From: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 13:20:20 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: Rearrange and test authz extension.
X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_0_2-beta1~614
X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=835d104f46c4448a27844a9309de456c7972a943;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

Rearrange and test authz extension.
---

diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
index 261fe0883f..cfe9a34c37 100644
--- a/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -312,8 +312,6 @@ static int cert_chain = 0;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 static BIO *authz_in = NULL;
 static const char *s_authz_file = NULL;
-static unsigned char *authz = NULL;
-static size_t authz_length;
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
@@ -1488,33 +1486,6 @@ bad:
 			next_proto.data = NULL;
 			}
 # endif
-		if (s_authz_file != NULL)
-			{
-			/* Allow authzs up to 64KB bytes. */
-			static const size_t authz_limit = 65536;
-
-			authz_in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-			if (authz_in == NULL)
-				{
-				ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			if (BIO_read_filename(authz_in, s_authz_file) <= 0)
-				{
-				ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-				goto end;
-				}
-			authz = OPENSSL_malloc(authz_limit);
-			authz_length = BIO_read(authz_in, authz, authz_limit);
-			if (authz_length == authz_limit || authz_length <= 0)
-				{
-				BIO_printf(bio_err, "authz too large\n");
-				goto end;
-				}
-			BIO_free(authz_in);
-			authz_in = NULL;
-			}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 		}
 
@@ -1811,7 +1782,7 @@ bad:
 	if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_cert, s_key, s_chain))
 		goto end;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (authz != NULL && !SSL_CTX_use_authz(ctx, authz, authz_length))
+	if (s_authz_file != NULL && !SSL_CTX_use_authz_file(ctx, s_authz_file))
 		goto end;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
@@ -1998,8 +1969,6 @@ end:
 		X509_free(s_cert2);
 	if (s_key2)
 		EVP_PKEY_free(s_key2);
-	if (authz != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(authz);
 	if (authz_in != NULL)
 		BIO_free(authz_in);
 #endif
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index 5f0dbe7a29..f5a5e7e43a 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -1773,8 +1773,16 @@ int	SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
 int	SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len);
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/* Set authz data for the current active cert. */
 int	SSL_CTX_use_authz(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *authz, size_t authz_length);
 int	SSL_use_authz(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *authz, size_t authz_length);
+/* Get the authz of type 'type' associated with the current active cert. */
+const unsigned char *SSL_CTX_get_authz_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char type,
+					    size_t *data_length);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int	SSL_CTX_use_authz_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file);
+int	SSL_use_authz_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file);
+#endif
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
@@ -2122,6 +2130,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 /* Error codes for the SSL functions. */
 
 /* Function codes. */
+#define SSL_F_AUTHZ_FIND_DATA				 330
 #define SSL_F_AUTHZ_VALIDATE				 323
 #define SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE			 100
 #define SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED				 167
@@ -2165,6 +2174,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO				 109
 #define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY				 110
 #define SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION				 111
+#define SSL_F_READ_AUTHZ				 329
 #define SSL_F_READ_N					 112
 #define SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE			 113
 #define SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH				 239
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 8e3594007b..1470cee234 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
 
 static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 	{
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_AUTHZ_FIND_DATA),	"AUTHZ_FIND_DATA"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_AUTHZ_VALIDATE),	"AUTHZ_VALIDATE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),	"CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED),	"CLIENT_FINISHED"},
@@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO),	"GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY),	"GET_SERVER_VERIFY"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION),	"i2d_SSL_SESSION"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_READ_AUTHZ),	"READ_AUTHZ"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_READ_N),	"READ_N"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE),	"REQUEST_CERTIFICATE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH),	"SERVER_FINISH"},
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_rsa.c b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
index 855952d54c..1babdef3c6 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
@@ -855,6 +855,46 @@ static char authz_validate(const unsigned char *authz, size_t length)
 		}
 	}
 
