From: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Date: Sun, 14 Sep 2008 14:57:50 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: Updates from stable branch... fixup CHANGES.
X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=351b731d008ecde6853b3965515effc40abbfcd8;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

Updates from stable branch... fixup CHANGES.
---

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 9b04e3e2fa..570f89c93d 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,6 +2,196 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 0.9.8h and 0.9.8i  [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+  *) Fix a state transitition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c
+     (was using SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B, should be ..._ST_SW_SRVR_...).
+     [Nagendra Modadugu]
+
+  *) The fix in 0.9.8c that supposedly got rid of unsafe
+     double-checked locking was incomplete for RSA blinding,
+     addressing just one layer of what turns out to have been
+     doubly unsafe triple-checked locking.
+
+     So now fix this for real by retiring the MONT_HELPER macro
+     in crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c.
+
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Marius Schilder]
+
+  *) Various precautionary measures:
+
+     - Avoid size_t integer overflow in HASH_UPDATE (md32_common.h).
+
+     - Avoid a buffer overflow in d2i_SSL_SESSION() (ssl_asn1.c).
+       (NB: This would require knowledge of the secret session ticket key
+       to exploit, in which case you'd be SOL either way.)
+
+     - Change bn_nist.c so that it will properly handle input BIGNUMs
+       outside the expected range.
+
+     - Enforce the 'num' check in BN_div() (bn_div.c) for non-BN_DEBUG
+       builds.
+
+     [Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add support for Local Machine Keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix BN_GF2m_mod_arr() top-bit cleanup code.
+     [Huang Ying]
+
+  *) Expand ENGINE to support engine supplied SSL client certificate functions.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Logica.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add CryptoAPI ENGINE to support use of RSA and DSA keys held in Windows
+     keystores. Support for SSL/TLS client authentication too.
+     Not compiled unless enable-capieng specified to Configure.
+
+     This work was sponsored by Logica.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Allow engines to be "soft loaded" - i.e. optionally don't die if
+     the load fails. Useful for distros.
+     [Ben Laurie and the FreeBSD team]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h  [28 May 2008]
+
+  *) Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS
+     handshake which could lead to a cilent crash as found using the
+     Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672) 
+     [Steve Henson, Mark Cox]
+
+  *) Fix double free in TLS server name extensions which could lead to
+     a remote crash found by Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-0891) 
+     [Joe Orton]
+
+  *) Clear error queue in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file()
+
+     Clear the error queue to ensure that error entries left from
+     older function calls do not interfere with the correct operation.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke, Erik de Castro Lopo]
+
+  *) Remove root CA certificates of commercial CAs:
+
+     The OpenSSL project does not recommend any specific CA and does not
+     have any policy with respect to including or excluding any CA.
+     Therefore it does not make any sense to ship an arbitrary selection
+     of root CA certificates with the OpenSSL software.
+     [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+  *) RSA OAEP patches to fix two separate invalid memory reads.
+     The first one involves inputs when 'lzero' is greater than
+     'SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH' (it would read about SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes
+     before the beginning of from). The second one involves inputs where
+     the 'db' section contains nothing but zeroes (there is a one-byte
+     invalid read after the end of 'db').
+     [Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com>]
+
+  *) Partial backport from 0.9.9-dev:
+
+     Introduce bn_mul_mont (dedicated Montgomery multiplication
+     procedure) as a candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation.
+     While 0.9.9-dev uses assembler for various architectures, only
+     x86_64 is available by default here in the 0.9.8 branch, and
+     32-bit x86 is available through a compile-time setting.
+
+     To try the 32-bit x86 assembler implementation, use Configure
+     option "enable-montasm" (which exists only for this backport).
+
+     As "enable-montasm" for 32-bit x86 disclaims code stability
+     anyway, in this constellation we activate additional code
