From: Christian Grothoff Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2017 11:30:55 +0000 (+0100) Subject: slightly better documentation for KX logic X-Git-Tag: taler-0.2.1~267 X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=5f81f7047cbb8a682803709f4821f5492930dbb2;p=oweals%2Fgnunet.git slightly better documentation for KX logic --- diff --git a/src/cadet/gnunet-service-cadet-new_tunnels.c b/src/cadet/gnunet-service-cadet-new_tunnels.c index 10ff2867d..ea8559eb4 100644 --- a/src/cadet/gnunet-service-cadet-new_tunnels.c +++ b/src/cadet/gnunet-service-cadet-new_tunnels.c @@ -133,32 +133,40 @@ struct CadetTunnelAxolotl struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey RK; /** - * 32-byte header key (send). + * 32-byte header key (currently used for sending). */ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey HKs; /** - * 32-byte header key (recv) + * 32-byte header key (currently used for receiving) */ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey HKr; /** - * 32-byte next header key (send). + * 32-byte next header key (for sending), used once the + * ratchet advances. We are sure that the sender has this + * key as well only after @e ratchet_allowed is #GNUNET_YES. */ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey NHKs; /** - * 32-byte next header key (recv). + * 32-byte next header key (for receiving). To be tried + * when decrypting with @e HKr fails and thus the sender + * may have advanced the ratchet. */ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey NHKr; /** - * 32-byte chain keys (used for forward-secrecy updating, send). + * 32-byte chain keys (used for forward-secrecy) for + * sending messages. Updated for every message. */ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey CKs; /** - * 32-byte chain keys (used for forward-secrecy updating, recv). + * 32-byte chain keys (used for forward-secrecy) for + * receiving messages. Updated for every message. If + * messages are skipped, the respective derived MKs + * (and the current @HKr) are kept in the @e skipped_head DLL. */ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_SymmetricSessionKey CKr; @@ -168,17 +176,18 @@ struct CadetTunnelAxolotl struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePrivateKey *kx_0; /** - * ECDH Ratchet key (send). + * ECDH Ratchet key (our private key in the current DH). */ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePrivateKey *DHRs; /** - * ECDH Ratchet key (recv). + * ECDH Ratchet key (other peer's public key in the current DH). */ struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_EcdhePublicKey DHRr; /** - * When does this ratchet expire and a new one is triggered. + * Time when the current ratchet expires and a new one is triggered + * (if @e ratchet_allowed is #GNUNET_YES). */ struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute ratchet_expiration; @@ -208,16 +217,28 @@ struct CadetTunnelAxolotl int ratchet_flag; /** - * Number of messages recieved since our last ratchet advance. - * - If this counter = 0, we cannot send a new ratchet key in next msg. - * - If this counter > 0, we can (but don't yet have to) send a new key. + * True (#GNUNET_YES) if we have received a message from the + * other peer that uses the keys from our last ratchet step. + * This implies that we are again allowed to advance the ratchet, + * otherwise we have to wait until the other peer sees our current + * ephemeral key and advances first. + * + * #GNUNET_NO if we have advanced the ratched but lack any evidence + * that the other peer has noticed this. */ - unsigned int ratchet_allowed; + int ratchet_allowed; /** * Number of messages recieved since our last ratchet advance. - * - If this counter = 0, we cannot send a new ratchet key in next msg. - * - If this counter > 0, we can (but don't yet have to) send a new key. + * + * If this counter = 0, we cannot send a new ratchet key in the next + * message. + * + * If this counter > 0, we could (but don't have to) send a new key. + * + * Once the @e ratchet_counter is larger than + * #ratchet_messages (or @e ratchet_expiration time has past), and + * @e ratchet_allowed is #GNUNET_YES, we advance the ratchet. */ unsigned int ratchet_counter; @@ -629,7 +650,7 @@ t_hmac (const void *plaintext, * Perform a HMAC. * * @param key Key to use. - * @param hash[out] Resulting HMAC. + * @param[out] hash Resulting HMAC. * @param source Source key material (data to HMAC). * @param len Length of @a source. */ @@ -809,7 +830,7 @@ t_ax_decrypt (struct CadetTunnelAxolotl *ax, * Encrypt header with the axolotl header key. * * @param ax key material to use. - * @param msg Message whose header to encrypt. + * @param[in|out] msg Message whose header to encrypt. */ static void t_h_encrypt (struct CadetTunnelAxolotl *ax, @@ -822,11 +843,11 @@ t_h_encrypt (struct CadetTunnelAxolotl *ax, &ax->HKs, NULL, 0, NULL); - out_size = GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_encrypt (&msg->ax_header.Ns, + out_size = GNUNET_CRYPTO_symmetric_encrypt (&msg->ax_header, sizeof (struct GNUNET_CADET_AxHeader), &ax->HKs, &iv, - &msg->ax_header.Ns); + &msg->ax_header); GNUNET_assert (sizeof (struct GNUNET_CADET_AxHeader) == out_size); } @@ -2579,6 +2600,9 @@ GCT_send (struct CadetTunnel *t, payload_size); ax_msg->ax_header.Ns = htonl (t->ax.Ns++); ax_msg->ax_header.PNs = htonl (t->ax.PNs); + /* FIXME: we should do this once, not once per message; + this is a point multiplication, and DHRs does not + change all the time. */ GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (t->ax.DHRs, &ax_msg->ax_header.DHRs); t_h_encrypt (&t->ax,