From: Dr. Stephen Henson Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2007 01:16:16 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Updates from 0.9.8-stable X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=0633bca11c566b2c3f0b659242e4a2ebbbfb8a0a;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git Updates from 0.9.8-stable --- diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 7b7c9ac876..dba53baca8 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -2,8 +2,7 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ - Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f-fips [xx XXX xxxx] - + Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h-fips [xx XXX xxxx] *) Add option --with-fipslibdir to specify location of fipscanister.lib and friends. When combined with fips build option fipscanister.lib is @@ -130,6 +129,180 @@ Update Windows build system. [Steve Henson] + Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h [xx XXX xxxx] + + *) Implement certificate status request TLS extension defined in RFC3546. + A client can set the appropriate parameters and receive the encoded + OCSP response via a callback. A server can query the supplied parameters + and set the encoded OCSP response in the callback. Add simplified examples + to s_client and s_server. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 0.9.8f and 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007] + + *) Fix various bugs: + + Binary incompatibility of ssl_ctx_st structure + + DTLS interoperation with non-compliant servers + + Don't call get_session_cb() without proposed session + + Fix ia64 assembler code + [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] + + Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007] + + *) DTLS Handshake overhaul. There were longstanding issues with + OpenSSL DTLS implementation, which were making it impossible for + RFC 4347 compliant client to communicate with OpenSSL server. + Unfortunately just fixing these incompatibilities would "cut off" + pre-0.9.8f clients. To allow for hassle free upgrade post-0.9.8e + server keeps tolerating non RFC compliant syntax. The opposite is + not true, 0.9.8f client can not communicate with earlier server. + This update even addresses CVE-2007-4995. + [Andy Polyakov] + + *) Changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL: some compilers + (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. + [Kurt Roeckx , Peter Hartley , + Steve Henson] + + *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in + RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded + SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically + supported. + + If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure + support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded + SSL_SESSION. + + The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket + protection in servers so again support should be possible + with no application modification. + + If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option + SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set. + + Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client + or server extensions to be examined. + + This work was sponsored by Google. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name + extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now + have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an + additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be + stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the + SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's + server_name extension. + + New functions (subject to change): + + SSL_get_servername() + SSL_get_servername_type() + SSL_set_SSL_CTX() + + New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change): + + SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB + - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback() + SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG + - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg() + SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() + + openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option. + + openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...', + '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows + testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert' + and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName + negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by + default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal' + option. + + [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou, Steve Henson] + + *) Add AES and SSE2 assembly language support to VC++ build. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Mitigate attack on final subtraction in Montgomery reduction. + [Andy Polyakov] + + *) Fix crypto/ec/ec_mult.c to work properly with scalars of value 0 + (which previously caused an internal error). + [Bodo Moeller] + + *) Squeeze another 10% out of IGE mode when in != out. + [Ben Laurie] + + *) AES IGE mode speedup. + [Dean Gaudet (Google)] + + *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see + http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and + add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162: + + TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "SEED-SHA" + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA" + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA" + TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "ADH-SEED-SHA" + + To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 + series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL + is configured with 'enable-seed'. + [KISA, Bodo Moeller] + + *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a + single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract + information. For detailed background information, see + http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron, + J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL + and Necessary Software Countermeasures"). The core of the change + are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and + BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(), + respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant + conditional branches. These are automatically called by BN_div() + and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one + of the input BIGNUMs. Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to + remove a conditional branch. + + BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous + BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just + modular exponentiation. (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag + in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative + implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().) The old name + remains as a deprecated alias. + + Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general + RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses + constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation. + Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias. + + BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that + the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the + modulus. This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to + BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now + essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually + change this in the header file before 0.9.9. It allows + RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to + enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. + + [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)] + + *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID + context matching (which matters if an application uses a single + external cache for different purposes). Previously, + out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was + set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that, + with applications using a single external cache for quite + different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite + restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session + in a different context. + [Bodo Moeller] + + *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that + a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable + authentication-only ciphersuites. + [Bodo Moeller] + Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [23 Feb 2007] *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a diff --git a/Configure b/Configure index c63c0c71cb..042bfcefda 100755 --- a/Configure +++ b/Configure @@ -619,6 +619,7 @@ my %disabled = ( # "what" => "comment" "rfc3779" => "default", "seed" => "default", "shared" => "default", + "tlsext" => "default", "zlib" => "default", "zlib-dynamic" => "default" ); @@ -882,6 +883,10 @@ if (defined($disabled{"md5"}) || defined($disabled{"sha"}) $disabled{"tls1"} = "forced"; } +if (defined($disabled{"tls1"})) + { + $disabled{"tlsext"} = "forced"; + } if ($target eq "TABLE") { foreach $target (sort keys %table) { diff --git a/apps/apps.h b/apps/apps.h index 945ef9d9eb..c1ce1bc90c 100644 --- a/apps/apps.h +++ b/apps/apps.h @@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE #include #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +#include +#endif #include int app_RAND_load_file(const char *file, BIO *bio_e, int dont_warn); @@ -231,6 +234,12 @@ extern int in_FIPS_mode; # endif #endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 +# define openssl_fdset(a,b) FD_SET((unsigned int)a, b) +#else +# define openssl_fdset(a,b) FD_SET(a, b) +#endif + typedef struct args_st { char **data; @@ -278,6 +287,12 @@ X509_STORE *setup_verify(BIO *bp, char *CAfile, char *CApath); ENGINE *setup_engine(BIO *err, const char *engine, int debug); #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(BIO *err, OCSP_REQUEST *req, + char *host, char *path, char *port, int use_ssl, + int req_timeout); +#endif + int load_config(BIO *err, CONF *cnf); char *make_config_name(void); diff --git a/apps/ec.c b/apps/ec.c index c63437fe2a..771e15f357 100644 --- a/apps/ec.c +++ b/apps/ec.c @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ bad: " the ec parameters are encoded\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " in the asn1 der " "encoding\n"); - BIO_printf(bio_err, " possilbe values:" + BIO_printf(bio_err, " possible values:" " named_curve (default)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err," " "explicit\n"); diff --git a/apps/ocsp.c b/apps/ocsp.c index 3dc36c4bdc..b95424b69b 100644 --- a/apps/ocsp.c +++ b/apps/ocsp.c @@ -56,15 +56,16 @@ * */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP - +#define USE_SOCKETS #include +#include #include -#include "apps.h" -#include +#include +#include #include -#include +#include #include -#include +#include "apps.h" /* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */ #define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60) @@ -86,6 +87,8 @@ static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser); static BIO *init_responder(char *port); static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio, char *port); static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp); +static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, char *path, + OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout); #undef PROG #define PROG ocsp_main @@ -112,11 +115,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) BIO *acbio = NULL, *cbio = NULL; BIO *derbio = NULL; BIO *out = NULL; + int req_timeout = -1; int req_text = 0, resp_text = 0; long nsec = MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD, maxage = -1; char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL; X509_STORE *store = NULL; - SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *sign_other = NULL, *verify_other = NULL, *rother = NULL; char *sign_certfile = NULL, *verify_certfile = NULL, *rcertfile = NULL; unsigned long sign_flags = 0, verify_flags = 0, rflags = 0; @@ -154,6 +157,22 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) } else badarg = 1; } + else if (!strcmp(*args, "-timeout")) + { + if (args[1]) + { + args++; + req_timeout = atol(*args); + if (req_timeout < 0) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err, + "Illegal timeout value %s\n", + *args); + badarg = 1; + } + } + else badarg = 1; + } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-url")) { if (args[1]) @@ -703,52 +722,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) else if (host) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK - cbio = BIO_new_connect(host); + resp = process_responder(bio_err, req, host, path, + port, use_ssl, req_timeout); + if (!resp) + goto end; #else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating connect BIO - sockets not supported.\n"); goto end; #endif - if (!cbio) - { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating connect BIO\n"); - goto end; - } - if (port) BIO_set_conn_port(cbio, port); - if (use_ssl == 1) - { - BIO *sbio; -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method()); -#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method()); -#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) - ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method()); -#else - BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL is disabled\n"); - goto end; -#endif - if (ctx == NULL) - { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating SSL context.\n"); - goto end; - } - SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); - sbio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1); - cbio = BIO_push(sbio, cbio); - } - if (BIO_do_connect(cbio) <= 0) - { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error connecting BIO\n"); - goto end; - } - resp = OCSP_sendreq_bio(cbio, path, req); - BIO_free_all(cbio); - cbio = NULL; - if (!resp) - { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responsder\n"); - goto end; - } } else if (respin) { @@ -897,7 +878,6 @@ end: OPENSSL_free(host); OPENSSL_free(port); OPENSSL_free(path); - SSL_CTX_free(ctx); } OPENSSL_EXIT(ret); @@ -1121,6 +1101,7 @@ static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser) char *itmp, *row[DB_NUMBER],**rrow; for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) row[i] = NULL; bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ser,NULL); + OPENSSL_assert(bn); /* FIXME: should report an error at this point and abort */ if (BN_is_zero(bn)) itmp = BUF_strdup("00"); else @@ -1231,4 +1212,137 @@ static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp) return 1; } +static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, char *path, + OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout) + { + int fd; + int rv; + OCSP_REQ_CTX *ctx = NULL; + OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL; + fd_set confds; + struct timeval tv; + + if (req_timeout != -1) + BIO_set_nbio(cbio, 1); + + rv = BIO_do_connect(cbio); + + if ((rv <= 0) && ((req_timeout == -1) || !BIO_should_retry(cbio))) + { + BIO_puts(err, "Error connecting BIO\n"); + return NULL; + } + + if (req_timeout == -1) + return OCSP_sendreq_bio(cbio, path, req); + + if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) <= 0) + { + BIO_puts(err, "Can't get connection fd\n"); + goto err; + } + + if (rv <= 0) + { + FD_ZERO(&confds); + openssl_fdset(fd, &confds); + tv.tv_usec = 0; + tv.tv_sec = req_timeout; + rv = select(fd + 1, NULL, (void *)&confds, NULL, &tv); + if (rv == 0) + { + BIO_puts(err, "Timeout on connect\n"); + return NULL; + } + } + + + ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(cbio, path, req, -1); + if (!ctx) + return NULL; + + for (;;) + { + rv = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&rsp, ctx); + if (rv != -1) + break; + FD_ZERO(&confds); + openssl_fdset(fd, &confds); + tv.tv_usec = 0; + tv.tv_sec = req_timeout; + if (BIO_should_read(cbio)) + rv = select(fd + 1, (void *)&confds, NULL, NULL, &tv); + else if (BIO_should_write(cbio)) + rv = select(fd + 1, NULL, (void *)&confds, NULL, &tv); + else + { + BIO_puts(err, "Unexpected retry condition\n"); + goto err; + } + if (rv == 0) + { + BIO_puts(err, "Timeout on request\n"); + break; + } + if (rv == -1) + { + BIO_puts(err, "Select error\n"); + break; + } + + } + err: + if (ctx) + OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(ctx); + + return rsp; + } + +OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(BIO *err, OCSP_REQUEST *req, + char *host, char *path, char *port, int use_ssl, + int req_timeout) + { + BIO *cbio = NULL; + SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; + OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; + cbio = BIO_new_connect(host); + if (!cbio) + { + BIO_printf(err, "Error creating connect BIO\n"); + goto end; + } + if (port) BIO_set_conn_port(cbio, port); + if (use_ssl == 1) + { + BIO *sbio; +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method()); +#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method()); +#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method()); +#else + BIO_printf(err, "SSL is disabled\n"); + goto end; +#endif + if (ctx == NULL) + { + BIO_printf(err, "Error creating SSL context.\n"); + goto end; + } + SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); + sbio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1); + cbio = BIO_push(sbio, cbio); + } + resp = query_responder(err, cbio, path, req, req_timeout); + if (!resp) + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responsder\n"); + end: + if (ctx) + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + if (cbio) + BIO_free_all(cbio); + return resp; + } + #endif diff --git a/apps/pkcs12.c b/apps/pkcs12.c index 77e9d7ba73..77907116fa 100644 --- a/apps/pkcs12.c +++ b/apps/pkcs12.c @@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) X509_keyid_set1(ucert, NULL, 0); X509_alias_set1(ucert, NULL, 0); /* Remove from list */ - sk_X509_delete(certs, i); + (void)sk_X509_delete(certs, i); break; } } diff --git a/apps/s_apps.h b/apps/s_apps.h index 886a95a2b8..08fbbc2229 100644 --- a/apps/s_apps.h +++ b/apps/s_apps.h @@ -167,4 +167,7 @@ long MS_CALLBACK bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, #ifdef HEADER_SSL_H void MS_CALLBACK apps_ssl_info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret); void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); +void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, + unsigned char *data, int len, + void *arg); #endif diff --git a/apps/s_cb.c b/apps/s_cb.c index b4992aa623..a512589e8c 100644 --- a/apps/s_cb.c +++ b/apps/s_cb.c @@ -575,3 +575,62 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void * } (void)BIO_flush(bio); } + +void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, + unsigned char *data, int len, + void *arg) + { + BIO *bio = arg; + char *extname; + + switch(type) + { + case TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name: + extname = "server name"; + break; + + case TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length: + extname = "max fragment length"; + break; + + case TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url: + extname = "client certificate URL"; + break; + + case TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys: + extname = "trusted CA keys"; + break; + + case TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac: + extname = "truncated HMAC"; + break; + + case TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request: + extname = "status request"; + break; + + case TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves: + extname = "elliptic curves"; + break; + + case TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats: + extname = "EC point formats"; + break; + + case TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket: + extname = "server ticket"; + break; + + + default: + extname = "unknown"; + break; + + } + + BIO_printf(bio, "TLS %s extension \"%s\" (id=%d), len=%d\n", + client_server ? "server": "client", + extname, type, len); + BIO_dump(bio, (char *)data, len); + (void)BIO_flush(bio); + } diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c index 6df534fa7a..a4983c178f 100644 --- a/apps/s_client.c +++ b/apps/s_client.c @@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ typedef unsigned int u_int; #include #include #include +#include #include "s_apps.h" #include "timeouts.h" @@ -171,11 +172,18 @@ static int c_nbio=0; #endif static int c_Pause=0; static int c_debug=0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +static int c_tlsextdebug=0; +static int c_status_req=0; +#endif static int c_msg=0; static int c_showcerts=0; static void sc_usage(void); static void print_stuff(BIO *berr,SSL *con,int full); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg); +#endif static BIO *bio_c_out=NULL; static int c_quiet=0; static int c_ign_eof=0; @@ -231,9 +239,37 @@ static void sc_usage(void) BIO_printf(bio_err," -engine id - Initialise and use the specified engine\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err," -rand file%cfile%c...\n", LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR, LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR); - + BIO_printf(bio_err," -sess_out arg - file to write SSL session to\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -sess_in arg - file to read SSL session from\n"); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + BIO_printf(bio_err," -servername host - Set TLS extension servername in ClientHello\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - request certificate status from server\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); +#endif } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + +/* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */ +typedef struct tlsextctx_st { + BIO * biodebug; + int ack; +} tlsextctx; + + +static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) + { + tlsextctx * p = (tlsextctx *) arg; + const char * hn= SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); + if (SSL_get_servername_type(s) != -1) + p->ack = !SSL_session_reused(s) && hn != NULL; + else + BIO_printf(bio_err,"Can't use SSL_get_servername\n"); + + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + } +#endif enum { PROTO_OFF = 0, @@ -287,6 +323,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) struct timeval tv; #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + char *servername = NULL; + tlsextctx tlsextcbp = + {NULL,0}; +#endif + char *sess_in = NULL; + char *sess_out = NULL; struct sockaddr peer; int peerlen = sizeof(peer); int enable_timeouts = 0 ; @@ -361,6 +404,16 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) if (--argc < 1) goto bad; cert_file= *(++argv); } + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-sess_out") == 0) + { + if (--argc < 1) goto bad; + sess_out = *(++argv); + } + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-sess_in") == 0) + { + if (--argc < 1) goto bad; + sess_in = *(++argv); + } else if (strcmp(*argv,"-certform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; @@ -385,6 +438,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) c_Pause=1; else if (strcmp(*argv,"-debug") == 0) c_debug=1; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-tlsextdebug") == 0) + c_tlsextdebug=1; + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-status") == 0) + c_status_req=1; +#endif #ifdef WATT32 else if (strcmp(*argv,"-wdebug") == 0) dbug_init(); @@ -460,6 +519,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) off|=SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ssl2") == 0) off|=SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0) + { off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; } +#endif else if (strcmp(*argv,"-serverpref") == 0) off|=SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE; else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cipher") == 0) @@ -498,6 +561,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) if (--argc < 1) goto bad; inrand= *(++argv); } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-servername") == 0) + { + if (--argc < 1) goto bad; + servername= *(++argv); + /* meth=TLSv1_client_method(); */ + } +#endif else { BIO_printf(bio_err,"unknown option %s\n",*argv); @@ -621,8 +692,51 @@ bad: store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx); X509_STORE_set_flags(store, vflags); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (servername != NULL) + { + tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_err; + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb); + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp); + } +#endif con=SSL_new(ctx); + if (sess_in) + { + SSL_SESSION *sess; + BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_in, "r"); + if (!stmp) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", + sess_in); + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } + sess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, NULL, 0, NULL); + BIO_free(stmp); + if (!sess) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", + sess_in); + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } + SSL_set_session(con, sess); + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (servername != NULL) + { + if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(con,servername)) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err,"Unable to set TLS servername extension.\n"); + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } + } +#endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (con && (con->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) { @@ -714,6 +828,30 @@ re_start: SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_c_out); } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (c_tlsextdebug) + { + SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); + SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_c_out); + } + if (c_status_req) + { + SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(con, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp); + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ocsp_resp_cb); + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, bio_c_out); +#if 0 +{ +STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); +OCSP_RESPID *id = OCSP_RESPID_new(); +id->value.byKey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); +id->type = V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY; +ASN1_STRING_set(id->value.byKey, "Hello World", -1); +sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(ids, id); +SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(con, ids); +} +#endif + } +#endif SSL_set_bio(con,sbio,sbio); SSL_set_connect_state(con); @@ -837,6 +975,17 @@ re_start: if (in_init) { in_init=0; + if (sess_out) + { + BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_out, "w"); + if (stmp) + { + PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, SSL_get_session(con)); + BIO_free(stmp); + } + else + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing session file %s\n", sess_out); + } print_stuff(bio_c_out,con,full_log); if (full_log > 0) full_log--; @@ -1306,3 +1455,31 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full) (void)BIO_flush(bio); } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + +static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) + { + const unsigned char *p; + int len; + OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp; + len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p); + BIO_puts(arg, "OCSP response: "); + if (!p) + { + BIO_puts(arg, "no response sent\n"); + return 1; + } + rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len); + if (!rsp) + { + BIO_puts(arg, "response parse error\n"); + BIO_dump_indent(arg, (char *)p, len, 4); + return 0; + } + BIO_puts(arg, "\n======================================\n"); + OCSP_RESPONSE_print(arg, rsp, 0); + BIO_puts(arg, "======================================\n"); + OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp); + return 1; + } +#endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c index 6c433e63fd..2b4e256c1a 100644 --- a/apps/s_server.c +++ b/apps/s_server.c @@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ typedef unsigned int u_int; #include #include #include +#include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include #endif @@ -238,6 +239,9 @@ static int bufsize=BUFSIZZ; static int accept_socket= -1; #define TEST_CERT "server.pem" +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +#define TEST_CERT2 "server2.pem" +#endif #undef PROG #define PROG s_server_main @@ -247,6 +251,9 @@ static char *cipher=NULL; static int s_server_verify=SSL_VERIFY_NONE; static int s_server_session_id_context = 1; /* anything will do */ static const char *s_cert_file=TEST_CERT,*s_key_file=NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +static const char *s_cert_file2=TEST_CERT2,*s_key_file2=NULL; +#endif static char *s_dcert_file=NULL,*s_dkey_file=NULL; #ifdef FIONBIO static int s_nbio=0; @@ -254,10 +261,18 @@ static int s_nbio=0; static int s_nbio_test=0; int s_crlf=0; static SSL_CTX *ctx=NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +static SSL_CTX *ctx2=NULL; +#endif static int www=0; static BIO *bio_s_out=NULL; static int s_debug=0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +static int s_tlsextdebug=0; +static int s_tlsextstatus=0; +static int cert_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg); +#endif static int s_msg=0; static int s_quiet=0; @@ -285,6 +300,11 @@ static void s_server_init(void) s_dkey_file=NULL; s_cert_file=TEST_CERT; s_key_file=NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + s_cert_file2=TEST_CERT2; + s_key_file2=NULL; + ctx2=NULL; +#endif #ifdef FIONBIO s_nbio=0; #endif @@ -371,6 +391,16 @@ static void sv_usage(void) #endif BIO_printf(bio_err," -id_prefix arg - Generate SSL/TLS session IDs prefixed by 'arg'\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err," -rand file%cfile%c...\n", LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR, LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + BIO_printf(bio_err," -servername host - servername for HostName TLS extension\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -servername_fatal - on mismatch send fatal alert (default warning alert)\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -cert2 arg - certificate file to use for servername\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," (default is %s)\n",TEST_CERT2); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -key2 arg - Private Key file to use for servername, in cert file if\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," not specified (default is %s)\n",TEST_CERT2); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); +#endif } static int local_argc=0; @@ -526,6 +556,185 @@ static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) } #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + +/* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */ +typedef struct tlsextctx_st { + char * servername; + BIO * biodebug; + int extension_error; +} tlsextctx; + + +static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) + { + tlsextctx * p = (tlsextctx *) arg; + const char * servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); + if (servername && p->biodebug) + BIO_printf(p->biodebug,"Hostname in TLS extension: \"%s\"\n",servername); + + if (!p->servername) + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + + if (servername) + { + if (strcmp(servername,p->servername)) + return p->extension_error; + if (ctx2) + { + BIO_printf(p->biodebug,"Swiching server context.\n"); + SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s,ctx2); + } + } + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; +} + +/* Structure passed to cert status callback */ + +typedef struct tlsextstatusctx_st { + /* Default responder to use */ + char *host, *path, *port; + int use_ssl; + int timeout; + BIO *err; + int verbose; +} tlsextstatusctx; + +static tlsextstatusctx tlscstatp = {NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, -1, NULL, 0}; + +/* Certificate Status callback. This is called when a client includes a + * certificate status request extension. + * + * This is a simplified version. It examines certificates each time and + * makes one OCSP responder query for each request. + * + * A full version would store details such as the OCSP certificate IDs and + * minimise the number of OCSP responses by caching them until they were + * considered "expired". + */ + +static int cert_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) + { + tlsextstatusctx *srctx = arg; + BIO *err = srctx->err; + char *host, *port, *path; + int use_ssl; + unsigned char *rspder = NULL; + int rspderlen; + STACK *aia = NULL; + X509 *x = NULL; + X509_STORE_CTX inctx; + X509_OBJECT obj; + OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL; + OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; + OCSP_CERTID *id = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; + int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + int i; +#if 0 +STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids; +SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(s, &ids); +BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: received %d ids\n", sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(ids)); +#endif + if (srctx->verbose) + BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: callback called\n"); + /* Build up OCSP query from server certificate */ + x = SSL_get_certificate(s); + aia = X509_get1_ocsp(x); + if (aia) + { + if (!OCSP_parse_url(sk_value(aia, 0), + &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) + { + BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: can't parse AIA URL\n"); + goto err; + } + if (srctx->verbose) + BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: AIA URL: %s\n", + sk_value(aia, 0)); + } + else + { + if (!srctx->host) + { + BIO_puts(srctx->err, "cert_status: no AIA and no default responder URL\n"); + goto done; + } + host = srctx->host; + path = srctx->path; + port = srctx->port; + use_ssl = srctx->use_ssl; + } + + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&inctx, + SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s)), + NULL, NULL)) + goto err; + if (X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&inctx,X509_LU_X509, + X509_get_issuer_name(x),&obj) <= 0) + { + BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: Can't retrieve issuer certificate.