+     backported from 0.9.9-dev for further performance improvements,
+     namely BN_from_montgomery_word.  (To enable this otherwise,
+     e.g. x86_64, try "-DMONT_FROM_WORD___NON_DEFAULT_0_9_8_BUILD".)
+
+     [Andy Polyakov (backport partially by Bodo Moeller)]
+
+  *) Add TLS session ticket callback. This allows an application to set
+     TLS ticket cipher and HMAC keys rather than relying on hardcoded fixed
+     values. This is useful for key rollover for example where several key
+     sets may exist with different names.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Reverse ENGINE-internal logic for caching default ENGINE handles.
+     This was broken until now in 0.9.8 releases, such that the only way
+     a registered ENGINE could be used (assuming it initialises
+     successfully on the host) was to explicitly set it as the default
+     for the relevant algorithms. This is in contradiction with 0.9.7
+     behaviour and the documentation. With this fix, when an ENGINE is
+     registered into a given algorithm's table of implementations, the
+     'uptodate' flag is reset so that auto-discovery will be used next
+     time a new context for that algorithm attempts to select an
+     implementation.
+     [Ian Lister (tweaked by Geoff Thorpe)]
+
+  *) Backport of CMS code to OpenSSL 0.9.8. This differs from the 0.9.9
+     implemention in the following ways:
+
+     Lack of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD means algorithm parameters have to be
+     hard coded.
+
+     Lack of BER streaming support means one pass streaming processing is
+     only supported if data is detached: setting the streaming flag is
+     ignored for embedded content.
+
+     CMS support is disabled by default and must be explicitly enabled
+     with the enable-cms configuration option.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Update the GMP engine glue to do direct copies between BIGNUM and
+     mpz_t when openssl and GMP use the same limb size. Otherwise the
+     existing "conversion via a text string export" trick is still used.
+     [Paul Sheer <paulsheer@gmail.com>]
+
+  *) Zlib compression BIO. This is a filter BIO which compressed and
+     uncompresses any data passed through it.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add AES_wrap_key() and AES_unwrap_key() functions to implement
+     RFC3394 compatible AES key wrapping.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add utility functions to handle ASN1 structures. ASN1_STRING_set0():
+     sets string data without copying. X509_ALGOR_set0() and
+     X509_ALGOR_get0(): set and retrieve X509_ALGOR (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+     data. Attribute function X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(): retrieves data
+     from an X509_ATTRIBUTE structure optionally checking it occurs only
+     once. ASN1_TYPE_set1(): set and ASN1_TYPE structure copying supplied
+     data.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix BN flag handling in RSA_eay_mod_exp() and BN_MONT_CTX_set()
+     to get the expected BN_FLG_CONSTTIME behavior.
+     [Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+  
+  *) Netware support:
+
+     - fixed wrong usage of ioctlsocket() when build for LIBC BSD sockets
+     - fixed do_tests.pl to run the test suite with CLIB builds too (CLIB_OPT)
+     - added some more tests to do_tests.pl
+     - fixed RunningProcess usage so that it works with newer LIBC NDKs too
+     - removed usage of BN_LLONG for CLIB builds to avoid runtime dependency
+     - added new Configure targets netware-clib-bsdsock, netware-clib-gcc,
+       netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc, netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc
+     - various changes to netware.pl to enable gcc-cross builds on Win32
+       platform
+     - changed crypto/bio/b_sock.c to work with macro functions (CLIB BSD)
+     - various changes to fix missing prototype warnings
+     - fixed x86nasm.pl to create correct asm files for NASM COFF output
+     - added AES, WHIRLPOOL and CPUID assembler code to build files
+     - added missing AES assembler make rules to mk1mf.pl
+     - fixed order of includes in apps/ocsp.c so that e_os.h settings apply
+     [Guenter Knauf <eflash@gmx.net>]
+
+  *) Implement certificate status request TLS extension defined in RFC3546.
+     A client can set the appropriate parameters and receive the encoded
+     OCSP response via a callback. A server can query the supplied parameters
+     and set the encoded OCSP response in the callback. Add simplified examples
+     to s_client and s_server.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
  Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h-fips  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
   *) Add flag EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS to indicate that input buffer length
@@ -133,14 +323,6 @@
      Update Windows build system.
      [Steve Henson]
 
- Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h  [xx XXX xxxx]
-
-  *) Implement certificate status request TLS extension defined in RFC3546.
-     A client can set the appropriate parameters and receive the encoded
-     OCSP response via a callback. A server can query the supplied parameters
-     and set the encoded OCSP response in the callback. Add simplified examples
-     to s_client and s_server.
-     [Steve Henson]
 
  Changes between 0.9.8f and 0.9.8g  [19 Oct 2007]
 
@@ -307,256 +489,9 @@
      authentication-only ciphersuites.
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
- Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f  [23 Feb 2007]
-
-  *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a
-     single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract
-     information.  For detailed background information, see
-     http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron,
-     J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
-     and Necessary Software Countermeasures").  The core of the change
-     are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and
-     BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(),
-     respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant
-     conditional branches.  These are automatically called by BN_div()
-     and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for the
-     modulus.  Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to remove a
-     conditional branch.
-
-     BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous
-     BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just
-     modular exponentiation.  (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag
-     in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative
-     implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().)  The old name
-     remains as a deprecated alias.
-
-     Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general
-     RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses
-     constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation.
-     Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias.
-
-     BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that
-     the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the
-     modulus.  This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to
-     BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now
-     essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually
-     change this in the header file before 0.9.9.  It allows
-     RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to
-     enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
-
-     [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)]
-
-  *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a
-     single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract
-     information.  For detailed background information, see
-     http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron,
-     J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
-     and Necessary Software Countermeasures").  The core of the change
-     are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and
-     BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(),
-     respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant
-     conditional branches.  These are automatically called by BN_div()
-     and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one
-     of the input BIGNUMs.  Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to
-     remove a conditional branch.
-
-     BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous
-     BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just
-     modular exponentiation.  (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag
-     in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative
-     implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().)  The old name
-     remains as a deprecated alias.
-
-     Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general
-     RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses
-     constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation.
-     Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias.
-
-     BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that
-     the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the
-     modulus.  This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to
-     BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now
-     essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually
-     change this in the header file before 0.9.9.  It allows
-     RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to
-     enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
-
-     [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)]
-
-  *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see
-     http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and
-     add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162:
-
-        TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA      =  "SEED-SHA"
-        TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  =  "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA"
-        TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  =  "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
-        TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  =  "ADH-SEED-SHA"
-
-     To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
-     series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
-     is configured with 'enable-seed'.
-     [KISA, Bodo Moeller]
-
-  *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a
-     single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract
-     information.  For detailed background information, see
-     http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron,
-     J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
-     and Necessary Software Countermeasures").  The core of the change
-     are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and
-     BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(),
-     respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant
-     conditional branches.  These are automatically called by BN_div()
-     and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one
-     of the input BIGNUMs.  Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to
-     remove a conditional branch.
-
-     BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous
-     BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just
-     modular exponentiation.  (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag
-     in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative
-     implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().)  The old name
-     remains as a deprecated alias.
-
-     Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general
-     RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses
-     constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation.
-     Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias.
-
-     BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that
-     the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the
-     modulus.  This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to
-     BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now
-     essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually
-     change this in the header file before 0.9.9.  It allows
-     RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to
-     enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
-
-     [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)]
-
-  *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see
-     http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and
-     add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162:
-
-        TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA      =  "SEED-SHA"
-        TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  =  "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA"
-        TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  =  "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
-        TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  =  "ADH-SEED-SHA"
-
-     To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
-     series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
-     is configured with 'enable-seed'.
-     [KISA, Bodo Moeller]
-
-  *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a
-     single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract
-     information.  For detailed background information, see
-     http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron,
-     J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
-     and Necessary Software Countermeasures").  The core of the change
-     are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and
-     BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(),
-     respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant
-     conditional branches.  These are automatically called by BN_div()
-     and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one
-     of the input BIGNUMs.  Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to
-     remove a conditional branch.
-
-     BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous
-     BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just
-     modular exponentiation.  (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag
-     in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative
-     implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().)  The old name
-     remains as a deprecated alias.
-
-     Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general
-     RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses
-     constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation.
-     Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias.
-
-     BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that
-     the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the
-     modulus.  This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to
-     BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now
-     essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually
-     change this in the header file before 0.9.9.  It allows
-     RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to
-     enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
-
-     [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)]
-
-  *) Squeeze another 10% out of IGE mode when in != out.
-     [Ben Laurie]
-
-  *) AES IGE mode speedup.
-     [Dean Gaudet (Google)]
-
-  *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see
-     http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and
-     add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162:
-
-        TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA      =  "SEED-SHA"
-        TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  =  "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA"
-        TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  =  "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
-        TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  =  "ADH-SEED-SHA"
-
-     To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
-     series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
-     is configured with 'enable-seed'.
-     [KISA, Bodo Moeller]
-
-  *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a
-     single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract
-     information.  For detailed background information, see
-     http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron,
-     J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
-     and Necessary Software Countermeasures").  The core of the change
-     are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and
-     BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(),
-     respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant
-     conditional branches.  These are automatically called by BN_div()
-     and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one
-     of the input BIGNUMs.  Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to
-     remove a conditional branch.
-
-     BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous
-     BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just
-     modular exponentiation.  (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag
-     in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative
-     implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().)  The old name
-     remains as a deprecated alias.
-
-     Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general
-     RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses
-     constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation.
-     Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias.
-
-     BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that
-     the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the
-     modulus.  This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to
-     BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now
-     essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually
-     change this in the header file before 0.9.9.  It allows
-     RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to
-     enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
-
-     [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)]
-
-  *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID
-     context matching (which matters if an application uses a single
-     external cache for different purposes).  Previously,
-     out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was
-     set.  This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that,
-     with applications using a single external cache for quite
-     different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite
-     restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session
-     in a different context.
-     [Bodo Moeller]
-
-  *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that
-     a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable
-     authentication-only ciphersuites.
-     [Bodo Moeller]
+  *) Update the SSL_get_shared_ciphers() fix CVE-2006-3738 which was
+     not complete and could lead to a possible single byte overflow
+     (CVE-2007-5135) [Ben Laurie]
 
  Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e  [23 Feb 2007]
 
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
index 8655eb118e..1e8e57626b 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
@@ -187,6 +187,17 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
 	BN_ULONG d0,d1;
 	int num_n,div_n;
 
+	/* Invalid zero-padding would have particularly bad consequences
+	 * in the case of 'num', so don't just rely on bn_check_top() for this one
+	 * (bn_check_top() works only for BN_DEBUG builds) */
+	if (num->top > 0 && num->d[num->top - 1] == 0)
+		{
+		BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	bn_check_top(num);
+
 	if ((BN_get_flags(num, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) || (BN_get_flags(divisor, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0))
 		{
 		return BN_div_no_branch(dv, rm, num, divisor, ctx);
@@ -194,7 +205,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
 
 	bn_check_top(dv);
 	bn_check_top(rm);
-	bn_check_top(num);
+	/* bn_check_top(num); */ /* 'num' has been checked already */
 	bn_check_top(divisor);
 
 	if (BN_is_zero(divisor))
@@ -419,7 +430,7 @@ static int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num,
 
 	bn_check_top(dv);
 	bn_check_top(rm);
-	bn_check_top(num);
+	/* bn_check_top(num); */ /* 'num' has been checked in BN_div() */
 	bn_check_top(divisor);
 
 	if (BN_is_zero(divisor))
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c b/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c
index e14232fdbb..e7c3d6bac2 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
 #include "bn_lcl.h"
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 
+
 #define BN_NIST_192_TOP	(192+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2
 #define BN_NIST_224_TOP	(224+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2
 #define BN_NIST_256_TOP	(256+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2
@@ -101,60 +102,98 @@ static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_521[] = {0xFFFFFFFF,0xFFFFFFFF,0xFFFFFFFF,
 	0xFFFFFFFF,0x000001FF};
 #endif
 
+
+static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_192 =
+	{
+	(BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_192,
+	BN_NIST_192_TOP,
+	BN_NIST_192_TOP,
+	0,
+	BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+	};
+
+static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_224 =
+	{
+	(BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_224,
+	BN_NIST_224_TOP,
+	BN_NIST_224_TOP,
+	0,
+	BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+	};
+
+static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_256 =
+	{
+	(BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_256,
+	BN_NIST_256_TOP,
+	BN_NIST_256_TOP,
+	0,
+	BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+	};
+
+static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_384 =
+	{
+	(BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_384,
+	BN_NIST_384_TOP,
+	BN_NIST_384_TOP,
+	0,
+	BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+	};
+
+static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_521 =
+	{
+	(BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_521,
+	BN_NIST_521_TOP,
+	BN_NIST_521_TOP,
+	0,
+	BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
+	};
+
+
 const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_192(void)
 	{
-	static BIGNUM const_nist_192 = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_192,
-		BN_NIST_192_TOP, BN_NIST_192_TOP, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA };
-	return &const_nist_192;
+	return &_bignum_nist_p_192;
 	}
 
