static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek);
-static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
-static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
-static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
- unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
-static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
- unsigned char *priority);
-static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
return (1);
}
-static int
+int
dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
{
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
return (1);
}
-static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
+int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
{
pitem *item;
dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
&((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
-/*
- * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
- * processed
- */
-#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
- dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
- &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
-static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
+int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
return (1);
}
-static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
-{
- int i, al;
- int enc_err;
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- unsigned int mac_size;
- unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-
- rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
- sess = s->session;
-
- /*
- * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
- * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
- */
- rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
- /*
- * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
- * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
- * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
- * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
- */
-
- /*
- * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
- * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
- */
-
- /* check is not needed I believe */
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
- rr->data = rr->input;
- rr->orig_len = rr->length;
-
- enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
- /*-
- * enc_err is:
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
- * 1: if the padding is valid
- * -1: if the padding is invalid
- */
- if (enc_err == 0) {
- /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
- rr->length = 0;
- s->packet_length = 0;
- goto err;
- }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
- {
- unsigned int z;
- for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
- printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
- }
- printf("\n");
-#endif
-
- /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
- if ((sess != NULL) &&
- (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
- /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
- unsigned char *mac = NULL;
- unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-
- /*
- * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
- * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
- * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
- * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
- */
- if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
- /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
- (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
- rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
- /*
- * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
- * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
- * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
- * contents of the padding bytes.
- */
- mac = mac_tmp;
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
- rr->length -= mac_size;
- } else {
- /*
- * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
- * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
- * |mac_size| above.
- */
- rr->length -= mac_size;
- mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
- }
-
- i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
- if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
- || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
- enc_err = -1;
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
- enc_err = -1;
- }
-
- if (enc_err < 0) {
- /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
- rr->length = 0;
- s->packet_length = 0;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* r->length is now just compressed */
- if (s->expand != NULL) {
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- rr->off = 0;
- /*-
- * So at this point the following is true
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
- * after use :-).
- */
-
- /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
- s->packet_length = 0;
- return (1);
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*-
- * Call this to get a new input record.
- * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
- * or non-blocking IO.
- * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
- */
-/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
-int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
-{
- int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
- int i, n;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- unsigned char *p = NULL;
- unsigned short version;
- DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
- unsigned int is_next_epoch;
-
- rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
-
- /*
- * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
- * This is a non-blocking operation.
- */
- if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
- return -1;
-
- /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
- if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
- return 1;
-
- /* get something from the wire */
- again:
- /* check if we have the header */
- if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
- (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)), 0);
- /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
- if (n <= 0)
- return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
-
- /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
- if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- s->packet_length = 0;
- goto again;
- }
-
- s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
-
- p = s->packet;
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
- rr->type = *(p++);
- ssl_major = *(p++);
- ssl_minor = *(p++);
- version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
-
- /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
- n2s(p, rr->epoch);
-
- memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
- p += 6;
-
- n2s(p, rr->length);
-
- /* Lets check version */
- if (!s->first_packet) {
- if (version != s->version) {
- /* unexpected version, silently discard */
- rr->length = 0;
- s->packet_length = 0;
- goto again;
- }
- }
-
- if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
- /* wrong version, silently discard record */
- rr->length = 0;
- s->packet_length = 0;
- goto again;
- }
-
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
- /* record too long, silently discard it */
- rr->length = 0;
- s->packet_length = 0;
- goto again;
- }
-
- /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
- }
-
- /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
-
- if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
- i = rr->length;
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
- /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
- if (n != i) {
- rr->length = 0;
- s->packet_length = 0;
- goto again;
- }
-
- /*
- * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
- * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
- */
- }
- s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
-
- /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
- bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
- if (bitmap == NULL) {
- rr->length = 0;
- s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
- goto again; /* get another record */
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
- if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
-#endif
- /*
- * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if
- * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look
- * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different
- * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily.
- */
- if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
- s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
- s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
- !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
- rr->length = 0;
- s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
- goto again; /* get another record */
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- }
-#endif
-
- /* just read a 0 length packet */
- if (rr->length == 0)
- goto again;
-
- /*
- * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
- * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
- * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while
- * listening.
- */
- if (is_next_epoch) {
- if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
- if (dtls1_buffer_record
- (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0)
- return -1;
- /* Mark receipt of record. */
- dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
- }
- rr->length = 0;
- s->packet_length = 0;
- goto again;
- }
-
- if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
- rr->length = 0;
- s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
- goto again; /* get another record */
- }
- dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */
-
- return (1);
-
-}
/*-
* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
return -1;
}
-static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
+int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
{
int cmp;
unsigned int shift;
return 1;
}
-static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
+void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
{
int cmp;
unsigned int shift;
return (i);
}
-static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
+DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
{
{
memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, 8);
}
+
+/*
+ * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
+ * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
+ * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
+ * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
+ */
+#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
+
+/*-
+ * Call this to get a new input record.
+ * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
+ * or non-blocking IO.
+ * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
+ */
+/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
+int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
+ int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ short version;
+ unsigned mac_size;
+ size_t extra;
+ unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
+
+ rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+ sess = s->session;
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
+ extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+ else
+ extra = 0;
+ if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
+ /*
+ * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
+ * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ again:
+ /* check if we have the header */
+ if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+ (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)), 0);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
+
+ p = s->packet;
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
+ rr->type = *(p++);
+ ssl_major = *(p++);
+ ssl_minor = *(p++);
+ version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
+ n2s(p, rr->length);
+
+ /* Lets check version */
+ if (!s->first_packet) {
+ if (version != s->version) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
+ && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
+ /*
+ * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
+ */
+ s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length >
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer))
+ - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+ }
+
+ /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
+
+ if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+ i = rr->length;
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
+ /*
+ * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ * + rr->length
+ */
+ }
+
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
+ * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+ */
+ rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ /*
+ * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
+ * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
+ * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
+ * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
+ * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
+ */
+
+ /* check is not needed I believe */
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+ rr->data = rr->input;
+ rr->orig_len = rr->length;
+ /*
+ * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
+ * the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
+ */
+ if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
+ unsigned char *mac;
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (rr->length < mac_size) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = rr->data + rr->length;
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
+ /*-
+ * enc_err is:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+ * 1: if the padding is valid
+ * -1: if the padding is invalid
+ */
+ if (enc_err == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+ printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
+ {
+ unsigned int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+ /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
+ if ((sess != NULL) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s)) {
+ /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+ unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+ unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+ * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+ * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
+ * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+ */
+ if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
+ /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+ /*
+ * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
+ * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
+ * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
+ * contents of the padding bytes.
+ */
+ mac = mac_tmp;
+ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
+ * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
+ * |mac_size| above.
+ */
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+ }
+
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
+ || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (enc_err < 0) {
+ /*
+ * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
+ * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
+ * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
+ * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become
+ * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* r->length is now just compressed */
+ if (s->expand != NULL) {
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ rr->off = 0;
+ /*-
+ * So at this point the following is true
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
+ * after use :-).
+ */
+
+ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+
+ /* just read a 0 length packet */
+ if (rr->length == 0) {
+ empty_record_count++;
+ if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int i;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+
+ rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer);
+ i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
+ (int)rr->length);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (0);
+ else
+ rr->length = i;
+ rr->data = rr->comp;
+#endif
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int i;
+ SSL3_RECORD *wr;
+
+ wr = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer);
+ i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
+ wr->input, (int)wr->length);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (0);
+ else
+ wr->length = i;
+
+ wr->input = wr->data;
+#endif
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i, al;
+ int enc_err;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ unsigned int mac_size;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+ sess = s->session;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
+ * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+ */
+ rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ /*
+ * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
+ * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
+ * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
+ * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
+ * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
+ */
+
+ /* check is not needed I believe */
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+ rr->data = rr->input;
+ rr->orig_len = rr->length;
+
+ enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
+ /*-
+ * enc_err is:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+ * 1: if the padding is valid
+ * -1: if the padding is invalid
+ */
+ if (enc_err == 0) {
+ /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+ printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
+ {
+ unsigned int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+ /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
+ if ((sess != NULL) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
+ /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+ unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+ unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+ * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+ * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
+ * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+ */
+ if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
+ /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+ /*
+ * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
+ * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
+ * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
+ * contents of the padding bytes.
+ */
+ mac = mac_tmp;
+ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
+ * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
+ * |mac_size| above.
+ */
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+ }
+
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
+ || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (enc_err < 0) {
+ /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* r->length is now just compressed */
+ if (s->expand != NULL) {
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ rr->off = 0;
+ /*-
+ * So at this point the following is true
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
+ * after use :-).
+ */
+
+ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ return (1);
+
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ return (0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
+ * processed
+ */
+#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
+ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
+ &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
+
+/*-
+ * Call this to get a new input record.
+ * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
+ * or non-blocking IO.
+ * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
+ */
+/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
+int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
+ int i, n;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ unsigned char *p = NULL;
+ unsigned short version;
+ DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
+ unsigned int is_next_epoch;
+
+ rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+
+ /*
+ * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
+ * This is a non-blocking operation.
+ */
+ if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
+ if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* get something from the wire */
+ again:
+ /* check if we have the header */
+ if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+ (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)), 0);
+ /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
+
+ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
+ if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
+
+ p = s->packet;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
+ rr->type = *(p++);
+ ssl_major = *(p++);
+ ssl_minor = *(p++);
+ version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
+
+ /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
+ n2s(p, rr->epoch);
+
+ memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
+ p += 6;
+
+ n2s(p, rr->length);
+
+ /* Lets check version */
+ if (!s->first_packet) {
+ if (version != s->version) {
+ /* unexpected version, silently discard */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
+ /* wrong version, silently discard record */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+ /* record too long, silently discard it */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+ }
+
+ /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
+
+ if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+ i = rr->length;
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
+ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
+ if (n != i) {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
+ * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
+ */
+ }
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
+
+ /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
+ bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
+ if (bitmap == NULL) {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
+ goto again; /* get another record */
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
+ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if
+ * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look
+ * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different
+ * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily.