\n"); + X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&inctx); + goto done; + } + req = OCSP_REQUEST_new(); + if (!req) + goto err; + id = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, x, obj.data.x509); + X509_free(obj.data.x509); + X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&inctx); + if (!id) + goto err; + if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(req, id)) + goto err; + id = NULL; + /* Add any extensions to the request */ + SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(s, &exts); + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) + { + X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); + if (!OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext(req, ext, -1)) + goto err; + } + resp = process_responder(err, req, host, path, port, use_ssl, + srctx->timeout); + if (!resp) + { + BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: error querying responder\n"); + goto done; + } + rspderlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, &rspder); + if (rspderlen <= 0) + goto err; + SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, rspder, rspderlen); + if (srctx->verbose) + { + BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: ocsp response sent:\n"); + OCSP_RESPONSE_print(err, resp, 2); + } + ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + done: + if (ret != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) + ERR_print_errors(err); + if (aia) + { + OPENSSL_free(host); + OPENSSL_free(path); + OPENSSL_free(port); + X509_email_free(aia); + } + if (id) + OCSP_CERTID_free(id); + if (req) + OCSP_REQUEST_free(req); + if (resp) + OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp); + return ret; + err: + ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + goto done; + } +#endif int MAIN(int, char **); int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) @@ -545,10 +754,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) int no_tmp_rsa=0,no_dhe=0,no_ecdhe=0,nocert=0; int state=0; SSL_METHOD *meth=NULL; -#ifdef sock_type -#undef sock_type -#endif - int sock_type=SOCK_STREAM; + int socket_type=SOCK_STREAM; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE *e=NULL; #endif @@ -559,6 +765,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) int s_dcert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_dkey_format = FORMAT_PEM; X509 *s_cert = NULL, *s_dcert = NULL; EVP_PKEY *s_key = NULL, *s_dkey = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + EVP_PKEY *s_key2 = NULL; + X509 *s_cert2 = NULL; +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING}; +#endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) meth=SSLv23_server_method(); @@ -724,6 +938,37 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) } else if (strcmp(*argv,"-debug") == 0) { s_debug=1; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-tlsextdebug") == 0) + s_tlsextdebug=1; + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-status") == 0) + s_tlsextstatus=1; + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-status_verbose") == 0) + { + s_tlsextstatus=1; + tlscstatp.verbose = 1; + } + else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-status_timeout")) + { + s_tlsextstatus=1; + if (--argc < 1) goto bad; + tlscstatp.timeout = atoi(*(++argv)); + } + else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-status_url")) + { + s_tlsextstatus=1; + if (--argc < 1) goto bad; + if (!OCSP_parse_url(*(++argv), + &tlscstatp.host, + &tlscstatp.port, + &tlscstatp.path, + &tlscstatp.use_ssl)) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n"); + goto bad; + } + } +#endif else if (strcmp(*argv,"-msg") == 0) { s_msg=1; } else if (strcmp(*argv,"-hack") == 0) @@ -754,6 +999,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) { off|=SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; } else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_tls1") == 0) { off|=SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0) + { off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; } +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 else if (strcmp(*argv,"-ssl2") == 0) { meth=SSLv2_server_method(); } @@ -770,7 +1019,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) else if (strcmp(*argv,"-dtls1") == 0) { meth=DTLSv1_server_method(); - sock_type = SOCK_DGRAM; + socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; } else if (strcmp(*argv,"-timeout") == 0) enable_timeouts = 1; @@ -799,6 +1048,25 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) if (--argc < 1) goto bad; inrand= *(++argv); } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-servername") == 0) + { + if (--argc < 1) goto bad; + tlsextcbp.servername= *(++argv); + } + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-servername_fatal") == 0) + { tlsextcbp.extension_error = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cert2") == 0) + { + if (--argc < 1) goto bad; + s_cert_file2= *(++argv); + } + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-key2") == 0) + { + if (--argc < 1) goto bad; + s_key_file2= *(++argv); + } +#endif else { BIO_printf(bio_err,"unknown option %s\n",*argv); @@ -831,6 +1099,10 @@ bad: if (s_key_file == NULL) s_key_file = s_cert_file; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s_key_file2 == NULL) + s_key_file2 = s_cert_file2; +#endif if (nocert == 0) { @@ -850,8 +1122,29 @@ bad: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } - } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (tlsextcbp.servername) + { + s_key2 = load_key(bio_err, s_key_file2, s_key_format, 0, pass, e, + "second server certificate private key file"); + if (!s_key2) + { + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } + + s_cert2 = load_cert(bio_err,s_cert_file2,s_cert_format, + NULL, e, "second server certificate file"); + + if (!s_cert2) + { + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } + } +#endif + } if (s_dcert_file) { @@ -908,6 +1201,10 @@ bad: s_key_file=NULL; s_dcert_file=NULL; s_dkey_file=NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + s_cert_file2=NULL; + s_key_file2=NULL; +#endif } ctx=SSL_CTX_new(meth); @@ -939,7 +1236,7 @@ bad: /* DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-( * Setting read ahead solves this problem. */ - if (sock_type == SOCK_DGRAM) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx, 1); + if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx, 1); if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,apps_ssl_info_callback); @@ -966,6 +1263,62 @@ bad: } store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx); X509_STORE_set_flags(store, vflags); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s_cert2) + { + ctx2=SSL_CTX_new(meth); + if (ctx2 == NULL) + { + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } + } + + if (ctx2) + { + BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Setting secondary ctx parameters\n"); + + if (session_id_prefix) + { + if(strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32) + BIO_printf(bio_err, + "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n"); + else if(strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 16) + BIO_printf(bio_err, + "warning: id_prefix is too long if you use SSLv2\n"); + if(!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx2, generate_session_id)) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting 'id_prefix'\n"); + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } + BIO_printf(bio_err,"id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix); + } + SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx2,1); + if (bugs) SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2,SSL_OP_ALL); + if (hack) SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2,SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG); + SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2,off); + + /* DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-( + * Setting read ahead solves this problem. + */ + if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx2, 1); + + + if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx2,apps_ssl_info_callback); + + SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx2,128); + + if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx2,CAfile,CApath)) || + (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx2))) + { + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + } + store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx2); + X509_STORE_set_flags(store, vflags); + } +#endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (!no_dhe) @@ -989,6 +1342,24 @@ bad: (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx,dh); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ctx2) + { + if (!dhfile) + { + DH *dh2=load_dh_param(s_cert_file2); + if (dh2 != NULL) + { + BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Setting temp DH parameters\n"); + (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); + + DH_free(dh); + dh = dh2; + } + } + SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx2,dh); + } +#endif DH_free(dh); } #endif @@ -1034,12 +1405,20 @@ bad: (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx,ecdh); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ctx2) + SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx2,ecdh); +#endif EC_KEY_free(ecdh); } #endif if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx,s_cert,s_key)) goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ctx2 && !set_cert_key_stuff(ctx2,s_cert2,s_key2)) + goto end; +#endif if (s_dcert != NULL) { if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx,s_dcert,s_dkey)) @@ -1049,7 +1428,13 @@ bad: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA #if 1 if (!no_tmp_rsa) + { SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx,tmp_rsa_cb); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ctx2) + SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx2,tmp_rsa_cb); +#endif + } #else if (!no_tmp_rsa && SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx)) { @@ -1065,6 +1450,16 @@ bad: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ctx2) + { + if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx2,rsa)) + { + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } + } +#endif RSA_free(rsa); BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"\n"); } @@ -1076,19 +1471,46 @@ bad: BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting cipher list\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ctx2 && !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx2,cipher)) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting cipher list\n"); + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } +#endif } SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx,s_server_verify,verify_callback); SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx,(void*)&s_server_session_id_context, sizeof s_server_session_id_context); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ctx2) + { + SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx2,s_server_verify,verify_callback); + SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx2,(void*)&s_server_session_id_context, + sizeof s_server_session_id_context); + + tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_s_out; + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx2, ssl_servername_cb); + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx2, &tlsextcbp); + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb); + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp); + } +#endif if (CAfile != NULL) - SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx,SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)); - + { + SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx,SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ctx2) + SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx2,SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)); +#endif + } BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"ACCEPT\n"); if (www) - do_server(port,sock_type,&accept_socket,www_body, context); + do_server(port,socket_type,&accept_socket,www_body, context); else - do_server(port,sock_type,&accept_socket,sv_body, context); + do_server(port,socket_type,&accept_socket,sv_body, context); print_stats(bio_s_out,ctx); ret=0; end: @@ -1105,6 +1527,13 @@ end: OPENSSL_free(pass); if (dpass) OPENSSL_free(dpass); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ctx2 != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx2); + if (s_cert2) + X509_free(s_cert2); + if (s_key2) + EVP_PKEY_free(s_key2); +#endif if (bio_s_out != NULL) { BIO_free(bio_s_out); @@ -1171,6 +1600,19 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context) if (con == NULL) { con=SSL_new(ctx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s_tlsextdebug) + { + SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); + SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); + } + if (s_tlsextstatus) + { + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, cert_status_cb); + tlscstatp.err = bio_err; + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, &tlscstatp); + } +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if ((con->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) { @@ -1241,6 +1683,13 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_out); } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s_tlsextdebug) + { + SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); + SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); + } +#endif width=s+1; for (;;) @@ -1606,6 +2055,13 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context) if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io,bufsize)) goto err; if ((con=SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s_tlsextdebug) + { + SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); + SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); + } +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if ((con->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) { diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c index 85f559ed81..8a1974f5fe 100644 --- a/apps/speed.c +++ b/apps/speed.c @@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) #define MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 64 #endif unsigned char DES_iv[8]; - unsigned char iv[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE/8]; + unsigned char iv[2*MAX_BLOCK_SIZE/8]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES DES_cblock *buf_as_des_cblock = NULL; static DES_cblock key ={0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9a,0xbc,0xde,0xf0}; diff --git a/apps/x509.c b/apps/x509.c index 5f61eb5c46..f6938356f8 100644 --- a/apps/x509.c +++ b/apps/x509.c @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static const char *x509_usage[]={ " -alias - output certificate alias\n", " -noout - no certificate output\n", " -ocspid - print OCSP hash values for the subject name and public key\n", +" -ocspurl - print OCSP Responder URL(s)\n", " -trustout - output a \"trusted\" certificate\n", " -clrtrust - clear all trusted purposes\n", " -clrreject - clear all rejected purposes\n", @@ -179,6 +180,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) int next_serial=0; int subject_hash=0,issuer_hash=0,ocspid=0; int noout=0,sign_flag=0,CA_flag=0,CA_createserial=0,email=0; + int ocsp_uri=0; int trustout=0,clrtrust=0,clrreject=0,aliasout=0,clrext=0; int C=0; int x509req=0,days=DEF_DAYS,modulus=0,pubkey=0; @@ -378,6 +380,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) C= ++num; else if (strcmp(*argv,"-email") == 0) email= ++num; + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-ocsp_uri") == 0) + ocsp_uri= ++num; else if (strcmp(*argv,"-serial") == 0) serial= ++num; else if (strcmp(*argv,"-next_serial") == 0) @@ -731,11 +735,14 @@ bad: ASN1_INTEGER_free(ser); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } - else if (email == i) + else if ((email == i) || (ocsp_uri == i)) { int j; STACK *emlst; - emlst = X509_get1_email(x); + if (email == i) + emlst = X509_get1_email(x); + else + emlst = X509_get1_ocsp(x); for (j = 0; j < sk_num(emlst); j++) BIO_printf(STDout, "%s\n", sk_value(emlst, j)); X509_email_free(emlst); diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1.h b/crypto/asn1/asn1.h index 30f1eecd5b..f15131ea3e 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/asn1.h +++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1.h @@ -322,6 +322,17 @@ typedef struct ASN1_VALUE_st ASN1_VALUE; #define I2D_OF(type) int (*)(type *,unsigned char **) #define I2D_OF_const(type) int (*)(const type *,unsigned char **) +#define CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i) \ + ((d2i_of_void*) (1 ? d2i : ((D2I_OF(type))0))) +#define CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d) \ + ((i2d_of_void*) (1 ? i2d : ((I2D_OF(type))0))) +#define CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew) \ + ((void *(*)(void)) (1 ? xnew : ((type *(*)(void))0))) +#define CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, p) \ + ((void*) (1 ? p : (type*)0)) +#define CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, p) \ + ((void**) (1 ? p : (type**)0)) + #define TYPEDEF_D2I_OF(type) typedef type *d2i_of_##type(type **,const unsigned char **,long) #define TYPEDEF_I2D_OF(type) typedef int i2d_of_##type(type *,unsigned char **) #define TYPEDEF_D2I2D_OF(type) TYPEDEF_D2I_OF(type); TYPEDEF_I2D_OF(type) @@ -902,23 +913,41 @@ int ASN1_object_size(int constructed, int length, int tag); /* Used to implement other functions */ void *ASN1_dup(i2d_of_void *i2d, d2i_of_void *d2i, char *x); + #define ASN1_dup_of(type,i2d,d2i,x) \ - ((type *(*)(I2D_OF(type),D2I_OF(type),type *))openssl_fcast(ASN1_dup))(i2d,d2i,x) + ((type*)ASN1_dup(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ + CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x))) + #define ASN1_dup_of_const(type,i2d,d2i,x) \ - ((type *(*)(I2D_OF_const(type),D2I_OF(type),type *))openssl_fcast(ASN1_dup))(i2d,d2i,x) + ((type*)ASN1_dup(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \ + CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x))) void *ASN1_item_dup(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *x); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API void *ASN1_d2i_fp(void *(*xnew)(void), d2i_of_void *d2i, FILE *in, void **x); + #define ASN1_d2i_fp_of(type,xnew,d2i,in,x) \ - ((type *(*)(type *(*)(void),D2I_OF(type),FILE *,type **))openssl_fcast(ASN1_d2i_fp))(xnew,d2i,in,x) + ((type*)ASN1_d2i_fp(CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew), \ + CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ + in, \ + CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x))) + void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x); int ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_of_void *i2d,FILE *out,void *x); + #define ASN1_i2d_fp_of(type,i2d,out,x) \ - ((int (*)(I2D_OF(type),FILE *,type *))openssl_fcast(ASN1_i2d_fp))(i2d,out,x) + (ASN1_i2d_fp(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ + out, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x))) + #define ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(type,i2d,out,x) \ - ((int (*)(I2D_OF_const(type),FILE *,type *))openssl_fcast(ASN1_i2d_fp))(i2d,out,x) + (ASN1_i2d_fp(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \ + out, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x))) + int ASN1_item_i2d_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *out, void *x); int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags); #endif @@ -927,14 +956,26 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO void *ASN1_d2i_bio(void *(*xnew)(void), d2i_of_void *d2i, BIO *in, void **x); + #define ASN1_d2i_bio_of(type,xnew,d2i,in,x) \ - ((type *(*)(type *(*)(void),D2I_OF(type),BIO *,type **))openssl_fcast(ASN1_d2i_bio))(xnew,d2i,in,x) + ((type*)ASN1_d2i_bio( CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew), \ + CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ + in, \ + CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x))) + void *ASN1_item_d2i_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *in, void *x); int ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d,BIO *out, unsigned char *x); + #define ASN1_i2d_bio_of(type,i2d,out,x) \ - ((int (*)(I2D_OF(type),BIO *,type *))openssl_fcast(ASN1_i2d_bio))(i2d,out,x) + (ASN1_i2d_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ + out, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x))) + #define ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(type,i2d,out,x) \ - ((int (*)(I2D_OF_const(type),BIO *,const type *))openssl_fcast(ASN1_i2d_bio))(i2d,out,x) + (ASN1_i2d_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \ + out, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x))) + int ASN1_item_i2d_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *out, void *x); int ASN1_UTCTIME_print(BIO *fp,ASN1_UTCTIME *a); int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(BIO *fp,ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *a); @@ -977,8 +1018,12 @@ void *ASN1_unpack_string(ASN1_STRING *oct, d2i_of_void *d2i); void *ASN1_item_unpack(ASN1_STRING *oct, const ASN1_ITEM *it); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_pack_string(void *obj, i2d_of_void *i2d, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **oct); + #define ASN1_pack_string_of(type,obj,i2d,oct) \ - ((ASN1_STRING *(*)(type *,I2D_OF(type),ASN1_OCTET_STRING **))openssl_fcast(ASN1_pack_string))(obj,i2d,oct) + (ASN1_pack_string(CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, obj), \ + CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ + oct)) + ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **oct); void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask); diff --git a/crypto/asn1/t_req.c b/crypto/asn1/t_req.c index c779a9bb18..5557e06584 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/t_req.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/t_req.c @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ get_next: } } } - if(!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES)) + if(!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS)) { exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(x); if(exts) @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ get_next: j=X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex); if (BIO_printf(bp,": %s\n",j?"critical":"") <= 0) goto err; - if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bp, ex, 0, 16)) + if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bp, ex, cflag, 16)) { BIO_printf(bp, "%16s", ""); M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_print(bp,ex->value); diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c index 66d229b08b..c4a3abe4f6 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL; if (!pval) pval = &ptmpval; - asn1_tlc_clear(&c); + c.valid = 0; if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) return *pval; return NULL; @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int ASN1_template_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt) { ASN1_TLC c; - asn1_tlc_clear(&c); + c.valid = 0; return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, tt, 0, &c); } diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c index 25c94aa1d9..ed892e2cb2 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c @@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out, { for (i = 0, tder = derlst; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++, tder++) - sk_ASN1_VALUE_set(sk, i, tder->field); + (void)sk_ASN1_VALUE_set(sk, i, tder->field); } OPENSSL_free(derlst); OPENSSL_free(tmpdat); diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c b/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c index b99f8fc522..70d56a67f2 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static int crl_inf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) * would affect the output of X509_CRL_print(). */ case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST: - sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked,X509_REVOKED_cmp); + (void)sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked,X509_REVOKED_cmp); break; } return 1; diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_exten.c b/crypto/asn1/x_exten.c index 702421b6c8..1732e66712 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/x_exten.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/x_exten.c @@ -67,5 +67,10 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_EXTENSION) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_EXTENSION, value, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_EXTENSION) +ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_EXTENSIONS) = + ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, Extension, X509_EXTENSION) +ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_EXTENSIONS) + IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_EXTENSION) +IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_EXTENSION) diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S index 7b82b820e6..951abc53ea 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S +++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S @@ -171,21 +171,21 @@ .skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary bn_add_words: .prologue - .fframe 0 .save ar.pfs,r2 { .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16 cmp4.le p6,p0=r35,r0 };; { .mfb; mov r8=r0 // return value (p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };; - .save ar.lc,r3 { .mib; sub r10=r35,r0,1 + .save ar.lc,r3 mov r3=ar.lc brp.loop.imp .L_bn_add_words_ctop,.L_bn_add_words_cend-16 } - .body { .mib; ADDP r14=0,r32 // rp + .save pr,r9 mov r9=pr };; + .body { .mii; ADDP r15=0,r33 // ap mov ar.lc=r10 mov ar.ec=6 } @@ -224,21 +224,21 @@ bn_add_words: .skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary bn_sub_words: .prologue - .fframe 0 .save ar.pfs,r2 { .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16 cmp4.le p6,p0=r35,r0 };; { .mfb; mov r8=r0 // return value (p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };; - .save ar.lc,r3 { .mib; sub r10=r35,r0,1 + .save ar.lc,r3 mov r3=ar.lc brp.loop.imp .L_bn_sub_words_ctop,.L_bn_sub_words_cend-16 } - .body { .mib; ADDP r14=0,r32 // rp + .save pr,r9 mov r9=pr };; + .body { .mii; ADDP r15=0,r33 // ap mov ar.lc=r10 mov ar.ec=6 } @@ -283,7 +283,6 @@ bn_sub_words: .skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary bn_mul_words: .prologue - .fframe 0 .save ar.pfs,r2 #ifdef XMA_TEMPTATION { .mfi; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,0,0,0 };; @@ -294,9 +293,10 @@ bn_mul_words: cmp4.le p6,p0=r34,r0 (p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };; - .save ar.lc,r3 { .mii; sub r10=r34,r0,1 + .save ar.lc,r3 mov r3=ar.lc + .save pr,r9 mov r9=pr };; .body @@ -397,22 +397,21 @@ bn_mul_words: .skip 48 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary bn_mul_add_words: .prologue - .fframe 0 .save ar.pfs,r2 - .save ar.lc,r3 - .save pr,r9 { .mmi; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,4,0,8 cmp4.le p6,p0=r34,r0 + .save ar.lc,r3 mov r3=ar.lc };; { .mib; mov r8=r0 // return value sub r10=r34,r0,1 (p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };; - .body { .mib; setf.sig f8=r35 // w + .save pr,r9 mov r9=pr brp.loop.imp .L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop,.L_bn_mul_add_words_cend-16 } + .body { .mmi; ADDP r14=0,r32 // rp ADDP r15=0,r33 // ap mov ar.lc=r10 } @@ -466,7 +465,6 @@ bn_mul_add_words: .skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary bn_sqr_words: .prologue - .fframe 0 .save ar.pfs,r2 { .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0 sxt4 r34=r34 };; @@ -476,9 +474,10 @@ bn_sqr_words: nop.f 0x0 (p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };; - .save ar.lc,r3 { .mii; sub r10=r34,r0,1 + .save ar.lc,r3 mov r3=ar.lc + .save pr,r9 mov r9=pr };; .body @@ -545,7 +544,6 @@ bn_sqr_words: .align 64 bn_sqr_comba8: .prologue - .fframe 0 .save ar.pfs,r2 #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64) { .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0 @@ -617,7 +615,6 @@ bn_sqr_comba8: .align 64 bn_mul_comba8: .prologue - .fframe 0 .save ar.pfs,r2 #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64) { .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0 @@ -1175,7 +1172,6 @@ bn_mul_comba8: .align 64 bn_sqr_comba4: .prologue - .fframe 0 .save ar.pfs,r2 #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64) { .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0 @@ -1208,7 +1204,6 @@ bn_sqr_comba4: .align 64 bn_mul_comba4: .prologue - .fframe 0 .save ar.pfs,r2 #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64) { .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0 @@ -1411,11 +1406,11 @@ equ=p24 .align 64 bn_div_words: .prologue - .fframe 0 .save ar.pfs,r2 - .save b0,r3 { .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,5,0,8 + .save b0,r3 mov r3=b0 + .save pr,r10 mov r10=pr };; { .mmb; cmp.eq p6,p0=r34,r0 mov r8=-1 diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_api.c b/crypto/conf/conf_api.c index 0032baa711..909d72b4b8 100644 --- a/crypto/conf/conf_api.c +++ b/crypto/conf/conf_api.c @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ int _CONF_add_string(CONF *conf, CONF_VALUE *section, CONF_VALUE *value) v = (CONF_VALUE *)lh_insert(conf->data, value); if (v != NULL) { - sk_CONF_VALUE_delete_ptr(ts,v); + (void)sk_CONF_VALUE_delete_ptr(ts,v); OPENSSL_free(v->name); OPENSSL_free(v->value); OPENSSL_free(v); diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c index 1373d46a4e..628e8333a6 100644 --- a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c +++ b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ void CONF_modules_unload(int all) if (((md->links > 0) || !md->dso) && !all) continue; /* Since we're working in reverse this is OK */ - sk_CONF_MODULE_delete(supported_modules, i); + (void)sk_CONF_MODULE_delete(supported_modules, i); module_free(md); } if (sk_CONF_MODULE_num(supported_modules) == 0) diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c index c053ea2873..316cb9221d 100644 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ #include /* Check that p is a safe prime and - * if g is 2, 3 or 5, check that is is a suitable generator + * if g is 2, 3 or 5, check that it is a suitable generator * where * for 2, p mod 24 == 11 * for 3, p mod 12 == 5 diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec.h b/crypto/ec/ec.h index 3c96fbd0d8..8bc2a235b1 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec.h +++ b/crypto/ec/ec.h @@ -471,6 +471,7 @@ void ERR_load_EC_strings(void); #define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP 126 #define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY 127 #define EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_DUP 207 +#define EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW 196 #define EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL 187 #define EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT 188 #define EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS 190 diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c index 7be315bac9..d04c895560 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* crypto/ec/ec_err.c */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP), "EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY), "EC_POINT_set_to_infinity"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_DUP), "EC_PRE_COMP_DUP"}, +{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW), "EC_PRE_COMP_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL), "ec_wNAF_mul"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT), "ec_wNAF_precompute_mult"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS), "i2d_ECParameters"}, diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c index a045139a00..2ba173ef36 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * Originally written by Bodo Moeller and Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -104,7 +104,10 @@ static EC_PRE_COMP *ec_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group) ret = (EC_PRE_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_PRE_COMP)); if (!ret) + { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ret; + } ret->group = group; ret->blocksize = 8; /* default */ ret->numblocks = 0; @@ -194,6 +197,19 @@ static signed char *compute_wNAF(const BIGNUM *scalar, int w, size_t *ret_len) int bit, next_bit, mask; size_t len = 0, j; + if (BN_is_zero(scalar)) + { + r = OPENSSL_malloc(1); + if (!r) + { + ECerr(EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + r[0] = 0; + *ret_len = 1; + return r; + } + if (w <= 0 || w > 7) /* 'signed char' can represent integers with absolute values less than 2^7 */ { ECerr(EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -212,7 +228,11 @@ static signed char *compute_wNAF(const BIGNUM *scalar, int w, size_t *ret_len) r = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); /* modified wNAF may be one digit longer than binary representation * (*ret_len will be set to the actual length, i.e. at most * BN_num_bits(scalar) + 1) */ - if (r == NULL) goto err; + if (r == NULL) + { + ECerr(EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } if (scalar->d == NULL || scalar->top == 0) { @@ -425,7 +445,10 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof val_sub[0]); if (!wsize || !wNAF_len || !wNAF || !val_sub) + { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; + } wNAF[0] = NULL; /* preliminary pivot */ @@ -538,6 +561,7 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, wNAF[i] = OPENSSL_malloc(wNAF_len[i]); if (wNAF[i] == NULL) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); goto err; } @@ -564,7 +588,11 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, * 'val_sub[i]' is a pointer to the subarray for the i-th point, * or to a subarray of 'pre_comp->points' if we already have precomputation. */ val = OPENSSL_malloc((num_val + 1) * sizeof val[0]); - if (val == NULL) goto err; + if (val == NULL) + { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } val[num_val] = NULL; /* pivot element */ /* allocate points for precomputation */ diff --git a/crypto/ec/ectest.c b/crypto/ec/ectest.c index 9d469f1cfa..6148d553f9 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ectest.