From: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2012 14:44:20 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_0_0j~2
X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=a969ca5cc81ad49fe2457b3b951d367e7bc726b7;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack.

Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
---

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 3b78496bf2..549dd041ce 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,14 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+     to fix DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+     (CVE-2012-2333)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
      Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
      [Steve Henson]
diff --git a/ssl/d1_enc.c b/ssl/d1_enc.c
index becbab91c2..07a5e97ce5 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 				}
 			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
 			 * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-			if (i > (int)rec->length)
+			if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
 				{
 				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
 				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is