+ */
+ if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
+ s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
+ s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
+ goto again; /* get another record */
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* just read a 0 length packet */
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ goto again;
+
+ /*
+ * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
+ * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
+ * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while
+ * listening.
+ */
+ if (is_next_epoch) {
+ if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
+ if (dtls1_buffer_record
+ (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ /* Mark receipt of record. */
+ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
+ }
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
+ goto again; /* get another record */
+ }
+ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */
+
+ return (1);
+
+}
+
void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r);
int SSL3_RECORD_setup(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t len);
void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num);
+int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
+__owur int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl);
+__owur int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl);
+int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s);
+
static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
-static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
{
return (n);
}
-/*
- * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
- * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
- * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
- * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
- */
-#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
-
-/*-
- * Call this to get a new input record.
- * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
- * or non-blocking IO.
- * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
- */
-/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
-static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
-{
- int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
- int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- short version;
- unsigned mac_size;
- size_t extra;
- unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
-
- rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
- sess = s->session;
-
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
- extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
- else
- extra = 0;
- if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
- /*
- * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
- * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- again:
- /* check if we have the header */
- if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
- (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)), 0);
- if (n <= 0)
- return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
- s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
-
- p = s->packet;
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
- rr->type = *(p++);
- ssl_major = *(p++);
- ssl_minor = *(p++);
- version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
- n2s(p, rr->length);
-
- /* Lets check version */
- if (!s->first_packet) {
- if (version != s->version) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
- && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
- /*
- * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
- */
- s->version = (unsigned short)version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rr->length >
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer))
- - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
- }
-
- /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
-
- if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
- i = rr->length;
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
- if (n <= 0)
- return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
- /*
- * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
- * + rr->length
- */
- }
-
- s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
-
- /*
- * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
- * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
- */
- rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
- /*
- * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
- * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
- * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
- * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
- */
-
- /*
- * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
- * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
- */
-
- /* check is not needed I believe */
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
- rr->data = rr->input;
- rr->orig_len = rr->length;
- /*
- * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
- * the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
- */
- if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
- unsigned char *mac;
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- if (rr->length < mac_size) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- rr->length -= mac_size;
- mac = rr->data + rr->length;
- i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
- if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
- /*-
- * enc_err is:
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
- * 1: if the padding is valid
- * -1: if the padding is invalid
- */
- if (enc_err == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
- {
- unsigned int z;
- for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
- printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
- }
- printf("\n");
-#endif
-
- /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
- if ((sess != NULL) &&
- (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
- (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s)) {
- /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
- unsigned char *mac = NULL;
- unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-
- /*
- * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
- * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
- * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
- * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
- */
- if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
- /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
- (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
- rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
- /*
- * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
- * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
- * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
- * contents of the padding bytes.
- */
- mac = mac_tmp;
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
- rr->length -= mac_size;
- } else {
- /*
- * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
- * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
- * |mac_size| above.
- */
- rr->length -= mac_size;
- mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
- }
-
- i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
- if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
- || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
- enc_err = -1;
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
- enc_err = -1;
- }
-
- if (enc_err < 0) {
- /*
- * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
- * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
- * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
- * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become
- * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
- */
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* r->length is now just compressed */
- if (s->expand != NULL) {
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- rr->off = 0;
- /*-
- * So at this point the following is true
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
- * after use :-).
- */
-
- /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
- s->packet_length = 0;
-
- /* just read a 0 length packet */
- if (rr->length == 0) {
- empty_record_count++;
- if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
- goto f_err;
- }
- goto again;
- }
-
- return (1);
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- int i;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-
- rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer);
- i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
- (int)rr->length);
- if (i < 0)
- return (0);
- else
- rr->length = i;
- rr->data = rr->comp;
-#endif
- return (1);
-}
-
-int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- int i;
- SSL3_RECORD *wr;
-
- wr = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer);
- i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
- wr->input, (int)wr->length);
- if (i < 0)
- return (0);
- else
- wr->length = i;
-
- wr->input = wr->data;
-#endif
- return (1);
-}
/*
* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
__owur int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type);
__owur int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend);
__owur int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek);
-__owur int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl);
-__owur int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl);
__owur int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
unsigned int len);
void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s,
__owur unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s);
__owur unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag);
+int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
+void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
+DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
+ unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
+int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue);
+int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
+ unsigned char *priority);
/* some client-only functions */
__owur int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
__owur int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s);
+<<<<<<< HEAD
__owur long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok);
__owur int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s);
__owur int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+=======
+long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok);
+int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+>>>>>>> Move SSL3_RECORD oriented functions into ssl3_record.c
unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement);
__owur int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
projects / oweals / openssl.git / commitdiff