash->blocklen) { - if (!EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, vtmp, NULL)) - return 0; - memcpy(out, vtmp, outlen); - OPENSSL_cleanse(vtmp, hash->blocklen); - break; - } else if(!EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, out, NULL)) { - return 0; - } - - outlen -= hash->blocklen; - if (outlen == 0) - break; - /* (Step 4.2) counter++ */ - tmp[0]++; - out += hash->blocklen; - } - return 1; -} - -/* Helper function that just passes 2 input parameters to hash_df() */ -static int hash_df1(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char in_byte, - const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len) -{ - return hash_df(drbg, out, in_byte, in1, in1len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0); -} - -/* - * Add 2 byte buffers together. The first elements in each buffer are the top - * most bytes. The result is stored in the dst buffer. - * The final carry is ignored i.e: dst = (dst + in) mod (2^seedlen_bits). - * where dst size is drbg->seedlen, and inlen <= drbg->seedlen. - */ -static int add_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *dst, - unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) -{ - size_t i; - int result; - const unsigned char *add; - unsigned char carry = 0, *d; - - assert(drbg->seedlen >= 1 && inlen >= 1 && inlen <= drbg->seedlen); - - d = &dst[drbg->seedlen - 1]; - add = &in[inlen - 1]; - - for (i = inlen; i > 0; i--, d--, add--) { - result = *d + *add + carry; - carry = (unsigned char)(result >> 8); - *d = (unsigned char)(result & 0xff); - } - - if (carry != 0) { - /* Add the carry to the top of the dst if inlen is not the same size */ - for (i = drbg->seedlen - inlen; i > 0; --i, d--) { - *d += 1; /* Carry can only be 1 */ - if (*d != 0) /* exit if carry doesnt propagate to the next byte */ - break; - } - } - return 1; -} - -/* V = (V + Hash(inbyte || V || [additional_input]) mod (2^seedlen) */ -static int add_hash_to_v(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char inbyte, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) -{ - RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; - EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = hash->ctx; - - return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, hash->md, NULL) - && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &inbyte, 1) - && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, hash->V, drbg->seedlen) - && (adin == NULL || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, adin, adinlen)) - && EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, hash->vtmp, NULL) - && add_bytes(drbg, hash->V, hash->vtmp, hash->blocklen); -} - -/* - * The Hashgen() as listed in SP800-90Ar1 10.1.1.4 Hash_DRBG_Generate_Process. - * - * drbg contains the current value of V. - * outlen is the requested number of bytes. - * out is a buffer to return the generated bits. - * - * The algorithm to generate the bits is: - * data = V - * w = NULL - * for (i = 1 to m) { - * W = W || Hash(data) - * data = (data + 1) mod (2^seedlen) - * } - * out = Leftmost(W, outlen) - * - * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. - */ -static int hash_gen(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) -{ - RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; - unsigned char one = 1; - - if (outlen == 0) - return 1; - memcpy(hash->vtmp, hash->V, drbg->seedlen); - for(;;) { - if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(hash->ctx, hash->md, NULL) - || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hash->ctx, hash->vtmp, drbg->seedlen)) - return 0; - - if (outlen < hash->blocklen) { - if (!EVP_DigestFinal(hash->ctx, hash->vtmp, NULL)) - return 0; - memcpy(out, hash->vtmp, outlen); - return 1; - } else { - if (!EVP_DigestFinal(hash->ctx, out, NULL)) - return 0; - outlen -= hash->blocklen; - if (outlen == 0) - break; - out += hash->blocklen; - } - add_bytes(drbg, hash->vtmp, &one, 1); - } - return 1; -} - -/* - * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.1.2 Hash_DRBG_Instantiate_Process: - * - * ent is entropy input obtained from a randomness source of length ent_len. - * nonce is a string of bytes of length nonce_len. - * pstr is a personalization string received from an application. May be NULL. - * - * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. - */ -static int drbg_hash_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len, - const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, - const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len) -{ - RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; - - /* (Step 1-3) V = Hash_df(entropy||nonce||pers, seedlen) */ - return hash_df(drbg, hash->V, INBYTE_IGNORE, - ent, ent_len, nonce, nonce_len, pstr, pstr_len) - /* (Step 4) C = Hash_df(0x00||V, seedlen) */ - && hash_df1(drbg, hash->C, 0x00, hash->V, drbg->seedlen); -} - -/* - * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.1.3 Hash_DRBG_Reseed_Process: - * - * ent is entropy input bytes obtained from a randomness source. - * addin is additional input received from an application. May be NULL. - * - * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. - */ -static int drbg_hash_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len) -{ - RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; - - /* (Step 1-2) V = Hash_df(0x01 || V || entropy_input || additional_input)*/ - /* V about to be updated so use C as output instead */ - if (!hash_df(drbg, hash->C, 0x01, hash->V, drbg->seedlen, ent, ent_len, - adin, adin_len)) - return 0; - memcpy(hash->V, hash->C, drbg->seedlen); - /* (Step 4) C = Hash_df(0x00||V, seedlen) */ - return hash_df1(drbg, hash->C, 0x00, hash->V, drbg->seedlen); -} - -/* - * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.1.4 Hash_DRBG_Generate_Process: - * - * Generates pseudo random bytes using the drbg. - * out is a buffer to fill with outlen bytes of pseudo random data. - * addin is additional input received from an application. May be NULL. - * - * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. - */ -static int drbg_hash_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len) -{ - RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; - unsigned char counter[4]; - int reseed_counter = drbg->reseed_gen_counter; - - counter[0] = (unsigned char)((reseed_counter >> 24) & 0xff); - counter[1] = (unsigned char)((reseed_counter >> 16) & 0xff); - counter[2] = (unsigned char)((reseed_counter >> 8) & 0xff); - counter[3] = (unsigned char)(reseed_counter & 0xff); - - return (adin == NULL - /* (Step 2) if adin != NULL then V = V + Hash(0x02||V||adin) */ - || adin_len == 0 - || add_hash_to_v(drbg, 0x02, adin, adin_len)) - /* (Step 3) Hashgen(outlen, V) */ - && hash_gen(drbg, out, outlen) - /* (Step 4/5) H = V = (V + Hash(0x03||V) mod (2^seedlen_bits) */ - && add_hash_to_v(drbg, 0x03, NULL, 0) - /* (Step 5) V = (V + H + C + reseed_counter) mod (2^seedlen_bits) */ - /* V = (V + C) mod (2^seedlen_bits) */ - && add_bytes(drbg, hash->V, hash->C, drbg->seedlen) - /* V = (V + reseed_counter) mod (2^seedlen_bits) */ - && add_bytes(drbg, hash->V, counter, 4); -} - -static int drbg_hash_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) -{ - EVP_MD_free(drbg->data.hash.md); - EVP_MD_CTX_free(drbg->data.hash.ctx); - OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.hash, sizeof(drbg->data.hash)); - return 1; -} - -static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_hash_meth = { - drbg_hash_instantiate, - drbg_hash_reseed, - drbg_hash_generate, - drbg_hash_uninstantiate -}; - -int drbg_hash_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg) -{ - EVP_MD *md; - RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; - - /* - * Confirm digest is allowed. We allow all digests that are not XOF - * (such as SHAKE). In FIPS mode, the fetch will fail for non-approved - * digests. - */ - md = EVP_MD_fetch(drbg->libctx, ossl_prov_util_nid_to_name(drbg->type), ""); - if (md == NULL) - return 0; - - if ((EVP_MD_flags(md) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) != 0) - return 0; - - drbg->meth = &drbg_hash_meth; - - if (hash->ctx == NULL) { - hash->ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (hash->ctx == NULL) { - EVP_MD_free(md); - return 0; - } - } - - EVP_MD_free(hash->md); - hash->md = md; - - /* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */ - hash->blocklen = EVP_MD_size(md); - /* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */ - drbg->strength = 64 * (hash->blocklen >> 3); - if (drbg->strength > 256) - drbg->strength = 256; - if (hash->blocklen > MAX_BLOCKLEN_USING_SMALL_SEEDLEN) - drbg->seedlen = HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN; - else - drbg->seedlen = HASH_PRNG_SMALL_SEEDLEN; - - drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->strength / 8; - drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; - - drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2; - drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; - - drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; - drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; - - /* Maximum number of bits per request = 2^19 = 2^16 bytes */ - drbg->max_request = 1 << 16; - - return 1; -} diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_hmac.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_hmac.c deleted file mode 100644 index ea55279ea3..0000000000 --- a/crypto/rand/drbg_hmac.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,256 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy - * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at - * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html - */ - -/* - * HMAC low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal - * use. - */ -#include "internal/deprecated.h" - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include "internal/thread_once.h" -#include "prov/providercommon.h" -#include "rand_local.h" - -/* - * Called twice by SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.2 HMAC_DRBG_Update_Process. - * - * hmac is an object that holds the input/output Key and Value (K and V). - * inbyte is 0x00 on the first call and 0x01 on the second call. - * in1, in2, in3 are optional inputs that can be NULL. - * in1len, in2len, in3len are the lengths of the input buffers. - * - * The returned K,V is: - * hmac->K = HMAC(hmac->K, hmac->V || inbyte || [in1] || [in2] || [in3]) - * hmac->V = HMAC(hmac->K, hmac->V) - * - * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. - */ -static int do_hmac(RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac, unsigned char inbyte, - const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len, - const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len, - const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len) -{ - HMAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx; - - return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, hmac->md, NULL) - /* K = HMAC(K, V || inbyte || [in1] || [in2] || [in3]) */ - && HMAC_Update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen) - && HMAC_Update(ctx, &inbyte, 1) - && (in1 == NULL || in1len == 0 || HMAC_Update(ctx, in1, in1len)) - && (in2 == NULL || in2len == 0 || HMAC_Update(ctx, in2, in2len)) - && (in3 == NULL || in3len == 0 || HMAC_Update(ctx, in3, in3len)) - && HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac->K, NULL) - /* V = HMAC(K, V) */ - && HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, hmac->md, NULL) - && HMAC_Update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen) - && HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL); -} - -/* - * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.2 HMAC_DRBG_Update_Process - * - * - * Updates the drbg objects Key(K) and Value(V) using the following algorithm: - * K,V = do_hmac(hmac, 0, in1, in2, in3) - * if (any input is not NULL) - * K,V = do_hmac(hmac, 1, in1, in2, in3) - * - * where in1, in2, in3 are optional input buffers that can be NULL. - * in1len, in2len, in3len are the lengths of the input buffers. - * - * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. - */ -static int drbg_hmac_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len, - const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len, - const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len) -{ - RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac; - - /* (Steps 1-2) K = HMAC(K, V||0x00||provided_data). V = HMAC(K,V) */ - if (!do_hmac(hmac, 0x00, in1, in1len, in2, in2len, in3, in3len)) - return 0; - /* (Step 3) If provided_data == NULL then return (K,V) */ - if (in1len == 0 && in2len == 0 && in3len == 0) - return 1; - /* (Steps 4-5) K = HMAC(K, V||0x01||provided_data). V = HMAC(K,V) */ - return do_hmac(hmac, 0x01, in1, in1len, in2, in2len, in3, in3len); -} - -/* - * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.3 HMAC_DRBG_Instantiate_Process: - * - * This sets the drbg Key (K) to all zeros, and Value (V) to all 1's. - * and then calls (K,V) = drbg_hmac_update() with input parameters: - * ent = entropy data (Can be NULL) of length ent_len. - * nonce = nonce data (Can be NULL) of length nonce_len. - * pstr = personalization data (Can be NULL) of length pstr_len. - * - * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. - */ -static int drbg_hmac_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len, - const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, - const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len) -{ - RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac; - - /* (Step 2) Key = 0x00 00...00 */ - memset(hmac->K, 0x00, hmac->blocklen); - /* (Step 3) V = 0x01 01...01 */ - memset(hmac->V, 0x01, hmac->blocklen); - /* (Step 4) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(entropy||nonce||pers string, K, V) */ - return drbg_hmac_update(drbg, ent, ent_len, nonce, nonce_len, pstr, - pstr_len); -} - -/* - * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.4 HMAC_DRBG_Reseed_Process: - * - * Reseeds the drbg's Key (K) and Value (V) by calling - * (K,V) = drbg_hmac_update() with the following input parameters: - * ent = entropy input data (Can be NULL) of length ent_len. - * adin = additional input data (Can be NULL) of length adin_len. - * - * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. - */ -static int drbg_hmac_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len) -{ - /* (Step 2) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(entropy||additional_input, K, V) */ - return drbg_hmac_update(drbg, ent, ent_len, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0); -} - -/* - * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.5 HMAC_DRBG_Generate_Process: - * - * Generates pseudo random bytes and updates the internal K,V for the drbg. - * out is a buffer to fill with outlen bytes of pseudo random data. - * adin is an additional_input string of size adin_len that may be NULL. - * - * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. - */ -static int drbg_hmac_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len) -{ - RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac; - HMAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx; - const unsigned char *temp = hmac->V; - - /* (Step 2) if adin != NULL then (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(adin, K, V) */ - if (adin != NULL - && adin_len > 0 - && !drbg_hmac_update(drbg, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) - return 0; - - /* - * (Steps 3-5) temp = NULL - * while (len(temp) < outlen) { - * V = HMAC(K, V) - * temp = temp || V - * } - */ - for (;;) { - if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, hmac->md, NULL) - || !HMAC_Update(ctx, temp, hmac->blocklen)) - return 0; - - if (outlen > hmac->blocklen) { - if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, out, NULL)) - return 0; - temp = out; - } else { - if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL)) - return 0; - memcpy(out, hmac->V, outlen); - break; - } - out += hmac->blocklen; - outlen -= hmac->blocklen; - } - /* (Step 6) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(adin, K, V) */ - if (!drbg_hmac_update(drbg, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) - return 0; - - return 1; -} - -static int drbg_hmac_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) -{ - EVP_MD_free(drbg->data.hmac.md); - HMAC_CTX_free(drbg->data.hmac.ctx); - OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.hmac, sizeof(drbg->data.hmac)); - return 1; -} - -static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_hmac_meth = { - drbg_hmac_instantiate, - drbg_hmac_reseed, - drbg_hmac_generate, - drbg_hmac_uninstantiate -}; - -int drbg_hmac_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg) -{ - EVP_MD *md = NULL; - RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac; - - /* - * Confirm digest is allowed. We allow all digests that are not XOF - * (such as SHAKE). In FIPS mode, the fetch will fail for non-approved - * digests. - */ - md = EVP_MD_fetch(drbg->libctx, ossl_prov_util_nid_to_name(drbg->type), ""); - if (md == NULL) - return 0; - - if ((EVP_MD_flags(md) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) != 0) - return 0; - - drbg->meth = &drbg_hmac_meth; - - if (hmac->ctx == NULL) { - hmac->ctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); - if (hmac->ctx == NULL) { - EVP_MD_free(md); - return 0; - } - } - - /* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */ - EVP_MD_free(hmac->md); - hmac->md = md; - hmac->blocklen = EVP_MD_size(md); - /* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */ - drbg->strength = 64 * (int)(hmac->blocklen >> 3); - if (drbg->strength > 256) - drbg->strength = 256; - drbg->seedlen = hmac->blocklen; - - drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->strength / 8; - drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; - - drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2; - drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; - - drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; - drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; - - /* Maximum number of bits per request = 2^19 = 2^16 bytes*/ - drbg->max_request = 1 << 16; - - return 1; -} diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_ctr.c b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_ctr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..33e1b324c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_ctr.c @@ -0,0 +1,503 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "crypto/modes.h" +#include "internal/thread_once.h" +#include "rand_local.h" + +/* + * Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG. + */ +static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr) +{ + unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[0]; + u32 n = 16, c = 1; + + do { + --n; + c += p[n]; + p[n] = (u8)c; + c >>= 8; + } while (n); +} + +static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) +{ + size_t i, n; + + if (in == NULL || inlen == 0) + return; + + /* + * Any zero padding will have no effect on the result as we + * are XORing. So just process however much input we have. + */ + n = inlen < ctr->keylen ? inlen : ctr->keylen; + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + ctr->K[i] ^= in[i]; + if (inlen <= ctr->keylen) + return; + + n = inlen - ctr->keylen; + if (n > 16) { + /* Should never happen */ + n = 16; + } + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + ctr->V[i] ^= in[i + ctr->keylen]; +} + +/* + * Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3 + */ +__owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, int len) +{ + int i, outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) + out[i] ^= in[i]; + + if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, len) + || outlen != len) + return 0; + return 1; +} + + +/* + * Handle several BCC operations for as much data as we need for K and X + */ +__owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in) +{ + unsigned char in_tmp[48]; + unsigned char num_of_blk = 2; + + memcpy(in_tmp, in, 16); + memcpy(in_tmp + 16, in, 16); + if (ctr->keylen != 16) { + memcpy(in_tmp + 32, in, 16); + num_of_blk = 3; + } + return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in_tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * num_of_blk); +} + +/* + * Initialise BCC blocks: these have the value 0,1,2 in leftmost positions: + * see 10.3.1 stage 7. + */ +__owur static int ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr) +{ + unsigned char bltmp[48] = {0}; + unsigned char num_of_blk; + + memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48); + num_of_blk = ctr->keylen == 16 ? 