From: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 13:06:26 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: PR: 2628
X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_0_9_8s~18
X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=8794569a08d0c16515ec65ca08491597c17867db;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

PR: 2628
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve

Send alert instead of assertion failure for incorrectly formatted DTLS
fragments.
---

diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index 1c4158d36d..85f4d83efe 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -793,7 +793,13 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 		*ok = 0;
 		return i;
 		}
-	OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+	/* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
+	if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
 
 	/* parse the message fragment header */
 	dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
@@ -865,7 +871,12 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 
 	/* XDTLS:  an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the 
 	 * handshake to fail */
-	OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
+	if (i != (int)frag_len)
+		{
+		al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
 
 	*ok = 1;