 const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_224(void)
 	{
-	static BIGNUM const_nist_224 = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_224,
-		BN_NIST_224_TOP, BN_NIST_224_TOP, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA };
-	return &const_nist_224;
+	return &_bignum_nist_p_224;
 	}
 
 const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_256(void)
 	{
-	static BIGNUM const_nist_256 = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_256,
-		BN_NIST_256_TOP, BN_NIST_256_TOP, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA };
-	return &const_nist_256;
+	return &_bignum_nist_p_256;
 	}
 
 const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_384(void)
 	{
-	static BIGNUM const_nist_384 = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_384,
-		BN_NIST_384_TOP, BN_NIST_384_TOP, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA };
-	return &const_nist_384;
+	return &_bignum_nist_p_384;
 	}
 
 const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void)
 	{
-	static BIGNUM const_nist_521 = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_521,
-		BN_NIST_521_TOP, BN_NIST_521_TOP, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA };
-	return &const_nist_521;
+	return &_bignum_nist_p_521;
 	}
 
-#define BN_NIST_ADD_ONE(a)	while (!(*(a)=(*(a)+1)&BN_MASK2)) ++(a);
 
 static void nist_cp_bn_0(BN_ULONG *buf, BN_ULONG *a, int top, int max)
-        {
+	{
 	int i;
-        BN_ULONG *_tmp1 = (buf), *_tmp2 = (a);
-        for (i = (top); i != 0; i--)
-                *_tmp1++ = *_tmp2++;
-        for (i = (max) - (top); i != 0; i--)
-                *_tmp1++ = (BN_ULONG) 0;
-        }
+	BN_ULONG *_tmp1 = (buf), *_tmp2 = (a);
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(top <= max);
+	for (i = (top); i != 0; i--)
+		*_tmp1++ = *_tmp2++;
+	for (i = (max) - (top); i != 0; i--)
+		*_tmp1++ = (BN_ULONG) 0;
+	}
 
 static void nist_cp_bn(BN_ULONG *buf, BN_ULONG *a, int top)
-        { 
+	{ 
 	int i;
-        BN_ULONG *_tmp1 = (buf), *_tmp2 = (a);
-        for (i = (top); i != 0; i--)
-                *_tmp1++ = *_tmp2++;
-        }
+	BN_ULONG *_tmp1 = (buf), *_tmp2 = (a);
+	for (i = (top); i != 0; i--)
+		*_tmp1++ = *_tmp2++;
+	}
 
 #if BN_BITS2 == 64
 #define bn_cp_64(to, n, from, m)	(to)[n] = (m>=0)?((from)[m]):0;
@@ -199,6 +238,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_192(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 		*res;
 	size_t   mask;
 
+	field = &_bignum_nist_p_192; /* just to make sure */
+
+ 	if (BN_is_negative(a) || a->top > 2*BN_NIST_192_TOP)
+		return BN_nnmod(r, field, a, ctx);
+
 	i = BN_ucmp(field, a);
 	if (i == 0)
 		{
@@ -208,9 +252,6 @@ int BN_nist_mod_192(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	else if (i > 0)
 		return (r == a) ? 1 : (BN_copy(r ,a) != NULL);
 
-	if (top == BN_NIST_192_TOP)
-		return BN_usub(r, a, field);
-
 	if (r != a)
 		{
 		if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_192_TOP))
@@ -245,6 +286,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_192(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	r->top = BN_NIST_192_TOP;
 	bn_correct_top(r);
 
+	if (BN_ucmp(field, r) <= 0)
+		{
+		if (!BN_usub(r, r, field)) return 0;
+		}
+
 	return 1;
 	}
 
@@ -272,6 +318,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 		*res;
 	size_t   mask;
 
+	field = &_bignum_nist_p_224; /* just to make sure */
+
+ 	if (BN_is_negative(a) || a->top > 2*BN_NIST_224_TOP)
+		return BN_nnmod(r, field, a, ctx);
+
 	i = BN_ucmp(field, a);
 	if (i == 0)
 		{
@@ -281,9 +332,6 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	else if (i > 0)
 		return (r == a)? 1 : (BN_copy(r ,a) != NULL);
 