2 : 3; + bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 1) + 3] = 1; + bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2) + 3] = 2; + return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, bltmp, num_of_blk * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); +} + +/* + * Process several blocks into BCC algorithm, some possibly partial + */ +__owur static int ctr_BCC_update(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, + const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) +{ + if (in == NULL || inlen == 0) + return 1; + + /* If we have partial block handle it first */ + if (ctr->bltmp_pos) { + size_t left = 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos; + + /* If we now have a complete block process it */ + if (inlen >= left) { + memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, left); + if (!ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp)) + return 0; + ctr->bltmp_pos = 0; + inlen -= left; + in += left; + } + } + + /* Process zero or more complete blocks */ + for (; inlen >= 16; in += 16, inlen -= 16) { + if (!ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, in)) + return 0; + } + + /* Copy any remaining partial block to the temporary buffer */ + if (inlen > 0) { + memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, inlen); + ctr->bltmp_pos += inlen; + } + return 1; +} + +__owur static int ctr_BCC_final(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr) +{ + if (ctr->bltmp_pos) { + memset(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, 0, 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos); + if (!ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp)) + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +__owur static int ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, + const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len, + const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len, + const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len) +{ + static unsigned char c80 = 0x80; + size_t inlen; + unsigned char *p = ctr->bltmp; + int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + + if (!ctr_BCC_init(ctr)) + return 0; + if (in1 == NULL) + in1len = 0; + if (in2 == NULL) + in2len = 0; + if (in3 == NULL) + in3len = 0; + inlen = in1len + in2len + in3len; + /* Initialise L||N in temporary block */ + *p++ = (inlen >> 24) & 0xff; + *p++ = (inlen >> 16) & 0xff; + *p++ = (inlen >> 8) & 0xff; + *p++ = inlen & 0xff; + + /* NB keylen is at most 32 bytes */ + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 0; + *p = (unsigned char)((ctr->keylen + 16) & 0xff); + ctr->bltmp_pos = 8; + if (!ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in1, in1len) + || !ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in2, in2len) + || !ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in3, in3len) + || !ctr_BCC_update(ctr, &c80, 1) + || !ctr_BCC_final(ctr)) + return 0; + /* Set up key K */ + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, -1)) + return 0; + /* X follows key K */ + if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + return 0; + if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + return 0; + if (ctr->keylen != 16) + if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen, + ctr->KX + 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * NB the no-df Update in SP800-90A specifies a constant input length + * of seedlen, however other uses of this algorithm pad the input with + * zeroes if necessary and have up to two parameters XORed together, + * so we handle both cases in this function instead. + */ +__owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len, + const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len, + const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen) +{ + RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; + int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + unsigned char V_tmp[48], out[48]; + unsigned char len; + + /* correct key is already set up. */ + memcpy(V_tmp, ctr->V, 16); + inc_128(ctr); + memcpy(V_tmp + 16, ctr->V, 16); + if (ctr->keylen == 16) { + len = 32; + } else { + inc_128(ctr); + memcpy(V_tmp + 32, ctr->V, 16); + len = 48; + } + if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, out, &outlen, V_tmp, len) + || outlen != len) + return 0; + memcpy(ctr->K, out, ctr->keylen); + memcpy(ctr->V, out + ctr->keylen, 16); + + if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) { + /* If no input reuse existing derived value */ + if (in1 != NULL || nonce != NULL || in2 != NULL) + if (!ctr_df(ctr, in1, in1len, nonce, noncelen, in2, in2len)) + return 0; + /* If this a reuse input in1len != 0 */ + if (in1len) + ctr_XOR(ctr, ctr->KX, drbg->seedlen); + } else { + ctr_XOR(ctr, in1, in1len); + ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len); + } + + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1) + || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +__owur static int drbg_ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen, + const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen, + const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen) +{ + RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; + + if (entropy == NULL) + return 0; + + memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K)); + memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V)); + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)) + return 0; + + inc_128(ctr); + if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +__owur static int drbg_ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen, + const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) +{ + RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; + + if (entropy == NULL) + return 0; + + inc_128(ctr); + if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter) +{ + u32 n = 12, c = 1; + + do { + --n; + c += counter[n]; + counter[n] = (u8)c; + c >>= 8; + } while (n); +} + +__owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, + const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) +{ + RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; + unsigned int ctr32, blocks; + int outl, buflen; + + if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) { + inc_128(ctr); + + if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) + return 0; + /* This means we reuse derived value */ + if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) { + adin = NULL; + adinlen = 1; + } + } else { + adinlen = 0; + } + + inc_128(ctr); + + if (outlen == 0) { + inc_128(ctr); + + if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) + return 0; + return 1; + } + + memset(out, 0, outlen); + + do { + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, + NULL, NULL, NULL, ctr->V, -1)) + return 0; + + /*- + * outlen has type size_t while EVP_CipherUpdate takes an + * int argument and thus cannot be guaranteed to process more + * than 2^31-1 bytes at a time. We process such huge generate + * requests in 2^30 byte chunks, which is the greatest multiple + * of AES block size lower than or equal to 2^31-1. + */ + buflen = outlen > (1U << 30) ? (1U << 30) : outlen; + blocks = (buflen + 15) / 16; + + ctr32 = GETU32(ctr->V + 12) + blocks; + if (ctr32 < blocks) { + /* 32-bit counter overflow into V. */ + if (ctr32 != 0) { + blocks -= ctr32; + buflen = blocks * 16; + ctr32 = 0; + } + ctr96_inc(ctr->V); + } + PUTU32(ctr->V + 12, ctr32); + + if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ctr, out, &outl, out, buflen) + || outl != buflen) + return 0; + + out += buflen; + outlen -= buflen; + } while (outlen); + + if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ecb); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ctr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_df); + EVP_CIPHER_free(drbg->data.ctr.cipher_ecb); + EVP_CIPHER_free(drbg->data.ctr.cipher_ctr); + OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.ctr, sizeof(drbg->data.ctr)); + return 1; +} + +static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_ctr_meth = { + drbg_ctr_instantiate, + drbg_ctr_reseed, + drbg_ctr_generate, + drbg_ctr_uninstantiate +}; + +int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; + size_t keylen; + EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ecb = NULL; + EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ctr = NULL; + + switch (drbg->type) { + default: + /* This can't happen, but silence the compiler warning. */ + return 0; + case NID_aes_128_ctr: + keylen = 16; + cipher_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-128-ECB", ""); + cipher_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-128-CTR", ""); + break; + case NID_aes_192_ctr: + keylen = 24; + cipher_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-192-ECB", ""); + cipher_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-192-CTR", ""); + break; + case NID_aes_256_ctr: + keylen = 32; + cipher_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-256-ECB", ""); + cipher_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-256-CTR", ""); + break; + } + if (cipher_ecb == NULL || cipher_ctr == NULL) + return 0; + + EVP_CIPHER_free(ctr->cipher_ecb); + ctr->cipher_ecb = cipher_ecb; + EVP_CIPHER_free(ctr->cipher_ctr); + ctr->cipher_ctr = cipher_ctr; + + ctr->keylen = keylen; + if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL) + ctr->ctx_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL) + ctr->ctx_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL || ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL + || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, + ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) + || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, + ctr->cipher_ctr, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)) + return 0; + + drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth; + drbg->strength = keylen * 8; + drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16; + + if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) { + /* df initialisation */ + static const unsigned char df_key[32] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f + }; + + if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL) + ctr->ctx_df = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL) + return 0; + /* Set key schedule for df_key */ + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df, + ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1)) + return 0; + + drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen; + drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; + drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2; + drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; + drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; + drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; + } else { +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + RANDerr(RAND_F_DRBG_CTR_INIT, + RAND_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_MANDATORY_FOR_FIPS); + return 0; +#else + drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->seedlen; + drbg->max_entropylen = drbg->seedlen; + /* Nonce not used */ + drbg->min_noncelen = 0; + drbg->max_noncelen = 0; + drbg->max_perslen = drbg->seedlen; + drbg->max_adinlen = drbg->seedlen; +#endif + } + + drbg->max_request = 1 << 16; + + return 1; +} diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hash.c b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hash.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f087d88965 --- /dev/null +++ b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,360 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "internal/thread_once.h" +#include "prov/providercommon.h" +#include "rand_local.h" + +/* 440 bits from SP800-90Ar1 10.1 table 2 */ +#define HASH_PRNG_SMALL_SEEDLEN (440/8) +/* Determine what seedlen to use based on the block length */ +#define MAX_BLOCKLEN_USING_SMALL_SEEDLEN (256/8) +#define INBYTE_IGNORE ((unsigned char)0xFF) + + +/* + * SP800-90Ar1 10.3.1 Derivation function using a Hash Function (Hash_df). + * The input string used is composed of: + * inbyte - An optional leading byte (ignore if equal to INBYTE_IGNORE) + * in - input string 1 (A Non NULL value). + * in2 - optional input string (Can be NULL). + * in3 - optional input string (Can be NULL). + * These are concatenated as part of the DigestUpdate process. + */ +static int hash_df(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char