+static const unsigned char *authz_find_data(const unsigned char *authz,
+					    size_t authz_length,
+					    unsigned char data_type,
+					    size_t *data_length)
+	{
+	if (authz == NULL) return NULL;
+	if (!authz_validate(authz, authz_length))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_AUTHZ_FIND_DATA,SSL_R_INVALID_AUTHZ_DATA);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		unsigned char type;
+		unsigned short len;
+		if (!authz_length)
+			return NULL;
+
+		type = *(authz++);
+		authz_length--;
+
+		/* We've validated the authz data, so we don't have to
+		 * check again that we have enough bytes left. */
+		len = ((unsigned short) authz[0]) << 8 |
+		      ((unsigned short) authz[1]);
+		authz += 2;
+		authz_length -= 2;
+		if (type == data_type)
+			{
+			*data_length = len;
+			return authz;
+			}
+		authz += len;
+		authz_length -= len;
+		}
+	/* No match */
+	return NULL;
+	}
+
 static int ssl_set_authz(CERT *c, unsigned char *authz, size_t authz_length)
 	{
 	CERT_PKEY *current_key = c->key;
@@ -901,4 +941,90 @@ int SSL_use_authz(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *authz, size_t authz_length)
 		}
 	return ssl_set_authz(ssl->cert, authz, authz_length);
 	}
+
+const unsigned char *SSL_CTX_get_authz_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char type,
+					    size_t *data_length)
+	{
+	CERT_PKEY *current_key;
+
+	if (ctx->cert == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	current_key = ctx->cert->key;
+	if (current_key->authz == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return authz_find_data(current_key->authz,
+		current_key->authz_length, type, data_length);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+/* read_authz returns a newly allocated buffer with authz data */
+static unsigned char *read_authz(const char *file, size_t *authz_length)
+	{
+	BIO *authz_in = NULL;
+	unsigned char *authz = NULL;
+	/* Allow authzs up to 64KB. */
+	static const size_t authz_limit = 65536;
+	size_t read_length;
+	unsigned char *ret = NULL;
+
+	authz_in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+	if (authz_in == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_AUTHZ,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+		goto end;
+		}
+
+	if (BIO_read_filename(authz_in,file) <= 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_AUTHZ,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+		goto end;
+		}
+
+	authz = OPENSSL_malloc(authz_limit);
+	read_length = BIO_read(authz_in, authz, authz_limit);
+	if (read_length == authz_limit || read_length <= 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_AUTHZ,SSL_R_AUTHZ_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+		OPENSSL_free(authz);
+		goto end;
+		}
+	*authz_length = read_length;
+	ret = authz;
+end:
+	if (authz_in != NULL) BIO_free(authz_in);
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_authz_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
+	{
+	unsigned char *authz = NULL;
+	size_t authz_length = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	authz = read_authz(file, &authz_length);
+	if (authz == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = SSL_CTX_use_authz(ctx, authz, authz_length);
+	/* SSL_CTX_use_authz makes a local copy of the authz. */
+	OPENSSL_free(authz);
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+int SSL_use_authz_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file)
+	{
+	unsigned char *authz = NULL;
+	size_t authz_length = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	authz = read_authz(file, &authz_length);
+	if (authz == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = SSL_use_authz(ssl, authz, authz_length);
+	/* SSL_use_authz makes a local copy of the authz. */
+	OPENSSL_free(authz);
+	return ret;
+	}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
diff --git a/ssl/ssltest.c b/ssl/ssltest.c
index 316bbb0c95..1f557dd9a1 100644
--- a/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -369,6 +369,11 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 	               "                 (default is sect163r2).\n");
 #endif
 	fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	fprintf(stderr," -server_authz arg - binary authz file for certificate\n");
+	fprintf(stderr," -c_support_proof  - indicate client support for server_authz audit proofs\n");
+	fprintf(stderr," -c_require_proof  - fail if no audit proof is sent\n");
+#endif
 	}
 