-	if (top == BN_NIST_224_TOP)
-		return BN_usub(r, a, field);
-
 	if (r != a)
 		{
 		if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_224_TOP))
@@ -333,6 +381,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	r->top = BN_NIST_224_TOP;
 	bn_correct_top(r);
 
+	if (BN_ucmp(field, r) <= 0)
+		{
+		if (!BN_usub(r, r, field)) return 0;
+		}
+
 	return 1;
 #else	/* BN_BITS!=32 */
 	return 0;
@@ -364,6 +417,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_256(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 		*res;
 	size_t   mask;
 
+	field = &_bignum_nist_p_256; /* just to make sure */
+
+ 	if (BN_is_negative(a) || a->top > 2*BN_NIST_256_TOP)
+		return BN_nnmod(r, field, a, ctx);
+
 	i = BN_ucmp(field, a);
 	if (i == 0)
 		{
@@ -373,9 +431,6 @@ int BN_nist_mod_256(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	else if (i > 0)
 		return (r == a)? 1 : (BN_copy(r ,a) != NULL);
 
-	if (top == BN_NIST_256_TOP)
-		return BN_usub(r, a, field);
-
 	if (r != a)
 		{
 		if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_256_TOP))
@@ -470,6 +525,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_256(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	r->top = BN_NIST_256_TOP;
 	bn_correct_top(r);
 
+	if (BN_ucmp(field, r) <= 0)
+		{
+		if (!BN_usub(r, r, field)) return 0;
+		}
+
 	return 1;
 #else	/* BN_BITS!=32 */
 	return 0;
@@ -505,6 +565,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_384(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 		*res;
 	size_t	 mask;
 
+	field = &_bignum_nist_p_384; /* just to make sure */
+
+ 	if (BN_is_negative(a) || a->top > 2*BN_NIST_384_TOP)
+		return BN_nnmod(r, field, a, ctx);
+
 	i = BN_ucmp(field, a);
 	if (i == 0)
 		{
@@ -514,9 +579,6 @@ int BN_nist_mod_384(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	else if (i > 0)
 		return (r == a)? 1 : (BN_copy(r ,a) != NULL);
 
-	if (top == BN_NIST_384_TOP)
-		return BN_usub(r, a, field);
-
 	if (r != a)
 		{
 		if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_384_TOP))
@@ -631,6 +693,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_384(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	r->top = BN_NIST_384_TOP;
 	bn_correct_top(r);
 
+	if (BN_ucmp(field, r) <= 0)
+		{
+		if (!BN_usub(r, r, field)) return 0;
+		}
+
 	return 1;
 #else	/* BN_BITS!=32 */
 	return 0;
@@ -649,11 +716,33 @@ int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	BN_ULONG *r_d;
 	BIGNUM	*tmp;
 
+	field = &_bignum_nist_p_521; /* just to make sure */
+
+ 	if (BN_is_negative(a))
+		return BN_nnmod(r, field, a, ctx);
+
 	/* check whether a reduction is necessary */
 	top = a->top;
 	if (top < BN_NIST_521_TOP  || ( top == BN_NIST_521_TOP &&
-           (!(a->d[BN_NIST_521_TOP-1] & ~(BN_NIST_521_TOP_MASK)))))
-		return (r == a)? 1 : (BN_copy(r ,a) != NULL);
+	    (!(a->d[BN_NIST_521_TOP-1] & ~(BN_NIST_521_TOP_MASK)))))
+		{
+		int i = BN_ucmp(field, a);
+		if (i == 0)
+			{
+			BN_zero(r);
+			return 1;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+#ifdef BN_DEBUG
+			OPENSSL_assert(i > 0); /* because 'field' is 1111...1111 */
+#endif
+			return (r == a)? 1 : (BN_copy(r ,a) != NULL);
+			}
+		}
+
+ 	if (BN_num_bits(a) > 2*521)
+		return BN_nnmod(r, field, a, ctx);
 