inbyte, + const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, + const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len, + const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len) +{ + RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = hash->ctx; + unsigned char *vtmp = hash->vtmp; + /* tmp = counter || num_bits_returned || [inbyte] */ + unsigned char tmp[1 + 4 + 1]; + int tmp_sz = 0; + size_t outlen = drbg->seedlen; + size_t num_bits_returned = outlen * 8; + /* + * No need to check outlen size here, as the standard only ever needs + * seedlen bytes which is always less than the maximum permitted. + */ + + /* (Step 3) counter = 1 (tmp[0] is the 8 bit counter) */ + tmp[tmp_sz++] = 1; + /* tmp[1..4] is the fixed 32 bit no_of_bits_to_return */ + tmp[tmp_sz++] = (unsigned char)((num_bits_returned >> 24) & 0xff); + tmp[tmp_sz++] = (unsigned char)((num_bits_returned >> 16) & 0xff); + tmp[tmp_sz++] = (unsigned char)((num_bits_returned >> 8) & 0xff); + tmp[tmp_sz++] = (unsigned char)(num_bits_returned & 0xff); + /* Tack the additional input byte onto the end of tmp if it exists */ + if (inbyte != INBYTE_IGNORE) + tmp[tmp_sz++] = inbyte; + + /* (Step 4) */ + for (;;) { + /* + * (Step 4.1) out = out || Hash(tmp || in || [in2] || [in3]) + * (where tmp = counter || num_bits_returned || [inbyte]) + */ + if (!(EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, hash->md, NULL) + && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, tmp, tmp_sz) + && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, in, inlen) + && (in2 == NULL || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, in2, in2len)) + && (in3 == NULL || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, in3, in3len)))) + return 0; + + if (outlen < hash->blocklen) { + if (!EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, vtmp, NULL)) + return 0; + memcpy(out, vtmp, outlen); + OPENSSL_cleanse(vtmp, hash->blocklen); + break; + } else if(!EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, out, NULL)) { + return 0; + } + + outlen -= hash->blocklen; + if (outlen == 0) + break; + /* (Step 4.2) counter++ */ + tmp[0]++; + out += hash->blocklen; + } + return 1; +} + +/* Helper function that just passes 2 input parameters to hash_df() */ +static int hash_df1(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char in_byte, + const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len) +{ + return hash_df(drbg, out, in_byte, in1, in1len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0); +} + +/* + * Add 2 byte buffers together. The first elements in each buffer are the top + * most bytes. The result is stored in the dst buffer. + * The final carry is ignored i.e: dst = (dst + in) mod (2^seedlen_bits). + * where dst size is drbg->seedlen, and inlen <= drbg->seedlen. + */ +static int add_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *dst, + unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) +{ + size_t i; + int result; + const unsigned char *add; + unsigned char carry = 0, *d; + + assert(drbg->seedlen >= 1 && inlen >= 1 && inlen <= drbg->seedlen); + + d = &dst[drbg->seedlen - 1]; + add = &in[inlen - 1]; + + for (i = inlen; i > 0; i--, d--, add--) { + result = *d + *add + carry; + carry = (unsigned char)(result >> 8); + *d = (unsigned char)(result & 0xff); + } + + if (carry != 0) { + /* Add the carry to the top of the dst if inlen is not the same size */ + for (i = drbg->seedlen - inlen; i > 0; --i, d--) { + *d += 1; /* Carry can only be 1 */ + if (*d != 0) /* exit if carry doesnt propagate to the next byte */ + break; + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* V = (V + Hash(inbyte || V || [additional_input]) mod (2^seedlen) */ +static int add_hash_to_v(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char inbyte, + const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) +{ + RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = hash->ctx; + + return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, hash->md, NULL) + && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &inbyte, 1) + && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, hash->V, drbg->seedlen) + && (adin == NULL || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, adin, adinlen)) + && EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, hash->vtmp, NULL) + && add_bytes(drbg, hash->V, hash->vtmp, hash->blocklen); +} + +/* + * The Hashgen() as listed in SP800-90Ar1 10.1.1.4 Hash_DRBG_Generate_Process. + * + * drbg contains the current value of V. + * outlen is the requested number of bytes. + * out is a buffer to return the generated bits. + * + * The algorithm to generate the bits is: + * data = V + * w = NULL + * for (i = 1 to m) { + * W = W || Hash(data) + * data = (data + 1) mod (2^seedlen) + * } + * out = Leftmost(W, outlen) + * + * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. + */ +static int hash_gen(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) +{ + RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; + unsigned char one = 1; + + if (outlen == 0) + return 1; + memcpy(hash->vtmp, hash->V, drbg->seedlen); + for(;;) { + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(hash->ctx, hash->md, NULL) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hash->ctx, hash->vtmp, drbg->seedlen)) + return 0; + + if (outlen < hash->blocklen) { + if (!EVP_DigestFinal(hash->ctx, hash->vtmp, NULL)) + return 0; + memcpy(out, hash->vtmp, outlen); + return 1; + } else { + if (!EVP_DigestFinal(hash->ctx, out, NULL)) + return 0; + outlen -= hash->blocklen; + if (outlen == 0) + break; + out += hash->blocklen; + } + add_bytes(drbg, hash->vtmp, &one, 1); + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.1.2 Hash_DRBG_Instantiate_Process: + * + * ent is entropy input obtained from a randomness source of length ent_len. + * nonce is a string of bytes of length nonce_len. + * pstr is a personalization string received from an application. May be NULL. + * + * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. + */ +static int drbg_hash_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len, + const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len) +{ + RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; + + /* (Step 1-3) V = Hash_df(entropy||nonce||pers, seedlen) */ + return hash_df(drbg, hash->V, INBYTE_IGNORE, + ent, ent_len, nonce, nonce_len, pstr, pstr_len) + /* (Step 4) C = Hash_df(0x00||V, seedlen) */ + && hash_df1(drbg, hash->C, 0x00, hash->V, drbg->seedlen); +} + +/* + * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.1.3 Hash_DRBG_Reseed_Process: + * + * ent is entropy input bytes obtained