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ectest.c @@ -659,13 +659,15 @@ void prime_field_tests() if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, R)) ABORT; /* R = P + 2Q */ { - const EC_POINT *points[3]; - const BIGNUM *scalars[3]; + const EC_POINT *points[4]; + const BIGNUM *scalars[4]; + BIGNUM scalar3; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT; points[0] = Q; points[1] = Q; points[2] = Q; + points[3] = Q; if (!BN_add(y, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT; if (BN_is_odd(y)) ABORT; @@ -704,10 +706,16 @@ void prime_field_tests() scalars[1] = y; scalars[2] = z; /* z = -(x+y) */ - if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 3, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT; + BN_init(&scalar3); + BN_zero(&scalar3); + scalars[3] = &scalar3; + + if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 4, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, " ok\n\n"); + + BN_free(&scalar3); } diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c index 32d66a9774..3ead1af94e 100644 --- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c @@ -251,8 +251,16 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } - if (dgst_len > BN_num_bytes(order)) + if (8 * dgst_len > BN_num_bits(order)) { + /* XXX + * + * Should provide for optional hash truncation: + * Keep the BN_num_bits(order) leftmost bits of dgst + * (see March 2006 FIPS 186-3 draft, which has a few + * confusing errors in this part though) + */ + ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ECDSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); goto err; @@ -376,6 +384,21 @@ static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } + if (8 * dgst_len > BN_num_bits(order)) + { + /* XXX + * + * Should provide for optional hash truncation: + * Keep the BN_num_bits(order) leftmost bits of dgst + * (see March 2006 FIPS 186-3 draft, which has a few + * confusing errors in this part though) + */ + + ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, + ECDSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); + ret = 0; + goto err; + } if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) || BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) || diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_table.c b/crypto/engine/eng_table.c index a83c3899ee..0c1656168d 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_table.c +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_table.c @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int engine_table_register(ENGINE_TABLE **table, ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cleanup, lh_insert(&(*table)->piles, fnd); } /* A registration shouldn't add duplciate entries */ - sk_ENGINE_delete_ptr(fnd->sk, e); + (void)sk_ENGINE_delete_ptr(fnd->sk, e); /* if 'setdefault', this ENGINE goes to the head of the list */ if(!sk_ENGINE_push(fnd->sk, e)) goto end; @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static void int_unregister_cb(ENGINE_PILE *pile, ENGINE *e) /* Iterate the 'c->sk' stack removing any occurance of 'e' */ while((n = sk_ENGINE_find(pile->sk, e)) >= 0) { - sk_ENGINE_delete(pile->sk, n); + (void)sk_ENGINE_delete(pile->sk, n); /* "touch" this ENGINE_CIPHER */ pile->uptodate = 1; } diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp.h b/crypto/evp/evp.h index 054902865b..ed4393d8fb 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/evp.h +++ b/crypto/evp/evp.h @@ -1049,6 +1049,7 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void); #define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE 126 #define EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH 109 #define EVP_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE 110 +#define EVP_R_SEED_KEY_SETUP_FAILED 162 #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/crypto/ex_data.c b/crypto/ex_data.c index 8914218fe8..3b11e7a556 100644 --- a/crypto/ex_data.c +++ b/crypto/ex_data.c @@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ static int def_add_index(EX_CLASS_ITEM *item, long argl, void *argp, } } toret = item->meth_num++; - sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_set(item->meth, toret, a); + (void)sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_set(item->meth, toret, a); err: CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA); return toret; diff --git a/crypto/md4/md4test.c b/crypto/md4/md4test.c index 5da53382c9..56591728a1 100644 --- a/crypto/md4/md4test.c +++ b/crypto/md4/md4test.c @@ -97,12 +97,12 @@ static char *pt(unsigned char *md); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i,err=0; - unsigned char **P,**R; + char **P,**R; char *p; unsigned char md[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - P=(unsigned char **)test; - R=(unsigned char **)ret; + P=test; + R=ret; i=1; while (*P != NULL) { diff --git a/crypto/md5/md5test.c b/crypto/md5/md5test.c index 0628053fa7..2b37190e32 100644 --- a/crypto/md5/md5test.c +++ b/crypto/md5/md5test.c @@ -97,12 +97,12 @@ static char *pt(unsigned char *md); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i,err=0; - unsigned char **P,**R; + char **P,**R; char *p; unsigned char md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - P=(unsigned char **)test; - R=(unsigned char **)ret; + P=test; + R=ret; i=1; while (*P != NULL) { diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h index a9528d5392..49dd4c1763 100644 --- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h +++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h @@ -62,12 +62,12 @@ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ -#define NUM_NID 780 -#define NUM_SN 773 -#define NUM_LN 773 -#define NUM_OBJ 729 +#define NUM_NID 786 +#define NUM_SN 779 +#define NUM_LN 779 +#define NUM_OBJ 735 -static unsigned char lvalues[5154]={ +static unsigned char lvalues[5204]={ 0x00, /* [ 0] OBJ_undef */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D, /* [ 1] OBJ_rsadsi */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01, /* [ 7] OBJ_pkcs */ @@ -797,6 +797,12 @@ static unsigned char lvalues[5154]={ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x04, /* [5129] OBJ_seed_cbc */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x06, /* [5137] OBJ_seed_ofb128 */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x05, /* [5145] OBJ_seed_cfb128 */ +0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x08,0x01,0x01, /* [5153] OBJ_hmac_md5 */ +0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x08,0x01,0x02, /* [5161] OBJ_hmac_sha1 */ +0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x0D,/* [5169] OBJ_id_PasswordBasedMAC */ +0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x1E,/* [5178] OBJ_id_DHBasedMac */ +0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x10, /* [5187] OBJ_id_it_suppLangTags */ +0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x05, /* [5195] OBJ_caRepository */ }; static ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID]={ @@ -2009,6 +2015,15 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID]={ {"SEED-CBC","seed-cbc",NID_seed_cbc,8,&(lvalues[5129]),0}, {"SEED-OFB","seed-ofb",NID_seed_ofb128,8,&(lvalues[5137]),0}, {"SEED-CFB","seed-cfb",NID_seed_cfb128,8,&(lvalues[5145]),0}, +{"HMAC-MD5","hmac-md5",NID_hmac_md5,8,&(lvalues[5153]),0}, +{"HMAC-SHA1","hmac-sha1",NID_hmac_sha1,8,&(lvalues[5161]),0}, +{"id-PasswordBasedMAC","password based MAC",NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC,9, + &(lvalues[5169]),0}, +{"id-DHBasedMac","Diffie-Hellman based MAC",NID_id_DHBasedMac,9, + &(lvalues[5178]),0}, +{"id-it-suppLangTags","id-it-suppLangTags",NID_id_it_suppLangTags,8, + &(lvalues[5187]),0}, +{"caRepository","CA Repository",NID_caRepository,8,&(lvalues[5195]),0}, }; static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={ @@ -2089,6 +2104,8 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={ &(nid_objs[67]),/* "DSA-old" */ &(nid_objs[297]),/* "DVCS" */ &(nid_objs[99]),/* "GN" */ +&(nid_objs[780]),/* "HMAC-MD5" */ +&(nid_objs[781]),/* "HMAC-SHA1" */ &(nid_objs[381]),/* "IANA" */ &(nid_objs[34]),/* "IDEA-CBC" */ &(nid_objs[35]),/* "IDEA-CFB" */ @@ -2227,6 +2244,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={ &(nid_objs[703]),/* "c2tnb431r1" */ &(nid_objs[483]),/* "cNAMERecord" */ &(nid_objs[179]),/* "caIssuers" */ +&(nid_objs[785]),/* "caRepository" */ &(nid_objs[443]),/* "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax" */ &(nid_objs[152]),/* "certBag" */ &(nid_objs[677]),/* "certicom-arc" */ @@ -2285,6 +2303,8 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={ &(nid_objs[473]),/* "homeTelephoneNumber" */ &(nid_objs[466]),/* "host" */ &(nid_objs[442]),/* "iA5StringSyntax" */ +&(nid_objs[783]),/* "id-DHBasedMac" */ +&(nid_objs[782]),/* "id-PasswordBasedMAC" */ &(nid_objs[266]),/* "id-aca" */ &(nid_objs[355]),/* "id-aca-accessIdentity" */ &(nid_objs[354]),/* "id-aca-authenticationInfo" */ @@ -2343,6 +2363,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *sn_objs[NUM_SN]={ &(nid_objs[299]),/* "id-it-signKeyPairTypes" */ &(nid_objs[305]),/* "id-it-subscriptionRequest" */ &(nid_objs[306]),/* "id-it-subscriptionResponse" */ +&(nid_objs[784]),/* "id-it-suppLangTags" */ &(nid_objs[304]),/* "id-it-unsupportedOIDs" */ &(nid_objs[128]),/* "id-kp" */ &(nid_objs[280]),/* "id-mod-attribute-cert" */ @@ -2796,7 +2817,9 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *ln_objs[NUM_LN]={ &(nid_objs[365]),/* "Basic OCSP Response" */ &(nid_objs[285]),/* "Biometric Info" */ &(nid_objs[179]),/* "CA Issuers" */ +&(nid_objs[785]),/* "CA Repository" */ &(nid_objs[131]),/* "Code Signing" */ +&(nid_objs[783]),/* "Diffie-Hellman based MAC" */ &(nid_objs[382]),/* "Directory" */ &(nid_objs[392]),/* "Domain" */ &(nid_objs[132]),/* "E-mail Protection" */ @@ -3049,6 +3072,8 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *ln_objs[NUM_LN]={ &(nid_objs[509]),/* "generationQualifier" */ &(nid_objs[601]),/* "generic cryptogram" */ &(nid_objs[99]),/* "givenName" */ +&(nid_objs[780]),/* "hmac-md5" */ +&(nid_objs[781]),/* "hmac-sha1" */ &(nid_objs[163]),/* "hmacWithSHA1" */ &(nid_objs[486]),/* "homePostalAddress" */ &(nid_objs[473]),/* "homeTelephoneNumber" */ @@ -3113,6 +3138,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *ln_objs[NUM_LN]={ &(nid_objs[299]),/* "id-it-signKeyPairTypes" */ &(nid_objs[305]),/* "id-it-subscriptionRequest" */ &(nid_objs[306]),/* "id-it-subscriptionResponse" */ +&(nid_objs[784]),/* "id-it-suppLangTags" */ &(nid_objs[304]),/* "id-it-unsupportedOIDs" */ &(nid_objs[128]),/* "id-kp" */ &(nid_objs[280]),/* "id-mod-attribute-cert" */ @@ -3272,6 +3298,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *ln_objs[NUM_LN]={ &(nid_objs[18]),/* "organizationalUnitName" */ &(nid_objs[475]),/* "otherMailbox" */ &(nid_objs[489]),/* "pagerTelephoneNumber" */ +&(nid_objs[782]),/* "password based MAC" */ &(nid_objs[374]),/* "path" */ &(nid_objs[621]),/* "payment gateway capabilities" */ &(nid_objs[ 9]),/* "pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC" */ @@ -3987,6 +4014,7 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *obj_objs[NUM_OBJ]={ &(nid_objs[310]),/* OBJ_id_it_implicitConfirm 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 13 */ &(nid_objs[311]),/* OBJ_id_it_confirmWaitTime 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 14 */ &(nid_objs[312]),/* OBJ_id_it_origPKIMessage 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 15 */ +&(nid_objs[784]),/* OBJ_id_it_suppLangTags 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 16 */ &(nid_objs[313]),/* OBJ_id_regCtrl 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 */ &(nid_objs[314]),/* OBJ_id_regInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 2 */ &(nid_objs[323]),/* OBJ_id_alg_des40 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 1 */ @@ -4036,6 +4064,9 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *obj_objs[NUM_OBJ]={ &(nid_objs[179]),/* OBJ_ad_ca_issuers 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2 */ &(nid_objs[363]),/* OBJ_ad_timeStamping 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 3 */ &(nid_objs[364]),/* OBJ_ad_dvcs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 4 */ +&(nid_objs[785]),/* OBJ_caRepository 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 5 */ +&(nid_objs[780]),/* OBJ_hmac_md5 1 3 6 1 5 5 8 1 1 */ +&(nid_objs[781]),/* OBJ_hmac_sha1 1 3 6 1 5 5 8 1 2 */ &(nid_objs[58]),/* OBJ_netscape_cert_extension 2 16 840 1 113730 1 */ &(nid_objs[59]),/* OBJ_netscape_data_type 2 16 840 1 113730 2 */ &(nid_objs[438]),/* OBJ_pilotAttributeType 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 */ @@ -4044,6 +4075,8 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *obj_objs[NUM_OBJ]={ &(nid_objs[441]),/* OBJ_pilotGroups 0 9 2342 19200300 100 10 */ &(nid_objs[108]),/* OBJ_cast5_cbc 1 2 840 113533 7 66 10 */ &(nid_objs[112]),/* OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC 1 2 840 113533 7 66 12 */ +&(nid_objs[782]),/* OBJ_id_PasswordBasedMAC 1 2 840 113533 7 66 13 */ +&(nid_objs[783]),/* OBJ_id_DHBasedMac 1 2 840 113533 7 66 30 */ &(nid_objs[ 6]),/* OBJ_rsaEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 */ &(nid_objs[ 7]),/* OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 2 */ &(nid_objs[396]),/* OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 3 */ diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_mac.h b/crypto/objects/obj_mac.h index 68b6e31a97..e4ce03b3f0 100644 --- a/crypto/objects/obj_mac.h +++ b/crypto/objects/obj_mac.h @@ -97,6 +97,16 @@ #define NID_identified_organization 676 #define OBJ_identified_organization OBJ_iso,3L +#define SN_hmac_md5 "HMAC-MD5" +#define LN_hmac_md5 "hmac-md5" +#define NID_hmac_md5 780 +#define OBJ_hmac_md5 OBJ_identified_organization,6L,1L,5L,5L,8L,1L,1L + +#define SN_hmac_sha1 "HMAC-SHA1" +#define LN_hmac_sha1 "hmac-sha1" +#define NID_hmac_sha1 781 +#define OBJ_hmac_sha1 OBJ_identified_organization,6L,1L,5L,5L,8L,1L,2L + #define SN_certicom_arc "certicom-arc" #define NID_certicom_arc 677 #define OBJ_certicom_arc OBJ_identified_organization,132L @@ -498,6 +508,16 @@ #define NID_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC 112 #define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,12L +#define SN_id_PasswordBasedMAC "id-PasswordBasedMAC" +#define LN_id_PasswordBasedMAC "password based MAC" +#define NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC 782 +#define OBJ_id_PasswordBasedMAC OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,13L + +#define SN_id_DHBasedMac "id-DHBasedMac" +#define LN_id_DHBasedMac "Diffie-Hellman based MAC" +#define NID_id_DHBasedMac 783 +#define OBJ_id_DHBasedMac OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,30L + #define SN_rsadsi "rsadsi" #define LN_rsadsi "RSA Data Security, Inc." #define NID_rsadsi 1 @@ -1513,6 +1533,10 @@ #define NID_id_it_origPKIMessage 312 #define OBJ_id_it_origPKIMessage OBJ_id_it,15L +#define SN_id_it_suppLangTags "id-it-suppLangTags" +#define NID_id_it_suppLangTags 784 +#define OBJ_id_it_suppLangTags OBJ_id_it,16L + #define SN_id_regCtrl "id-regCtrl" #define NID_id_regCtrl 313 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl OBJ_id_pkip,1L @@ -1748,6 +1772,11 @@ #define NID_ad_dvcs 364 #define OBJ_ad_dvcs OBJ_id_ad,4L +#define SN_caRepository "caRepository" +#define LN_caRepository "CA Repository" +#define NID_caRepository 785 +#define OBJ_caRepository OBJ_id_ad,5L + #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP OBJ_ad_OCSP #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_basic "basicOCSPResponse" diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num b/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num index 76fa050c11..06e4193651 100644 --- a/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num +++ b/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num @@ -777,3 +777,9 @@ seed_ecb 776 seed_cbc 777 seed_ofb128 778 seed_cfb128 779 +hmac_md5 780 +hmac_sha1 781 +id_PasswordBasedMAC 782 +id_DHBasedMac 783 +id_it_suppLangTags 784 +caRepository 785 diff --git a/crypto/objects/objects.txt b/crypto/objects/objects.txt index 499ff62fbe..bbba5ed04b 100644 --- a/crypto/objects/objects.txt +++ b/crypto/objects/objects.txt @@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ iso 2 : member-body : ISO Member Body iso 3 : identified-organization +# HMAC OIDs +identified-organization 6 1 5 5 8 1 1 : HMAC-MD5 : hmac-md5 +identified-organization 6 1 5 5 8 1 2 : HMAC-SHA1 : hmac-sha1 + identified-organization 132 : certicom-arc joint-iso-itu-t 23 : international-organizations : International Organizations @@ -141,6 +145,10 @@ ISO-US 113533 7 66 10 : CAST5-CBC : cast5-cbc !Cname pbeWithMD5AndCast5-CBC ISO-US 113533 7 66 12 : : pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC +# Macs for CMP and CRMF +ISO-US 113533 7 66 13 : id-PasswordBasedMAC : password based MAC +ISO-US 113533 7 66 30 : id-DHBasedMac : Diffie-Hellman based MAC + ISO-US 113549 : rsadsi : RSA Data Security, Inc. rsadsi 1 : pkcs : RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS @@ -484,6 +492,7 @@ id-it 12 : id-it-revPassphrase id-it 13 : id-it-implicitConfirm id-it 14 : id-it-confirmWaitTime id-it 15 : id-it-origPKIMessage +id-it 16 : id-it-suppLangTags # CRMF registration id-pkip 1 : id-regCtrl @@ -570,6 +579,7 @@ id-ad 2 : caIssuers : CA Issuers id-ad 3 : ad_timestamping : AD Time Stamping !Cname ad-dvcs id-ad 4 : AD_DVCS : ad dvcs +id-ad 5 : caRepository : CA Repository !Alias id-pkix-OCSP ad-OCSP diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp.h b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp.h index 53f3364af0..a0577a717e 100644 --- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp.h +++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp.h @@ -186,11 +186,11 @@ typedef struct ocsp_resp_bytes_st * responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus, * responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL } */ -typedef struct ocsp_response_st +struct ocsp_response_st { ASN1_ENUMERATED *responseStatus; OCSP_RESPBYTES *responseBytes; - } OCSP_RESPONSE; + }; /* ResponderID ::= CHOICE { * byName [1] Name, @@ -198,14 +198,18 @@ typedef struct ocsp_response_st */ #define V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME 0 #define V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY 1 -typedef struct ocsp_responder_id_st +struct ocsp_responder_id_st { int type; union { X509_NAME* byName; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *byKey; } value; - } OCSP_RESPID; + }; + +DECLARE_STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) +DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPID) + /* KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING --SHA-1 hash of responder's public key * --(excluding the tag and length fields) */ @@ -397,6 +401,10 @@ typedef struct ocsp_service_locator_st (char *(*)())d2i_OCSP_CERTSTATUS,(char *)(cs)) OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *b, char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req); +OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req, + int maxline); +int OCSP_sendreq_nbio(OCSP_RESPONSE **presp, OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx); +void OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx); OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_to_id(const EVP_MD *dgst, X509 *subject, X509 *issuer); @@ -469,7 +477,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_sign(OCSP_BASICRESP *brsp, ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_encode(ASN1_STRING *s, i2d_of_void *i2d, void *data, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *sk); #define ASN1_STRING_encode_of(type,s,i2d,data,sk) \ -((ASN1_STRING *(*)(ASN1_STRING *,I2D_OF(type),type *,STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *))openssl_fcast(ASN1_STRING_encode))(s,i2d,data,sk) + ASN1_STRING_encode(s, CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), data, sk) X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_crlID_new(char *url, long *n, char *tim); @@ -574,6 +582,7 @@ void ERR_load_OCSP_strings(void); #define OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY 116 #define OCSP_F_OCSP_RESPONSE_GET1_BASIC 111 #define OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO 112 +#define OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1 117 #define OCSP_F_REQUEST_VERIFY 113 /* Reason codes. */ diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c index ad62364f29..d2f2e79f44 100644 --- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c +++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA OCSP_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY), "OCSP_request_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_RESPONSE_GET1_BASIC), "OCSP_response_get1_basic"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO), "OCSP_sendreq_bio"}, +{ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1), "PARSE_HTTP_LINE1"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_REQUEST_VERIFY), "REQUEST_VERIFY"}, {0,NULL} }; diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ht.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ht.c index 9213e58ae4..a8e569b74a 100644 --- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ht.c +++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ht.c @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ /* ocsp_ht.c */ /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL - * project 2000. + * project 2006. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -68,106 +68,404 @@ #define strtoul (unsigned long)strtol #endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_SUNOS */ -/* Quick and dirty HTTP OCSP request handler. - * Could make this a bit cleverer by adding - * support for non blocking BIOs and a few - * other refinements. - */ +/* Stateful OCSP request code, supporting non-blocking I/O */ -OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *b, char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req) -{ - BIO *mem = NULL; - char tmpbuf[1024]; - OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; - char *p, *q, *r; - int len, retcode; - static char req_txt[] = -"POST %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\ -Content-Type: application/ocsp-request\r\n\ -Content-Length: %d\r\n\r\n"; - - len = i2d_OCSP_REQUEST(req, NULL); - if(BIO_printf(b, req_txt, path, len) < 0) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO,OCSP_R_SERVER_WRITE_ERROR); - goto err; - } - if(i2d_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(b, req) <= 0) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO,OCSP_R_SERVER_WRITE_ERROR); - goto err; +/* Opaque OCSP request status structure */ + +struct ocsp_req_ctx_st { + int state; /* Current I/O state */ + unsigned char *iobuf; /* Line buffer */ + int iobuflen; /* Line buffer length */ + BIO *io; /* BIO to perform I/O with */ + BIO *mem; /* Memory BIO response is built into */ + unsigned long asn1_len; /* ASN1 length of response */ + }; + +#define OCSP_MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH (100 * 1024) +#define OCSP_MAX_LINE_LEN 4096; + +/* OCSP states */ + +/* If set no reading should be performed */ +#define OHS_NOREAD 0x1000 +/* Error condition */ +#define OHS_ERROR (0 | OHS_NOREAD) +/* First line being read */ +#define OHS_FIRSTLINE 1 +/* MIME headers being read */ +#define OHS_HEADERS 2 +/* OCSP initial header (tag + length) being read */ +#define OHS_ASN1_HEADER 3 +/* OCSP content octets being read */ +#define OHS_ASN1_CONTENT 4 +/* Request being sent */ +#define OHS_ASN1_WRITE (6 | OHS_NOREAD) +/* Request being flushed */ +#define OHS_ASN1_FLUSH (7 | OHS_NOREAD) +/* Completed */ +#define OHS_DONE (8 | OHS_NOREAD) + + +static int parse_http_line1(char *line); + +void OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx) + { + if (rctx->mem) + BIO_free(rctx->mem); + if (rctx->iobuf) + OPENSSL_free(rctx->iobuf); + OPENSSL_free(rctx); } - if(!(mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) goto err; - /* Copy response to a memory BIO: socket bios can't do gets! */ - while ((len = BIO_read(b, tmpbuf, sizeof tmpbuf))) { - if(len < 0) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO,OCSP_R_SERVER_READ_ERROR); - goto err; + +OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req, + int maxline) + { + static char post_hdr[] = "POST %s HTTP/1.0\r\n" + "Content-Type: application/ocsp-request\r\n" + "Content-Length: %d\r\n\r\n"; + + OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx; + rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(OCSP_REQ_CTX)); + rctx->state = OHS_FIRSTLINE; + rctx->mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + rctx->io = io; + if (maxline > 0) + rctx->iobuflen = maxline; + else + rctx->iobuflen = OCSP_MAX_LINE_LEN; + rctx->iobuf = OPENSSL_malloc(rctx->iobuflen); + if (!path) + path = "/"; + + if (BIO_printf(rctx->mem, post_hdr, path, + i2d_OCSP_REQUEST(req, NULL)) <= 0) + { + rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; + return 0; } - BIO_write(mem, tmpbuf, len); - } - if(BIO_gets(mem, tmpbuf, 512) <= 0) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO,OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR); - goto err; + if (i2d_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(rctx->mem, req) <= 0) + { + rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; + return 0; + } + rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_WRITE; + rctx->asn1_len = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, NULL); + + return rctx; } - /* Parse the HTTP response. This will look like this: - * "HTTP/1.0 200 OK". We need to obtain the numeric code and - * (optional) informational message. - */ +/* Parse the HTTP response. This will look like this: + * "HTTP/1.0 200 OK". We need to obtain the numeric code and + * (optional) informational message. + */ + +static int parse_http_line1(char *line) + { + int retcode; + char *p, *q, *r; /* Skip to first white space (passed protocol info) */ - for(p = tmpbuf; *p && !isspace((unsigned char)*p); p++) continue; - if(!*p) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO,OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR); - goto err; - } + + for(p = line; *p && !isspace((unsigned char)*p); p++) + continue; + if(!*p) + { + OCSPerr(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1, + OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* Skip past white space to start of response code */ - while(*p && isspace((unsigned char)*p)) p++; - if(!*p) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO,OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR); - goto err; - } + while(*p && isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + p++; + + if(!*p) + { + OCSPerr(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1, + OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* Find end of response code: first whitespace after start of code */ - for(q = p; *q && !isspace((unsigned char)*q); q++) continue; - if(!*q) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO,OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR); - goto err; - } + for(q = p; *q && !isspace((unsigned char)*q); q++) + continue; + + if(!*q) + { + OCSPerr(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1, + OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* Set end of response code and start of message */ *q++ = 0; + /* Attempt to parse numeric code */ retcode = strtoul(p, &r, 10); - if(*r) goto err; + + if(*r) + return 0; + /* Skip over any leading white space in message */ - while(*q && isspace((unsigned char)*q)) q++; - if(*q) { - /* Finally zap any trailing white space in message (include CRLF) */ - /* We know q has a non white space character so this is OK */ - for(r = q + strlen(q) - 1; isspace((unsigned char)*r); r--) *r = 0; - } - if(retcode != 200) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO,OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_ERROR); - if(!*q) { - ERR_add_error_data(2, "Code=", p); + while(*q && isspace((unsigned char)*q)) + q++; + + if(*q) + { + /* Finally zap any trailing white space in message (include + * CRLF) */ + + /* We know q has a non white space character so this is OK */ + for(r = q + strlen(q) - 1; isspace((unsigned char)*r); r--) + *r = 0; } - else { + if(retcode != 200) + { + OCSPerr(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1, OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_ERROR); + if(!*q) + ERR_add_error_data(2, "Code=", p); + else ERR_add_error_data(4, "Code=", p, ",Reason=", q); + return 0; } - goto err; + + + return 1; + } - /* Find blank line marking beginning of content */ - while(BIO_gets(mem, tmpbuf, 512) > 0) + +int OCSP_sendreq_nbio(OCSP_RESPONSE **presp, OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx) { - for(p = tmpbuf; *p && isspace((unsigned char)*p); p++) continue; - if(!*p) break; - } - if(*p) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO,OCSP_R_NO_CONTENT); - goto err; + int i, n; + const unsigned char *p; + next_io: + if (!(rctx->state & OHS_NOREAD)) + { + n = BIO_read(rctx->io, rctx->iobuf, rctx->iobuflen); + + if (n <= 0) + { + if (BIO_should_retry(rctx->io)) + return -1; + return 0; + } + + /* Write data to memory BIO */ + + if (BIO_write(rctx->mem, rctx->iobuf, n) != n) + return 0; + } + + switch(rctx->state) + { + + case OHS_ASN1_WRITE: + n = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, &p); + + i = BIO_write(rctx->io, + p + (n - rctx->asn1_len), rctx->asn1_len); + + if (i <= 0) + { + if (BIO_should_retry(rctx->io)) + return -1; + rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + rctx->asn1_len -= i; + + if (rctx->asn1_len > 0) + goto next_io; + + rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_FLUSH; + + (void)BIO_reset(rctx->mem); + + case OHS_ASN1_FLUSH: + + i = BIO_flush(rctx->io); + + if (i > 0) + { + rctx->state = OHS_FIRSTLINE; + goto next_io; + } + + if (BIO_should_retry(rctx->io)) + return -1; + + rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; + return 0; + + case OHS_ERROR: + return 0; + + case OHS_FIRSTLINE: + case OHS_HEADERS: + + /* Attempt to read a line in */ + + next_line: + /* Due to &%^*$" memory BIO behaviour with BIO_gets we + * have to check there's a complete line in there before + * calling BIO_gets or we'll just get a partial read. + */ + n = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, &p); + if ((n <= 0) || !memchr(p, '\n', n)) + { + if (n >= rctx->iobuflen) + { + rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; + return 0; + } + goto next_io; + } + n = BIO_gets(rctx->mem, (char *)rctx->iobuf, rctx->iobuflen); + + if (n <= 0) + { + if (BIO_should_retry(rctx->mem)) + goto next_io; + rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + /* Don't allow excessive lines */ + if (n == rctx->iobuflen) + { + rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + /* First line */ + if (rctx->state == OHS_FIRSTLINE) + { + if (parse_http_line1((char *)rctx->iobuf)) + { + rctx->state = OHS_HEADERS; + goto next_line; + } + else + { + rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; + return 0; + } + } + else + { + /* Look for blank line: end of headers */ + for (p = rctx->iobuf; *p; p++) + { + if ((*p != '\r') && (*p != '\n')) + break; + } + if (*p) + goto next_line; + + rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_HEADER; + + } + + /* Fall thru */ + + + case OHS_ASN1_HEADER: + /* Now reading ASN1 header: can read at least 6 bytes which + * is more than enough for any valid ASN1 SEQUENCE header + */ + n = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, &p); + if (n < 6) + goto next_io; + + /* Check it is an ASN1 SEQUENCE */ + if (*p++ != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE|V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) + { + rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + /* Check out length field */ + if (*p & 0x80) + { + n = *p & 0x7F; + /* Not NDEF or excessive length */ + if (!n || (n > 4)) + { + rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; + return 0; + } + p++; + rctx->asn1_len = 0; + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + { + rctx->asn1_len <<= 8; + rctx->asn1_len |= *p++; + } + + if (rctx->asn1_len > OCSP_MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH) + { + rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + rctx->asn1_len += n + 2; + } + else + rctx->asn1_len = *p + 2; + + rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_CONTENT; + + /* Fall thru */ + + case OHS_ASN1_CONTENT: + n = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, &p); + if (n < (int)rctx->asn1_len) + goto next_io; + + + *presp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, rctx->asn1_len); + if (*presp) + { + rctx->state = OHS_DONE; + return 1; + } + + rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; + return 0; + + break; + + case OHS_DONE: + return 1; + + } + + + + return 0; + + } - if(!(resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(mem, NULL))) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_SENDREQ_BIO,ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); - goto err; + +/* Blocking OCSP request handler: now a special case of non-blocking I/O */ + +OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *b, char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req) + { + OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; + OCSP_REQ_CTX *ctx; + int rv; + + ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(b, path, req, -1); + + do + { + rv = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&resp, ctx); + } while ((rv == -1) && BIO_should_retry(b)); + + OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(ctx); + + if (rv) + return resp; + + return NULL; } - err: - BIO_free(mem); - return resp; -} diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h index 8dc1ef545a..e09ca54ec1 100644 --- a/crypto/opensslv.h +++ b/crypto/opensslv.h @@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x00908060L +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x00908080L #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8f-fips-dev xx XXXX xxxx" +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8h-fips-dev xx XXX xxxx" #else -#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8f-dev xx XXXX xxxx" +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8h-dev xx XXX xxxx" #endif #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT diff --git a/crypto/ossl_typ.h b/crypto/ossl_typ.h index 9c335a1819..08c2968f12 100644 --- a/crypto/ossl_typ.h +++ b/crypto/ossl_typ.h @@ -171,4 +171,8 @@ typedef void CRYPTO_EX_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, typedef int CRYPTO_EX_dup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp); +typedef struct ocsp_req_ctx_st OCSP_REQ_CTX; +typedef struct ocsp_response_st OCSP_RESPONSE; +typedef struct ocsp_responder_id_st OCSP_RESPID; + #endif /* def HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H */ diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem.h b/crypto/pem/pem.h index c28706ddc0..4e24cc5b52 100644 --- a/crypto/pem/pem.h +++ b/crypto/pem/pem.h @@ -220,19 +220,28 @@ typedef struct pem_ctx_st #define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_fp(name, type, str, asn1) \ type *PEM_read_##name(FILE *fp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)\ { \ -return(((type *(*)(D2I_OF(type),char *,FILE *,type **,pem_password_cb *,void *))openssl_fcast(PEM_ASN1_read))(d2i_##asn1, str,fp,x,cb,u)); \ + return (type*)PEM_ASN1_read(CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i_##asn1), \ + str, fp, \ + CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x), \ + cb, u); \ } #define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x) \ { \ -return(((int (*)(I2D_OF(type),const char *,FILE *,type *, const EVP_CIPHER *,unsigned char *,int, pem_password_cb *,void *))openssl_fcast(PEM_ASN1_write))(i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)); \ + return PEM_ASN1_write(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d_##asn1), \ + str, fp, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x), \ + NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); \ } #define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, const type *x) \ { \ -return(((int (*)(I2D_OF_const(type),const char *,FILE *, const type *, const EVP_CIPHER *,unsigned char *,int, pem_password_cb *,void *))openssl_fcast(PEM_ASN1_write))(i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)); \ + return PEM_ASN1_write(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d_##asn1), \ + str, fp, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x), \ + NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); \ } #define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type, str, asn1) \ @@ -240,7 +249,10 @@ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, \ void *u) \ { \ - return(((int (*)(I2D_OF(type),const char *,FILE *,type *, const EVP_CIPHER *,unsigned char *,int, pem_password_cb *,void *))openssl_fcast(PEM_ASN1_write))(i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u)); \ + return PEM_ASN1_write(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d_##asn1), \ + str, fp, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x), \ + enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); \ } #define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ @@ -248,7 +260,10 @@ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, \ void *u) \ { \ - return(((int (*)(I2D_OF_const(type),const char *,FILE *,type *, const EVP_CIPHER *,unsigned char *,int, pem_password_cb *,void *))openssl_fcast(PEM_ASN1_write))(i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u)); \ + return PEM_ASN1_write(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d_##asn1), \ + str, fp, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x), \ + enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); \ } #endif @@ -256,33 +271,48 @@ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ #define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ type *PEM_read_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)\ { \ -return(((type *(*)(D2I_OF(type),const char *,BIO *,type **,pem_password_cb *,void *))openssl_fcast(PEM_ASN1_read_bio))(d2i_##asn1, str,bp,x,cb,u)); \ + return (type*)PEM_ASN1_read_bio(CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i_##asn1), \ + str, bp, \ + CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x), \ + cb, u); \ } #define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x) \ { \ -return(((int (*)(I2D_OF(type),const char *,BIO *,type *, const EVP_CIPHER *,unsigned char *,int, pem_password_cb *,void *))openssl_fcast(PEM_ASN1_write_bio))(i2d_##asn1,str,bp,x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)); \ + return PEM_ASN1_write_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d_##asn1), \ + str, bp, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x), \ + NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); \ } #define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, const type *x) \ { \ -return(((int (*)(I2D_OF_const(type),const char *,BIO *,const type *, const EVP_CIPHER *,unsigned char *,int, pem_password_cb *,void *))openssl_fcast(PEM_ASN1_write_bio))(i2d_##asn1,str,bp,x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)); \ + return PEM_ASN1_write_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d_##asn1), \ + str, bp, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x), \ + NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); \ } #define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) \ { \ - return(((int (*)(I2D_OF(type),const char *,BIO *,type *,const EVP_CIPHER *,unsigned char *,int,pem_password_cb *,void *))openssl_fcast(PEM_ASN1_write_bio))(i2d_##asn1,str,bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u)); \ + return PEM_ASN1_write_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d_##asn1), \ + str, bp, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x), \ + enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); \ } #define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) \ { \ - return(((int (*)(I2D_OF_const(type),const char *,BIO *,type *,const EVP_CIPHER *,unsigned char *,int,pem_password_cb *,void *))openssl_fcast(PEM_ASN1_write_bio))(i2d_##asn1,str,bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u)); \ + return PEM_ASN1_write_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d_##asn1), \ + str, bp, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x), \ + enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); \ } #define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write(name, type, str, asn1) \ @@ -545,13 +575,22 @@ int PEM_bytes_read_bio(unsigned char **pdata, long *plen, char **pnm, const char pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); void * PEM_ASN1_read_bio(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, BIO *bp, void **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + #define PEM_ASN1_read_bio_of(type,d2i,name,bp,x,cb,u) \ -((type *(*)(D2I_OF(type),const char *,BIO *,type **,pem_password_cb *,void *))openssl_fcast(PEM_ASN1_read_bio))(d2i,name,bp,x,cb,u) + ((type*)PEM_ASN1_read_bio(CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ + name, bp, \ + CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x), \ + cb, u)) + int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d,const char *name,BIO *bp,char *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,unsigned char *kstr,int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + #define PEM_ASN1_write_bio_of(type,i2d,name,bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u) \ - ((int (*)(I2D_OF(type),const char *,BIO *,type *, const EVP_CIPHER *,unsigned char *,int, pem_password_cb *,void *))openssl_fcast(PEM_ASN1_write_bio))(i2d,name,bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u) + (PEM_ASN1_write_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ + name, bp, \ + CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x), \ + enc, kstr, klen, cb, u)) STACK_OF(X509_INFO) * PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio(BIO *bp,X509_INFO *xi, EVP_CIPHER *enc, diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c index 105e4e07ad..28b2ebfd14 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c @@ -220,7 +220,6 @@ void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy) int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); - memset(buf, 0, num); if (meth && meth->bytes) return meth->bytes(buf,num); return(-1); @@ -229,7 +228,6 @@ int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); - memset(buf, 0, num); if (meth && meth->pseudorand) return meth->pseudorand(buf,num); return(-1); diff --git a/crypto/ripemd/rmdtest.c b/crypto/ripemd/rmdtest.c index cbfdf2ae6f..fb34e0e836 100644 --- a/crypto/ripemd/rmdtest.c +++ b/crypto/ripemd/rmdtest.c @@ -103,12 +103,12 @@ static char *pt(unsigned char *md); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i,err=0; - unsigned char **P,**R; + char **P,**R; char *p; unsigned char md[RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - P=(unsigned char **)test; - R=(unsigned char **)ret; + P=test; + R=ret; i=1; while (*P != NULL) { diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl index 93a4f01796..f7ed67a726 100755 --- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl +++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ # gcc 3.4 32-bit asm cycles/byte # Opteron +45% +20% 6.8 # Xeon P4 +65% +0% 9.9 -# Core2 +60% +10% 8.8 +# Core2 +60% +10% 7.0 $output=shift; diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha1test.c b/crypto/sha/sha1test.c index b0650c7254..6feb3964c7 100644 --- a/crypto/sha/sha1test.c +++ b/crypto/sha/sha1test.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static char *pt(unsigned char *md); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i,err=0; - unsigned char **P,**R; + char **P,**R; static unsigned char buf[1000]; char *p,*r; EVP_MD_CTX c; @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) #endif EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c); - P=(unsigned char **)test; - R=(unsigned char **)ret; + P=test; + R=ret; i=1; while (*P != NULL) { diff --git a/crypto/stack/safestack.h b/crypto/stack/safestack.h index d496f365c2..c3b7ed53db 100644 --- a/crypto/stack/safestack.h +++ b/crypto/stack/safestack.h @@ -57,11 +57,20 @@ #include -typedef void (*openssl_fptr)(void); -#define openssl_fcast(f) ((openssl_fptr)f) - #ifdef DEBUG_SAFESTACK +#ifndef CHECKED_PTR_OF +#define CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, p) \ + ((void*) (1 ? p : (type*)0)) +#endif + +#define CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC(type, p) \ + ((void (*)(void *)) ((1 ? p : (void (*)(type *))0))) + +#define CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC(type, p) \ + ((int (*)(const char * const *, const char * const *)) \ + ((1 ? p : (int (*)(const type * const *, const type * const *))0))) + #define STACK_OF(type) struct stack_st_##type #define PREDECLARE_STACK_OF(type) STACK_OF(type); @@ -76,76 +85,71 @@ STACK_OF(type) \ /* SKM_sk_... stack macros are internal to safestack.h: * never use them directly, use sk__... instead */ #define SKM_sk_new(type, cmp) \ - ((STACK_OF(type) * (*)(int (*)(const type * const *, const type * const *)))openssl_fcast(sk_new))(cmp) + ((STACK_OF(type) *)sk_new(CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC(type, cmp))) #define SKM_sk_new_null(type) \ - ((STACK_OF(type) * (*)(void))openssl_fcast(sk_new_null))() + ((STACK_OF(type) *)sk_new_null()) #define SKM_sk_free(type, st) \ - ((void (*)(STACK_OF(type) *))openssl_fcast(sk_free))(st) + sk_free(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st)) #define SKM_sk_num(type, st) \ - ((int (*)(const STACK_OF(type) *))openssl_fcast(sk_num))(st) + sk_num(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st)) #define SKM_sk_value(type, st,i) \ - ((type * (*)(const STACK_OF(type) *, int))openssl_fcast(sk_value))(st, i) + ((type *)sk_value(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), i)) #define SKM_sk_set(type, st,i,val) \ - ((type * (*)(STACK_OF(type) *, int, type *))openssl_fcast(sk_set))(st, i, val) + sk_set(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), i, CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, val)) #define SKM_sk_zero(type, st) \ - ((void (*)(STACK_OF(type) *))openssl_fcast(sk_zero))(st) + sk_zero(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st)) #define SKM_sk_push(type, st,val) \ - ((int (*)(STACK_OF(type) *, type *))openssl_fcast(sk_push))(st, val) + sk_push(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, val)) #define SKM_sk_unshift(type, st,val) \ - ((int (*)(STACK_OF(type) *, type *))openssl_fcast(sk_unshift))(st, val) + sk_unshift(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, val)) #define SKM_sk_find(type, st,val) \ - ((int (*)(STACK_OF(type) *, type *))openssl_fcast(sk_find))(st, val) + sk_find(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, val)) #define SKM_sk_delete(type, st,i) \ - ((type * (*)(STACK_OF(type) *, int))openssl_fcast(sk_delete))(st, i) + (type *)sk_delete(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), i) #define SKM_sk_delete_ptr(type, st,ptr) \ - ((type * (*)(STACK_OF(type) *, type *))openssl_fcast(sk_delete_ptr))(st, ptr) + (type *)sk_delete_ptr(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, ptr)) #define SKM_sk_insert(type, st,val,i) \ - ((int (*)(STACK_OF(type) *, type *, int))openssl_fcast(sk_insert))(st, val, i) + sk_insert(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, val), i) #define SKM_sk_set_cmp_func(type, st,cmp) \ - ((int (*(*)(STACK_OF(type) *, int (*)(const type * const *, const type * const *))) \ - (const type * const *, const type * const *))openssl_fcast(sk_set_cmp_func))\ - (st, cmp) + ((int (*)(const type * const *,const type * const *)) \ + sk_set_cmp_func(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC(type, cmp))) #define SKM_sk_dup(type, st) \ - ((STACK_OF(type) *(*)(STACK_OF(type) *))openssl_fcast(sk_dup))(st) + (STACK_OF(type) *)sk_dup(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st)) #define SKM_sk_pop_free(type, st,free_func) \ - ((void (*)(STACK_OF(type) *, void (*)(type *)))openssl_fcast(sk_pop_free))\ - (st, free_func) + sk_pop_free(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC(type, free_func)) #define SKM_sk_shift(type, st) \ - ((type * (*)(STACK_OF(type) *))openssl_fcast(sk_shift))(st) + (type *)sk_shift(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st)) #define SKM_sk_pop(type, st) \ - ((type * (*)(STACK_OF(type) *))openssl_fcast(sk_pop))(st) + (type *)sk_pop(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st)) #define SKM_sk_sort(type, st) \ - ((void (*)(STACK_OF(type) *))openssl_fcast(sk_sort))(st) + sk_sort(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st)) #define SKM_sk_is_sorted(type, st) \ - ((int (*)(const STACK_OF(type) *))openssl_fcast(sk_is_sorted))(st) + sk_is_sorted(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st)) #define SKM_ASN1_SET_OF_d2i(type, st, pp, length, d2i_func, free_func, ex_tag, ex_class) \ -((STACK_OF(type) * (*) (STACK_OF(type) **,const unsigned char **, long , \ - type *(*)(type **, const unsigned char **,long), \ - void (*)(type *), int ,int )) openssl_fcast(d2i_ASN1_SET)) \ - (st,pp,length, d2i_func, free_func, ex_tag,ex_class) + (STACK_OF(type) *)d2i_ASN1_SET(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), \ + pp, length, \ + CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i_func), \ + CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC(type, free_func), \ + ex_tag, ex_class) + #define SKM_ASN1_SET_OF_i2d(type, st, pp, i2d_func, ex_tag, ex_class, is_set) \ - ((int (*)(STACK_OF(type) *,unsigned char **, \ - int (*)(type *,unsigned char **), int , int , int)) openssl_fcast(i2d_ASN1_SET)) \ - (st,pp,i2d_func,ex_tag,ex_class,is_set) + i2d_ASN1_SET(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), pp, \ + CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d_func), \ + ex_tag, ex_class, is_set) #define SKM_ASN1_seq_pack(type, st, i2d_func, buf, len) \ - ((unsigned char *(*)(STACK_OF(type) *, \ - int (*)(type *,unsigned char **), unsigned char **,int *)) openssl_fcast(ASN1_seq_pack)) \ - (st, i2d_func, buf, len) + ASN1_seq_pack(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type), st), \ + CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d_func), buf, len) + #define SKM_ASN1_seq_unpack(type, buf, len, d2i_func, free_func) \ - ((STACK_OF(type) * (*)(const unsigned char *,int, \ - type *(*)(type **,const unsigned char **, long), \ - void (*)(type *)))openssl_fcast(ASN1_seq_unpack)) \ - (buf,len,d2i_func, free_func) + (STACK_OF(type) *)ASN1_seq_unpack(buf, len, CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i_func), CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC(type, free_func)) #define SKM_PKCS12_decrypt_d2i(type, algor, d2i_func, free_func, pass, passlen, oct, seq) \ - ((STACK_OF(type) * (*)(X509_ALGOR *, \ - type *(*)(type **, const unsigned char **, long), \ - void (*)(type *), \ - const char *, int, \ - ASN1_STRING *, int))PKCS12_decrypt_d2i) \ - (algor,d2i_func,free_func,pass,passlen,oct,seq) + (STACK_OF(type) *)PKCS12_decrypt_d2i(algor, \ + CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i_func), \ + CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC(type, free_func), \ + pass, passlen, oct, seq) #else @@ -960,6 +964,28 @@ STACK_OF(type) \ #define sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(OCSP_ONEREQ, (st)) #define sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(OCSP_ONEREQ, (st)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_new(st) SKM_sk_new(OCSP_RESPID, (st)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(OCSP_RESPID) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_free(st) SKM_sk_free(OCSP_RESPID, (st)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(st) SKM_sk_num(OCSP_RESPID, (st)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(st, i) SKM_sk_value(OCSP_RESPID, (st), (i)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_set(st, i, val) SKM_sk_set(OCSP_RESPID, (st), (i), (val)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero(OCSP_RESPID, (st)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(st, val) SKM_sk_push(OCSP_RESPID, (st), (val)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_unshift(st, val) SKM_sk_unshift(OCSP_RESPID, (st), (val)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_find(st, val) SKM_sk_find(OCSP_RESPID, (st), (val)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_find_ex(st, val) SKM_sk_find_ex(OCSP_RESPID, (st), (val)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete(OCSP_RESPID, (st), (i)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_delete_ptr(st, ptr) SKM_sk_delete_ptr(OCSP_RESPID, (st), (ptr)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_insert(st, val, i) SKM_sk_insert(OCSP_RESPID, (st), (val), (i)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) SKM_sk_set_cmp_func(OCSP_RESPID, (st), (cmp)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup(OCSP_RESPID, st) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(st, free_func) SKM_sk_pop_free(OCSP_RESPID, (st), (free_func)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift(OCSP_RESPID, (st)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop(st) SKM_sk_pop(OCSP_RESPID, (st)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(OCSP_RESPID, (st)) +#define sk_OCSP_RESPID_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(OCSP_RESPID, (st)) + #define sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_new(st) SKM_sk_new(OCSP_SINGLERESP, (st)) #define sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(OCSP_SINGLERESP) #define sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_free(st) SKM_sk_free(OCSP_SINGLERESP, (st)) diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509.h b/crypto/x509/x509.h index 16a954f709..c431237ec7 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509.h +++ b/crypto/x509/x509.h @@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ typedef struct X509_extension_st ASN1_OCTET_STRING *value; } X509_EXTENSION; +typedef STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) X509_EXTENSIONS; + DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_EXTENSION) @@ -918,6 +920,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ATTRIBUTE) X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(int nid, int atrtype, void *value); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_EXTENSION) +DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME_ENTRY) diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index 07df21f6b9..9a62ebcf67 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) goto end; } CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); + (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); ctx->last_untrusted++; x=xtmp; num++; @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) */ X509_free(x); x = xtmp; - sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); + (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); ctx->last_untrusted=0; } } diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c index 5e69259a79..e9db6d62a7 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_table(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { ptmp = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, idx); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ptmp); - sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_delete(param_table, idx); + (void)sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_delete(param_table, idx); } } if (!sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_push(param_table, param)) diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c index 27d29f25a8..4fda1d419a 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) { node->parent->nchild--; OPENSSL_free(node); - sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(curr->nodes, i); + (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(curr->nodes, i); } } @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) { node->parent->nchild--; OPENSSL_free(node); - sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(curr->nodes, i); + (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(curr->nodes, i); } } if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c index 3dba0557b8..ac171ca940 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c @@ -473,6 +473,30 @@ STACK *X509_get1_email(X509 *x) return ret; } +STACK *X509_get1_ocsp(X509 *x) +{ + AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *info; + STACK *ret = NULL; + int i; + info = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL); + if (!info) + return NULL; + for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(info); i++) + { + ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(info, i); + if (OBJ_obj2nid(ad->method) == NID_ad_OCSP) + { + if (ad->location->type == GEN_URI) + { + if (!append_ia5(&ret, ad->location->d.uniformResourceIdentifier)) + break; + } + } + } + AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_free(info); + return ret; +} + STACK *X509_REQ_get1_email(X509_REQ *x) { GENERAL_NAMES *gens; diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h b/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h index 91d2fb5b8b..db2b0482c1 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h +++ b/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h @@ -617,6 +617,7 @@ int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *); STACK *X509_get1_email(X509 *x); STACK *X509_REQ_get1_email(X509_REQ *x); void X509_email_free(STACK *sk); +STACK *X509_get1_ocsp(X509 *x); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS(const char *ipasc); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS_NC(const char *ipasc); diff --git a/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/doc/apps/s_client.pod index c17a83a225..c44d357cf7 100644 --- a/doc/apps/s_client.pod +++ b/doc/apps/s_client.pod @@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ B B [B<-cipher cipherlist>] [B<-starttls protocol>] [B<-engine id>] +[B<-tlsextdebug>] +[B<-no_ticket>] +[B<-sess_out filename>] +[B<-sess_in filename>] [B<-rand file(s)>] =head1 DESCRIPTION @@ -186,6 +190,26 @@ send the protocol-specific message(s) to switch to TLS for communication. B is a keyword for the intended protocol. Currently, the only supported keywords are "smtp", "pop3", "imap", and "ftp". +=item B<-tlsextdebug> + +print out a hex dump of any TLS extensions received from the server. Note: this +option is only available if extension support is explicitly enabled at compile +time + +=item B<-no_ticket> + +disable RFC4507bis session ticket support. Note: this option is only available +if extension support is explicitly enabled at compile time + +=item B<-sess_out filename> + +output SSL session to B + +=item B<-sess_in sess.pem> + +load SSL session from B. The client will attempt to resume a +connection from this session. + =item B<-engine id> specifying an engine (by it's unique B string) will cause B @@ -246,6 +270,13 @@ on the command line is no guarantee that the certificate works. If there are problems verifying a server certificate then the B<-showcerts> option can be used to show the whole chain. +Since the SSLv23 client hello cannot include compression methods or extensions +these will only be supported if its use is disabled, for example by using the +B<-no_sslv2> option. + +TLS extensions are only supported in OpenSSL 0.9.8 if they are explictly +enabled at compile time using for example the B switch. + =head1 BUGS Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of diff --git a/doc/apps/s_server.pod b/doc/apps/s_server.pod index 7c1a9581d9..57c2adfb9f 100644 --- a/doc/apps/s_server.pod +++ b/doc/apps/s_server.pod @@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ B B [B<-WWW>] [B<-HTTP>] [B<-engine id>] +[B<-tlsextdebug>] +[B<-no_ticket>] [B<-id_prefix arg>] [B<-rand file(s)>] @@ -205,6 +207,14 @@ also included in the server list is used. Because the client specifies the preference order, the order of the server cipherlist irrelevant. See the B command for more information. +=item B<-tlsextdebug> + +print out a hex dump of any TLS extensions received from the server. + +=item B<-no_ticket> + +disable RFC4507bis session ticket support. + =item B<-www> sends a status message back to the client when it connects. This includes @@ -307,6 +317,9 @@ mean any CA is acceptable. This is useful for debugging purposes. The session parameters can printed out using the B program. +TLS extensions are only supported in OpenSSL 0.9.8 if they are explictly +enabled at compile time using for example the B switch. + =head1 BUGS Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of diff --git a/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod b/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod index ba6e3c2e81..60867d951a 100644 --- a/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod +++ b/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod @@ -28,7 +28,11 @@ The actual data encoded is determined by the string B and the configuration information. The general format of the string is: - B<[modifier,]type[:value]> +=over 2 + +=item B<[modifier,]type[:value]> + +=back That is zero or more comma separated modifiers followed by a type followed by an optional colon and a value. The formats of B, @@ -81,13 +85,13 @@ the format B. =item B, B -Emcodes an ASN1 B. B represents the contents +Encodes an ASN1 B. B represents the contents of this structure, the format strings B and B can be used to specify the format of B. -=item B, B +=item B, B -Emcodes an ASN1 B. B represents the contents +Encodes an ASN1 B. B represents the contents of this structure, the format strings B, B and B can be used to specify the format of B. @@ -171,13 +175,13 @@ An IA5String explicitly tagged using APPLICATION tagging: A more complex example using a config file to produce a SEQUENCE consiting of a BOOL an OID and a UTF8String: -asn1 = SEQUENCE:seq_section + asn1 = SEQUENCE:seq_section -[seq_section] + [seq_section] -field1 = BOOLEAN:TRUE -field2 = OID:commonName -field3 = UTF8:Third field + field1 = BOOLEAN:TRUE + field2 = OID:commonName + field3 = UTF8:Third field This example produces an RSAPrivateKey structure, this is the key contained in the file client.pem in all OpenSSL distributions diff --git a/doc/crypto/DH_set_method.pod b/doc/crypto/DH_set_method.pod index 73261fc467..d5cdc3be0c 100644 --- a/doc/crypto/DH_set_method.pod +++ b/doc/crypto/DH_set_method.pod @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ structures created later. B: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has been set as a default for DH, so this function is no longer recommended. DH_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default DH_METHOD. -However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependant on whether the ENGINE +However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependent on whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended. DH_set_method() selects B to perform all operations using the key B. diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_set_method.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_set_method.pod index bc3cfb1f0a..9c1434bd8d 100644 --- a/doc/crypto/DSA_set_method.pod +++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_set_method.pod @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ structures created later. B: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has been set as a default for DSA, so this function is no longer recommended. DSA_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default -DSA_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependant on +DSA_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependent on whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended. diff --git a/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod index 121a8ddee5..2e659d34a5 100644 --- a/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod +++ b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod @@ -17,19 +17,27 @@ register after executing CPUID instruction with EAX=1 input value (see Intel Application Note #241618). Naturally it's meaningful on IA-32[E] platforms only. The variable is normally set up automatically upon toolkit initialization, but can be manipulated afterwards to modify -crypto library behaviour. For the moment of this writing three bits are -significant, namely bit #28 denoting Hyperthreading, which is used to -distinguish Intel P4 core, bit #26 denoting SSE2 support, and bit #4 -denoting presence of Time-Stamp Counter. Clearing bit #26 at run-time -for example disables high-performance SSE2 code present in the crypto -library. You might have to do this if target OpenSSL application is -executed on SSE2 capable CPU, but under control of OS which does not -support SSE2 extentions. Even though you can manipulate the value -programmatically, you most likely will find it more appropriate to set -up an environment variable with the same name prior starting target -application, e.g. 'env OPENSSL_ia32cap=0x10 apps/openssl', to achieve -same effect without modifying the application source code. -Alternatively you can reconfigure the toolkit with no-sse2 option and -recompile. +crypto library behaviour. For the moment of this writing six bits are +significant, namely: + +1. bit #28 denoting Hyperthreading, which is used to distiguish + cores with shared cache; +2. bit #26 denoting SSE2 support; +3. bit #25 denoting SSE support; +4. bit #23 denoting MMX support; +5. bit #20, reserved by Intel, is used to choose between RC4 code + pathes; +6. bit #4 denoting presence of Time-Stamp Counter. + +For example, clearing bit #26 at run-time disables high-performance +SSE2 code present in the crypto library. You might have to do this if +target OpenSSL application is executed on SSE2 capable CPU, but under +control of OS which does not support SSE2 extentions. Even though you +can manipulate the value programmatically, you most likely will find it +more appropriate to set up an environment variable with the same name +prior starting target application, e.g. on Intel P4 processor 'env +OPENSSL_ia32cap=0x12900010 apps/openssl', to achieve same effect +without modifying the application source code. Alternatively you can +reconfigure the toolkit with no-sse2 option and recompile. =cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RAND_bytes.pod b/doc/crypto/RAND_bytes.pod index ce6329ce54..1a9b91e281 100644 --- a/doc/crypto/RAND_bytes.pod +++ b/doc/crypto/RAND_bytes.pod @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ unpredictable. They can be used for non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic protocols, but usually not for key generation etc. +The contents of B is mixed into the entropy pool before retrieving +the new pseudo-random bytes unless disabled at compile time (see FAQ). + =head1 RETURN VALUES RAND_bytes() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. The error code can be diff --git a/doc/crypto/RAND_set_rand_method.pod b/doc/crypto/RAND_set_rand_method.pod index c9bb6d9f27..e5b780fad0 100644 --- a/doc/crypto/RAND_set_rand_method.pod +++ b/doc/crypto/RAND_set_rand_method.pod @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ true only whilst no ENGINE has been set as a default for RAND, so this function is no longer recommended. RAND_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current RAND_METHOD. -However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependant on whether the ENGINE +However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependent on whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended. =head1 THE RAND_METHOD STRUCTURE diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_set_method.