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 	tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -673,15 +762,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 
 	if (!BN_uadd(r, tmp, r))
 		goto err;
-	top = r->top;
-	r_d = r->d;
-	if (top == BN_NIST_521_TOP  && 
-           (r_d[BN_NIST_521_TOP-1] & ~(BN_NIST_521_TOP_MASK)))
+
+	if (BN_ucmp(field, r) <= 0)
 		{
-		BN_NIST_ADD_ONE(r_d)
-		r->d[BN_NIST_521_TOP-1] &= BN_NIST_521_TOP_MASK; 
+		if (!BN_usub(r, r, field)) goto err;
 		}
-	bn_correct_top(r);
 
 	ret = 1;
 err:
diff --git a/crypto/md32_common.h b/crypto/md32_common.h
index 089c450290..61bcd9786f 100644
--- a/crypto/md32_common.h
+++ b/crypto/md32_common.h
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ int HASH_UPDATE (HASH_CTX *c, const void *data_, size_t len)
 		{
 		p=(unsigned char *)c->data;
 
-		if ((n+len) >= HASH_CBLOCK)
+		if (len >= HASH_CBLOCK || len+n >= HASH_CBLOCK)
 			{
 			memcpy (p+n,data,HASH_CBLOCK-n);
 			HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER (c,p,1);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 8a3778e290..0ac6418449 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -150,16 +150,6 @@ const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
 	return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
 	}
 
-/* Usage example;
- *    MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
- */
-#define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \
-	if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \
-			!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \
-				CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, \
-				(rsa)->m, (ctx))) \
-		err_instr
-
 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
@@ -227,13 +217,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
 	
 	if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-		{	
+		{
 		/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
 		goto err;
 		}
 
-	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+		if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+			goto err;
 
 	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
 		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
@@ -436,9 +428,11 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 			BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 			}
 		else
-			d = rsa->d;
+			d= rsa->d;
 
-		MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+		if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+			if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+				goto err;
 
 		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
 				rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
@@ -559,7 +553,9 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		else
 			d = rsa->d;
 
-		MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+		if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+			if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+				goto err;
 		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
 				rsa->_method_mod_n))
 		  goto err;
@@ -669,7 +665,9 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		goto err;
 		}
 
-	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+		if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+			goto err;
 
 	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
 		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
@@ -717,7 +715,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
 	BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
 	BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
-	int bn_flags;
 	int ret=0;
 
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
@@ -725,31 +722,41 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 
-	/* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct 
-	 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
-	 */
-	bn_flags = rsa->p->flags;
-	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-		{
-		rsa->p->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
-		}
-	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
-	/* We restore bn_flags back */
-	rsa->p->flags = bn_flags;
+	{
+		BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
+		BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
 
-        /* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct
-         * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
-         */
-	bn_flags = rsa->q->flags;
-	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-		{
-		rsa->q->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
-		}
-	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
-	/* We restore bn_flags back */
-	rsa->q->flags = bn_flags;	
+		/* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
+		 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
+		 */
+		if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+			{
+			BN_init(&local_p);
+			p = &local_p;
+			BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 
-	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+			BN_init(&local_q);
+			q = &local_q;
+			BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			p = rsa->p;
+			q = rsa->q;
+			}
+
+		if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
+			{
+			if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
+				goto err;
+			if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
+				goto err;
+			}
+	}
+
+	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+		if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+			goto err;
 
 	/* compute I mod q */
 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
diff --git a/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index 927b01f3c4..0bbf8ae7f3 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 
 		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l);
 
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
 		/* number of bytes to write */
 		s->init_num=p-buf;
 		s->init_off=0;
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
 		}
 
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
 	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 	}
 
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s)
 		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
 		}
 
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
 	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 	}
 
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index d5d3c4ad58..274493e002 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1172,13 +1172,13 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
 		l2n3(l,d);
 
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
 		/* number of bytes to write */
 		s->init_num=p-buf;
 		s->init_off=0;
 		}
 
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
 	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 	}
 
@@ -1202,7 +1202,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
 		s->init_off=0;
 		}
 
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
 	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 	}
 
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
index 6e14f4d834..0f9a3489dd 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 	memcpy(ret->session_id,os.data,os.length);
 
 	M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-	if (ret->master_key_length > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+	if (os.length > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
 		ret->master_key_length=SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
 	else
 		ret->master_key_length=os.length;