from a randomness source. + * addin is additional input received from an application. May be NULL. + * + * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. + */ +static int drbg_hash_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len, + const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len) +{ + RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; + + /* (Step 1-2) V = Hash_df(0x01 || V || entropy_input || additional_input)*/ + /* V about to be updated so use C as output instead */ + if (!hash_df(drbg, hash->C, 0x01, hash->V, drbg->seedlen, ent, ent_len, + adin, adin_len)) + return 0; + memcpy(hash->V, hash->C, drbg->seedlen); + /* (Step 4) C = Hash_df(0x00||V, seedlen) */ + return hash_df1(drbg, hash->C, 0x00, hash->V, drbg->seedlen); +} + +/* + * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.1.4 Hash_DRBG_Generate_Process: + * + * Generates pseudo random bytes using the drbg. + * out is a buffer to fill with outlen bytes of pseudo random data. + * addin is additional input received from an application. May be NULL. + * + * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. + */ +static int drbg_hash_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, + const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len) +{ + RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; + unsigned char counter[4]; + int reseed_counter = drbg->reseed_gen_counter; + + counter[0] = (unsigned char)((reseed_counter >> 24) & 0xff); + counter[1] = (unsigned char)((reseed_counter >> 16) & 0xff); + counter[2] = (unsigned char)((reseed_counter >> 8) & 0xff); + counter[3] = (unsigned char)(reseed_counter & 0xff); + + return (adin == NULL + /* (Step 2) if adin != NULL then V = V + Hash(0x02||V||adin) */ + || adin_len == 0 + || add_hash_to_v(drbg, 0x02, adin, adin_len)) + /* (Step 3) Hashgen(outlen, V) */ + && hash_gen(drbg, out, outlen) + /* (Step 4/5) H = V = (V + Hash(0x03||V) mod (2^seedlen_bits) */ + && add_hash_to_v(drbg, 0x03, NULL, 0) + /* (Step 5) V = (V + H + C + reseed_counter) mod (2^seedlen_bits) */ + /* V = (V + C) mod (2^seedlen_bits) */ + && add_bytes(drbg, hash->V, hash->C, drbg->seedlen) + /* V = (V + reseed_counter) mod (2^seedlen_bits) */ + && add_bytes(drbg, hash->V, counter, 4); +} + +static int drbg_hash_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + EVP_MD_free(drbg->data.hash.md); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(drbg->data.hash.ctx); + OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.hash, sizeof(drbg->data.hash)); + return 1; +} + +static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_hash_meth = { + drbg_hash_instantiate, + drbg_hash_reseed, + drbg_hash_generate, + drbg_hash_uninstantiate +}; + +int drbg_hash_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + EVP_MD *md; + RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash; + + /* + * Confirm digest is allowed. We allow all digests that are not XOF + * (such as SHAKE). In FIPS mode, the fetch will fail for non-approved + * digests. + */ + md = EVP_MD_fetch(drbg->libctx, ossl_prov_util_nid_to_name(drbg->type), ""); + if (md == NULL) + return 0; + + if ((EVP_MD_flags(md) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) != 0) + return 0; + + drbg->meth = &drbg_hash_meth; + + if (hash->ctx == NULL) { + hash->ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (hash->ctx == NULL) { + EVP_MD_free(md); + return 0; + } + } + + EVP_MD_free(hash->md); + hash->md = md; + + /* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */ + hash->blocklen = EVP_MD_size(md); + /* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */ + drbg->strength = 64 * (hash->blocklen >> 3); + if (drbg->strength > 256) + drbg->strength = 256; + if (hash->blocklen > MAX_BLOCKLEN_USING_SMALL_SEEDLEN) + drbg->seedlen = HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN; + else + drbg->seedlen = HASH_PRNG_SMALL_SEEDLEN; + + drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->strength / 8; + drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; + + drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2; + drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; + + drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; + drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; + + /* Maximum number of bits per request = 2^19 = 2^16 bytes */ + drbg->max_request = 1 << 16; + + return 1; +} diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hmac.c b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hmac.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ea55279ea3 --- /dev/null +++ b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hmac.c @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* + * HMAC low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal + * use. + */ +#include "internal/deprecated.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "internal/thread_once.h" +#include "prov/providercommon.h" +#include "rand_local.h" + +/* + * Called twice by SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.2 HMAC_DRBG_Update_Process. + * + * hmac is an object that holds the input/output Key and Value (K and V). + * inbyte is 0x00 on the first call and 0x01 on the second call. + * in1, in2, in3 are optional inputs that can be NULL. + * in1len, in2len, in3len are the lengths of the input buffers. + * + * The returned K,V is: + * hmac->K = HMAC(hmac->K, hmac->V || inbyte || [in1] || [in2] || [in3]) + * hmac->V = HMAC(hmac->K, hmac->V) + * + * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. + */ +static int do_hmac(RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac, unsigned char inbyte, + const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len, + const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len, + const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len) +{ + HMAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx; + + return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, hmac->md, NULL) + /* K = HMAC(K, V || inbyte || [in1] || [in2] || [in3]) */ + && HMAC_Update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen) + && HMAC_Update(ctx, &inbyte, 1) + && (in1 == NULL || in1len == 0 || HMAC_Update(ctx, in1, in1len)) + && (in2 == NULL || in2len == 0 || HMAC_Update(ctx, in2, in2len)) + && (in3 == NULL || in3len == 0 || HMAC_Update(ctx, in3, in3len)) + && HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac->K, NULL) + /* V = HMAC(K, V) */ + && HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, hmac->md, NULL) + && HMAC_Update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen) + && HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL); +} + +/* + * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.2 