From: Kurt Roeckx Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2018 22:19:03 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Make sure we use a nonce when a nonce is required X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_1_1-pre4~8 X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=2a70d65b99e1f2376be705d18bca88703b7e774a;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git Make sure we use a nonce when a nonce is required If a nonce is required and the get_nonce callback is NULL, request 50% more entropy following NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1. Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre GH: #5503 --- diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c index e1b3ddb57f..b9ad1b8867 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c @@ -266,6 +266,9 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, { unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL; size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0; + size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength; + size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen; + size_t max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen; if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, @@ -288,22 +291,33 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, } drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; + + /* + * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy + * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing + * the minimum length to accomadate the length of the nonce. + * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL. + */ + if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) { + min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2; + min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen; + max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen; + } + if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) - entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength, - drbg->min_entropylen, - drbg->max_entropylen, 0); - if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen - || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) { + entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy, + min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0); + if (entropylen < min_entropylen + || entropylen > max_entropylen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); goto end; } - if (drbg->max_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) { + if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) { noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2, drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen); if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, - RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE); + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE); goto end; } } diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h index 0a34aa0b93..94ffc96f20 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h @@ -107,6 +107,27 @@ typedef struct rand_drbg_ctr_st { } RAND_DRBG_CTR; +/* + * The 'random pool' acts as a dumb container for collecting random + * input from various entropy sources. The pool has no knowledge about + * whether its randomness is fed into a legacy RAND_METHOD via RAND_add() + * or into a new style RAND_DRBG. It is the callers duty to 1) initialize the + * random pool, 2) pass it to the polling callbacks, 3) seed the RNG, and + * 4) cleanup the random pool again. + * + * The random pool contains no locking mechanism because its scope and + * lifetime is intended to be restricted to a single stack frame. + */ +struct rand_pool_st { + unsigned char *buffer; /* points to the beginning of the random pool */ + size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */ + + size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */ + size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */ + size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */ + size_t requested_entropy; /* requested entropy count in bits */ +}; + /* * The state of all types of DRBGs, even though we only have CTR mode * right now. diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c index defa3ecb53..143dfb0f19 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c @@ -466,27 +466,6 @@ err: return ret; } -/* - * The 'random pool' acts as a dumb container for collecting random - * input from various entropy sources. The pool has no knowledge about - * whether its randomness is fed into a legacy RAND_METHOD via RAND_add() - * or into a new style RAND_DRBG. It is the callers duty to 1) initialize the - * random pool, 2) pass it to the polling callbacks, 3) seed the RNG, and - * 4) cleanup the random pool again. - * - * The random pool contains no locking mechanism because its scope and - * lifetime is intended to be restricted to a single stack frame. - */ -struct rand_pool_st { - unsigned char *buffer; /* points to the beginning of the random pool */ - size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */ - - size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */ - size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */ - size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */ - size_t requested_entropy; /* requested entropy count in bits */ -}; - /* * Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool */ diff --git a/test/drbgtest.c b/test/drbgtest.c index bef504ebd1..5426046854 100644 --- a/test/drbgtest.c +++ b/test/drbgtest.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include "../crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h" +#include "../crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h" #if defined(_WIN32) # include @@ -864,6 +865,67 @@ static int test_multi_thread(void) } #endif +/* + * This function only returns the entropy already added with RAND_add(), + * and does not get entropy from the OS. + * + * Returns 0 on failure and the size of the buffer on success. + */ +static size_t get_pool_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + unsigned char **pout, + int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len, + int prediction_resistance) +{ + if (drbg->pool == NULL) + return 0; + + if (drbg->pool->entropy < (size_t)entropy || drbg->pool->len < min_len + || drbg->pool->len > max_len) + return 0; + + *pout = drbg->pool->buffer; + return drbg->pool->len; +} + +/* + * Clean up the entropy that get_pool_entropy() returned. + */ +static void cleanup_pool_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) +{ + OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg->pool->buffer, drbg->pool->max_len); + OPENSSL_free(drbg->pool); + drbg->pool = NULL; +} + +/* + * Test that instantiating works when OS entropy is not available and that + * RAND_add() is enough to reseed it. + */ +static int test_rand_add(void) +{ + RAND_DRBG *master = RAND_DRBG_get0_master(); + RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn old_get_entropy = master->get_entropy; + RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn old_cleanup_entropy = master->cleanup_entropy; + int rv = 0; + unsigned char rand_add_buf[256]; + + master->get_entropy = get_pool_entropy; + master->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_pool_entropy; + master->reseed_counter++; + RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(master); + memset(rand_add_buf, 0xCD, sizeof(rand_add_buf)); + RAND_add(rand_add_buf, sizeof(rand_add_buf), sizeof(rand_add_buf)); + if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(master, NULL, 0))) + goto error; + + rv = 1; + +error: + master->get_entropy = old_get_entropy; + master->cleanup_entropy = old_cleanup_entropy; + return rv; +} + int setup_tests(void) { app_data_index = RAND_DRBG_get_ex_new_index(0L, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); @@ -871,6 +933,7 @@ int setup_tests(void) ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_kats, OSSL_NELEM(drbg_test)); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_error_checks, OSSL_NELEM(drbg_test)); ADD_TEST(test_rand_reseed); + ADD_TEST(test_rand_add); #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) ADD_TEST(test_multi_thread); #endif