From: Nicola Tuveri Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 15:00:41 +0000 (+0200) Subject: [EC] harden EC_KEY against leaks from memory accesses X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=6a01f6f4b41d045e2a3abcb10163633d769db76a;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git [EC] harden EC_KEY against leaks from memory accesses We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key, so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM` holding the secret scalar. This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when the called specifically set it. The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer. In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated correctly and should not generate unintended consequences. Setting the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag alone is never enough, we also have to preallocate the `BIGNUM` internal buffer to a fixed public size big enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory accesses. Fixed Length ------------ The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid secret scalars. For preallocating the `BIGNUM` storage we look at the number of "words" required for the internal representation of the order, and we preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing might temporarily overflow the order length. Future work ----------- A separate commit addresses further hardening of `BN_copy()` (and indirectly `BN_dup()`). (cherry picked from commit 0401d766afcd022748763f5614188301c9856c6e) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11127) --- diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c index 08aaac5d8a..90698b9664 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "internal/refcount.h" #include #include +#include "crypto/bn.h" EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void) { @@ -416,17 +417,86 @@ const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key) int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key) { + int fixed_top; + const BIGNUM *order = NULL; + BIGNUM *tmp_key = NULL; + if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL) return 0; + + /* + * Not only should key->group be set, but it should also be in a valid + * fully initialized state. + * + * Specifically, to operate in constant time, we need that the group order + * is set, as we use its length as the fixed public size of any scalar used + * as an EC private key. + */ + order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group); + if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order)) + return 0; /* This should never happen */ + if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0) return 0; if (key->meth->set_private != NULL && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0) return 0; + + /* + * We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key, + * so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM` + * holding the secret scalar. + * + * This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not + * propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and + * this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when + * the called specifically set it. + * + * The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past + * years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in + * some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer. + * + * In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by + * manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that + * inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated + * correctly and should not generate unintended consequences. + * + * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have + * to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big + * enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger + * a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory + * accesses. + * + * Fixed Length + * ------------ + * + * The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for + * a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for + * generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid + * secret scalars. + * + * For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words" + * required for the internal representation of the order, and we + * preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing + * might temporarily overflow the order length. + */ + tmp_key = BN_dup(priv_key); + if (tmp_key == NULL) + return 0; + + BN_set_flags(tmp_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + fixed_top = bn_get_top(order) + 2; + if (bn_wexpand(tmp_key, fixed_top) == NULL) { + BN_clear_free(tmp_key); + return 0; + } + BN_clear_free(key->priv_key); - key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key); - return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1; + key->priv_key = tmp_key; + + return 1; } const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)