 static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix)
@@ -498,6 +503,56 @@ int opaque_prf_input_cb(SSL *ssl, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg_)
 	}
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+struct audit_proof_cb_arg_st
+	{
+	unsigned char *expected_proof;
+	size_t expected_proof_length;
+	int require;
+	};
+
+struct audit_proof_cb_arg_st c_expected = { NULL, 0, 0 };
+
+static int audit_proof_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+	{
+	const unsigned char *proof;
+	size_t proof_len;
+	SSL_SESSION *sess = SSL_get_session(s);
+	struct audit_proof_cb_arg_st *cb_arg = (struct audit_proof_cb_arg_st*)arg;
+
+	proof = SSL_SESSION_get_tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof(sess,
+		&proof_len);
+	if (proof != NULL)
+		{
+		if (proof_len == cb_arg->expected_proof_length &&
+			cb_arg->expected_proof != NULL &&
+			memcmp(proof, cb_arg->expected_proof, proof_len) == 0)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Audit proof OK (%lu bytes).\n",
+				   (long)proof_len);
+			return 1;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Audit proof mismatch.\n");
+			/* Cause handshake failure. */
+			return 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+	else /* proof == NULL */
+		{
+		BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "No audit proof found.\n");
+		if (cb_arg->require)
+			{
+			/* Cause handshake failure. */
+			return 0;
+			}
+		return 1;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	{
 	char *CApath=NULL,*CAfile=NULL;
@@ -549,6 +604,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 	int fips_mode=0;
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	char *s_authz_file = NULL;
+	int c_support_proof = 0;
+	int c_require_proof = 0;
+#endif
 
 	verbose = 0;
 	debug = 0;
@@ -765,6 +825,24 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 			{
 			test_cipherlist = 1;
 			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		else if(strcmp(*argv,"-server_authz") == 0)
+			{
+			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+			s_authz_file = *(++argv);
+			tls1 = 1;
+			}
+		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-c_support_proof") == 0)
+			{
+			c_support_proof = 1;
+			tls1 = 1;
+			}
+		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-c_require_proof") == 0)
+			{
+			c_require_proof = 1;
+			tls1 = 1;
+			}
+#endif
 		else
 			{
 			fprintf(stderr,"unknown option %s\n",*argv);
@@ -798,6 +876,15 @@ bad:
 			"to avoid protocol mismatch.\n");
 		EXIT(1);
 		}
+	if (c_require_proof && s_authz_file == NULL && !force)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work. -c_require_proof "
+			"requires an audit proof, but none was supplied. "
+			"Use -f to perform the test anyway (and\n-d to see "
+			"what happens), or use -server_authz to supply an "
+			"audit proof.\n");
+		EXIT(1);
+		}
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 	if(fips_mode)
@@ -1063,6 +1150,34 @@ bad:
 		SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
 		}
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (s_authz_file != NULL)
+		{
+		if(!SSL_CTX_use_authz_file(s_ctx, s_authz_file))
+			{
+			BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set authz data\n");
+			goto end;
+			}
+		}
+	if (c_support_proof || c_require_proof)
+		{
+		size_t proof_length;
+		const unsigned char *proof = SSL_CTX_get_authz_data(s_ctx,
+			TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof, &proof_length);
+		if (proof != NULL)
+			{
+			/* Store a local copy. */
+			c_expected.expected_proof = OPENSSL_malloc(proof_length);
+			c_expected.expected_proof_length = proof_length;
+			memcpy(c_expected.expected_proof, proof, proof_length);
+			}
+		c_expected.require = c_require_proof;
+		SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb(c_ctx,
+			audit_proof_cb);
+		SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb_arg(c_ctx,
+			&c_expected);
+		}
+#endif
 
 	c_ssl=SSL_new(c_ctx);
 	s_ssl=SSL_new(s_ctx);
@@ -1137,6 +1252,10 @@ end:
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 	ENGINE_cleanup();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (c_expected.expected_proof != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(c_expected.expected_proof);
 #endif
 	CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
 	ERR_free_strings();