From: Dr. Stephen Henson Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2009 21:49:38 +0000 (+0000) Subject: PR: 1835 X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_0_9_8k^2~35 X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=477fd4596feb89fe943130c8b1a4e37a0d3764bb;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git PR: 1835 Submitted by: Damien Miller Approved by: steve@openssl.org Fix various typos. --- diff --git a/MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/ErrorHandling.hpp b/MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/ErrorHandling.hpp index 3036df7ee0..fbfbe786b7 100644 --- a/MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/ErrorHandling.hpp +++ b/MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/ErrorHandling.hpp @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ OSErr AppendErrorMessageToHandle(Handle inoutHandle); -// A bunch of evil macros that would be uneccessary if I were always using C++ ! +// A bunch of evil macros that would be unnecessary if I were always using C++ ! #define SetErrorMessageAndBailIfNil(theArg,theMessage) \ { \ diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c b/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c index 8d13f9c931..92d630cdba 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_type_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp, if (tag >= 32) { - i=ASN1_R_TAG_VALUE_TOO_HIGH;; + i=ASN1_R_TAG_VALUE_TOO_HIGH; goto err; } if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(tag) & type)) diff --git a/crypto/bn/bntest.c b/crypto/bn/bntest.c index 565590a1f1..14990bc4ff 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bntest.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bntest.c @@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) BN_bntest_rand(b,2+i,0,0); /**/ if (!BN_mod_exp(d,a,b,c,ctx)) - return(00); + return(0); if (bp != NULL) { @@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ int test_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) BN_bntest_rand(b,2+i,0,0); /**/ if (!BN_exp(d,a,b,ctx)) - return(00); + return(0); if (bp != NULL) { diff --git a/crypto/des/times/usparc.cc b/crypto/des/times/usparc.cc index f6ec8e8831..0864285ef6 100644 --- a/crypto/des/times/usparc.cc +++ b/crypto/des/times/usparc.cc @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ solaris 2.5.1 usparc 167mhz?? - SC4.0 cc -fast -Xa -xO5 For the ultra sparc, SunC 4.0 cc -fast -Xa -xO5, running 'des_opts' gives a speed of 475,000 des/s while 'speed' gives 417,000 des/s. -I belive the difference is tied up in optimisation that the compiler +I believe the difference is tied up in optimisation that the compiler is able to perform when the code is 'inlined'. For 'speed', the DES routines are being linked from a library. I'll record the higher speed since if performance is everything, you can always inline diff --git a/crypto/ripemd/README b/crypto/ripemd/README index 7097707264..f1ffc8b134 100644 --- a/crypto/ripemd/README +++ b/crypto/ripemd/README @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html This is my implementation of RIPEMD-160. The pentium assember is a little off the pace since I only get 1050 cycles, while the best is 1013. I have a few ideas for how to get another 20 or so cycles, but at -this point I will not bother right now. I belive the trick will be +this point I will not bother right now. I believe the trick will be to remove my 'copy X array onto stack' until inside the RIP1() finctions the first time round. To do this I need another register and will only have one temporary one. A bit tricky.... I can also cleanup the saving of the 5 words diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c index 706a2b4b42..4a8751722d 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ int X509V3_add_value(const char *name, const char *value, CONF_VALUE *vtmp = NULL; char *tname = NULL, *tvalue = NULL; if(name && !(tname = BUF_strdup(name))) goto err; - if(value && !(tvalue = BUF_strdup(value))) goto err;; + if(value && !(tvalue = BUF_strdup(value))) goto err; if(!(vtmp = (CONF_VALUE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_VALUE)))) goto err; if(!*extlist && !(*extlist = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null())) goto err; vtmp->section = NULL; diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod index f81f692df5..f62a869a9b 100644 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER_get_version() returns the protocol version for B, currently SSL_CIPHER_description() returns a textual description of the cipher used into the buffer B of length B provided. B must be at least -128 bytes, otherwise a pointer to the the string "Buffer too small" is +128 bytes, otherwise a pointer to the string "Buffer too small" is returned. If B is NULL, a buffer of 128 bytes is allocated using OPENSSL_malloc(). If the allocation fails, a pointer to the string "OPENSSL_malloc Error" is returned. diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod index ca8d81b82c..81566839d3 100644 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ specifies the B function to be used. If no callback function shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B. In this case last B set specifically for this B remains. If no special B was set before, the default callback for the underlying -B is used, that was valid at the the time B was created with +B is used, that was valid at the time B was created with L. SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B for the certificate chain diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod index 558de01df9..110ec73ab6 100644 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ SSL_SESSION_free - free an allocated SSL_SESSION structure SSL_SESSION_free() decrements the reference count of B and removes the B structure pointed to by B and frees up the allocated -memory, if the the reference count has reached 0. +memory, if the reference count has reached 0. =head1 NOTES diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod index 2d4f8b6168..13c1abd9ec 100644 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ SSL_free - free an allocated SSL structure SSL_free() decrements the reference count of B, and removes the SSL structure pointed to by B and frees up the allocated memory if the -the reference count has reached 0. +reference count has reached 0. =head1 NOTES diff --git a/doc/ssleay.txt b/doc/ssleay.txt index c75312911f..a8b04d7059 100644 --- a/doc/ssleay.txt +++ b/doc/ssleay.txt @@ -3800,9 +3800,9 @@ made public on sci.crypt in Sep 1994 (RC4) and Feb 1996 (RC2). I have copies of the origional postings if people are interested. RSA I believe claim that they were 'trade-secrets' and that some-one broke an NDA in revealing them. Other claim they reverse engineered the algorithms from -compiled binaries. If the algorithms were reverse engineered, I belive +compiled binaries. If the algorithms were reverse engineered, I believe RSA had no legal leg to stand on. If an NDA was broken, I don't know. -Regardless, RSA, I belive, is willing to go to court over the issue so +Regardless, RSA, I believe, is willing to go to court over the issue so licencing is probably the best idea, or at least talk to them. If there are people who actually know more about this, pease let me know, I don't want to vilify or spread miss-information if I can help it. diff --git a/ssl/kssl.c b/ssl/kssl.c index 56e5eeeecd..864eb83608 100644 --- a/ssl/kssl.c +++ b/ssl/kssl.c @@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text) if (kssl_err == NULL) return; kssl_err->reason = reason; - BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, text); + BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, "%s", text); return; } diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c index 5d89086571..f83389b543 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) long num1; void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; int ret= -1; - int new_state,state,skip=0;; + int new_state,state,skip=0; RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); ERR_clear_error(); diff --git a/test/times b/test/times index 49aeebf216..738d569b8f 100644 --- a/test/times +++ b/test/times @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ eric (adding numbers to speculation) --- Appendix --- - The time measured is user time but these number a very rough. - Remember this is the cost of both client and server sides of the protocol. -- The TCP/kernal overhead of connection establishment is normally the +- The TCP/kernel overhead of connection establishment is normally the killer in SSL. Often delays in the TCP protocol will make session-id reuse look slower that new sessions, but this would not be the case on a loaded server.