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_set_method.pod index 0a305f6b14..2c963d7e5b 100644 --- a/doc/crypto/RSA_set_method.pod +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_set_method.pod @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ structures created later. B: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has been set as a default for RSA, so this function is no longer recommended. RSA_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default -RSA_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependant on +RSA_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependent on whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended. diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod index 919b908919..2579a5dc9d 100644 --- a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod +++ b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod @@ -86,10 +86,10 @@ is equivalent to: B -B is a more readable one line format it is the same as: +B is a more readable one line format which is the same as: B -B is a multiline format is is the same as: +B is a multiline format which is the same as: B B uses a format identical to X509_NAME_print(): in fact it calls X509_NAME_print() internally. diff --git a/doc/crypto/engine.pod b/doc/crypto/engine.pod index 75933fccad..f5ab1c3e50 100644 --- a/doc/crypto/engine.pod +++ b/doc/crypto/engine.pod @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ Due to the modular nature of the ENGINE API, pointers to ENGINEs need to be treated as handles - ie. not only as pointers, but also as references to the underlying ENGINE object. Ie. one should obtain a new reference when making copies of an ENGINE pointer if the copies will be used (and -released) independantly. +released) independently. ENGINE objects have two levels of reference-counting to match the way in which the objects are used. At the most basic level, each ENGINE pointer is @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ B reference. This kind of reference can be considered a specialised form of structural reference, because each functional reference implicitly contains a structural reference as well - however to avoid difficult-to-find programming bugs, it is recommended to treat the two -kinds of reference independantly. If you have a functional reference to an +kinds of reference independently. If you have a functional reference to an ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised ready to perform cryptographic operations and will remain uninitialised until after you have released your reference. @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ extension). The ENGINE API and internal architecture is currently being reviewed. Slated for possible release in 0.9.8 is support for transparent loading of "dynamic" ENGINEs (built as self-contained shared-libraries). This would allow ENGINE -implementations to be provided independantly of OpenSSL libraries and/or +implementations to be provided independently of OpenSSL libraries and/or OpenSSL-based applications, and would also remove any requirement for applications to explicitly use the "dynamic" ENGINE to bind to shared-library implementations. diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod index fa63263601..eaed190809 100644 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod @@ -201,6 +201,15 @@ When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session (i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial handshake). This option is not needed for clients. +=item SSL_OP_NO_TICKET + +Normally clients and servers will, where possible, transparently make use +of RFC4507bis tickets for stateless session resumption if extension support +is explicitly set when OpenSSL is compiled. + +If this option is set this functionality is disabled and tickets will +not be used by clients or servers. + =back =head1 RETURN VALUES diff --git a/e_os.h b/e_os.h index 5068d1bd74..ab3c539eab 100644 --- a/e_os.h +++ b/e_os.h @@ -277,6 +277,14 @@ static unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str) } # endif # include +# if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER<=1200 && defined(_MT) && defined(isspace) + /* compensate for bug is VC6 ctype.h */ +# undef isspace +# undef isdigit +# undef isalnum +# undef isupper +# undef isxdigit +# endif # endif # include # include diff --git a/engines/e_gmp.c b/engines/e_gmp.c index 39da65f74b..f7126d8621 100644 --- a/engines/e_gmp.c +++ b/engines/e_gmp.c @@ -57,10 +57,10 @@ */ /* This engine is not (currently) compiled in by default. Do enable it, - * reconfigure OpenSSL with "-DOPENSSL_USE_GMP -lgmp". The GMP libraries and + * reconfigure OpenSSL with "enable-gmp -lgmp". The GMP libraries and * headers must reside in one of the paths searched by the compiler/linker, * otherwise paths must be specified - eg. try configuring with - * "-DOPENSSL_USE_GMP -I -L -lgmp". YMMV. */ + * "enable-gmp -I -L -lgmp". YMMV. */ /* As for what this does - it's a largely unoptimised implementation of an * ENGINE that uses the GMP library to perform RSA private key operations. To @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -#if defined(OPENSSL_USE_GMP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_GMP) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMP #include @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static int e_gmp_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) /* This stuff is needed if this ENGINE is being compiled into a self-contained * shared-library. */ -#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT +#ifndef ENGINE_NO_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT static int bind_fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id) { if(id && (strcmp(id, engine_e_gmp_id) != 0)) @@ -430,6 +430,6 @@ IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_fn) #endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_GMP */ +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_GMP */ #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */ diff --git a/engines/e_ubsec.c b/engines/e_ubsec.c index 8b6c98bafa..e8389de6a1 100644 --- a/engines/e_ubsec.c +++ b/engines/e_ubsec.c @@ -822,11 +822,11 @@ static int ubsec_dsa_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, int v_len, d_len; int to_return = 0; int fd; - BIGNUM v; + BIGNUM v, *pv = &v; BN_init(&v); - if(!bn_wexpand(&v, dsa->p->top)) { + if(!bn_wexpand(pv, dsa->p->top)) { UBSECerr(UBSEC_F_UBSEC_DSA_VERIFY, UBSEC_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL); goto err; } diff --git a/makevms.com b/makevms.com index 284ff87ccb..2b2173bf4a 100755 --- a/makevms.com +++ b/makevms.com @@ -317,7 +317,12 @@ $ WRITE H_FILE "#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT" $ WRITE H_FILE "#undef SIXTEEN_BIT" $ WRITE H_FILE "#undef EIGHT_BIT" $ WRITE H_FILE "#endif" -$ +$! +$ WRITE H_FILE "#if defined(HEADER_SHA_H)" +$ WRITE H_FILE "#undef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512" +$ WRITE H_FILE "#define OPENSSL_NO_SHA512" +$ WRITE H_FILE "#endif" +$! $ WRITE H_FILE "#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" $ WRITE H_FILE "#define OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" $! diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index 7e6d300377..15a201a25c 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -138,38 +138,40 @@ static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, unsigned long frag_len); static int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s); static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, - long max, int *ok); -static void dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int frag_len); + long max, int *ok); static hm_fragment * dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len) - { - hm_fragment *frag = NULL; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - - frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment)); - if ( frag == NULL) - return NULL; - - buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len - + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); - if ( buf == NULL) - { - OPENSSL_free(frag); - return NULL; - } - - frag->fragment = buf; - - return frag; - } + { + hm_fragment *frag = NULL; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment)); + if ( frag == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (frag_len) + { + buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len); + if ( buf == NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(frag); + return NULL; + } + } + + /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */ + frag->fragment = buf; + + return frag; + } static void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag) - { - OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); - OPENSSL_free(frag); - } + { + if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); + OPENSSL_free(frag); + } /* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) @@ -180,7 +182,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */ if ( ! (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) - { + { s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); @@ -207,7 +209,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) mtu = curr_mtu; else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0) return ret; - + if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu) { ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); @@ -254,11 +256,11 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - /* write atleast DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes */ + /* write atleast DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes */ if ( len <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } - + dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); @@ -286,18 +288,40 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) } else { - + /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake * message got sent. but why would this happen? */ - OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret); - + OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret); + if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting) + { /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case * we'll ignore the result anyway */ - ssl3_finish_mac(s, - (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off + - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH], ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); - + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]; + const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; + int xlen; + + if (frag_off == 0 && s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + /* reconstruct message header is if it + * is being sent in single fragment */ + *p++ = msg_hdr->type; + l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p); + s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p); + l2n3(0,p); + l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p); + p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + xlen = ret; + } + else + { + p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + } + + ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen); + } + if (ret == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) @@ -307,7 +331,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */ s->init_num = 0; - + return(1); } s->init_off+=ret; @@ -327,6 +351,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) { int i, al; + struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr; /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused * by the absence of an optional handshake message */ @@ -344,25 +369,56 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size; return s->init_num; } - + + msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr; do { - if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) + if ( msg_hdr->frag_off == 0) { /* s->d1->r_message_header.msg_len = 0; */ - memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); + memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); } i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok); if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || - i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */ + i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */ continue; else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok) return i; - if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len == (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) + /* Note that s->init_sum is used as a counter summing + * up fragments' lengths: as soon as they sum up to + * handshake packet length, we assume we have got all + * the fragments. Overlapping fragments would cause + * premature termination, so we don't expect overlaps. + * Well, handling overlaps would require something more + * drastic. Indeed, as it is now there is no way to + * tell if out-of-order fragment from the middle was + * the last. '>=' is the best/least we can do to control + * the potential damage caused by malformed overlaps. */ + if ((unsigned int)s->init_num >= msg_hdr->msg_len) { - memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + unsigned long msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; + + /* reconstruct message header as if it was + * sent in single fragment */ + *(p++) = msg_hdr->type; + l2n3(msg_len,p); + s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p); + l2n3(0,p); + l2n3(msg_len,p); + if (s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) + p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, + msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + + ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len); + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + p, msg_len, + s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; /* we just read a handshake message from the other side: @@ -379,11 +435,11 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) * first data segment, but is there a better way? */ dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); - s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - return s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + return s->init_num; } else - s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off = i; + msg_hdr->frag_off = i; } while(1) ; f_err: @@ -393,161 +449,183 @@ f_err: } -static int -dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, unsigned long *copied) - { - /* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available - * if so: - * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[] - * (2) update s->init_num - */ - pitem *item; - hm_fragment *frag; - unsigned long overlap; - unsigned char *p; - - item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages); - if ( item == NULL) - return 0; - - frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; - - if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq && - frag->msg_header.frag_off <= (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) - { - pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); - overlap = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - - frag->msg_header.frag_off; - - p = frag->fragment; - - memcpy(&s->init_buf->data[s->init_num], - p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + overlap, - frag->msg_header.frag_len - overlap); - - OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); - OPENSSL_free(frag); - pitem_free(item); - - *copied = frag->msg_header.frag_len - overlap; - return *copied; - } - else - return 0; - } +static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max) + { + size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len; + msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; + frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off; + frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; -static int -dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr) -{ - hm_fragment *frag = NULL; - pitem *item = NULL; - PQ_64BIT seq64; + /* sanity checking */ + if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } - frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->frag_len); - if ( frag == NULL) - goto err; + if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } - memcpy(frag->fragment, &(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num]), - msg_hdr->frag_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); + if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */ + { + /* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked + * against max above */ + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } - memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); + s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len; + s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len; + s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type; + s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type; + s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq; + } + else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) + { + /* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce + * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + return 0; /* no error */ + } - pq_64bit_init(&seq64); - pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq); - item = pitem_new(seq64, frag); - if ( item == NULL) - goto err; +static int +dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok) + { + /* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available + * if so: + * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[] + * (2) update s->init_num + */ + pitem *item; + hm_fragment *frag; + int al; - pq_64bit_free(&seq64); + *ok = 0; + item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages); + if ( item == NULL) + return 0; - pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); - return 1; + frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; -err: - if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item); - return 0; -} + if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) + { + pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); + al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max); -static void -dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int frag_len) - { - unsigned char *p; + if (al==0) /* no alert */ + { + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], + frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len); + } - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); + pitem_free(item); - ssl3_finish_mac(s, &p[s->init_num - frag_len], frag_len); - } + if (al==0) + { + *ok = 1; + return frag->msg_header.frag_len; + } + + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + s->init_num = 0; + *ok = 0; + return -1; + } + else + return 0; + } static int -dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok) - { - int i; - unsigned char *p; - - /* make sure there's enough room to read this fragment */ - if ( (int)msg_hdr->frag_len && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, - (int)msg_hdr->frag_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } - - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - - /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ - if ( msg_hdr->frag_len > 0) +dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) +{ + int i=-1; + hm_fragment *frag = NULL; + pitem *item = NULL; + PQ_64BIT seq64; + unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; + + if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len) + goto err; + + if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq) { - i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, - &p[s->init_num], - msg_hdr->frag_len,0); - if (i <= 0) + unsigned char devnull [256]; + + while (frag_len) { - *ok = 0; - return i; + i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + devnull, + frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0); + if (i<=0) goto err; + frag_len -= i; } } - if ( msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq) - dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(s, msg_hdr); - else - OPENSSL_assert(msg_hdr->seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq); + frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len); + if ( frag == NULL) + goto err; + + memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); + + if (frag_len) + { + /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ + i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + frag->fragment,frag_len,0); + if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + goto err; + } + + pq_64bit_init(&seq64); + pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq); + + item = pitem_new(seq64, frag); + pq_64bit_free(&seq64); + if ( item == NULL) + goto err; + + pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; - return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; err: - *ok = 0; - return -1; - } + if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); + if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item); + *ok = 0; + return i; + } static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) { - unsigned char *p; + unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; unsigned long l, frag_off, frag_len; int i,al; struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; - unsigned long overlap; - - /* see if we have the required fragment already */ - if (dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, &l)) - { - /* compute MAC, remove fragment headers */ - dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(s, l); - s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - s->state = stn; - return 1; - } - - /* get a handshake fragment from the record layer */ - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - - /* read handshake message header */ - i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num], + + /* see if we have the required fragment already */ + if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok) + { + if (*ok) s->init_num += frag_len; + return frag_len; + } + + /* read handshake message header */ + i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0); if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */ { @@ -555,130 +633,61 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) *ok = 0; return i; } - OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); - p += s->init_num; - /* parse the message fragment header */ - - dtls1_get_message_header(p, &msg_hdr); + /* parse the message fragment header */ + dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr); - /* - * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered - * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time - */ - if ( msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq) - return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok); + /* + * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered + * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time + */ + if ( msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq) + return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok); - l = msg_hdr.msg_len; - frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off; + l = msg_hdr.msg_len; + frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off; frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len; - /* sanity checking */ - if ( frag_off + frag_len > l) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - goto f_err; - } - if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 && - p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) - { - /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- - * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them - * if their format is correct. Does not count for - * 'Finished' MAC. */ - if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0) - { - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, - p, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, - s->msg_callback_arg); - - s->init_num = 0; - return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, - max, ok); - } - else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */ - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - } - - /* XDTLS: do a sanity check on the fragment */ - - s->init_num += i; - - if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */ + wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { - /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ - if (l > (INT_MAX-DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - goto f_err; - } - if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l - + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) + /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- + * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them + * if their format is correct. Does not count for + * 'Finished' MAC. */ + if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + s->init_num = 0; + return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, + max, ok); } - /* Only do this test when we're reading the expected message. - * Stale messages will be dropped and future messages will be buffered */ - if ( l > (unsigned long)max) + else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */ { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } - - s->s3->tmp.message_size=l; } - if ( frag_len > (unsigned long)max) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - goto f_err; - } - if ( frag_len + s->init_num > (INT_MAX - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - goto f_err; - } - - if ( frag_len & !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)frag_len - + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } - - if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) - { - s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr.type; - s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr.type; - s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = l; - /* s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = seq_num; */ - } + if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max))) + goto f_err; /* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */ s->state=stn; - - /* next state (stn) */ - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if ( frag_len > 0) { + unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, - &p[s->init_num], - frag_len,0); - /* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */ + &p[frag_off],frag_len,0); + /* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */ if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate=SSL_READING; @@ -689,70 +698,23 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) else i = 0; - /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the - * handshake to fail */ + /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the + * handshake to fail */ OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len); -#if 0 - /* Successfully read a fragment. - * It may be (1) out of order, or - * (2) it's a repeat, in which case we dump it - * (3) the one we are expecting next (maybe with overlap) - * If it is next one, it may overlap with previously read bytes - */ - - /* case (1): buffer the future fragment - * (we can treat fragments from a future message the same - * as future fragments from the message being currently read, since - * they are sematically simply out of order. - */ - if ( msg_hdr.seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq || - frag_off > s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) - { - dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(s, &msg_hdr); - return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; - } - - /* case (2): drop the entire fragment, and try again */ - if ( msg_hdr.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq || - frag_off + frag_len < s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) - { - s->init_num -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; - } -#endif + *ok = 1; - /* case (3): received a immediately useful fragment. Determine the - * possible overlap and copy the fragment. - */ - overlap = (s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) - frag_off; - - /* retain the header for the first fragment */ - if ( s->init_num > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) - { - memmove(&(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num]), - &(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + overlap]), - frag_len - overlap); - - s->init_num += frag_len - overlap; - } - else - s->init_num += frag_len; - - dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(s, frag_len - overlap); - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, - (size_t)s->init_num, s, - s->msg_callback_arg); - *ok=1; - - return s->init_num; + /* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in + * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments' + * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet + * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */ + s->init_num += frag_len; + return frag_len; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - s->init_num = 0; -err: + s->init_num = 0; + *ok=0; return(-1); } @@ -790,7 +752,7 @@ int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); - + s->state=b; } @@ -815,10 +777,15 @@ int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *p++=SSL3_MT_CCS; s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; - s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; - s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p); - s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; + + if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; + s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p); + s->init_num+=2; + } + s->init_off=0; dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, @@ -915,316 +882,280 @@ unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x) } int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code) - { - DTLS1_STATE *state; - BIO *bio; - int send_alert = 0; - - if ( code > 0) - { - fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__); - return 1; - } - - bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); - if ( ! BIO_dgram_recv_timedout(bio)) - { - /* not a timeout, none of our business, - let higher layers handle this. in fact it's probably an error */ - return code; - } - - if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ - { - BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ); - return code; - } - - state = s->d1; - state->timeout.num_alerts++; - if ( state->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) - { - /* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED); - return 0; - } - - state->timeout.read_timeouts++; - if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) - { - send_alert = 1; - state->timeout.read_timeouts = 1; - } - - + { + DTLS1_STATE *state; + BIO *bio; + int send_alert = 0; + + if ( code > 0) + { + fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__); + return 1; + } + + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + if ( ! BIO_dgram_recv_timedout(bio)) + { + /* not a timeout, none of our business, + let higher layers handle this. in fact it's probably an error */ + return code; + } + + if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ + { + BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ); + return code; + } + + state = s->d1; + state->timeout.num_alerts++; + if ( state->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) + { + /* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED); + return 0; + } + + state->timeout.read_timeouts++; + if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) + { + send_alert = 1; + state->timeout.read_timeouts = 1; + } + + #if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */ - item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records); - if ( item ) - { - /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */ - } - else + item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records); + if ( item ) + { + /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */ + } + else #endif #if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */ - if ( send_alert) - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, - DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); + if ( send_alert) + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, + DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); #endif - return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s) ; - } + return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s) ; + } static int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s) - { - pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages; - piterator iter; - pitem *item; - hm_fragment *frag; - int found = 0; - - iter = pqueue_iterator(sent); - - for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) - { - frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; - if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, &found) <= 0 && - found) - { - fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n"); - return -1; - } - } - - return 1; - } + { + pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages; + piterator iter; + pitem *item; + hm_fragment *frag; + int found = 0; -#if 0 -static dtls1_message_buffer * -dtls1_message_buffer_new(unsigned int len) - { - dtls1_message_buffer *msg_buf; - - msg_buf = (dtls1_message_buffer *) - OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(dtls1_message_buffer)); - if ( msg_buf == NULL) - return NULL; - - memset(msg_buf, 0x00, sizeof(dtls1_message_buffer)); - - msg_buf->data = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len); - if ( msg_buf->data == NULL) - { - OPENSSL_free(msg_buf); - return NULL; - } - - memset(msg_buf->data, 0x00, len); - return msg_buf; - } -#endif + iter = pqueue_iterator(sent); -#if 0 -static void -dtls1_message_buffer_free(dtls1_message_buffer *msg_buf) - { - if (msg_buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_free(msg_buf->data); - OPENSSL_free(msg_buf); - } - } -#endif + for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) + { + frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; + if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, &found) <= 0 && + found) + { + fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n"); + return -1; + } + } + + return 1; + } int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) - { - pitem *item; - hm_fragment *frag; + { + pitem *item; + hm_fragment *frag; PQ_64BIT seq64; + unsigned int epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; + + /* this function is called immediately after a message has + * been serialized */ + OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); + + frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num); + + memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); + + if ( is_ccs) + { + OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + + DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH <= (unsigned int)s->init_num); + epoch++; + } + else + { + OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); + } + + frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; + frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq; + frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type; + frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; + frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; + frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs; - /* this function is called immediately after a message has - * been serialized */ - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); - - frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num); - - memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); - - if ( is_ccs) - { - OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + - DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); - } - else - { - OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); - } - - frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; - frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq; - frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type; - frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; - frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; - frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs; - - pq_64bit_init(&seq64); - pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, frag->msg_header.seq); - - item = pitem_new(seq64, frag); - pq_64bit_free(&seq64); - if ( item == NULL) - { - dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - return 0; - } + pq_64bit_init(&seq64); + pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, epoch<<16 | frag->msg_header.seq); + + item = pitem_new(seq64, frag); + pq_64bit_free(&seq64); + if ( item == NULL) + { + dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); + return 0; + } #if 0 - fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type); - fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len); - fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num); + fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type); + fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len); + fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num); #endif - pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item); - return 1; - } + pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item); + return 1; + } int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off, - int *found) - { - int ret; - /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */ - pitem *item; - hm_fragment *frag ; - unsigned long header_length; + int *found) + { + int ret; + /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */ + pitem *item; + hm_fragment *frag ; + unsigned long header_length; PQ_64BIT seq64; - /* - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0); - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); - */ - - /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */ - pq_64bit_init(&seq64); - pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, seq); - - item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64); - pq_64bit_free(&seq64); - if ( item == NULL) - { - fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq); - *found = 0; - return 0; - } - - *found = 1; - frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; - - if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs) - header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; - else - header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - - memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment, - frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length); - s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length; - - dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type, - frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, - frag->msg_header.frag_len); - - s->d1->retransmitting = 1; - ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ? - SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); - s->d1->retransmitting = 0; - - (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); - return ret; - } + /* + OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0); + OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); + */ + + /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */ + pq_64bit_init(&seq64); + pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, seq); + + item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64); + pq_64bit_free(&seq64); + if ( item == NULL) + { + fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq); + *found = 0; + return 0; + } + + *found = 1; + frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; + + if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs) + header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; + else + header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + + memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment, + frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length); + s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length; + + dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type, + frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, + frag->msg_header.frag_len); + + s->d1->retransmitting = 1; + ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ? + SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); + s->d1->retransmitting = 0; + + (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); + return ret; + } /* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */ void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s) - { - pitem *item; - - for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages); - item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) - { - dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data); - pitem_free(item); - } - } + { + pitem *item; + + for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages); + item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) + { + dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } + } unsigned char * dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt, - unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) - { - if ( frag_off == 0) - { - s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; - s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; - } - - dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq, - frag_off, frag_len); - - return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - } + unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) + { + if ( frag_off == 0) + { + s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; + s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; + } + + dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq, + frag_off, frag_len); + + return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + } /* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */ static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, - unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, - unsigned long frag_len) - { - struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; - - msg_hdr->type = mt; - msg_hdr->msg_len = len; - msg_hdr->seq = seq_num; - msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; - msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; -} + unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, + unsigned long frag_len) + { + struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; + + msg_hdr->type = mt; + msg_hdr->msg_len = len; + msg_hdr->seq = seq_num; + msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; + msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; + } static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, - unsigned long frag_len) - { - struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; - - msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; - msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; - } + unsigned long frag_len) + { + struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; + + msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; + msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; + } static unsigned char * dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) - { - struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; - - *p++ = msg_hdr->type; - l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); - - s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p); - l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p); - l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p); - - return p; - } + { + struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; + + *p++ = msg_hdr->type; + l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); + + s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p); + l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p); + l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p); + + return p; + } static unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void) - { - return - g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / - sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]; - } + { + return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / + sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]); + } static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu) @@ -1237,27 +1168,26 @@ dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu) for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++) if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i]) return g_probable_mtu[i]; - + return curr_mtu; } void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) - { - memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); - msg_hdr->type = *(data++); - n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len); - - n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq); - n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off); - n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len); - } + { + memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); + msg_hdr->type = *(data++); + n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len); + + n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq); + n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off); + n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len); + } void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr) - { - memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st)); - - ccs_hdr->type = *(data++); - n2s(data, ccs_hdr->seq); -} + { + memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st)); + + ccs_hdr->type = *(data++); + } diff --git a/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ssl/d1_clnt.c index e8b60a45d2..5e59dc845a 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/d1_clnt.c @@ -214,17 +214,21 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ - ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; s->init_num=0; + /* mark client_random uninitialized */ + memset(s->s3->client_random,0,sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: s->shutdown=0; + + /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + ret=dtls1_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; @@ -422,6 +426,9 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; } s->init_num=0; + /* mark client_random uninitialized */ + memset (s->s3->client_random,0,sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); + break; case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: @@ -544,9 +551,15 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s) /* else use the pre-loaded session */ p=s->s3->client_random; - Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ - l2n(Time,p); - RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time)); + /* if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are + * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */ + for (i=0;p[i]=='\0' && is3->client_random);i++) ; + if (i==sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) + { + Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ + l2n(Time,p); + RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4); + } /* Do the message type and length last */ d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); @@ -732,7 +745,7 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf; q=p; - /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ + /* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) p+=2; n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf, @@ -747,7 +760,7 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) goto err; } - /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ + /* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { s2n(n,q); diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c index d07a212fac..fc088b4148 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c @@ -188,3 +188,23 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s) ssl3_clear(s); s->version=DTLS1_VERSION; } + +/* + * As it's impossible to use stream ciphers in "datagram" mode, this + * simple filter is designed to disengage them in DTLS. Unfortunately + * there is no universal way to identify stream SSL_CIPHER, so we have + * to explicitly list their SSL_* codes. Currently RC4 is the only one + * available, but if new ones emerge, they will have to be added... + */ +SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u) + { + SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher(u); + + if (ciph != NULL) + { + if ((ciph->algorithms&SSL_ENC_MASK) == SSL_RC4) + return NULL; + } + + return ciph; + } diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c index 8270419a8d..377696deac 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c +++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); @@ -486,9 +487,9 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) SSL3_RECORD *rr; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *p; - short version; + unsigned short version; DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; - unsigned int is_next_epoch; + unsigned int is_next_epoch; rr= &(s->s3->rrec); sess=s->session; @@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ again: ssl_minor= *(p++); version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; - /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ + /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ n2s(p,rr->epoch); memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6); @@ -535,7 +536,7 @@ again: /* Lets check version */ if (!s->first_packet) { - if (version != s->version) + if (version != s->version && version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); /* Send back error using their @@ -546,7 +547,8 @@ again: } } - if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) + if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) && + (version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); goto err; @@ -559,6 +561,7 @@ again: goto f_err; } + s->client_version = version; /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } @@ -973,47 +976,40 @@ start: } if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) - { - struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; + { + struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr); - if ( ccs_hdr.seq == s->d1->handshake_read_seq) + /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know + * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ + /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */ + if ( (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER && rr->length != 3) || + (s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && rr->length != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) || + (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { - /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know - * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ - /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */ - if ( (rr->length != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) || - (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) - { - i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto err; - } - - rr->length=0; - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; - if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) - goto err; - - /* do this whenever CCS is processed */ - dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); - - /* handshake read seq is reset upon handshake completion */ - s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; - - goto start; - } - else - { - rr->length = 0; - goto start; + i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + goto err; } + + rr->length=0; + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; + if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) + goto err; + + /* do this whenever CCS is processed */ + dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); + + if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; + + goto start; } /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ @@ -1341,8 +1337,12 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, *(p++)=type&0xff; wr->type=type; - *(p++)=(s->version>>8); - *(p++)=s->version&0xff; + if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8, + *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff; + else + *(p++)=(s->version>>8), + *(p++)=s->version&0xff; /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ pseq=p; @@ -1397,8 +1397,14 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ - wr->length += bs; /* bs != 0 in case of CBC. The enc fn provides - * the randomness */ + if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */ + { + RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs); + /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for + * the rest of randomness */ + wr->length += bs; + } + s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); /* record length after mac and block padding */ diff --git a/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/ssl/d1_srvr.c index ff27b4b467..927b01f3c4 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/d1_srvr.c @@ -285,6 +285,10 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) s->d1->send_cookie = 0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; + + /* HelloVerifyRequests resets Finished MAC */ + if (s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: @@ -620,20 +624,24 @@ int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); - *(p++) = s->version >> 8; - *(p++) = s->version & 0xFF; + if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8, + *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff; + else + *(p++) = s->version >> 8, + *(p++) = s->version & 0xFF; - *(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len; - if ( s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb != NULL && - s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, - &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) - { + if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb != NULL && + s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, + &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) + { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - /* else the cookie is assumed to have - * been initialized by the application */ + return 0; + } + /* else the cookie is assumed to have + * been initialized by the application */ + *(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len; memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); p += s->d1->cookie_len; msg_len = p - msg; @@ -672,8 +680,12 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s) /* Do the message type and length last */ d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); - *(p++)=s->version>>8; - *(p++)=s->version&0xff; + if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + *(p++)=DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8, + *(p++)=DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff; + else + *(p++)=s->version>>8, + *(p++)=s->version&0xff; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); @@ -1088,7 +1100,7 @@ int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) /* XDTLS: set message header ? */ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - dtls1_set_message_header(s, s->init_buf->data, + dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len); /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ diff --git a/ssl/dtls1.h b/ssl/dtls1.h index b377cc5f6b..a663cf85f2 100644 --- a/ssl/dtls1.h +++ b/ssl/dtls1.h @@ -67,9 +67,8 @@ extern "C" { #endif -#define DTLS1_VERSION 0x0100 -#define DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x01 -#define DTLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x00 +#define DTLS1_VERSION 0xFEFF +#define DTLS1_BAD_VER 0x0100 #define DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE 110 @@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ extern "C" { #define DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT -2 #define DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY -3 -#define DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH 3 +#define DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH 1 #define DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH 7 diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c index f1867bd2d9..bc918170e1 100644 --- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c @@ -223,6 +223,17 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s) { version = SSL2_VERSION; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (version != SSL2_VERSION) + { + /* have to disable SSL 2.0 compatibility if we need TLS extensions */ + + if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) + ssl2_compat = 0; + if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1) + ssl2_compat = 0; + } +#endif buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) @@ -368,6 +379,13 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s) *(p++)=comp->id; } *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } +#endif l = p-d; *p = 42; diff --git a/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/ssl/s2_clnt.c index ce60de630a..e2a90a3ca2 100644 --- a/ssl/s2_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s2_clnt.c @@ -466,11 +466,11 @@ static int get_server_hello(SSL *s) return(-1); } - sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(sk,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); + (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(sk,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); /* get the array of ciphers we will accept */ cl=SSL_get_ciphers(s); - sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(cl,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); + (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(cl,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); /* * If server preference flag set, choose the first diff --git a/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/ssl/s2_srvr.c index 27d71a2e09..0daf2b129d 100644 --- a/ssl/s2_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s2_srvr.c @@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s) else { i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,&(p[s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length]), - s->s2->tmp.session_id_length); + s->s2->tmp.session_id_length, NULL); if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ s->hit=1; @@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s) { if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,z)) < 0) { - sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio,z); + (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio,z); z--; } } diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c index 0f753c7b85..a04d60f90c 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver); static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s); +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id); @@ -265,15 +268,43 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + ret=ssl3_check_finished(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + if (ret == 2) + { + s->hit = 1; + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + } +#endif /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) { ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + } + else + { + skip = 1; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + } +#else } else skip=1; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; +#endif s->init_num=0; break; @@ -417,11 +448,36 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) } else { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else +#endif + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; } s->init_num=0; break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: + ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: + ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; +#endif + case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: @@ -601,7 +657,13 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) } #endif *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */ - +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } +#endif l=(p-d); d=buf; *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; @@ -635,7 +697,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, - 300, /* ?? */ + 20000, /* ?? */ &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); @@ -785,6 +847,24 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; } #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* TLS extensions*/ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + { + if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) + { + /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); + goto f_err; + } + if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } + } +#endif + if (p != (d+n)) { @@ -1593,6 +1673,143 @@ static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b) { return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b)); } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) + { + int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen; + long n; + const unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *d; + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, + -1, + 16384, + &ok); + + if (!ok) + return((int)n); + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) + { + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; + return(1); + } + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) + { + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + if (n < 6) + { + /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */ + al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint); + n2s(p, ticklen); + /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ + if (ticklen + 6 != n) + { + al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + if (s->session->tlsext_tick) + { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); + s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; + } + s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); + if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen); + s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; + + ret=1; + return(ret); +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); +err: + return(-1); + } + +int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) + { + int ok, al; + unsigned long resplen; + long n; + const unsigned char *p; + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, + SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, + 16384, + &ok); + + if (!ok) return((int)n); + if (n < 4) + { + /* need at least status type + length */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) + { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + n2l3(p, resplen); + if (resplen + 4 != n) + { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen); + if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) + { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; + if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) + { + int ret; + ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + if (ret == 0) + { + al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); + goto f_err; + } + if (ret < 0) + { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + return 1; +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + return(-1); + } +#endif int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) { @@ -2461,3 +2678,33 @@ static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id) return nid_list[curve_id]; } #endif + +/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a + * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of + * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure. + */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) + { + int ok; + long n; + if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) + return 1; + /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate + * message, so permit appropriate message length */ + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, + -1, + s->max_cert_list, + &ok); + if (!ok) return((int)n); + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) + || (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) + return 2; + + return 1; + } +#endif diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c index 10087b50ae..cbb7b9745a 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_lib.c +++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c @@ -1904,6 +1904,77 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) } break; #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME: + if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) + { + if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); + s->tlsext_hostname = NULL; + + ret = 1; + if (parg == NULL) + break; + if (strlen((char *)parg) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME); + return 0; + } + if ((s->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + else + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE); + return 0; + } + break; + case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG: + s->tlsext_debug_arg=parg; + ret = 1; + break; + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE: + s->tlsext_status_type=larg; + ret = 1; + break; + + case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS: + *(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_exts; + ret = 1; + break; + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS: + s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = parg; + ret = 1; + break; + + case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS: + *(STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_ids; + ret = 1; + break; + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS: + s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = parg; + ret = 1; + break; + + case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP: + *(unsigned char **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_resp; + return s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP: + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = parg; + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = larg; + ret = 1; + break; + +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ default: break; } @@ -1954,6 +2025,12 @@ long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp; } break; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB: + s->tlsext_debug_cb=(void (*)(SSL *,int ,int, + unsigned char *, int, void *))fp; + break; #endif default: break; @@ -2088,6 +2165,42 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) } break; #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG: + ctx->tlsext_servername_arg=parg; + break; + case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS: + case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS: + { + unsigned char *keys = parg; + if (!keys) + return 48; + if (larg != 48) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + if (cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS) + { + memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, keys, 16); + memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, keys + 16, 16); + memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, keys + 32, 16); + } + else + { + memcpy(keys, ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); + memcpy(keys + 16, ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16); + memcpy(keys + 32, ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16); + } + return 1; + } + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG: + ctx->tlsext_status_arg=parg; + return 1; + break; + +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ /* A Thawte special :-) */ case SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT: if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL) @@ -2132,6 +2245,16 @@ long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp; } break; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB: + ctx->tlsext_servername_callback=(int (*)(SSL *,int *,void *))fp; + break; + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB: + ctx->tlsext_status_cb=(int (*)(SSL *,void *))fp; + break; + #endif default: return(0); @@ -2178,6 +2301,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, SSL_CIPHER *c,*ret=NULL; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow; int i,j,ok; + CERT *cert; unsigned long alg,mask,emask; diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 6c5fdf71b5..827a8c5673 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include @@ -143,7 +144,6 @@ #include static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH static int nid2curve_id(int nid); #endif @@ -306,10 +306,24 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) { ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + } + else + { + skip = 1; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + } +#else } else skip=1; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; +#endif s->init_num=0; break; @@ -494,11 +508,34 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) s->state=SSL_ST_OK; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; +#endif else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: + ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: + ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + +#endif + case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: @@ -699,7 +736,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; p+=2; - if (s->client_version < s->version) + if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || + (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) @@ -727,14 +765,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with * an earlier library version) */ - if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) + if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) goto err; } else { - i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j); + i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ s->hit=1; @@ -750,7 +788,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) p+=j; - if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) + if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) { /* cookie