From: Richard Levitte Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2020 20:38:47 +0000 (+0100) Subject: libcrypto: Eliminate as much use of EVP_PKEY_size() as possible X-Git-Tag: openssl-3.0.0-alpha1~639 X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=9767a3dca781563a3dcc20094610d8ed0cb6061e;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git libcrypto: Eliminate as much use of EVP_PKEY_size() as possible Some uses were going against documented recommendations. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10798) --- diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c b/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c index fdf25b204b..564a500cf4 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c @@ -216,7 +216,12 @@ int ASN1_item_sign_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it, goto err; } inl = buf_len; - outll = outl = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + if (!EVP_DigestSign(ctx, NULL, &outll, buf_in, inl)) { + outl = 0; + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + outl = outll; buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc(outll); if (buf_in == NULL || buf_out == NULL) { outl = 0; diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c index ade3fe2578..3246f33688 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c @@ -589,6 +589,7 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx) { const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md; EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx); + RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk); int saltlen; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) <= 0) @@ -600,7 +601,7 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx) if (saltlen == -1) { saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd); } else if (saltlen == -2 || saltlen == -3) { - saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2; + saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2; if ((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) & 0x7) == 1) saltlen--; if (saltlen < 0) diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c index 390188d13a..34cbba658e 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk) { if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) return 1; - if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey))) == NULL) { + if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(pk->pkey->pkey.rsa))) == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_SETUP_TBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, return ret; ret = sltmp; } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { - if ((size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey) < tbslen + 1) { + if ((size_t)RSA_size(rsa) < tbslen + 1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); return -1; }