HMAC_DRBG_Update_Process + * + * + * Updates the drbg objects Key(K) and Value(V) using the following algorithm: + * K,V = do_hmac(hmac, 0, in1, in2, in3) + * if (any input is not NULL) + * K,V = do_hmac(hmac, 1, in1, in2, in3) + * + * where in1, in2, in3 are optional input buffers that can be NULL. + * in1len, in2len, in3len are the lengths of the input buffers. + * + * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. + */ +static int drbg_hmac_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len, + const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len, + const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len) +{ + RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac; + + /* (Steps 1-2) K = HMAC(K, V||0x00||provided_data). V = HMAC(K,V) */ + if (!do_hmac(hmac, 0x00, in1, in1len, in2, in2len, in3, in3len)) + return 0; + /* (Step 3) If provided_data == NULL then return (K,V) */ + if (in1len == 0 && in2len == 0 && in3len == 0) + return 1; + /* (Steps 4-5) K = HMAC(K, V||0x01||provided_data). V = HMAC(K,V) */ + return do_hmac(hmac, 0x01, in1, in1len, in2, in2len, in3, in3len); +} + +/* + * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.3 HMAC_DRBG_Instantiate_Process: + * + * This sets the drbg Key (K) to all zeros, and Value (V) to all 1's. + * and then calls (K,V) = drbg_hmac_update() with input parameters: + * ent = entropy data (Can be NULL) of length ent_len. + * nonce = nonce data (Can be NULL) of length nonce_len. + * pstr = personalization data (Can be NULL) of length pstr_len. + * + * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. + */ +static int drbg_hmac_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len, + const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len) +{ + RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac; + + /* (Step 2) Key = 0x00 00...00 */ + memset(hmac->K, 0x00, hmac->blocklen); + /* (Step 3) V = 0x01 01...01 */ + memset(hmac->V, 0x01, hmac->blocklen); + /* (Step 4) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(entropy||nonce||pers string, K, V) */ + return drbg_hmac_update(drbg, ent, ent_len, nonce, nonce_len, pstr, + pstr_len); +} + +/* + * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.4 HMAC_DRBG_Reseed_Process: + * + * Reseeds the drbg's Key (K) and Value (V) by calling + * (K,V) = drbg_hmac_update() with the following input parameters: + * ent = entropy input data (Can be NULL) of length ent_len. + * adin = additional input data (Can be NULL) of length adin_len. + * + * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. + */ +static int drbg_hmac_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len, + const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len) +{ + /* (Step 2) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(entropy||additional_input, K, V) */ + return drbg_hmac_update(drbg, ent, ent_len, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0); +} + +/* + * SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.5 HMAC_DRBG_Generate_Process: + * + * Generates pseudo random bytes and updates the internal K,V for the drbg. + * out is a buffer to fill with outlen bytes of pseudo random data. + * adin is an additional_input string of size adin_len that may be NULL. + * + * Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1. + */ +static int drbg_hmac_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, + const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len) +{ + RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac; + HMAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx; + const unsigned char *temp = hmac->V; + + /* (Step 2) if adin != NULL then (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(adin, K, V) */ + if (adin != NULL + && adin_len > 0 + && !drbg_hmac_update(drbg, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) + return 0; + + /* + * (Steps 3-5) temp = NULL + * while (len(temp) < outlen) { + * V = HMAC(K, V) + * temp = temp || V + * } + */ + for (;;) { + if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, hmac->md, NULL) + || !HMAC_Update(ctx, temp, hmac->blocklen)) + return 0; + + if (outlen > hmac->blocklen) { + if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, out, NULL)) + return 0; + temp = out; + } else { + if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL)) + return 0; + memcpy(out, hmac->V, outlen); + break; + } + out += hmac->blocklen; + outlen -= hmac->blocklen; + } + /* (Step 6) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(adin, K, V) */ + if (!drbg_hmac_update(drbg, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static int drbg_hmac_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + EVP_MD_free(drbg->data.hmac.md); + HMAC_CTX_free(drbg->data.hmac.ctx); + OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.hmac, sizeof(drbg->data.hmac)); + return 1; +} + +static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_hmac_meth = { + drbg_hmac_instantiate, + drbg_hmac_reseed, + drbg_hmac_generate, + drbg_hmac_uninstantiate +}; + +int drbg_hmac_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + EVP_MD *md = NULL; + RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac; + + /* + * Confirm digest is allowed. We allow all digests that are not XOF + * (such as SHAKE). In FIPS mode, the fetch will fail for non-approved + * digests. + */ + md = EVP_MD_fetch(drbg->libctx, ossl_prov_util_nid_to_name(drbg->type), ""); + if (md == NULL) + return 0; + + if ((EVP_MD_flags(md) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) != 0) + return 0; + + drbg->meth = &drbg_hmac_meth; + + if (hmac->ctx == NULL) { + hmac->ctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); + if (hmac->ctx == NULL) { + EVP_MD_free(md); + return 0; + } + } + + /* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */ + EVP_MD_free(hmac->md); + hmac->md = md; + hmac->blocklen = EVP_MD_size(md); + /* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */ + drbg->strength = 64 * (int)(hmac->blocklen >> 3); + if (drbg->strength > 256) + drbg->strength = 256; + drbg->seedlen = hmac->blocklen; + + drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->strength / 8; + drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; + + drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2; + drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; + + drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; + drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; + + /* Maximum number of bits per request = 2^19 = 2^16 bytes*/ + drbg->max_request = 1 << 16; + + return 1; +}