stuff */ cookie_len = *(p++); @@ -897,6 +935,22 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) goto f_err; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* TLS extensions*/ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + { + if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) + { + /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); + goto f_err; + } + } + if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } +#endif /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ @@ -1088,7 +1142,13 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) else *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif - +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } +#endif /* do the header */ l=(p-d); d=buf; @@ -1713,8 +1773,9 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; } - /* TLS */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && + s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { n2s(p,i); if (n != i+2) @@ -2617,3 +2678,125 @@ static int nid2curve_id(int nid) } } #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) + { + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) + { + unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; + int len, slen; + unsigned int hlen; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; + HMAC_CTX hctx; + + /* get session encoding length */ + slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); + /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is + * too long + */ + if (slen > 0xFF00) + return -1; + /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as + * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length + * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session + * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). + */ + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, + 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) + return -1; + senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); + if (!senc) + return -1; + p = senc; + i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + /* do the header */ + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; + /* Skip message length for now */ + p += 3; + l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); + /* Skip ticket length for now */ + p += 2; + /* Output key name */ + macstart = p; + memcpy(p, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); + p += 16; + /* Generate and output IV */ + RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); + /* Encrypt session data */ + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, p); + p += 16; + EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); + p += len; + EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); + p += len; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + + HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); + HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); + HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + + p += hlen; + /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ + /* Total length */ + len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; + l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ + p += 4; + s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ + + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num= len; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; + s->init_off=0; + OPENSSL_free(senc); + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } + +int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) + { + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) + { + unsigned char *p; + /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as + * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) + * + (ocsp response) + */ + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) + return -1; + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + + /* do the header */ + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; + /* message length */ + l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); + /* status type */ + *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; + /* length of OCSP response */ + l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); + /* actual response */ + memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; + s->init_off = 0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } +#endif diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h index 3e4c103f17..439a16b4bb 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/ssl/ssl.h @@ -475,6 +475,13 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st /* These are used to make removal of session-ids more * efficient and to implement a maximum cache size. */ struct ssl_session_st *prev,*next; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + char *tlsext_hostname; + /* RFC4507 info */ + unsigned char *tlsext_tick; /* Session ticket */ + size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */ + long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */ +#endif } SSL_SESSION; @@ -503,6 +510,8 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st #define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU 0x00001000L /* Turn on Cookie Exchange (on relevant for servers) */ #define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE 0x00002000L +/* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */ +#define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0x00004000L /* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */ #define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0x00010000L @@ -750,6 +759,22 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st #endif int quiet_shutdown; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* TLS extensions servername callback */ + int (*tlsext_servername_callback)(SSL*, int *, void *); + void *tlsext_servername_arg; + /* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */ + unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[16]; + unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[16]; + unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[16]; + + /* certificate status request info */ + /* Callback for status request */ + int (*tlsext_status_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg); + void *tlsext_status_arg; +#endif + }; #define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF 0x0000 @@ -971,6 +996,37 @@ struct ssl_st int first_packet; int client_version; /* what was passed, used for * SSLv3/TLS rollback check */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* TLS extension debug callback */ + void (*tlsext_debug_cb)(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, + unsigned char *data, int len, + void *arg); + void *tlsext_debug_arg; + char *tlsext_hostname; + int servername_done; /* no further mod of servername + 0 : call the servername extension callback. + 1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback. + 2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello + */ + /* certificate status request info */ + /* Status type or -1 if no status type */ + int tlsext_status_type; + /* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */ + int tlsext_status_expected; + /* OCSP status request only */ + STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *tlsext_ocsp_ids; + X509_EXTENSIONS *tlsext_ocsp_exts; + /* OCSP response received or to be sent */ + unsigned char *tlsext_ocsp_resp; + int tlsext_ocsp_resplen; + + /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */ + int tlsext_ticket_expected; + SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ +#define session_ctx initial_ctx +#else +#define session_ctx ctx +#endif }; #ifdef __cplusplus @@ -1116,6 +1172,10 @@ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count); #define SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR /* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED #define SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION +#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE +#define SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME +#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE #define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0 #define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1 @@ -1174,6 +1234,27 @@ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count); #define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST 50 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST 51 +/* see tls1.h for macros based on these */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB 53 +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG 54 +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME 55 +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB 56 +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG 57 +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 58 +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 59 + +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB 63 +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG 64 +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE 65 +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 66 +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 67 +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 68 +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 69 +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 70 +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 71 +#endif + #define SSL_session_reused(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED,0,NULL) #define SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) \ @@ -1446,6 +1527,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); /* obtain a reference count */ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl); +SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx); void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)); void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val); @@ -1562,6 +1644,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT 253 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD 254 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255 +#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 277 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258 @@ -1615,6 +1698,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC 134 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 135 +#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS 288 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY 136 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 137 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 138 @@ -1622,10 +1706,12 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED 140 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142 +#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO 146 +#define SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 284 #define SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 147 #define SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK 235 #define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES 148 @@ -1641,8 +1727,10 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157 #define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158 #define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159 +#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 272 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 215 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 216 +#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 273 #define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD 160 #define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST 161 #define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP 221 @@ -1650,6 +1738,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE 214 #define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW 162 #define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 163 +#define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 274 #define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR 230 #define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT 231 #define SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR 164 @@ -1682,6 +1771,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185 #define SSL_F_SSL_NEW 186 #define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK 270 +#define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 275 +#define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 276 #define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223 #define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 187 #define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188 @@ -1764,6 +1855,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH 137 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE 138 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR 139 +#define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 157 #define SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 140 #define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE 141 #define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE 307 @@ -1791,6 +1883,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158 #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280 #define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE 278 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE 316 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH 275 #define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST 279 #define SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG 284 #define SSL_R_KRB5 285 @@ -1848,6 +1942,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED 197 #define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 297 #define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 198 +#define SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT 223 #define SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG 270 #define SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE 199 #define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR 200 @@ -1871,11 +1966,14 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO 216 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO 217 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO 218 +#define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 224 #define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277 #define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219 #define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220 #define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE 221 #define SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG 299 +#define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME 225 +#define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE 226 #define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG 300 #define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT 222 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE 1042 @@ -1910,6 +2008,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA 1048 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090 #define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER 232 +#define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST 227 #define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233 #define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 234 #define SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 235 @@ -1941,6 +2040,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE 315 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL 258 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION 259 +#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE 329 #define SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET 260 #define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED 261 #define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE 262 diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h index bacaff157e..4b1e2e9834 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl3.h +++ b/ssl/ssl3.h @@ -481,6 +481,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st #define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) #define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A (0x1D0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) #define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B (0x1D1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) +#define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A (0x1E0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) +#define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B (0x1E1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) +#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A (0x1F0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) +#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B (0x1F1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) /* server */ /* extra state */ @@ -522,10 +526,15 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st #define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B (0x1D1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) #define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A (0x1E0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) #define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B (0x1E1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) +#define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A (0x1F0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) +#define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B (0x1F1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) +#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A (0x200|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) +#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B (0x201|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) #define SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST 0 #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO 1 #define SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO 2 +#define SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET 4 #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE 11 #define SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12 #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13 @@ -533,6 +542,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15 #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20 +#define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22 #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 diff --git a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c index d129acc329..6e14f4d834 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c @@ -78,6 +78,11 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st ASN1_INTEGER time; ASN1_INTEGER timeout; ASN1_INTEGER verify_result; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_hostname; + ASN1_INTEGER tlsext_tick_lifetime; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_tick; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ } SSL_SESSION_ASN1; int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) @@ -86,6 +91,10 @@ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) int v1=0,v2=0,v3=0,v4=0,v5=0; unsigned char buf[4],ibuf1[LSIZE2],ibuf2[LSIZE2]; unsigned char ibuf3[LSIZE2],ibuf4[LSIZE2],ibuf5[LSIZE2]; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + int v6=0,v9=0,v10=0; + unsigned char ibuf6[LSIZE2]; +#endif long l; SSL_SESSION_ASN1 a; M_ASN1_I2D_vars(in); @@ -178,7 +187,33 @@ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) ASN1_INTEGER_set(&a.verify_result,in->verify_result); } - +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (in->tlsext_hostname) + { + a.tlsext_hostname.length=strlen(in->tlsext_hostname); + a.tlsext_hostname.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + a.tlsext_hostname.data=(unsigned char *)in->tlsext_hostname; + } + if (in->tlsext_tick) + { + a.tlsext_tick.length= in->tlsext_ticklen; + a.tlsext_tick.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + a.tlsext_tick.data=(unsigned char *)in->tlsext_tick; + /* If we have a ticket set session ID to empty because + * it will be bogus. If liftime hint is -1 treat as a special + * case because the session is being used as a container + */ + if (in->tlsext_ticklen && (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint != -1)) + a.session_id.length=0; + } + if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0) + { + a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.length=LSIZE2; + a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER; + a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.data=ibuf6; + ASN1_INTEGER_set(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime,in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER); M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.ssl_version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER); M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); @@ -200,6 +235,14 @@ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK) M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.verify_result),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,5,v5); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0) + M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,9,v9); + if (in->tlsext_tick) + M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_tick), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,10,v10); + if (in->tlsext_hostname) + M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_hostname), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,6,v6); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total(); M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER); @@ -223,6 +266,14 @@ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) v4); if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK) M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.verify_result,i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,5,v5); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (in->tlsext_hostname) + M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_hostname), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,6,v6); + if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0) + M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,9,v9); + if (in->tlsext_tick) + M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_tick), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,10,v10); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ M_ASN1_I2D_finish(); } @@ -394,5 +445,56 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, else ret->verify_result=X509_V_OK; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + os.length=0; + os.data=NULL; + M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,6); + if (os.data) + { + ret->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length); + OPENSSL_free(os.data); + os.data = NULL; + os.length = 0; + } + else + ret->tlsext_hostname=NULL; + ai.length=0; + M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,9); + if (ai.data != NULL) + { + ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip); + OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0; + } + else if (ret->tlsext_ticklen && ret->session_id_length) + ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = -1; + else + ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0; + os.length=0; + os.data=NULL; + M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,10); + if (os.data) + { + ret->tlsext_tick = os.data; + ret->tlsext_ticklen = os.length; + os.data = NULL; + os.length = 0; +#if 0 + /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion. + * One is to set a random session ID and then the server + * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal + * client session ID matching to work. + */ + if (ret->session_id_length == 0) + { + ret->session_id_length=SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->session_id, + ret->session_id_length); + } +#endif + } + else + ret->tlsext_tick=NULL; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ + M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a,SSL_SESSION_free,SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION); } diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c index fb080093e5..a32b2d4446 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ err: if(x != NULL) X509_free(x); - sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp); + (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp); return ret; } diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c index e7f4d93c7d..50779c1632 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_err.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* ssl/ssl_err.c */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD), "DTLS1_GET_RECORD"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE), "DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES), "DTLS1_READ_BYTES"}, @@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC), "SSL3_ENC"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST), "SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS), "SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY), "SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE), "SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO"}, @@ -147,10 +149,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED), "SSL3_GET_FINISHED"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE), "SSL3_GET_MESSAGE"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD), "SSL3_GET_RECORD"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK), "SSL3_PEEK"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES), "SSL3_READ_BYTES"}, @@ -166,8 +170,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES), "SSL3_WRITE_BYTES"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING), "SSL3_WRITE_PENDING"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK), "SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK), "SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD), "SSL_BAD_METHOD"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP), "SSL_CERT_DUP"}, @@ -175,6 +181,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE), "SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW), "SSL_CERT_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "SSL_check_private_key"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR), "SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT), "SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR), "SSL_clear"}, @@ -207,6 +214,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE), "SSL_load_client_CA_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEW), "SSL_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK), "SSL_peek"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ), "SSL_read"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"}, @@ -292,6 +301,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH),"cipher code wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE),"cipher or hash unavailable"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR),"cipher table src error"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT) ,"clienthello tlsext"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"compressed length too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE) ,"compression failure"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE),"compression id not within private range"}, @@ -319,6 +329,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND) ,"invalid command"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE) ,"invalid purpose"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE),"invalid status response"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH),"invalid ticket keys length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST) ,"invalid trust"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG) ,"key arg too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5) ,"krb5"}, @@ -376,6 +388,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED),"old session cipher not returned"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),"only tls allowed in fips mode"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"packet length too long"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT) ,"parse tlsext"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG) ,"path too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE),"peer did not return a certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR) ,"peer error"}, @@ -399,11 +412,14 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cert length not zero"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cert type not zero"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cipher list not zero"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT) ,"serverhello tlsext"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),"session id context uninitialized"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ) ,"short read"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE),"signature for non signing certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE),"ssl23 doing session id reuse"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG),"ssl2 connection id too long"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME),"ssl3 ext invalid servername"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE),"ssl3 ext invalid servername type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG),"ssl3 session id too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT),"ssl3 session id too short"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE),"sslv3 alert bad certificate"}, @@ -438,6 +454,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA),"tlsv1 alert unknown ca"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED),"tlsv1 alert user cancelled"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER),"tls client cert req with anon cipher"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST),"tls invalid ecpointformat list"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST),"tls peer did not respond with certificate list"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),"tls rsa encrypted value length is wrong"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER),"tried to use unsupported cipher"}, @@ -469,6 +486,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE),"unsupported elliptic curve"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL) ,"unsupported protocol"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION),"unsupported ssl version"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE),"unsupported status type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET) ,"write bio not set"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED) ,"wrong cipher returned"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE) ,"wrong message type"}, diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 946e14990e..3715224531 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include #endif @@ -306,7 +308,19 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->ctx=ctx; - +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; + s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; + s->tlsext_status_type = -1; + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; + s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; + s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL; + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + s->initial_ctx=ctx; +#endif s->verify_result=X509_V_OK; s->method=ctx->method; @@ -492,7 +506,16 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) /* Free up if allocated */ if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); - +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) + sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, + X509_EXTENSION_free); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids) + sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); +#endif if (s->client_CA != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); @@ -1201,7 +1224,6 @@ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str) char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len) { char *p; - const char *cp; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; SSL_CIPHER *c; int i; @@ -1214,20 +1236,21 @@ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len) sk=s->session->ciphers; for (i=0; iname; *cp; ) + n=strlen(c->name); + if (n+1 > len) { - if (len-- <= 0) - { - *p='\0'; - return(buf); - } - else - *(p++)= *(cp++); + if (p != buf) + --p; + *p='\0'; + return buf; } + strcpy(p,c->name); + p+=n; *(p++)=':'; + len-=n+1; } p[-1]='\0'; return(buf); @@ -1304,6 +1327,29 @@ err: return(NULL); } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. + * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546). + */ + +const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) + { + if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) + return NULL; + + return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? + s->session->tlsext_hostname : + s->tlsext_hostname; + } + +int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) + { + if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) + return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; + return -1; + } +#endif + unsigned long SSL_SESSION_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) { unsigned long l; @@ -1461,6 +1507,20 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->extra_certs=NULL; ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; + ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; + /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ + if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) + || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) + || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) + ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; + + ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; + ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; + +#endif + return(ret); err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -2410,6 +2470,24 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) return(ssl->ctx); } +SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx) + { + if (ssl->ctx == ctx) + return ssl->ctx; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ctx == NULL) + ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; +#endif + if (ssl->cert != NULL) + ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); + ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + if (ssl->ctx != NULL) + SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ + ssl->ctx = ctx; + return(ssl->ctx); + } + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h index c36cafd01d..f66fd7df94 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h +++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h @@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ - ssl3_get_cipher, \ + dtls1_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ dtls1_default_timeout, \ &DTLSv1_enc_data, \ @@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void); void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc); int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type); int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session); -int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session,int len); +int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session,int len, const unsigned char *limit); int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a,const SSL_CIPHER *b); int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp); @@ -777,6 +777,8 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p); int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c,unsigned char *p); void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s); +int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s); +int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s,int state_a,int state_b); int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s,int state_a,int state_b); @@ -861,12 +863,16 @@ void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr); void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw); long dtls1_default_timeout(void); +SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u); + /* some client-only functions */ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s); +int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s); +int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s); @@ -948,5 +954,24 @@ int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs); SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit); +unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit); +int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al); +int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al); +int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); +int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); +int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); +int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 +#define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha1 +#else +#define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha256 +#endif +int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, + const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret); +EVP_MD_CTX* ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) ; +void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash); +#endif #endif diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c index 5bee2d5619..ee88be2b88 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) ss->prev=NULL; ss->next=NULL; ss->compress_meth=0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL; +#endif CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); return(ss); } @@ -216,6 +219,14 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) SSL_SESSION_free(ss); return(0); } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */ + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + { + ss->session_id_length = 0; + goto sess_id_done; + } +#endif /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); if(s->generate_session_id) @@ -257,6 +268,17 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) SSL_SESSION_free(ss); return(0); } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + sess_id_done: + if (s->tlsext_hostname) { + ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); + if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + } +#endif } else { @@ -278,21 +300,41 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) return(1); } -int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len) +int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, + const unsigned char *limit) { /* This is used only by servers. */ - SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL,data; + SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL; int fatal = 0; - - data.ssl_version=s->version; - data.session_id_length=len; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + int r; +#endif + if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) goto err; - memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len); - +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret); + if (r == -1) + { + fatal = 1; + goto err; + } + else if (r == 0 || (!ret && !len)) + goto err; + else if (!ret && !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) +#else + if (len == 0) + goto err; if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) +#endif { + SSL_SESSION data; + data.ssl_version=s->version; + data.session_id_length=len; + if (len == 0) + return 0; + memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len); CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,&data); if (ret != NULL) @@ -548,6 +590,10 @@ void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert); if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer); if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ss->tlsext_hostname != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname); + if (ss->tlsext_tick != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick); +#endif OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss)); OPENSSL_free(ss); } diff --git a/ssl/ssl_txt.c b/ssl/ssl_txt.c index 4eb0867155..06b86750fd 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_txt.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_txt.c @@ -151,6 +151,21 @@ int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x) if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->krb5_client_princ[i]) <= 0) goto err; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) + { + if (BIO_printf(bp, + "\n TLS session ticket lifetime hint: %ld (seconds)", + x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) <=0) + goto err; + } + if (x->tlsext_tick) + { + if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n TLS session ticket:\n") <= 0) goto err; + if (BIO_dump_indent(bp, (char *)x->tlsext_tick, x->tlsext_ticklen, 4) <= 0) + goto err; + } +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (x->compress_meth != 0) { diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c index 99f78cd60b..c1518264c8 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -740,15 +740,35 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash); buf[0]=rec->type; - buf[1]=TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR; - buf[2]=TLS1_VERSION_MINOR; + if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + buf[1]=TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR; + buf[2]=TLS1_VERSION_MINOR; + } + else { + buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8); + buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version); + } + buf[3]=rec->length>>8; buf[4]=rec->length&0xff; /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac); HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac,mac_sec,EVP_MD_size(hash),hash,NULL); - HMAC_Update(&hmac,seq,8); + + if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq; + + s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p); + memcpy (p,&seq[2],6); + + HMAC_Update(&hmac,dtlsseq,8); + } + else + HMAC_Update(&hmac,seq,8); + HMAC_Update(&hmac,buf,5); HMAC_Update(&hmac,rec->input,rec->length); HMAC_Final(&hmac,md,&md_size); @@ -765,8 +785,8 @@ printf("rec="); {unsigned int z; for (z=0; zlength; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); } #endif - if ( SSL_version(ssl) != DTLS1_VERSION) - { + if ( SSL_version(ssl) != DTLS1_VERSION) + { for (i=7; i>=0; i--) { ++seq[i]; diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index 1ecbbcb8fb..8ff1734dab 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -58,10 +58,19 @@ #include #include +#include +#include +#include #include "ssl_locl.h" const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, + const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, + SSL_SESSION **psess); +#endif + SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ tls1_enc, tls1_mac, @@ -117,3 +126,736 @@ long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void *(*fp)()) return(0); } #endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) + { + int extdatalen=0; + unsigned char *ret = p; + + ret+=2; + + if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ + + if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) + { + /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ + unsigned long size_str; + long lenmax; + + /* check for enough space. + 4 for the servername type and entension length + 2 for servernamelist length + 1 for the hostname type + 2 for hostname length + + hostname length + */ + + if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 + || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) + return NULL; + + /* extension type and length */ + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); + s2n(size_str+5,ret); + + /* length of servername list */ + s2n(size_str+3,ret); + + /* hostname type, length and hostname */ + *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; + s2n(size_str,ret); + memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); + ret+=size_str; + + } + + if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) + { + int ticklen; + if (s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) + ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; + else + ticklen = 0; + /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len + * rest for ticket + */ + if (limit - ret - 4 - ticklen < 0) + return NULL; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); + s2n(ticklen,ret); + if (ticklen) + { + memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); + ret += ticklen; + } + } + + if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) + { + int i; + long extlen, idlen, itmp; + OCSP_RESPID *id; + + idlen = 0; + for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) + { + id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); + itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); + if (itmp <= 0) + return NULL; + idlen += itmp + 2; + } + + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) + { + extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); + if (extlen < 0) + return NULL; + } + else + extlen = 0; + + if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); + if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) + return NULL; + s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); + *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; + s2n(idlen, ret); + for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) + { + /* save position of id len */ + unsigned char *q = ret; + id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); + /* skip over id len */ + ret += 2; + itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); + /* write id len */ + s2n(itmp, q); + } + s2n(extlen, ret); + if (extlen > 0) + i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); + } + + if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) + return p; + + s2n(extdatalen,p); + return ret; + } + +unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) + { + int extdatalen=0; + unsigned char *ret = p; + + ret+=2; + if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ + + if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) + { + if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) return NULL; + + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); + s2n(0,ret); + } + + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected + && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) + { + if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) return NULL; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); + s2n(0,ret); + } + + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) + { + if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); + s2n(0,ret); + } + + if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) + return p; + + s2n(extdatalen,p); + return ret; + } + +int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) + { + unsigned short type; + unsigned short size; + unsigned short len; + unsigned char *data = *p; + s->servername_done = 0; + s->tlsext_status_type = -1; + + if (data >= (d+n-2)) + return 1; + n2s(data,len); + + if (data > (d+n-len)) + return 1; + + while (data <= (d+n-4)) + { + n2s(data,type); + n2s(data,size); + + if (data+size > (d+n)) + return 1; + + if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) + s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, + s->tlsext_debug_arg); +/* The servername extension is treated as follows: + + - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. + - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, + in which case an fatal alert is generated. + - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. + - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order + to allow the application to position itself to the right context. + - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when + it is identical to a previously used for the same session. + Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time + set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the + case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and + a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername + presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches + the value of the Host: field. + - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION + if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, + i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. + - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. + +*/ + + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + { + unsigned char *sdata; + int servname_type; + int dsize; + + if (size < 2) + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + n2s(data,dsize); + size -= 2; + if (dsize > size ) + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + sdata = data; + while (dsize > 3) + { + servname_type = *(sdata++); + n2s(sdata,len); + dsize -= 3; + + if (len > dsize) + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + if (s->servername_done == 0) + switch (servname_type) + { + case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: + if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) + { + if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name || + ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } + memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); + s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; + if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); + *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } + s->servername_done = 1; + + } + else + s->servername_done = strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len + && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + dsize -= len; + } + if (dsize != 0) + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + } + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request + && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) + { + + if (size < 5) + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; + size--; + if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) + { + const unsigned char *sdata; + int dsize; + /* Read in responder_id_list */ + n2s(data,dsize); + size -= 2; + if (dsize > size ) + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + while (dsize > 0) + { + OCSP_RESPID *id; + int idsize; + if (dsize < 4) + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + n2s(data, idsize); + dsize -= 2 + idsize; + if (dsize < 0) + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + sdata = data; + data += idsize; + id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, + &sdata, idsize); + if (!id) + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + if (data != sdata) + { + OCSP_RESPID_free(id); + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids + && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = + sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) + { + OCSP_RESPID_free(id); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( + s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) + { + OCSP_RESPID_free(id); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + } + + /* Read in request_extensions */ + n2s(data,dsize); + size -= 2; + if (dsize > size) + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + sdata = data; + if (dsize > 0) + { + s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = + d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, + &sdata, dsize); + if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts + || (data + dsize != sdata)) + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + } + } + /* We don't know what to do with any other type + * so ignore it. + */ + else + s->tlsext_status_type = -1; + } + /* session ticket processed earlier */ + + data+=size; + } + + *p = data; + return 1; + } + +int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) + { + unsigned short type; + unsigned short size; + unsigned short len; + unsigned char *data = *p; + + int tlsext_servername = 0; + + if (data >= (d+n-2)) + return 1; + + n2s(data,len); + + while(data <= (d+n-4)) + { + n2s(data,type); + n2s(data,size); + + if (data+size > (d+n)) + return 1; + + if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) + s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, + s->tlsext_debug_arg); + + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + { + if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } + tlsext_servername = 1; + } + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) + { + if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) + || (size > 0)) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + return 0; + } + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; + } + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) + { + /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested + * a status request message. + */ + if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + return 0; + } + /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ + s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; + } + + data+=size; + } + + if (data != d+n) + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) + { + if (s->tlsext_hostname) + { + if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) + { + s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); + if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) + { + *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } + } + else + { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + } + } + + *p = data; + return 1; + } + +int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) + { + int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + + if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) + ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); + else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) + ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); + + /* If status request then ask callback what to do. + * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case + * the certificate has changed. + */ + if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) + { + int r; + r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + switch (r) + { + /* We don't want to send a status request response */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; + break; + /* status request response should be sent */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) + s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; + else + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; + break; + /* something bad happened */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: + ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto err; + } + } + else + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; + err: + switch (ret) + { + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + return -1; + + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); + return 1; + + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: + s->servername_done=0; + default: + return 1; + } + } + +int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) + { + int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + + if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) + ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); + else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) + ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); + + /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one + * tell the callback + */ + if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) + && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) + { + int r; + /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows + * there is no response. + */ + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) + { + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; + } + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; + r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + if (r == 0) + { + al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; + ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } + if (r < 0) + { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } + } + + switch (ret) + { + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + return -1; + + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); + return 1; + + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: + s->servername_done=0; + default: + return 1; + } + } + +/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client + * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS + * session ticket extension at the same time. + */ + +int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, + const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) + { + /* Point after session ID in client hello */ + const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; + unsigned short i; + if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) + return 1; + if (p >= limit) + return -1; + /* Skip past cipher list */ + n2s(p, i); + p+= i; + if (p >= limit) + return -1; + /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ + i = *(p++); + p += i; + if (p > limit) + return -1; + /* Now at start of extensions */ + if ((p + 2) >= limit) + return 1; + n2s(p, i); + while ((p + 4) <= limit) + { + unsigned short type, size; + n2s(p, type); + n2s(p, size); + if (p + size > limit) + return 1; + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) + { + /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will + * trigger a full handshake + */ + if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) + return 0; + /* If zero length not client will accept a ticket + * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake + */ + if (size == 0) + { + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; + return 0; /* Cache miss */ + } + return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, + ret); + } + p += size; + } + return 1; + } + +static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, + const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, + SSL_SESSION **psess) + { + SSL_SESSION *sess; + unsigned char *sdec; + const unsigned char *p; + int slen, mlen; + unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + HMAC_CTX hctx; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; + /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and + * integrity checks on ticket. + */ + mlen = EVP_MD_size(tlsext_tick_md()); + eticklen -= mlen; + /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ + if (eticklen < 48) + goto tickerr; + /* Check key name matches */ + if (memcmp(etick, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) + goto tickerr; + /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ + HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); + HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); + HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) + goto tickerr; + /* Set p to start of IV */ + p = etick + 16; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); + /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, p); + /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ + p += 16; + eticklen -= 32; + sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); + if (!sdec) + { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + return -1; + } + EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); + if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) + goto tickerr; + slen += mlen; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + p = sdec; + + sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); + OPENSSL_free(sdec); + if (sess) + { + /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to + * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to + * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero + * as required by standard. + */ + if (sesslen) + memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); + sess->session_id_length = sesslen; + *psess = sess; + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; + return 1; + } + /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to + * send a new ticket + */ + tickerr: + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; + return 0; + } + +#endif diff --git a/ssl/tls1.h b/ssl/tls1.h index 2b04effeae..7c3b6a8a85 100644 --- a/ssl/tls1.h +++ b/ssl/tls1.h @@ -96,6 +96,90 @@ extern "C" { #define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* fatal */ #define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90 #define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100 +/* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */ +#define TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 110 +#define TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 111 +#define TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112 +#define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 113 +#define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 114 +#define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115 /* fatal */ + +/* ExtensionType values from RFC 3546 */ +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name 0 +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length 1 +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url 2 +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys 3 +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac 4 +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request 5 +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves 10 +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats 11 +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket 35 + +/* NameType value from RFC 3546 */ +#define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 +/* status request value from RFC 3546 */ +#define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp 1 + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + +#define TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name 255 + +const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) ; +int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) ; + +#define SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s,name) \ +SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME,TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name,(char *)name) + +#define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(ssl, cb) \ +SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) + +#define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(ssl, arg) \ +SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG,0, (void *)arg) + +#define SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(ssl, type) \ +SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE,type, NULL) + +#define SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \ +SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg) + +#define SSL_set_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \ +SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg) + +#define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \ +SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg) + +#define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \ +SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg) + +#define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg) \ +SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,0, (void *)arg) + +#define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg, arglen) \ +SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,arglen, (void *)arg) + +#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, cb) \ +SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) + +#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK 0 +#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING 1 +#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL 2 +#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK 3 + +#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, arg) \ +SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG,0, (void *)arg) + +#define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \ + SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_GET_TLXEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys)) +#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \ + SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_SET_TLXEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys)) + +#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ssl, cb) \ +SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) + +#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ssl, arg) \ +SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG,0, (void *)arg) + +#endif /* Additional TLS ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-00.txt * (available if TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES is defined, see diff --git a/util/clean-depend.pl b/util/clean-depend.pl index 6c485d1e2f..2b2bdb4048 100755 --- a/util/clean-depend.pl +++ b/util/clean-depend.pl @@ -37,8 +37,11 @@ foreach $file (sort keys %files) { $file=~s/^\.\///; push @{$files{$file}},$origfile; my $prevdep=""; - foreach $dep (sort @{$files{$file}}) { - $dep=~s/^\.\///; + + # Remove leading ./ before sorting + my @deps = map { $_ =~ s/^\.\///; $_ } @{$files{$file}}; + + foreach $dep (sort @deps) { next if $prevdep eq $dep; # to exterminate duplicates... $prevdep = $dep; $len=0 if $len+length($dep)+1 >= 80; diff --git a/util/mk1mf.pl b/util/mk1mf.pl index 95daff5c04..f251ac4e5f 100755 --- a/util/mk1mf.pl +++ b/util/mk1mf.pl @@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_DH" if $no_dh; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SOCK" if $no_sock; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2" if $no_ssl2; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL3" if $no_ssl3; +$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT" if $no_tlsext; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ERR" if $no_err; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5" if $no_krb5; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC" if $no_ec; @@ -1283,6 +1284,7 @@ sub read_options "gaswin" => \$gaswin, "no-ssl2" => \$no_ssl2, "no-ssl3" => \$no_ssl3, + "no-tlsext" => \$no_tlsext, "no-err" => \$no_err, "no-sock" => \$no_sock, "no-krb5" => \$no_krb5, diff --git a/util/mkdef.pl b/util/mkdef.pl index 510a57743c..fd42083f1a 100755 --- a/util/mkdef.pl +++ b/util/mkdef.pl @@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ my @known_algorithms = ( "RC2", "RC4", "RC5", "IDEA", "DES", "BF", "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", # RFC3779 support "RFC3779", + # TLS extension support + "TLSEXT", # Deprecated functions "DEPRECATED" ); @@ -116,7 +118,7 @@ my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5; my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw; my $no_camellia; my $no_seed; my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated; -my $no_rfc3779; +my $no_rfc3779; my $no_tlsext; my $fips; @@ -196,6 +198,7 @@ foreach (@ARGV, split(/ /, $options)) elsif (/^no-engine$/) { $no_engine=1; } elsif (/^no-hw$/) { $no_hw=1; } elsif (/^no-gmp$/) { $no_gmp=1; } + elsif (/^no-tlsext$/) { $no_tlsext=1; } elsif (/^no-rfc3779$/) { $no_rfc3779=1; } } @@ -232,6 +235,7 @@ $max_crypto = $max_num; my $ssl="ssl/ssl.h"; $ssl.=" ssl/kssl.h"; +$ssl.=" ssl/tls1.h"; my $crypto ="crypto/crypto.h"; $crypto.=" crypto/o_dir.h"; @@ -1121,6 +1125,7 @@ sub is_valid if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; } if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; } if ($keyword eq "RFC3779" && $no_rfc3779) { return 0; } + if ($keyword eq "TLSEXT" && $no_tlsext) { return 0; } if ($keyword eq "DEPRECATED" && $no_deprecated) { return 0; } # Nothing recognise as true diff --git a/util/opensslwrap.sh b/util/opensslwrap.sh index 91d29e2b87..b27cbb897f 100755 --- a/util/opensslwrap.sh +++ b/util/opensslwrap.sh @@ -3,6 +3,10 @@ HERE="`echo $0 | sed -e 's|[^/]*$||'`" OPENSSL="${HERE}../apps/openssl" +if [ -d "${HERE}../engines" -a "x$OPENSSL_ENGINES" = "x" ]; then + OPENSSL_ENGINES="${HERE}../engines"; export OPENSSL_ENGINES +fi + if [ -x "${OPENSSL}.exe" ]; then # The original reason for this script existence is to work around # certain caveats in run-time linker behaviour. On Windows platforms diff --git a/util/ssleay.num b/util/ssleay.num index b424aecc52..b3ac136a56 100755 --- a/util/ssleay.num +++ b/util/ssleay.num @@ -238,3 +238,6 @@ SSL_CTX_set_info_callback 286 EXIST::FUNCTION: SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb 287 EXIST::FUNCTION: SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb 288 EXIST::FUNCTION: SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb 289 EXIST::FUNCTION: +SSL_set_SSL_CTX 290 EXIST::FUNCTION: +SSL_get_servername 291 EXIST::FUNCTION:TLSEXT +SSL_get_servername_type 292 EXIST::FUNCTION:TLSEXT